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1I INTRODUCTION AND CENTRAL QUESTION 
1 Introduction 
1.1  A just cause for dismissal 
1.1.1 Protection against arbitrary dismissal in general 
In this thesis, I focus on a just cause for dismissal, also referred to as the just 
cause standard. In practice, the term just cause is used interchangeably with the 
term good cause, however, generally refers to the same standard.1 This standard 
aims to provide private-sector employees protection against arbitrary dismissal 
in general, by requiring a valid reason for dismissal. This must be distinguished 
from protection against arbitrary dismissal for specified reasons, based on 
prohibitions on dismissal (opzegverboden).2
For a proper understanding of the just cause standard, we need to go 
back to the Industrial Revolution, which started about the 1760s in England with 
the invention of the steam engine.3 In what is known as the First Industrial 
Revolution, the energy potential of coal was exploited. In the Second Industrial 
Revolution, electric power replaced coal.4 Due to these new technologies and 
sources of power, mass production and mass profits became possible. This 
resulted in a new class of wealthy factory owners, the industrialists, better 
known as capitalists.5 The motivation of these capitalists was profits, and 
whether they be conscienceless exploiters or tender hearted idealists, as Filene 
stresses, they had to run their businesses on business principles, which 
conflicted with humane sentiment.6 Hence, employers benefited from the new 
sources of power to be applied to the production process at the expense of 
workers.7 Consequently, the Industrial Revolution became a revolution of the 
rich against the poor,8 bringing together large groups of people in factories 
1  In contrast, civil courts in the United States courts make a distinction between just cause as applied in 
the context of collective bargaining agreements, referring to the interpretation of just cause by 
arbitrators, and good cause as applied in the context of common law exceptions to the at-will rule, 
referring to the interpretation of just cause by civil courts.  See also below under § 11.3.3 and  
§ 12.3.3. 
2  The right to protection against arbitrary dismissal may also include the right to appeal, compensation 
and/or damages, besides the right not to be dismissed without a valid reason. In this thesis, focusing 
on Art. 4 of ILO Convention 158, the term arbitrary refers to the latter only. 
3  The (First) Industrial Revolution also affected Scotland and Wales. Therefore, it is also correct to say 
that the First Industrial Revolution started in Britain. See Hepple 1986, p. 13; Stearns 1993, p. 1; 
Deane 1996, p. 16, 17 and 19. 
4  Stearns 1993, p. 5; Atkeson and Kehoe 2001, p. 1. 
5  Woll 1930, p. 101; Stearns 1993, p. 5 and 6, 26. 
6  Filene 1930, p. 3. 
7  For the Industrial Revolution, see further below under § 1.2.1. 
8  Polanyi 1944, p. 35; Stearns 1993, p. 5. 
2under bad working conditions.9 Moreover, most countries provided for absolute 
freedom of contract with regard to hiring and firing, i.e. provided for the 
freedom of either party to terminate the employment relationship without cause, 
requiring only prior notification of such an intention.10 The negative effects of 
the Industrial Revolution, however, made governments realize that the principle 
of freedom of contract, in response to the prevailing theories of economic 
liberalism, had its limits, and that workers should be protected against abuse of 
employers.11 Subsequently, most but not all countries enacted legislation on 
safety, working hours and child labour.12 Also, a number of countries started to 
require a valid reason for dismissal, i.e. a just cause for dismissal to protect 
employees against arbitrary dismissal in general: a iusta causa dimissionis.13
1.1.2 Dismissal systems in the world 
In the course of the second half of the twentieth century, the just cause standard 
had become widely accepted.14 Just cause protection did not become universal,
however.15 Different dismissal systems saw the light after the Industrial 
Revolution.16 When we look more closely at these dismissal systems generally 
two perceptions prevail. As Summers states  
‘On the one hand, [there are those] who see the world in economic terms. For 
them, free trade is an inviolable principle that promotes economic development 
and works for the economic benefit of all. Any regulation limiting that freedom 
violates that principle and undermines its benefits. On the other side [there are] 
those who see the world in social and moral terms. They see free trade as 
needing regulation to protect and promote non-economic values of human 
rights, the environment, and labour rights.’17
Based on these perceptions, a rough distinction can be made between (i) an at-
will dismissal system that allows a dismissal without cause; and (ii) a just cause 
dismissal system that requires a just cause for dismissal.18 In brief, under the 
9  Hepple 1986, p. 13; Stearns 1993, p. 5 and 6 and 27; Deane 1996, p. 17. 
10  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 9. 
11  Hepple 1986, p. 6 and 12; Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 9.  
12  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 9. 
13  Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 275. 
14  See also Van Peijpe 1998, p. 45, referring to the rules of law regarding a ‘socially-justified dismissal’ 
in Germany, 1951; a ‘reasonable and serious reason’ in France, 1973; an ‘unfair dismissal’ in Great 
Britain, 1971; an ‘objective and legally-recognized ground’ in Spain, 1980.  For other countries, see 
Appendix I. 
15  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 8-11. 
16  See also Appendix I. 
17  Summers 2001, p. 7. 
18  See Blanpain 2001, p. 14, who refers to different criteria, among which the just cause standard, based 
on which one can distinguish different systems of job security (in this respect, see Appendix I). For a 
distinction based on employment protection including social security, see Van Peijpe 1998, p. 49 and 
50. One further can distinguish between an open-ended just cause dismissal system and a limited 
3economic perception, which dominates in an at-will dismissal system, labour is 
considered as a commodity to be exchanged on the open market; just cause 
protection hampers this free trade.19 Under the social perception, which 
dominates in a just cause dismissal system, the idea is that the employee is 
dependent on the employer in economic and societal aspects, hence, workers 
need to be protected by the government against abuse of employers.20
1.2   The need for protection of workers against abuse of employers 
1.2.1  Industrial Revolution 
From England, the Industrial Revolution spread to other countries. The first 
countries affected in the nineteenth century were those that were geographically 
close to England, e.g. the Netherlands, or in the case of the United States, 
historically and culturally close.21 In the United States, the Industrial Revolution 
started in the 1820s with the importation of technological systems from Britain. 
Textile factories in New England formed the core of the American factory 
industry.22 The United States emerged as a strong industrial nation by the end of 
the nineteenth century, with the burst of growth of automobile plants in Detroit. 
It had a labor shortage, however. Hereupon, it had no other choice than to 
import immigrant workers. They were generally treated as racially inferior by 
many of the American industrialists. Hence, particularly for immigrant workers, 
the Industrial Revolution led to extremely bad working conditions.23
 In the Netherlands, the Industrial Revolution began in the 1830s. In 
these years, the first large-scale factories were set up to produce more boats and 
textiles in order to meet the demands of the Javanese market under the colonial 
Dutch government. In the 1870s, a period in which employees were still 
unorganized, the Industrial Revolution reached its lowest point for the Dutch 
workers, a period better known as the ‘Social Question’ (Sociale Quaestie),
characterized by low wages, bad housing and unsafe working environments.24
Subsequently, the Industrial Revolution further spread to other countries in the 
world, e.g. Russia and Japan, where workers met the same problems that 
workers elsewhere had met during their Industrial Revolution. In effect, 
(exhaustive) just cause dismissal system. Article 4 of ILO Convention 158 contains a limited just 
cause dismissal system, however, in practice is open-ended. See below under § 22.1.  
19  Rojot 2001, p. 428; Vandenberghe 2004, p. 50-54. 
20  Hepple 1986, p. 11; Hepple 2003, p. 7; Vandenberghe 2004, p. 48, referring to P. Davies and M. 
Freedland, Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law, Stevens, London, 1983, p. 18. 
21  Stearns 1993, p. 1 and 41; Hepple 1986, p. 13. 
22  Stearns 1993, p. 48. 
23  Hepple 1986, p. 13; Stearns 1993, p. 52; Parker 1996, p. 354 and 355, and 364 and 365. See also De 
Swaan 1989, p. 209, referring to state old age pensions at the time, initiated by employers, which 
excluded black people and immigrants. 
24  Van Zanden 1996, p. 84 and 85; Bakels 2000, p. 5 and 6; De Swaan 1989, p. 216. 
4worldwide, the negative effects of the Industrial Revolution emphasized the 
need for protection of workers against abuse of employers.25
1.2.2   Economic globalization 
In the course of the twentieth century, many of the individual factory owners, 
i.e. capitalists were replaced by multinationals. As Stearns describes it 
‘(…) the explosion of multinationals and their increasing ability to operate a 
variety of economic activities, from resource extraction to capital transfers, in 
almost every part of the world constituted the clearest sign that the industrial 
revolution had entered a new, global phase after 1950 [in which] the globe was 
treated as a single industrial unit.’26
These multinationals are considered as the ‘key engines’ of what is called the 
process of economic globalization.27 This process could evolve, due to the 
opening of markets,28 as promoted by international organizations as the GATT 
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), its successor the WTO (World Trade 
Organisation),29 the IMF (International Monetary Fund),30 and the World 
Bank.31 More specifically, the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development)32 defines economic globalization as the process in which 
25  Stearns 1993, p. 1, 104, 123 and 124; Munting 1996, p. 331. 
26  Stearns 1993, p. 222 and 223. 
27  According to Davidsson they account for two-thirds of global trade in goods and services. Davidsson 
2002, p. 1. See also Beck 2003, p. 2 and 19; Grapperhaus 2006, p. 4. 
28  Clem Tisdell and Raj Kumar Sen in: Economic Globalisation 2004, p. 3. 
29  The WTO succeeded the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades) in 1995. It aims to 
reduce trade barriers in order to help producers of goods and services, exporters and importers 
conduct their businesses. On 11 December 2005, the WTO has 149 members, covering about 90 per 
cent of world trade, e.g. among the still absent countries are Taiwan and the Russian Federation. See 
www.wto.org. See also Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 32; Validire 2001, p. 51and 52; Munck 2002, p. 
128 and 129; Mandle 2003, p. 12. 
30  The IMF is a specialized agency of the United Nations with 184 member states (2007). Its goal is to 
foster monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high 
employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty. Kooijmans 2000, p. 187. See also 
www.imf.org 
31  The World Bank is a specialized agency of the UN. The World Bank’s mission is to fight poverty and 
to improve the living standards of people in the developing world. Already, in 1995, the World Bank 
stated that globalization was likely to continue based on (i) the ongoing technological change that 
continues to drive down communications and transportation costs; (ii) the decrease of political 
conflicts in areas ranging from Europe to the Middle East and South Africa that makes moving goods 
and capital across borders easier; and (iii) developing countries continue to abandon strategy of 
closing their borders for trade. See Kooijmans 2000, p. 187; World Bank’s World Development 
Report 1995, Workers in an Integrating World, p. 52; www.worldbank.org  
32  The predecessor of the OECD (the OEEC: Organisation for European Economic Co-operation) was 
established in 1948 at the initiative of the US Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marshall in the light of the 
restoration of Europe after the Second World War. In 1960, it was succeeded by the OECD, which 
until now has served as an international forum for discussions on economic and social policies. By 
2007, it has a global reach and groups 30 member countries sharing a commitment to democratic 
government and the market economy among which the Netherlands and the United States, with 
5economic markets, and technologies and communication patterns, gradually 
exhibit more global characteristics, and fewer national or local ones.33 Similarly, 
Blanpain and Colucci speak of an increased international economic integration, 
involving trade, foreign direct investment and capital flow on the one hand, and 
the emergence of a knowledge society, going hand in hand with a revolution in 
the information and communication technology on the other.34
In general, one tends to define the process of economic globalization simply as 
globalization. However, the latter is a general term, which lacks an 
unambiguous definition. Hey, for example, defines globalization as the process 
by which social relationships, including those of individuals and groups, extend 
across the globe.35 Beck, on the other hand, defines globalization as denoting the 
processes, through which sovereign national states are criss-crossed and 
undermined by transnational actors with varying prospects of power, 
orientations, identities and networks.36 To the extent they indicate that 
globalization captures elements of a widespread perception that there is a 
broadening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all 
aspects of life, both are right.37 Globalization has a number of dimensions, 
however. In this respect, Beck, without claiming completeness, refers to 
globalization of communications technology, ecology, economics, work 
organization, culture and civil society.38
This thesis focuses on economic globalization, and particularly on the 
negative effects this process has had on workers worldwide since the 1990s, 
when a large number of developing low-wage countries became involved, either 
as important exporters of manufactured goods, or as attractors of foreign direct 
investment.39 The reason to particularly focus on its negative effects is to 
demonstrate that workers still need protection against abuse of employers, and 
against arbitrary dismissal in particular.40 In brief, employers in developed
countries claim that, due to the entrance of  low-wage countries they need to 
reduce costs of employees by reducing wages, by dismissal at home and/or 
active relationships with some 70 other countries. See Kooijmans 2000, p. 203 and 204. See also 
www.oecd.org 
33  The Internet with a worldwide reach sharply reduced transportation and telecommunication costs and 
played an important role in the process of economic globalization. OECD 1997, p. 19; World 
Economic Outlook 1997, p. 45 and 46; Peeters 2001, p. 21-24. 
34  Blanpain en Colucci 2004, p. 1. See also Beck 2003, p. 1; Peeters 2001, p. 21; Van der Heijden en 
Noordam 2001, p. 19; Wailes 2002, p. 34.  
35  Hey 2003, p. 3. 
36  Beck 2003, p. 11. 
37  See www.polity.co.uk/global/executiv.htm  
38  Beck 2003, p. 2 and 19. See also Stearns 1993, p. 172. Another dimension, for example, is 
globalization of crime. 
39  World Economic Outlook 1997, p. 45 and 46; Peeters 2001, p. 21-24. 
40  See also below under § 23.2. 
6making use of plants abroad.41 Van der Heijden and Noordam, for example, 
refer to the closing of Philips Lighting in Terneuzen, the Netherlands, when 
Philips decided to have the lights produced in Poland where goods could be 
produced cheaper because of lower wages.42 Blanpain and Colucci refer to 
Siemens in Germany which, in 2003, relocated one-third of its software 
development to low-wage countries for the same reason.43 Hence, these 
countries stress that the entrance of low-wage countries in the process of 
economic globalization for them has led to either a fall in wages of low-skilled 
workers and/or a rise in the unemployment rate. Consequently, employers in 
developed countries (have) put pressure on governments to deregulate dismissal 
laws to enable them to react more flexibly to changes on the market to 
strengthen their competitive position in the international context.44
In developing countries, with the emergence of so-called export processing 
zones (EPZs), the process of economic globalization has brought negative 
effects for workers as well. The term EPZs refers to specially designated 
industrial zones or plants that have been established with special incentives or 
privileges in order to attract foreign investors, ranging from the provision of 
infrastructure to tax exemptions. To give an idea, in 1998, there were some 850 
EPZs worldwide, employing 27 million people, the overwhelming bulk 
consisting of young female workers.45
In particular, governments of developing countries – which are 
generally most in need of foreign investment – did not hesitate to publicize that 
their EPZs were excluded from normal industrial relations, wages were low and 
trade unions were prohibited. A study of the World Confederation of Labour 
(WCL) shows that the rights of  workers in EPZs, in effect, have been put ‘for 
sale’ to attract multinationals in the hope for job creation. Trade union rights and 
gender discrimination constitute the most serious violations of workers’ rights,46
consequently, globalization in this respect is tending to undermine 
(inter)national protections of basic workers’ rights.47
41  Laurence Lasselle, Serge Svizzero and Clem Tisdell in: Economic Globalisation 2004, p. 188; 
Peeters 2001, p. 38 and 223.  
42  Van der Heijden en Noordam 2001, p. 19 and 20. See also De Telegraaf 5 April 2006, which 
announced the closing of Philips Lightning in Weert  – involving 250 employees – partly moving its 
production lines to low-wage countries as China and Poland. 
43  Blanpain en Colucci 2004, p. 3. 
44  Laurence Lasselle, Serge Svizzero and Clem Tisdell in: Economic Globalisation 2004, p. 188; 
Peeters 2001, p. 38 and 223. 
45  Akpokavie 2001, p. 35 referring to ILO: Labour and social issues relating to export processing 
zones, Report for discussion at the Tripartite Meeting of Export Processing Zones-operating countries 
Geneva, 1998. 
46  Akpokavie 2001, p. 35-39, referring to a study of the World Confederation of Labour (WCL) of 
EPZs on the compliance with core labour standards (right to join a union and right on collective 
bargaining; non-discrimination; elimination of forced, and child labour). See WCL: Export 
processing zones and international labour standards, Case Studies of Senegal, Madagascar, Mexico, 
Honduras, Sri Lanka and Indonesia, Brussels, 2000.
47  Howard 2001, p. 55 and 56. 
71.3    International labour standards 
1.3.1 ILO 
Already, during the Industrial Revolution, industrialists became aware of the 
boomerang effect massive production had on workers who had become less 
productive because of bad working conditions. By improving the working 
conditions for their workers, they exposed themselves to economic 
disadvantages as the price of their social policy, undermining their competitive 
position in the international context.48 Consequently, the Industrial Revolution 
led to a distortion of the balance of competitiveness among states. Industrialists 
realized that an international labour body was needed to create humane working 
conditions to improve productivity of workers, and to correct the pattern of 
international competition. Subsequently, in 1897, at the  initiative of 
industrialists, a private organization was set up in Brussels, Belgium, the 
International Association for the Legal Protection of Workers, whose main 
purpose came to serve as a link between the different groups in different 
industrial countries, necessary to correct the distortions of a free labour market. 
The functioning of the Association was hampered by the outbreak of the First 
World War. Nevertheless, after the war their initiative, eventually, resulted in 
the establishment of the International Labour Organization (ILO), whose goal it 
was to create international labour standards to establish social justice, and to 
correct the pattern of international competition.49
 The entrance of low-wage countries in the process of economic 
globalization, however, led to a new distortion of the balance of competitiveness 
among developed and developing states.50 Subsequently, in 1998, the legislative 
body of the ILO, the International Labour Conference, adopted the Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up (hereafter also 
ILO Declaration of 1998). This Declaration aims to achieve that workers in the 
world – through harmonization of core labour standards – equally benefit from 
the process of economic globalization.51
1.3.2 ILO Convention 158 
Earlier, in 1982, the International Labour Conference adopted ILO Convention 
158, supplemented by ILO Recommendation 166. With this Convention, the 
Conference aimed to offer a stronger counterweight than ILO Recommendation 
48  Ghebali 1989, p. 2 and 3, 7 and 8. 
49  Betten 1993, p. 3-5; Boonstra 1996, p. 11; Gould 2001, p. 2. For the establishment and the goals of 
the ILO, see further below under § 20.2. For international – universal and uniform – labour standards, 
see below under § 20.4. 
50  See further below under § 20.5. 
51  Raynauld and Vidal 1998, p. 65; Velasco 2001, p. VI; Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 72 and 73. For an in-
depth discussion of the ILO Declaration of 1998, see below under § 20.5.3. 
8119 of 1963 it replaced,52 for the powerful multinationals that emerged in the 
process of economic globalization.53
Primarily, ILO Convention 158 aims to establish just cause protection
for workers worldwide. Article 4, the core of this Convention, provides an 
international just cause standard. It requires a valid reason for dismissal 
connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational 
requirements of the undertaking. What makes Article 4 unique compared to just 
cause provisions in other treaties,54 is that it has a tripartite character, i.e. has 
been adopted by the Conference, consisting of representatives of governments, 
employers’ and workers’ associations.55 Moreover, ILO Convention 158 covers 
practically all countries of the world, including the United States of America 
and the Netherlands, what makes Article 4 of ILO Convention 158 a perfect 
gauge to compare just cause protection under American and Dutch dismissal 
law.
1.3.3    American and Dutch dismissal law in light of ILO Convention 158 
At the end of the twentieth century, the Dutch government expressed its wish to 
ratify ILO Convention 158. This makes it interesting to look at Dutch dismissal 
law in light of Article 4 of ILO Convention 158. The fact that only a minority of 
states – by 2007, thirty-two member states – ratified the Convention, apparently, 
is not relevant to the Dutch government. In contrast, the Labour Foundation 
(Stichting voor de Arbeid or STAR), advising the Dutch government – among 
others – on the reform of dismissal law, declared that it was not (yet) convinced 
whether ILO Convention 158 should be the basis for Dutch dismissal law, due to 
the low number of ratifications among member states of the European Union.56
In reply, the Dutch government, however, held that the Dutch dual just cause 
dismissal system is unique in the world.57 Hence, it may cause inequality in 
social protection among states, and pursuant thereto may distort the balance of 
competitiveness among states.58
52  On the legal status of Conventions and Recommendations, see below under § 20.4.2. 
53  Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer, Report V (1), International Labour 
Conference, 68th Session 1982, p. 3 and 4.  
54  Article II-90 of the European Constitution and Article 24 of the (revised) European Social Charter of 
1996 contain just cause standards. However, the United States is not a member of the European 
Union and the European Council, respectively. For a discussion of these just cause standards, see 
below under § 14.3. 
55  For an in-depth discussion of the tripartite system of the ILO, see below under § 20.3.2. 
56  STAR-Advies 2003/7, p. 7. For ratifications of ILO Convention 158, see www.ilo.org 
57  For a review on dismissal laws in the world, see Appendix I. For the Dutch dual just cause dismissal 
system, see Chapter 3. 
58  ADO-Rapport 2000, p. 6, 142 and 151; Fouarge 2002, p. 3. It, however, is disputed that for 
companies to vest in the country in question, its dismissal system is determinative. Undisputed is that 
the less restrictive a dismissal system, the more a company will be able to adapt to the flexible 
changes. HSI 1999/03, p. 10. 
9As a brief review on dismissal laws in the world shows, the Dutch 
dismissal system, indeed, is unique in the world.59 Under the Dutch dual just 
cause dismissal system, a private-sector employer in the Netherlands who 
wishes to terminate an employment agreement against the will of the employee 
must address the government to ask for permission to dismiss the employee, or 
address court to ask for a dissolution of the employment agreement.60 ILO 
Convention 158, in itself, allows member states to offer employees a broader 
protection.61 Meanwhile, the Dutch dismissal system has become unique among 
dismissal systems in the world.62  Subsequently, in 1999, the Dutch government 
asked a Committee – which has become known as the ADO-Committee or the 
Committee Rood – to  make a proposal for a Dutch dismissal system in 
accordance with ILO Convention 158. This proposal, drafted after the example 
of ILO Convention 158, led to a heated debate which, as today, still endures.63
The United States, too, has a unique dismissal system, being one of the few 
developed industrialized countries in the world that still embraces the at-will
rule.64 Under its classic version, a private-sector employee can be dismissed for 
good cause, without cause and even for a cause morally wrong.65 Consequently, 
ILO Convention 158, requiring a just cause for dismissal is contrary to the 
American at-will dismissal system.66 Hence, the United States has no intention 
to ratify ILO Convention 158. This raises the question what makes it interesting 
to look at American dismissal law in light of ILO Convention 158.  
A reason to look at American – and Dutch – dismissal law in light of 
article 4 of ILO Convention 158 is that Article 19(5) of the ILO Constitution 
imposes a duty on non-ratifying states, including the United States and the 
Netherlands, to regularly report on the law of the state, and to state the reason 
why it has not (yet) ratified the Convention.67 In this respect, it remains 
interesting to examine where the law stands in the Netherlands and the United 
States. Moreover, it is interesting to look at American dismissal law in respect of 
59  Other countries, which, too, require prior authorization of the government to dismiss an employee are 
Indonesia, the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam which, however, are all former colonies of the 
Netherlands. Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 82 footnote 12. See Appendix I. 
60  For an in-depth discussion of the BBA 1945, see below under § 16. For an in-depth discussion of Art. 
7:685 DCC, see below under § 18. 
61  See Art. 19(8) of the ILO Constitution, which holds that: ‘In no case shall the adoption of any 
Convention or Recommendation by the Conference, or the ratification of any Convention by any 
member, be deemed to affect any law, award, custom or agreement which ensures more favorable 
conditions to the workers concerned than those provided for in the Convention or Recommendation.’ 
62  See Annex I. See also Grapperhaus 2006, p. 7-9. 
63  For the ADO-Committee, see below under § 29.2. 
64  See Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 7, in which the International Labour Office 
refers to Austria, Belgium, Denmark and the United States as countries with developed economies 
that do not recognize a general employee’s right not to be unjustifiably dismissed. See also Appendix 
I.
65  For a short history of the at-will rule, see below under § 10.2. 
66  Hardin 1997, p. 23.21; Jacobs 2003, p. 22. 
67  See also below under § 20.4.2. 
10
just cause protection, because the American judiciary, since the late 1970s, and 
the early 1980s, has started to accept just cause exceptions to the at-will rule.68
The fact that the United States has approximately 60 million workers who work 
on an at-will basis, underlines the importance of this development.69 An 
examination of just cause protection in the United States is all the more 
interesting in light of the ongoing debate on dismissal law in the United States. 
Recently, a discussion has arisen under the (drafts on a) Restatement of 
Employment Law on the recognition of just cause protection under common 
law.70 Furthermore, most research in the Netherlands concentrates on dismissal 
systems of surrounding countries as Belgium, England, France and Germany.71
However, in light of the process of economic globalization, it is as important to 
pay attention to other important players on the international market with whom 
the Netherlands has to compete.72
2  Central question,  importance,  topic and scope of the research 
2.1  Central question and  importance of the research 
This thesis examines to what extent private-sector employees enjoy just cause 
protection in the United States and the Netherlands, and where American and 
Dutch dismissal law stands in respect of Article 4 of ILO Convention 158. 
Subsequently, through a so-called illustrative comparison,73 I wish to answer the 
question whether and what both countries can learn from each other to overcome 
bottlenecks regarding just cause protection. The aim of the research is to 
contribute to the ongoing debate on dismissal law in both countries.  
2.2  Topic and scope of the research 
As the title of this book indicates, the emphasis of my research is on dismissal
law. This field of law became recognized as a distinct division of law in most 
European countries after the Second World War,74 and can be defined as 
regulating the relationship between employers and employees regarding 
termination of employment. What makes this field of law an interesting one is 
68  For judicial exceptions to the at-will rule, see below under § 10.4.  
69  For the number of at-will employees, see also below under § 4. 
70  For the (drafts on a) Restatement of Employment Law, see below under § 6.4. 
71  Van den Heuvel (1983)(England, France, Germany); Luttmer-Kat (1985)(France and Germany); 
Kuip (1993)(Belgium, England and Germany); Heinsius (2004)(Belgium, England and Germany). 
72  Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 20. See De Jong (1) 2006, p. 108 and 109. 
73  For the term illustrative comparison, see below under § 27.1. 
74  In Europe – with the exceptions of Germany and Denmark – labour law before the Second World 
War was preoccupied with the contract of employment, but less frequently with protective labour 
law. See Hepple 1986, p. 6; Van Peijpe 1998, p. 45. In the Netherlands, labour law became 
recognized as a distinct division of law i.e. science due to M.G. Levenbach (1896-1981). See 
Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 25; Jansen en Loonstra 1992, p. 110-132. For the United States, see 
below under § 6.1.  
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that an employer and an employee – may – have conflicting interests, but that 
they depend on each other to reach their goals.75
More specifically, the emphasis is on private dismissal law, i.e. the 
rules of dismissal law which apply to private-sector employees, to be 
distinguished from public employees.76 The reason to focus on private-sector 
employees is, that this category of workers forms the majority of workers in the 
United States and the Netherlands.77 I will concentrate on private-sector 
employees with employment agreements for an indefinite period only. As this 
thesis reached its completion, the majority of private-sector employees in the 
United States and the Netherlands work on the basis of employment agreement 
for an indefinite period.78 In general, specific legislation applies to those who 
work on the basis of an employment agreement for a definite period.79 Also, I 
will focus on dismissals at the initiative of the employer only. This restriction 
comes forward out of Article 3 of ILO Convention 158, which excludes 
termination of employment at the initiative of the worker, or termination as a 
result of a genuine and freely negiotated agreement between the parties.80 This 
thesis further concentrates on individual dismissals, unless a discussion of 
collective dismissals is indispensable. One must bear in mind, however, that in a 
broad sense, private dismissal law, too, may apply to collective dismissals, 
employment agreements for a definite period, a dismissal at the initiative of the 
employee, or termination otherwise.81 In this thesis, I will not discuss ILO 
Recommendation 166, although ILO Convention 158 is inextricably bound up 
with the latter. The reason is that the debates in the United States and the 
Netherlands on just cause protection mainly focus on the standard(s) of the 
Convention.82
Furthermore, I have made restrictions in respect of American dismissal law. 
With regard to state statutory law – the United States is lacking national just 
cause legislation – the dismissal law of the state of Montana merits examination, 
75  See also Kuip 1993a, p. 1 and 3;  Van Peijpe 1998, p. 5. 
76  The term private-sector workers refers to non-government, i.e. non-public employees to distinguish 
them from public employees who in general enjoy – constitutional and/or statutory – just cause 
protection against dismissal. For the United States, see Leonard 1988, p. 7; Delmendo 1991, p. 1; 
Goldman 1996, p. 27 and 85. For the Netherlands, see below under § 14.4.1. 
77  For the United States, see Goldman 1996, p. 16-18 (about 120 v. 20 million workers in the public 
sector). For the Netherlands, see Verhulp 2002, p. 19; Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 21 and 22 (about 
4 v. 1 million workers in the public sector). 
78  For the Netherlands, see Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 102; Zijl 2006, p. 113. The Dutch government, 
in principle, also wishes to maintain the employment agreement for an indefinite period as the main 
contract. See TK 1996-1997, 25 263, No. 6, p. 4. For the United States, see Goldman 1996, p. 16. 
79  For American and Dutch legislation in this respect, see § 9.3.3 (United States: the common law rule 
regarding employment agreements for a definite period in Montana applies to virtually all of its 
states), and § 14.4.2 (the Netherlands). 
80  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 19. 
81  Verhulp 2002, p. 28; Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 274.  
82  See Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 84. 
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as it is the only state in the United States which has enacted a statute with a good 
cause standard that replaced the at-will rule.
With regard to state common law, the emphasis in this research is on the 
states of California and Michigan. These states were the first to accept good 
cause protection under the handbook exception and the implied-in-fact (good 
cause) contract exception, respectively. In discussing these exceptions, I will 
involve the law of other states, which either accepted or rejected these 
exceptions. As one can imagine, it is virtually impossible to focus on all 50 
states, each having its own state law. Hence, it can be said that the combined 
effect of the choice for the states of California and Michigan is to give an 
overview of common law exceptions to the at-will rule in the United States on 
the one hand. However, account has to be given that a number of states may still 
reject one or more common law exceptions to the at-will rule on the other.83 It, 
nonetheless, seems justified to focus on the states of California and Michigan, in 
that they are representative in other aspects as well. First, California is at the 
forefront of accepting common law exceptions to the at-will rule. With the 
landmark case of Foley (1988), the California Supreme Court was the first 
among state courts to take a comprehensive look at wrongful discharge 
litigation. Foley (1988) affected the development of wrongful discharge 
litigation throughout the United States.84 Moreover, California has been at the 
forefront of wrongful discharge litigation for the past decades in other cases. 
Second, the state of California, too, is representative for being the largest and 
one of the most important economies of the United States with approximately 30 
million inhabitants.85 Finally, Michigan, due to its number of inhabitants, 
amounting to approximately 10 million inhabitants, is representative for the 
majority of states, taking the middle course in either accepting or rejecting 
exceptions to the at-will rule. In brief, these states reject the exception of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and accept the public policy exception 
and the handbook exception.86
3  Method of discussion 
3.1  The ILO, the United States and the Netherlands 
For my research on American dismissal law, I relied on federal and state 
statutes, legislative history, and literature. For an examination of common law 
on wrongful discharge, I particularly relied on case law, i.e. decisions of courts. 
As main sources, I used LexisNexis Academic and Westlaw. Besides, I visited 
83  For example, the state of New York, in effect, reject all exceptions, i.e. accepted one exception in a 
very strict sense only. For the latter, see below under § 10.1. 
84  Mendelsohn 1990, p. 10. 
85  See also below under § 10.1.
86  For the handbook exception under Michigan law, see below under § 11. For the public policy 
exception under Michigan law, see Suchodolski v. Mich. Consol. Gas. Co., 316 N.W. 2d. 710 (Mich., 
1982). 
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the United States several times and conducted interviews with experts in the 
field of dismissal law. These experts included Professor J.R. Grodin and 
Professor Theodore J. St. Antoine. Joseph Grodin, ‘John F. Digardi 
Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of 
the Law, San Francisco’, was appointed to the California Court of Appeal in 
1979, and later elevated to the California Supreme Court of which he was a 
member until 1987. Grodin was the writing judge in Pugh (1981). With this 
decision, the Court of Appeal of California was the first among American state 
courts to accept the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception to the at-will 
rule in the United States. Moreover, in 2005, Grodin was appointed member of 
the Consultative Group to the American Law Institute on drafting a Restatement 
of Employment Law. Grodin was so kind as to comment on the part on the 
United States, and on the chapter on the State of California in particular. 
Additionally, Professor St. Antoine commented on the Chapter on the State of 
Michigan. Theodore J. St. Antoine, ‘James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor 
Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan’ was the former Dean of this 
University and was named the Reporter of the Drafting Committee for a Model 
Employment Termination Act (META). Last, LeRoy Schramm, at the time 
Chief Legal Counsel for the Montana University System, who was 
recommended to me by the Montana Labor Department, commented on the 
Chapter on Montana.  
For my research on Dutch dismissal law I relied on statutes, legislative history, 
literature and case law. In a preliminary stage, I, too, conducted interviews with 
Dutch experts in the field of dismissal law. These experts included P.F. van der 
Heijden, former Professor in Employment Law at the University of Amsterdam, 
the Netherlands, at present, among others, Crown Member of the Social and 
Economic Council of the Netherlands (Sociaal-Economische Raad or SER), and 
A.T.J.M. Jacobs, Professor in Labour Law, Social Security and Social Policy at 
Tilburg University, the Netherlands, regarding his expertise on international 
employment law, social policy, and American labor and employment law.87
Moreover, I conducted interviews with Drs. C.A. van der Wijst and Drs. A. 
Devreese of the SER to discuss the Advice on the Dutch Social-Economic 
Policy on the Mid-Long Term (Advies over het Nederlandse Sociaal-
Economische Beleid op de Middellange Termijn or MLT-Advies).
In writing the part on the ILO, and Convention 158 in particular, I relied on 
documents of the ILO, among which reports of the Director-General, 
preparatory reports and records of proceedings. Also, I conducted interviews 
with experts outside and within the ILO, either through e-mail and/or during my 
stay in June 2004 when I was fortunate to visit the Annual Conference in 
Geneva, Switzerland. I, too, conducted interviews with C.C. van der Louw, 
working at the the Dutch Department of Social Affairs (Foreign Affairs) with 
87  See Jacobs 2003. 
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regard to the ratification of ILO Conventions by the Netherlands, and N. Elkin, 
an officer in the International Standards Department of the ILO, who was 
willing to read the final version on the Chapter on the ILO on an informal and 
personal basis. In a preliminary stage, K. Boonstra, Professor in International 
Employment Law at the Free University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, who 
wrote a dissertation on the ILO, was so kind to comment on the Chapter on the 
ILO.88 In writing the thesis, E. Hey, Professor in Public International Law, 
Erasmus University of Rotterdam, the Netherlands, was so kind to comment on 
the aspect of (economic) globalization, and F.J.M. De Ly, Professor in 
International Private Law and Comparative Private Law, Erasmus University of 
Rotterdam, the Netherlands, on the aspect of comparitive law. 
3.2 Outline of the book  
In the Chapters 2 and 3, respectively, I will describe American and Dutch 
dismissal law. In Chapter 4, I will examine to what extent the just cause 
standards under American and Dutch dismissal law meet the international just 
cause standard of Article 4 of ILO Convention 158. Through an illustrative 
comparison, in Chapter 5, I will clarify the similarities, differences and 
bottlenecks regarding just cause protection under American and Dutch dismissal 
law. The aim of the comparison is to examine whether and what both countries 
can learn from each other to overcome these bottlenecks. Chapter 6, finally, 
holds conclusions, and suggestions on how to solve these bottlenecks.  
The manuscript was finished on 1 January 2007, hence, this book states the law 
as I believe it to be on this date. Explicit reference will be made to any literature 
and case law after this date.  
A.A. Foster of the Centre for Acadamic English at the University of Leyden, the 
Netherlands, reviewed the manuscript on the English language.  
88  See Boonstra 1996. 
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II AMERICAN DISMISSAL LAW 
4 Introduction 
As this dissertation reached its completion, the United States is one of the few 
developed industrialized countries in the world that still embraces the 
employment-at-will doctrine.1 The American at-will rule in its classic 
formulation holds that an employee can be discharged for a good cause, no 
cause or even a cause morally wrong.2 Under this doctrine, the majority of the 
private-sector employees in the United States – about 90% of the total private 
workforce, which is about 60 million people3 – can be discharged at will by the 
employer.4 However, in the mid of the twentieth century, legislative and 
judicially created limitations have resulted in what is called the erosion, the 
decline or ‘the impending death’ of the at-will doctrine.5 In effect, these 
limitations to the at-will rule constitute the field of private dismissal law.6 Still, 
the general opinion in the Netherlands is that the American dismissal system is a 
so-called hire-and-fire-system, and, therefore, one cannot speak of dismissal 
law.7 This view may be true for the past, but as this Chapter will show, not for 
the present.8 As Befort puts it 
‘In 1950, employment law did not exist as an area of legal practice or study. 
The controlling law of the workplace was (…) the at-will regime, which was no 
law at all. (…). Much [however] has changed in the world of labor and 
employment law in the past (…) years.’9
In this Chapter, I examine to what extent private-sector employees in the United 
States can find just cause protection under their system of dismissal law. An 
overview of private dismissal law in the United States cannot be easily given, 
however. It constitutes a complicated and incoherent field of law. The United 
States is lacking national legislation on employment termination. The field of 
1  See above under § 1.3.3. 
2  See Payne v. Western & A.R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-520 (1884), in which the Tennessee Supreme 
Court decided that employers could dismiss their employees ‘at will, be they many or few, for good 
cause or no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, without thereby guilty of legal wrong.’ Player 
1998, p. 2; Befort 2002, p. 3. See also below under § 10.2.  
3  Sprang 1994, p. 2; Fisher 1994, p.79. In 1993 Barber estimated that 70 to 75% of those employed in 
the United States were employed at will. Barber 1993, p. 2. 
4  Private-sector employees who are not subject to the at-will rule and generally enjoy just cause 
protection are those contracted on an employment agreement for a definite period. Jacobs 2003,  
p. 225. The same applies to about ten percent of the private sector workforce   who belong to a so-
called bargaining unit. See below under § 7.4.4. 
5  Ballam 2000. See also Jacobs 2003, p. 212. 
6  With the term private dismissal law, I refer to the rules of dismissal law that apply to private-sector 
employees, to be distinguished from public employees.  
7  For example, VNO-NCW 1995, p. 13. 
8  Jacobs 2003, p. 219 and 228. 
9  Befort 2002, p. 3 and 4. 
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dismissal law has to be derived from other fields of law, on federal and state 
level. Also, to understand the field of private dismissal law, one first must 
understand the legal system of the United States.10
5  The legal system of the United States 
5.1 Separation of powers and federalism 
In the United States there are fifty states, each with its own executive, 
lawmaking and judicial power, besides a federal government with the same 
powers.11 The federal and state governments are subject to the Constitution of 
the United States of 1787 (hereafter US Constitution), which still governs the 
country. The US Constitution reflects the two characteristics of the unique 
governmental structure of the United States (i) federalism; and (ii) the separation 
of powers. Both directly affect the legal system(s) of the United States.12
The principle of federalism, meaning that there are two levels of 
government – federal and state – was conceived by the founders of the US 
Constitution.13 The founders, i.e. thirteen colonist states, had declared their 
independency – of the English Crown – through the Declaration of 
Independency in July 1776. In brief, they wished to have a central government 
on the one hand, but to maintain their independence on the other. Their first 
serious attempt at a federal union was in 1781. Through the Articles of 
Confederation the colonist states had established a Congress which lacked 
important powers, however.14 For example, when Congress approved a treaty 
with England in 1784 to end the War of Independence and many states did not 
comply with the treaty, Congress could not act. Subsequently, at one of its 
conferences the colonist states suggested that a convention be held in 
Philadelphia to discuss a new charter of government. This convention took place 
in May 1787, in furtherance of which, on 25 September 1787, the Constitution 
of the United States was signed.15
Under the US Constitution, the legislative, executive and judicial powers were 
vested in Congress,16 the President,17 and the Supreme Court of the United 
10  Burnham 1995, p. 1. 
11  Klik 1994, p. 11; Jacobs 2003, p. 16. 
12  Klik 1994, p. 7; Burnham 1995, p. 1. For examples, see Koopmans, 2002, p. 7 and 8. 
13  On 25 September 1787, the Constitution of the United States (US Constitution) was signed and 
submitted to Congress – consisting of delegates of the 13 colonist states – to become effective upon 
its acceptance by two thirds of the states, which occurred in July 1788, after which the first President, 
George Washington, was inaugurated in April, 1789. Farnsworth 1987, p. 3;  Klik 1994, p. 7; 
Burnham 1995, p. 1; Goldman 1996, p. 6;  Van Oudheusden 2000, p. 22-25; Boon 2001, p. 2 and 3.
14  Brody 1978, p. 15; Farnsworth 1987, p. 2 and 3.  
15  Farnsworth 1987, p. 3; Burnham 1995, p. 1-3. 
16  Article 1 Section 1 of the US Constitution. 
17  Article II Section 1 of the US Constitution. 
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States18 (hereafter the US Supreme Court), respectively.19 However, to 
safeguard the independence of the thirteen colonist states, the Tenth Amendment 
in the Bill of Rights of 179120 determined that 
‘The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.’21
Hence, it would be more accurate to speak of fifty-one legal systems of the 
United States. Nevertheless, the creation of a federal governmental structure 
under the US Constitution justifies speaking of the legal system of the United 
States.22
5.2  Federal and state law 
5.2.1 Federal and state statutes 
State legislatures have not been created by the US Constitution. Therefore, they 
need not search the US Constitution for their power to make law.23 In fact, all 
thirteen colonist states with their own state constitutions, based on which they 
could enact state law, existed long before the US Constitution was established. 
Moreover, due to the Tenth Amendment, states did not lose their power to enact 
state statutes. Consequently, state legislatures can regulate any subject matter 
they choose  the same subject matter as federal legislatures if they like  so 
long as their state laws do not conflict with federal law under Article VI of the 
US Constitution, the so-called Supremacy Clause.24 In general, the state 
legislative branch consists of a house of representatives and a senate, and a chief 
executive officer with limited veto power over the legislative branch.25
 Congress, on the other hand, need to search the US Constitution for 
their power to enact federal statutes,26 and to initiate bills in this respect.27
18  Article III Section 1 of the US Constitution. 
19  Burnham 1995, p. 1, 4-9; Goldman 1996, p. 6-8; Koopmans 2002, p. 18. 
20  The Bill of Rights, adopted in 1791, originally consisting of ten amendments to the US Constitution 
holds a list of mainly individual rights against the federal government. Farnsworth 1987, p. 4; 
Burnham 1995, p. 3 and 4, 24 and 25 and 338. 
21  Klik 1994, p. 10. 
22  Burnham 1995, p. 1; Rabinowitz 1998, p. 15. 
23  As from 1776, state constitutions have been adopted. Farnsworth 1987, p. 3; Burnham, 1995, p. 19 
24  Burnham 1995, p. 33; Jacobs 2003, p. 17. For the Supremacy Clause see below under § 5.2.1.1. 
25  Burnham 1995, p. 19 and 20. 
26  The President also has the power to issue Executive Orders which generally are legislative in 
character. These are very limited as to private-sector employers. Farnsworth 1987, p. 56; Burnham 
1995, p. 14-16. See Jacobs 2003, p. 22 and 131 with regard to employment law, referring to the 
Executive Order 13807 (1998) of President Clinton, prohibiting discrimination based on sexual 
orientation of federal civil servants. 
27  Article I Section 8 under 18 of the US Constitution. See also Farnsworth 1987, p. 56. 
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Under the US Constitution, a bill can only become federal law after the House 
of Representatives and the Senate have agreed upon it.28 Moreover, the 
President must approve the bill. However, the President has the right to reject 
the bill.29 The presidential power to veto legislation is limited, in that the 
President’s veto can be overridden by a two-thirds majority vote of Congress.30
The historical background of this limited power of the President is that the 
founders of the US Constitution feared tyranny from a too powerful executive. 
On the other hand, they feared that without a powerful executive to 
counterbalance Congress, there would be legislative tyranny.31
5.2.1.1 Conflict 
To understand how federal and state (statutory) law and common law relate to 
one another, and can exist side by side, one must understand Article VI of the 
US Constitution, i.e. the Supremacy Clause. This Clause determines the 
hierarchy of all sources of law in the United States.32 More specifically, it 
determines that the US Constitution, and the federal laws which shall be made in 
pursuance hereof, are ‘the supreme Law of the Land’ and that ‘Justices in every 
State shall be bound thereby’.33 Consequently, under the Supremacy Clause, the 
US Constitution is superior to federal statutes; federal statutes – but also treaties 
and federal court rules standing on the same level as federal statutes34 – are 
superior to federal administrative rules;35 federal administrative rules are 
superior to state constitutions. Within states, state constitutions are the 
paramount authorities, but are superior to state statutes; state statutes, in turn, are 
superior to state administrative rules; and, state administrative rules are superior 
to state common law.36
28  Article 1 Section 1 of the US Constitution. The Congress consists of the House of Representatives 
and the Senate. The members of the House of Representatives are popularly elected from 
geographically-structured, population-based, districts established within each state of the United 
States; in the Senate two senators of each state, irrespective of how large or small in territory or 
population, are sided. See Farnsworth 1987, p. 57-59; Burnham 1995, p. 4-6 and 38; Goldman 1996, 
p. 7; Schirmeister 1996, p. 58, footnote 20. 
29  Article I Section 7 under 2 of the US Constitution. 
30  See also Burnham 1995, p. 7. 
31  Burnham 1995, p. 7. 
32  Farnsworth 1987, p. 55; Klik 1994, p. 11 footnote 18; Burnham 1995, p. 6 and 37. 
33  Farnsworth 1987, p. 55; Klik 1994, p. 11 footnote 18; Burnham 1995, p. 6 and 37. 
34  Under Article II Section 2 under 2 of the US Constitution the President can make Treaties, provided 
two-thirds of the Senators present concur. The US Constitution, however, is superior to these treaties, 
which are on the same hierarchical level as federal statutes, other than in most other countries. This 
means that Congress can change a treaty in the same way as a federal statute, by simply passing a 
contrary statute. See Burnham 1995, p. 38; Boon 2001, p. 70 and 71. Further, the US Constitution is 
superior to Federal Court Rules, which stand on the same hierarchical level as federal statutes as 
well. Burnham 1995, p. 38. 
35  Presidential executive orders are on the same level as federal administrative rules. See Farnsworth 
1987, p. 56.  
36  For an overview, see Farnsworth 1987, p. 55-57 and Burnham 1995, p. 37-40. Burnham further 
distinguishes common law case law from case law interpreting enacted law. They differ in hierarchy: 
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 Consequenty, state law must give way when in conflict with federal 
law.37 Moreover, the US Supreme Court has held that, even if not in conflict 
with federal law, state law must – also – give way if federal law is designed to 
be the exclusive body of law governing an area of regulation.38 For example, 
with regard to anti-discrimination law, the California Fair Employment and 
Housing Act (hereafter the FEHA)39 and its federal counterpart Title VII40 can 
exist side by side,41 because the FEHA does not conflict with Title VII; nor does 
Title VII intend to exclusively cover the field of employment discrimination 
law, i.e. to preempt state law.42 Consequently, state and federal courts must 
declare void state statutes, which conflict federal statutes and/or the US 
Constitution.43 The US Supreme Court, however, is the ultimate arbiter.44
5.2.1.2  Intersection  
An employee can base his claim on a federal or a state statute, regulating the 
matter in question. Federal and state statutes on the same subject matter may 
exist side by side, because a state had already regulated the subject and/or 
because the state government deemed the subject and/or remedies adopted by 
the federal government as inadequate.45 To continue our example in the previous 
paragraph, the FEHA and Title VII cover discrimination based on the basis of 
race, color, national origin, sex and religion.46 The value added of the FEHA, 
which was enacted after Title VII, is that the California statute also prohibits 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and marital status.47 Moreover, it 
case law interpreting enacted law takes on the hierarchical level of the enacted law that it interprets. 
See Burnham 1995, p. 39. The term common law in this thesis is used in the sense of common law 
case law. 
37  Burnham 1995, p. 6; Boon 2001, p. 115. 
38 Washington v. District of Columbia (1995).  See also Farnsworth 1987, p. 57 and Goldman 1996,  
p. 377. 
39  Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12940. The 2000 California Employer, p. 31. 
40  For Title VII, see below under § 8.2.  
41  Section 708 of Title VII in fact explicitly allows for state law so long as it does not require action 
prohibited by Title VII. 
42  For example, the National Labour Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 intends to exclusively cover the 
field of collective bargaining in the United States. State legislatures, however, can regulate this 
subject matter for situations in which the NLRA does not apply. See Klik 1994, p. 11; Jacobs 2003, 
p. 32. For the NLRA, see below under § 7.1 and 7.3. 
43  Ever since Marbury v. Madison (1803) was decided, American courts have had the power to nullify 
statutes enacted by the legislature on the ground that they were unconstitutional. See Van Wezel 
Stone 2000, p. 359, footnote 28. 
44  Van der Does 1990, p. 10; Burnham 1995, p. 6; Rabinowitz 1998, p. 12; Boon 2001, p. 115. 
45  Burnham 1995, p. 34. 
46  Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 4 and 5. 
47  The 2000 California Employer, p. 31. 
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offers unlimited compensatory and punitive damages,48 while Title VII includes 
a cap for compensatory and punitive damages of US$ 300,000.49
 The choice for a federal or a state statute in a procedure depends on the 
protection an employee is seeking on the one hand, and the protection the statute 
provides on the other. For example, if an employee in California feels 
discriminated against by his employer because of his race, he can rely on the 
FEHA and/or Title VII. However, when he feels discriminated against because 
of his marital status, he can base his cause of action on the FEHA only. 
Moreover, when he seeks for unlimited punitive damages – which usually is the 
case – he will base his claim primarily on the FEHA. An important aspect 
further is that the FEHA applies to employers with five or more employees. Title 
VII applies to employers with a minimum of fifteen or more employees.50 Of 
course, an employee can decide to base his claim on multiple grounds, hence, 
can base his claim on a federal statute, a state statute and/or a common law 
rule.51 For example, when a discharged fifty-old private-sector employee feels 
discriminated against because of age, and had been verbally promised that he 
would be discharged for good cause only, he can base his claim on the ADEA52,
an anti-discrimination state allowing for higher awards,53 and/or the implied-in-
fact (good cause) contract exception under common law.54
5.2.2 State common law 
State common law is created by the highest courts of states.55 As derives from 
the Supremacy Clause, state common law stands on the lowest level of the 
hierarchy of law, and consistently can be abolished or modified by the federal 
and/or state legislatures.56 This, however, does not mean that common law is of 
48  The 2000 California Employer, p. 33. For Title VII, see below under § 8.2.  
49  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII. As from then the latter provided punitive damages, 
however, the total amount of compensatory and punitive damages was subject to a cap that varies 
with the size of the employer; 15-100 employees: $ 50,000; 101-200: $ 100,000; 201-500: $ 200,000 
and more than 500: $ 300,000. See Lindemann and Kadue 1996, p. 231; Lindemann and Grossman 
1997, p. 1775; California Labor Law Digest 1997, p. 542 and 543; The 2000 California Employer,  
p. 33. 
50  Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 4 and 5; The 1998 National Employer, p. 418; The 2000 
California Employer, p. 31. 
51  Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 682. 
52  For the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADEA), a federal statute that bans discrimination of 
employees of 40 years and older, see below under § 8.3.  
53  See Guz (2000), in which an employee was released at the age of 49 when his work unit was 
eliminated, after which the employee Guz sued his employer alleging age discrimination based on a 
state statute, and for breach of an implied contract to be terminated only for good cause and breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
54  For the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract claim, see below under § 10.4.4.2.  
55  Burnham, 1995, p. 42. In the Netherlands, justices create law, for example, to the extent legislatures 
use open norms, such as the norm of fairness and reasonability. See Wiarda 1963, p. 161 and 162. 
Initially, under – English – common law the  ‘courts of equity’ only, hence, not the common  ‘courts 
of law’, could create law. See Uniken Venema/Zwalve 2000, p. 72 and 73. 
56  For the Supremacy Clause, see above under § 5.2.1.1. 
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less importance than the other sources of law. In fact, everyday transactions 
affecting most people are governed by state common law.57 Also, employment 
agreements are governed by state common law.  
Initially, the federal legislature left the power to regulate employment 
agreements with the states.58 States, however, left this power to courts, which, in 
effect, create law.59 In this respect, the so-called landmark cases are particularly 
important. These involve cases which are voluntarily followed by a great 
number of other state courts for having persuasive authority, hence, has become 
the law of those other states as well. In employment termination cases state 
courts, in fact, often follow the decision of a court of another state,60 persuaded 
by the arguments of the court’s decision.61
In principle, state courts need not follow a decision of a – higher – court of 
another state or of a non-coordinate – federal – court within the state. They only 
must follow a decision of a higher court in the same state. Hence, a decision of 
the California Supreme Court has binding effect on all other lower state courts 
in California.
 The binding effect on all other lower state courts is called stare decisis,
also called precedent.62 This term is derived from the Latin phrase ‘stare decisis 
et non quieta movere’ and literally means ‘to stand by precedents and not to 
disturb settled points’ or, in brief, ‘let the decision stand’.63 The principle of 
stare decisis means that judicial decisions of a higher court within the same state 
control later cases, which involve similar facts. The rationale behind this 
principle is to limit arbitrariness, and to allow parties to rely with some certainty 
on how the system has dealt with cases similar to theirs. This is called the 
binding or mandatory effect of stare decisis.64 This authority includes decisions 
of higher courts of the same jurisdiction, and decisions of coordinate – federal – 
courts.65 When courts voluntarily follow the decision of a court of another state 
57  Burnham 1995, p. 39 and 40. 
58  Finkin 1995, p. 167 and 170. 
59  See also below under § 10.3. 
60  Brody 1978, p. 41; Farnsworth 1987, p. 46; Burnham 1995, p. 66. 
61  Klik distinguishes between the reasoning (arguments), the holding (decision) and dictum (additional 
arguments). The rule is the holding of a case, usually a one or two sentence statement that 
summarizes the broader, more abstract principle for which the case stands, and for which the case can 
be used to decide later cases. Klik 1994, p. 16 and 17; Burnham 1995, p. 67; Schirmeister 1996, p. 69 
and 70. 
62  Burnham 1995, p. 65. 
63  Brody 1978, p. 36; Farnsworth 1987, p. 44;  Klik 1994, p. 16; Burnham 1995, p. 39 and 64-66; 
Schirmeister 1996, p. 68 and 69. 
64  Schirmeister 1996, p. 69. Uniken Venema is of the opinion that under the Dutch court system there 
are only persuasive precedents, in contrast with Drion, who is of the opinion that although binding 
precedents do not exist in theory, they do in practice. See Jessurun d'Oliveira 1973, p. 22 and 42, 
referring to C.A. Uniken Venema, Common Law & Civil Law, 1971, p. 19 and J. Drion, Stare
Decisis, Het gezag van precedenten, 1950, opgenomen in: Verzamelde Geschriften van J. Drion, 
1968, p. 168. 
65  Farnsworth 1987, p. 46. 
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or of a non-coordinate court, this is called the persuasive effect of stare 
decisis.66 Under the principle of stare decisis, the highest court of a state, too, is  
bound by its own decisions, although it can decide to overrule its own precedent 
if there is some overwhelming reason to change that principle.67
5.3     Federal and state court systems 
The federal court system consists of the US Supreme Court, twelve federal 
appellate circuit courts, and ninety-four federal district courts of first instance.68
The US Constitution that established the US Supreme Court gave power to 
Congress to create lower federal courts,69 upon which Congress acted with the 
Judiciary Act of 1789.70 The reason for a central judiciary  although all states 
already had their own state court systems based on their own state constitutional 
provisions71  was the need for a uniform interpretation of federal law.72 All
federal courts, therefore, have jurisdiction over federal questions.73 The US 
Supreme Court, however, is the ultimate arbiter over all federal questions, which 
involve all cases of federal law, treaties, and/or the US Constitution.74
 Federal courts, too, have jurisdiction over state claims in so-called 
diversity of citizenship cases – i.e. cases in which citizens of different states are 
involved – to ensure non-partiality.75 In these cases, the US Supreme Court is 
not the ultimate arbiter, in that the US Supreme Court must apply state
substantive law as declared by the highest court of the relevant state.76 The 
highest courts of the states are the ultimate arbiters over state questions. Courts 
of first instance – going by various names such as trial, district or municipal 
courts – exist besides courts of appeal and supreme courts. The unsuccessful 
party in first instance has the right to appeal to an appellate court, which reviews 
the decision on judicial merits only, not on the facts,77 after which the 
unsuccessful party can seek review in the highest court of the state. Generally, 
the highest court of a state is called the supreme court with the exception of the 
66  Schirmeister 1996, p. 69.  
67  Brody 1978, p. 36; Burnham 1995, p. 65 and 66. See also Uniken Venema/Zwalve 2000, p. 75. 
68  Van der Does 1990, p. 8 and 11. 
69  Article III of the US Constitution. See also Brody 1978, p. 17, 21 and 23. 
70  Rabinowitz 1998, p. 9, 10 and 15; Van der Does 1990, p. 7. 
71  Brody 1978, p. 23; Van der Does 1990, p. 55. 
72  Rabinowitz 1998, p. 9. See also Van der Does 1990, p. 23. 
73  Schirmeister 1996, p. 55. 
74  For all the cases in which the US Supreme Court has jurisdiction, see Article III Section 2 of the US 
Constitution. See Brody 1978, p. 17; Van der Does 1990, p. 9, 19 and 20; Rabinowitz 1998, p. 11 and 
12.
75  Brody 1978, p. 53; Van der Does 1990, p. 7; Burnham 1995, p. 35; Schirmeister 1996, p. 55; Boon 
2001, p. 109. 
76  Burnham 1995, p. 35. 
77  Klik 1994, p. 15. If a court has granted a motion for summary judgment in which the plaintiff argues 
that a debate needs to take place on the applicable legal principles only, there is no debate on the 
facts (yet). See Brody 1978 p. 101; Burnham, p. 246 and 247. 
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state of New York, whose highest court is established in the Court of Appeals; it 
does, however, has the same function as the supreme courts of other states.78 In 
a minority of states, intermediate appellate courts lack. In these states, there is a 
direct appeal to the supreme court.79
The highest court(s) on federal and state level handle only a small number of 
cases, due to the so-called certiorari-procedure. This procedure was introduced 
by the US Supreme Court after the federal circuit courts of appeal were installed 
and a case could be heard in two instances.80 The highest court of a state – with 
the exception of the states where there are no intermediate appellate courts –, 
exercises a similar discretionary review as the US Supreme Court.81
 Under this procedure, the unsuccessful party must obtain a writ of 
certiorari  a request to have the case heard in appeal  before his case can be 
heard before the US Supreme Court. Unlike the Netherlands Supreme Court, the 
US Supreme Court, thus, has a discretionary authority to grant a request for 
appeal.82 Put differently, a review of the case by the highest court in the United 
States is not a matter of right, but a judicial decision. Generally, it is granted 
only when there are special reasons, for example, when several federal circuit 
courts of appeal are in disagreement on a certain principle of law.83 State 
supreme courts, too, grant a writ of certiorari only when necessary, for example, 
to give clarity about the state of law after this has become unclear due to a 
conflict between intermediate appellate state courts.84
In employment termination cases, federal and state court systems interact. In 
general, these cases involve parties of one state, in which an employee files a 
claim under federal and/or state law. If it concerns a state claim, deriving from a 
78  The state of New York has a Supreme Court, which is inferior to the Court of Appeals. Brody 1978, 
p. 24; Burnham 1995, p. 181; Goldman 1996, p. 8; Schirmeister 1996, p. 57. 
79  Van der Does enumerates twelve states, including the State of Montana. See Van der Does 1990,  
p. 54 referring to footnote 2. In general, Brody states, smaller, rural, states do not have appellate 
courts, hence, appeals go directly to the highest court. Brody 1978, p. 24. 
80  Klik 1994, p. 14, referring to the year of 1925, when the certiorari-procedure was introduced. Van der 
Does 1990, p. 12 referring to the year of 1891, when the circuit courts of appeal were established and 
the authority was given by Congress to introduce a certiorari-procedure. For the certiorari-procedure 
see Schirmeister 1996, p. 55. Under Dutch law, the Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) cannot 
refuse an appellate case if this case meets the technical requirements of Article 398 of the Act on the 
Civil Procedure (Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering). In brief, parties must have followed 
other forms of appeal first. See Veegens 2005, p. 83 and 84. The Netherlands did consider 
introducing the US system of granting a writ of certiorari to reduce the flood of - less important – 
cases – to the Netherlands Supreme Court. See Van der Does 1990, p. 1. 
81  Van der Does 1990, p. 9; Schirmeister 1996, p. 55. 
82  With regard to the US Supreme Court, a writ of certiorari must be granted, if four out of the nine 
judges plead for certiorari. Brody 1978, p. 68-70; Burnham 1995, p. 177; Boon 2001, p. 112 and 113. 
Van der Does 1990, p. 27. 
83  Brody 1978, p. 69 referring to footnote 29. 
84  Van der Does 1990, p. 60. See, for example, Cotran (1998), 17 Cal.4th 93, 95, in which the California 
Supreme Court explicitly stated that they granted review ‘to resolve the conflict among the Courts of 
Appeal.’
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state statute, a state court has jurisdiction and must apply the substantive and 
procedural law of the state.  If it concerns a federal claim, deriving from a 
federal statute, a state court has jurisdiction as well. It then must apply federal 
substantive law, but is allowed to follow its own state procedural law.  
When an employee brings a federal claim before a state court, the 
defendant may ‘remove’ the case to a federal court, which is done, for example, 
when the defendant is of the opinion that the federal court will be more 
favorable than the state court, or to win time. Therefore, in general, the 
employee will bring a federal claim before the federal court, which must apply 
federal substantive and federal procedural law. Common law exceptions to the 
at-will rule, which concern state claims, in principle, are brought before state 
courts.85
5.4    Conclusion 
To understand the field of private dismissal law – and any other field of law – in 
the United States, one must understand how federal and state (statutory and 
common) law, and court systems on federal and state level relate to one another. 
In sum, the US Constitution vests the legislative, executive and judicial powers 
in Congress, the President and the US Supreme Court, respectively. Besides, 
states maintain(ed) their own executive, lawmaking and judicial powers under 
the Tenth Amendment to the Bill of Rights. This explains that there are two 
levels of law in the United States, federal and state law, and fifty states in the 
United States with each state having its own state law and state court system.  
Article VI of the US Constitution – the so-called Supremacy Clause – 
determines the hierarchy of all sources of law in the United States. Under this 
Clause, federal and state law can exist side by side, unless they conflict with one 
another upon which state law must give way to federal law. It bears mentioning, 
that although state common law stands on the lowest level in the hierarchy of 
sources of law, it is an extremely important source in employment termination 
cases.
6 American rules on employment termination 
6.1 The field of private dismissal law  
The decisions of state courts form only part of the field of private dismissal law. 
For a complete view of this field of law under which private-sector employees 
enjoy just cause protection, we, too, need to concentrate on federal and state 
statutory law. As a matter of fact, the first statute to contain an exception to the 
at-will rule was a federal act on labor relations, the National Labor Relations 
Act of 1935 (NLRA). This Act forbids discriminatory discharge based on union 
85  Burnham 1995, p. 35. 
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activity.86 The NLRA further left space for parties to include just cause 
provisions in collective bargaining agreements.87 Additionally, federal anti-
discrimination statutes forbade discriminatory discharges based on race, color, 
religion or national origin, age, pregnancy and disability.88 The Equal Pay Act of 
1994 (EPA)89 prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex with respect to 
wages,90 however, does not prohibit discrimination in respect of discharging.91
State anti-discrimination statutes, too, prohibit dismissals based on – 
other – specified reasons under state law. State legislatures further undermined 
the at-will rule by enacting state anti-whistleblower laws, prohibiting employers 
to discharge an employee for ‘blowing the whistle’, i.e. alerting the public to 
wrongdoings within the firm.92 Moreover, as from the late 1970s, and early 
1980s, courts started to recognize common law exceptions to the at-will rule. 
These common law exceptions, in fact, induced the state of Montana to enact a 
wrongful termination statute.93
As part of the field of private dismissal law, finally, one may consider the law of 
retaliation, prohibiting employers from taking adverse action, including 
termination of employment, against their employees for participating in 
protected activity or opposing unlawful employment practices, i.e. for exercising 
their rights under the Act.94 For example, federal statutes, providing anti-
retaliation clauses, are the NLRA, the aforementioned federal anti-
discrimination statutes, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 
(OSHA),95 the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA),96 and the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).97
The International Labour Office of the ILO further considers the 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA) as relevant for American private-
sector employees to the issue of termination of employment.98 However, this 
Act applies to public employees only. Apparently, it is included in the list, 
86  For the NLRA (1935), see below under § 7.3.  
87  Leonard 1988, p. 2. 
88  For a discussion of these federal anti-discrimination statutes, see below under § 8. 
89  29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. 
90  The 1998 National Employer, p. 418 and 419. 
91  Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 490. 
92  Westman 1991, p. 51-53; Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 355. For anti-
whistleblower law, see below under § 10.4.2.3. 
93  Mendelsohn 1990, p. 2; Callahan and Dworkin 2000, p. 2; Befort 2002, p. 9 and 10. 
94  Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 668 and 669; The 1998 National Employer, p. 2. For a list of 
federal protective legislation, see Mendelsohn 1990, p. 3 and Appendix A; The 2000 California 
Employer, p. 16. 
95  29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. 
96  29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. See also Snow 2002, p. 8. 
97  29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. See also the 2000 California Employer, p. 15. 
98  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 355. See also Barber 1993, p. 4, referring to the 
same sources of law. 
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because it is likely to have a strong impact on state anti-whistleblower laws 
which apply to private-sector employees.99
6.2 Lack of national just cause legislation  
Congress can regulate almost any subject matter, including employment matters, 
under the Commerce Clause, established in Article 1 Section 8 under 3 of the 
US Constitution.100 Hence, the argument that there is no federal constitutional 
basis for a general federal unjust cause statute is unjust. In fact, one may wonder 
why Congress has never enacted national just cause legislation with regard to 
employment termination.  
A federal act on employment termination would not only end the 
feeling of uncertainty amongst employers and employees as a result of different 
state causes of action and state remedies applied by various state courts,101 it 
would also be the most effective and simplest way to create equal protection 
against unjustified dismissal for private-sector employees in the United States 
and uniformity under state courts.102 It can give clarity on exceptions and 
limitations, the permissible remedies for unjust discharges, and on what 
constitutes a just cause for discharge.103
Supporters of a bill, however, must have sufficient political power to overcome 
the opposition to its enactment. The problem with private-sector employees is 
that not all are organized. Therefore, they do not constitute an effective lobbying 
group and have no organization to act for them in achieving enactment of a 
federal just cause statute. Although labor unions with effective lobbying power – 
their political power has weakened, however, due to the decline of union 
membership104  may be supportive, to them national just cause legislation is 
not a priority. One of the most persuasive organizing arguments unions have 
towards workers is that they will bring just cause protection against arbitrary 
action to the work place. In fact, many union leaders believe that enactment of 
such a law would undermine the very reasons for having labor unions.105   
Employers, the machine of the economy in the United States, who 
probably have the power to have a federal statute enacted generally raise the 
politically powerful argument that they cannot compete in global markets if the 
99  For anti-whistleblower law, see below under § 10.4.2.3.  
100  The US Supreme Court’s test under the Commerce Clause is that the regulated activity has to affect 
interstate commerce. This includes an activity that relates indirectly to movement of commerce 
across state lines, as well as an activity that occurs within a state, and its effect on national economy 
can be demonstrated as a matter of economic theory. See Klik 1994, p. 11 footnote 17; Burnham 
1995, p. 25 and 26. 
101  Perry 1992, p. 2; Barber 1993, p. 2. 
102  Perry 1992, p. 2; Weinstein 1993, p. 8. 
103  Peck 1991, p. 14 and 15; Weinstein 1993, p. 2 and 7; Sprang 1994, p. 3. 
104  For the reasons of the decline of union membership, see below under § 7.2. 
105  Jung and Harkness 1989, p. 8; Peck 1991, p. 14 and 15. 
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law is overregulating and restricting them.106 According to Barber, pressure 
from employers alone, in effect, keeps national just cause legislation from 
enactment.107 Plaintiffs’ attorneys, finally, oppose enactment of – national – just 
cause legislation. They believe that under a national just cause statute, punitive
damages will be limited, as occurred under the Montana wrongful termination 
statute, hence, the outcome under – national – just cause legislation will become 
less attractive for them.108 In brief, the majority of plaintiffs’ attorneys work on 
a contingency fee basis, i.e. on a no cure, no pay-basis on the one hand, but 
claiming a certain percentage of a possible positive outcome on the other.109
Consequently, wrongful discharge cases are particularly profitable if an 
employee can ask for punitive damages.110 The only purpose of punitive 
damages is to punish and deter, hence, these damages generally amount to much 
higher amounts than contract damages.111
6.3 The Model Employment Termination Act (META) 
In 1991, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(hereafter the Uniform Law Commissioners or ULC) proposed a model state just 
cause statute.112 This quasi-governmental body – that seeks to have state 
legislatures adopt uniform statutes in areas where uniformity is desirable 
nationwide113 – consists of lawyers, judges, legislators and academics, and was 
established, in 1892, at the initiative of the federal government.114 These 
uniform laws are either drafted (i) as uniform acts, intended to be adopted by the 
states without modification; or (ii) as model acts, intended to act as a model i.e. a 
blue print for appropriate state legislation. Well-known is the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC).115 This uniform act was a joint product of the ULC 
and the American Law Institute,116 and was submitted to the legislature of each 
state in its final form in 1957. By 1967, it had been adopted by every state 
except for Louisiana, which, however, adopted parts of the Code.117
 Because of its great influence on American Law it, therefore, was an 
important moment when the ULC, in their January 1985 meeting, recognized the 
importance of just cause protection for private-sector employees. It held that the 
106  Corbett 2002, p. 5. 
107  Barber 1993, p. 13. 
108  Corbett 2002, p. 5. 
109  The contingency fee amounts to an average of one-third of the outcome. See Schirmeister 1996, p. 
125.
110  O’Connell 1985, p. 59-63. 
111  For an in-depth discussion of punitive damages, see Schirmeister 1996, Chapter 3. 
112  For the text of the META (Final draft 1991), see Holloway and Leech 1993, Appendix F, p. 951-976.  
113  Theodore J. St. Antoine 1994, p. 95. 
114  Theodore J. St. Antoine 1994, p. 95. 
115  Barber 1993, p. 10. 
116  For the American Law Institute (ALI), see below under § 6.4. 
117  Farnsworth 1987, p. 122-123; Burnham 1995, p. 397 and 398. 
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many judicial modifications in the at-will doctrine had created tremendous 
uncertainty for both employers and employees. This confusion was the major 
reason leading to its recommendations, initially, to draft a uniform act.118 The 
ULC found that the underlying assumption of the concept of at-will 
employment, that all parties are equal to the bargain, rarely applied to the 
employment relationship in the twentieth century.119 Consequently, a drafting 
committee, on which Professor Theodore St. Antoine was appointed Reporter, 
began work in 1987.120
In August 1991, after nearly four years of drafting, the ULC adopted the third 
and final draft of the proposed Uniform Employment Termination Act, 
including a good cause provision. The central objective of the META was to 
achieve a balance between the interests of employers in maintaining efficient 
and productive operation on the one hand, and the interests of employees to be 
free from arbitrary treatment in the workplace on the other.121
 The term good cause was used to distinguish it from just cause, 
customary in collective bargaining agreements, interpreted by labor 
arbitrators.122 Therefore, the term good cause was chosen, particularly to 
emphasize the discretion allowed to management in dismissals based on 
economic reasons.123 In brief, employers may dismiss full-time employees – 
defined as one working twenty or more hours a week – after a one-year 
probationary period with good cause only.124 Good cause under the META of 
1991 is defined as  
              
x a reasonable basis related to an individual employee for termination 
of the employee’s employment in view of relevant factors and 
circumstances, which may include the employee’s duties, 
responsibilities, conduct on the job or otherwise, job performance, 
and employment record; or  
x the exercise of business judgment in good faith by the employer, 
including setting its economic or industrial goals and determining 
methods to achieve those goals, organizing or reorganizing 
operations, discontinuing, consolidating, or divesting operations or 
parts of operations or positions, determining the size of its work 
force and the nature of the positions filled by its work force, and 
118  Peck 1991, p. 14; Barber 1993, p. 3 and 10; Weinstein 1993, p. 2. 
119  Fisher 1994, p. 84 and 85. 
120  Fisher 1994, p. 82-84; Theodore J. St. Antoine 1994, p. 95. 
121  Theodore J. St. Antoine 1994, p. 96. 
122  Fisher 1994, p. 85. See also below under § 12.3.3. 
123  Theodore St. Antoine 1994, p. 97; Theodore St. Antoine 2001, p. 7. For the good-faith standard under 
common law, see below under § 11.3.3 and § 12.3.3. 
124  Fisher 1994, p. 85; Theodore St. Antoine 2001, p. 7. 
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determining and changing standards of performance for 
positions.125
It may be clear that if unalterally adopted by all states, the META would 
eliminate the at-will presumption and require that terminations of employment 
agreements be imposed for good cause only.126 Subsequently, it would provide 
almost all private-sector employees – with the exception of probationary and 
employees working with an employer with fewer than five employees,127 and 
employees working less than twenty hours a week protection – against arbitrary 
dismissal in general by a good cause standard, along with procedures and 
remedies.128
The ULC, however, could not reach consensus on adopting it as a 
uniform act, and approved the statute as a mere model,129 serving as a guide for 
appropriate legislation only.130 In literature, this has been severely criticized. 
Academics were of the opinion that the ULC compromised too much by 
changing the uniform act into a model act to be adopted on a state by state 
basis.131 By 2007, although several had considered its adoption, none of the 
states has adopted the META.132 All this may indicate that the META standards 
as to unjust dismissal remain controversial in the United States. On the other 
hand, it, too, may indicate that the political power of employers and attorneys-
at-law is of greater influence on the enactment of state just cause legislation, 
than one primarily assumes. 133
Several provisions of the Model Employment Termination Act (META), among 
which its good cause provision,134 were modeled after the  Montana Wrongful 
Discharge From Employment Act of 1987 (WDFEA).135 The META, too, shows 
a striking similarity with ILO Convention 158. It is unclear, however, whether 
125  Holloway and Leech 1993, p. 956-962. See also Barber 1993, p. 10.  
126  Perry 1992, p. 2. For the economic impact of the META, see Maltby 1994. 
127  Sprang 1994, p. 12. 
128  Peck 1991, p. 14; Barber 1993, p. 3 and 10; Weinstein 1993, p. 2.  
129  Peck 1991, p. 14; Sprang 1994. 
130  Sprang 1994, p. 20. 
131  Sprang 1994, p. 3. 
132 For example, the states of Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and 
Oklahoma. See Fisher 1994, p. 88. 
133  See below under § 10 to § 12. 
134  Barber 1993, p. 10. 
135  Schramm 1990, p. 116; Moberly 1999, p. 12. See also Bierman and Youngblood 1992, p. 54 and 55 
and 376 as well as Jarsulic 1999, p. 2, pointing out that some provisions of the WDFEA differ 
considerably from the META. For example, in the WDFEA the probationary period in principle is 
left to the discretion of the employer, contrary to the META, which restricts this period to a 
maximum of one year. Further, the WDFEA, unlike META, does not compel arbitration. The META 
allows an employee to demand arbitration. Moreover, unlike the WDFEA, the META allows an 
arbitrator to award attorney fees to a prevailing employee. For an in-depth discussion of the WDFEA, 
see below under § 9.3. 
30
the ULC considered the ILO Convention 158 as a basis for the META.136 In 
fact, besides similarities, there are significant differences with ILO Convention 
158.137
First, the META applies to firms with five or more employees only. 
Second, the META offers an opt-out provision under which an employer can 
substitute an automatic severance pay package – with a three year cap – in lieu 
of the good cause limitation, thereby at first sight significantly weakening the 
good cause standard.138 It bears mentioning, however, that employees only have 
the right to waive this statutory good cause protection, regardless of cause by an 
express written agreement, substituting a mandatory severance payment of at 
least one month’s pay for each years of employment up to 30 month’s pay.139
This, in turn, seems in accordance with ILO Convention 158, which does not 
allow employers to buy off just cause protection. 140 Third, Barber is of the 
opinion that under the definition of the good cause standard, the employer is 
given an opportunity to exercise his business judgment in an unjust manner. In 
brief, an employer can legitimately discharge an employee by stating that a 
reduction in the work force would be beneficial to his business. Although she 
recognizes that this statement is partially alleviated by the requirement that the 
employer must use good faith when terminating an employee, due to the 
ambiguous nature of the term good faith, she states, it will be difficult for an 
employee to prove that his employer had acted improperly in exercising his 
business judgment.141 Fourth, under the META, only rare employees will have a 
monetary claim to justify the attention of a lawyer dependent on a contingency 
fee, in that it requires an outrageous violation of a well-established public 
policy.142 Fifth, under the META an employee must give up his common law 
claims against his employer,143 and can be awarded the remedies specifically 
enumerated in the META only, of which reinstatement is named as the preferred 
remedy.144 Perry in this respect stresses that reinstatement is unlikely to be 
awarded in many circumstances and when awarded, the deterrent effect will be 
minimal, because an employer is unlikely to be financially impacted by such a 
remedy.145 Additionally, the preference of the ULC for arbitrators over courts 
and juries has been criticized.146
136  Barber 1993, p. 10. 
137  For ILO Convention 158, see below under § 21. For the just cause standard under the Convention, 
see below under § 22. 
138  Perry 1992, p. 5; Weinstein 1993, p. 10. 
139  Fisher 1994, p. 85; Theodore J. St. Antoine 1994, p. 99. 
140  See also below under § 33.2, seventh suggestion. 
141  Barber 1993, p. 11. 
142  Theodore J. St. Antoine 1994, p. 95 and 97. 
143  Barber 1993, p. 11; Weinstein 1993, p. 10. 
144  Perry 1992, p. 5; Barber 1993, p. 12; Weinstein 1993, p. 10. 
145  Perry 1992, p. 5 and 6. 
146  Sprang 1994, p. 13. For the difference between the procedures under arbitration and civil court cases, 
see below under § 7.5.2. 
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6.4  The (drafts on a) Restatement of Employment Law 
In 2005, the American Law Institute (ALI) produced a first draft on a 
Restatement of Employment Law. At the issuance of this book the ALI 
produced its Fourth Draft (October, 2005). It should be stressed that these drafts 
are very preliminary expressions of the drafter(s), produced as they are for the 
considerations and advice of the project’s Advisers and Members Consultative 
Group, i.e. subject to substantial revision following those meetings. Preliminary 
drafts, in other words, do not reflect or represent a position of the American Law 
Institute. Hence, the drafts initially are the work-product of the project’s 
Reporters147 and have not (yet) been considered by the Council of the American 
Law Institute and by its membership. Also, whether this project will come to 
completion is at least open to doubt. Most likely it will take years.  
When it will reach its completion, it is important to realize that the 
Restatement of Employment Law does not function as a code. The ALI, which 
was established in 1923 and issues Restatements on Law, does not have 
lawmaking power. It consists of American justices, lawyers and teachers 
‘only’.148 Nevertheless, although it does not have a legislative character, it can 
be of influence in providing just cause protection to private-sector employees.  
In brief, Restatements on Law give guidance on fields in which the need for 
clarification and simplification is most felt. Generally, these are the fields in 
which case law is dominant.149 Although Restatements on Law, in principle, 
reflect the law as its stands, many believe that the function of the ALI is not only 
to codify majority rules, but also to anticipate and encourage the development of 
law. In fact, Burnham emphasizes that Restatements on Law, in the past, have 
not prevented the ALI from restating what their Drafters believe is the more 
enlightened rule of law, even if it is not the majority view in current case law. 
Therefore, it is said that a Restatement on Law generally is not merely a 
summary of what has been decided by the courts in the past. Hence, it can 
exercise an important influence towards unification when a new question arises, 
because although a state court has to follow precedent under settled doctrine, the 
restatement can be persuasive when the law is still unsettled.150
Therefore, the Restatement of Employment Law may fulfill an 
important function as regards just cause protection under state common law. 
Interesting for this thesis is the Third Draft (May, 2005), in which the Drafter(s) 
refused to recognize one of the common law exceptions to the at-will rule, i.e. 
147  From the Fourth Draft (October, 2005) derives that the appointed Reporters are Professors (i) Samual 
Estreicher, New York University School of Law; (ii) Michael C. Harper, Boston University School of 
Law; (iii) Christine Jolls, Harvard Law School; (iv) Stewart J. Schwab, Cornell Law School. 
148  Farnsworth 1987, p. 79. 
149  Farnsworth 1987, p. 30 and 79; Klik 1994, p. 57 and 58. See also www.ali.org 
150  Farnsworth 1987, p. 80; Klik 1994, p. 57; Burnham 1995, p. 77. 
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the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception.151 Consequently, the 
emphasis in this thesis will be on the Fourth and the previous Draft. Particularly 
of interest are the Chapters 1 (Existence of Employment Relationship), 3 
(Employment At Will and its Contractual Exceptions), and 4 (The Tort of 
Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy). 
6.5   Chances for national just cause legislation 
The United States is lacking federal just cause legislation.The chance that the 
META will result in a uniform law, providing just cause protection to private-
sector employees in the United States is small. There is no broadly based 
programmatic group that champions such legislation.152 Besides employers, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys are META’s most outspoken opponents. Some of them are 
sincere in believing that it is wrong for employees to be denied the possibility of 
full compensatory and punitive damages. Others simply oppose the loss of the 
contingency fees they can collect.153 The META, therefore, is likely to remain 
an orphan, unadopted by any of the states.154 Theodore St. Antoine remains 
optimistic, however, based on his experience with the ULC. He stresses that, 
whereas the initial reaction was considerable skepticism along with some 
outright hostility, after three years of searching debate and extensive revision of 
the proposal, lawyers, justices, and legislators became convinced of the essential 
fairness and soundness of the model act resulting in a final vote of thirty-nine to 
eleven approval.155
 Grodin is also of the opinion that just cause legislation  at least in the 
state of California  should be possible. In his opinion, workers compromise a 
significant majority of the population in California. Therefore, it would not take 
a great deal of foresight for a politician to realize that political gold can be 
mined on this issue.156 However, Grodin, too, must conclude that none of the 
bills, which were introduced in California have mustered widespread support. In 
fact, trial lawyers, typically a potent force in Sacramento, he admits, are 
ambivalent about any statute that will deprive plaintiffs of tort recovery, because 
of the effect it will have on the system of contingency fees.157 In general, 
proposed bills for just cause legislation in other states have not been successful 
either for the same reason.158 Overall, the rationale behind these bills is that (1) 
unlike most other leading industrial nations, the majority of private-sector 
employees in the United States are not protected from arbitrary, capricious, or 
151  For a discussion of this refusal, see below under § 12. 
152  Kittner and Kohler 2000, p. 10 and 11. 
153  Theodore St. Antoine 2001, p. 7. See also Fisher 1994, p. 89. 
154  Kittner and Kohler 2000, p. 10. 
155  Theodore St. Antoine 1994, p. 101; Theodore St. Antoine 2001, p. 7. 
156  Grodin 1990, p. 3. 
157  Grodin 1990, p. 3. 
158  Peck 1991, p. 15; Fisher 1994, p. 88.
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unjust discharge and are terminable at will; and (2) unjust discharge results in (i) 
employees having no meaningful job security, nor security in income, health, 
and other benefits; (ii) devastating effects on employees and their families; (iii) a 
reduction in productivity; (iv) an undermining of fairness, well-being, peace, 
and safety; and (v) practices contrary to American ideas of justice and fair 
play.159 Still, as this dissertation reached its completion, the state of Montana 
only has enacted a general  statute that requires a good cause for dismissal.160
6.6  Conclusion 
The United States is one of the few developed industrialized countries in the 
world that adheres to the at-will rule and does not have national just cause 
legislation.161 The chance that Congress – in the near or distant future  will 
enact national just cause legislation is slim. In 1991, there was hope when the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (ULC) adopted 
the Model Employment Termination Act (META), requiring a good cause for 
dismissal. However, the chance that it will be adopted – unalteredly – by all 
states is small. Pressure of politically powered groups among which employers 
and lawyers, in effect, stands in the way of the enactment of national – and state 
– just cause legislation. A Restatement of Employment Law, which may see the 
light in the future, may exercise influence towards a continuing trend towards 
recognition of just cause protection under common law. One expects, however, 
that it will take years before this Restatement will reach its completion. Hence, 
under present law, private-sector employees must still rely on exceptions to the 
at-will rule under federal and/or state (common) law, to be discussed below. 
7  Federal labor law and collective labor law 
7.1    Introduction 
In this Section, I will examine to what extent private-sector employees enjoy 
just cause protection under federal labor law and collective labor law. In this 
respect, it bears mentioning, that the American labor law system significantly 
differs from the Dutch system.162
In the Netherlands, under the Collective Bargaining Agreement Act (Wet op 
de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst or WCAO), in principle, the contracting 
parties – and its members to which the collective bargaining agreement applies – 
only are bound by the collective bargaining agreement. However, under Article 
14 of the Act – unless agreed upon otherwise in the collective bargaining 
agreement – an employer who is a member of a contracting party must also
159 Henry 1994, p. 162. For an in-depth discussion of 30 just cause bill between 1980 and 1992, see  
p. 149-170.
160  For the law of Montana, see further below under § 9. 
161  See above under § 1.3.3. 
162  See also Stege 2004, p. 333. 
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apply the terms of this agreement to an employee who is not a member of one of 
the contracting parties. In brief, these include employees who are members of 
other unions, or employees who are not union members at all. Article 14-
employees, on the other hand, lack direct recourse against their employer in case 
of non-compliance by the employer. Only the contracting parties can demand 
compliance with this obligation.163 Second, under the Dutch Generally Binding 
and Non-Binding Act (Wet op het algemeen verbindend en onverbindend 
verklaren van bepalingen van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten or 
WAVV/OVV), the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs has the authority to declare 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement generally binding – usually for a 
certain period only – for all unionized and non-unionized employers and 
employees of a certain branch.164
In contrast, employers in the private sector in the United States are not obliged 
to apply the conditions of the collective bargaining agreement to all of their 
employees, but so-called bargaining-unit employees only,165 nor does any 
American federal instance have the authority to declare conditions of a 
collective bargaining agreement binding for employers and employees in a 
certain branch. The federal labor system in the United States, on the other hand, 
has many other interesting aspects to discuss. The aim of this Chapter is not to 
focus on all of these aspects, but only to those that – directly or indirectly – 
relate to just cause protection. For a complete view on all aspects, I refer to the 
numerous publications in this field.166
Consequently, in this thesis, I will particularly focus on the National 
Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA),167 and collective labor law, in respect of 
just cause protection. I will not search the field of state labor law. In my opinion 
this is not necessary for the purpose of this research. First, the NLRA allows 
states to regulate subject matters for situations in which the NLRA does not 
apply,168 however, Section 7 of this Act on which this thesis particularly 
163  See Art. 9 and 14 of the WCAO. See also Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 492-499; Van Arkel en 
Loonstra 2004, p. 12.36-12.39. 
164  For the terms of a collective bargaining agreement to be declared generally binding, the agreement in 
question must apply to at least 55 percent of the employees in the relevant industrial sector. See 
Toetsingskader Algemeen Verbindend Verklaring CAO-bepalingen, which applies to the WAVV/OVV,
Art. 4.1, Stcrt. 1998, 240 and 2002, 114. See also Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 499-505; Van Arkel 
en Loonstra 2004, p. 12.38. 
165  For the term bargaining-unit (employees), see below under § 7.4.2. 
166  For example, see Melvyn Dubofsky, The state and Labor in Modern America, The University of 
North Carolina Express, USA, 1994 (hereafter Dubofsky 1994); Labor and the American State, 
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, in: The Rise and Development of Collective Labour Law, Marcel van 
der Linden and Richard Price (eds.), Lang, 2000, p. 350-376 (hereafter Van Wezel Stone 2000); 
Archibald Cox, Derek Curtis Bok, Robert A. Gorman and Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Law, 
Foundation Press, New York, USA, 2001 (hereafter Cox 2001). For an in-depth discussion of the 
American federal labor law system, see also Stege 2004, p. 331-473. 
167  For the NLRA, see below under § 7.3. 
168  Klik 1994, p. 11; Cox 2001, p. 939; Jacobs 2003, p. 32; Stege 2004, p. 370. 
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focuses,169 created a federal right to engage in concerted activities immune from 
state interference.170 Second, the US Supreme Court requires that the state 
statute’s provisions parallel those of the federal act.171 Consequently, the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)172 – the body that is responsible for the 
enforcement of the Act173 – and has the power to negotiate an agreement with a 
state agency to cede jurisdiction to the latter,174 only will do so if state law is 
consistent with the federal act. Subsequently, state labor relations generally are 
patterned after the NLRA and rather broaden the scope of the NLRA – e.g.  
include smaller employers and/or cover employees who are exempted from the 
NLRA – than that they interfere with the basic rights under Section 7 of the 
NLRA.175
7.2  The decline of unions 
The NLRA allows – but does not compel – employers and employees to agree 
upon collective bargaining agreements.176 To the extent one would assume that 
private-sector employees will try to get a union to represent them towards the 
employer to obtain better working conditions, including protection against 
unjust dismissal, one is mistaken.177
Union membership still grew during the World Wars, and the Great 
Depression in 1937, but the density of union membership has declined ever 
since the mid-1950s.178 As this thesis reached its completion, about ten percent – 
by 2007, this is about twenty-six percent in the Netherlands179 – of the private-
sector employees were union members.180
Carlson stresses that it would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the 
comparatively low rate of unionization thus reflects equanimity or apathy on the 
169  For Section 7 of the NLRA, see below under § 7.3.3. 
170  Cox 2001, p. 939; Stege 2004, p. 371. 
171  Cox 2001, p. 938 referring to Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Board, 336 U.S. 301, 69 S.Ct. 584, 93 L.Ed. 691 (1949). See also Stege 2004, p. 371 and 372. 
172  For the NLRB, see also below under § 7.3.2 and § 7.3.4. 
173  Kahn 1994, p. 1, 25 and 33; Cox 2001, p. 104; Clark and Ansay 2002, p. 116. 
174  Under Art. 10(a) of the NLRA. 
175  Kahn 1994, p. 14; Jacobs 2003, p. 32 and 33; Stege 2004, p. 367. For the coverage of the NLRA, see 
below under § 7.3.2.  
176  For the just cause standard in collective bargaining agreements, see below under § 7.4.3 and § 7.5.2. 
177  The International Brotherhood of Teamsters with 1.8 million members in 1993 (1.4 in 2003: see 
Jacobs 2003, p. 41) is the nation’s largest labor union. Traditionally this union organized wagon 
drivers, truck drivers, warehouse workers and their helpers and meanwhile, also retail clerks, office 
clericals, factory workers, and others. Goldman 1996, p. 231. For other – smaller – unions, see Jacobs 
2003, p. 41. For the existence of unions, see Van Wezel Stone 2000, p. 351-376; Cox 2001, p. 11-17; 
Stege 2004, p. 335-352. 
178  Fahlbeck 1994, p. 11; Goldman 1996, p. 224 and 225, 227 and 231; Befort 2003, p. 2. 
179  This percentage amounts to approximately 1,900,000 employees. Source: Centraal Bureau voor de 
Statistiek or CBS (Netherlands Bureau of Statistics). 
180  Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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part of American workers. In fact, polls indicate that most employees are 
favorably disposed to unions and believe employees are better off when they are 
represented by unions.181 Why then most private-sector employees seem 
reluctant to join a union?  
In general, one assumes that the reasons for this reluctance are the 
employer’s resistance towards unions;182 the shift in the American economy 
from manufacturing to services;183 the increase of contingent workers such as 
part-time workers, contract workers and independent contractors, who are 
difficult to organize because of their weak affiliation with the enterprise;184
corruption within unions;185 the collapse of communitarian habits;186 and the fact 
that an employee does not wish to be bound by all provisions of the collective 
bargaining agreement.187 Moreover, Carlson and Grodin stress that many 
employees in non-union workplaces have not rejected union representation, but 
they cannot have it because of the so-called majority rule which, in effect, 
creates a strong headwind against union representation.188 In brief, a union must 
obtain 50 percent plus one of all votes to become the exclusive representative of 
employees.189
Last, Bales refers to the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)190 and the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),191 stating that a private-sector employee is 
reluctant to join a union for, in effect, waiving his individual rights under federal 
and state statutory and common law by becoming a bargaining-unit employee.192
Bales in my opinion partly overstates the ‘price’ a private-sector employee has 
to pay by becoming a bargaining-unit employee, though.  
Indeed, under Section 301 of the LMRA, federal courts must refer 
parties to arbitration in case of an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining 
agreement.193 On the other hand, in practice, it must only do so with regard to 
state law claims194 that require interpretation of the collective bargaining 
agreement.195 These generally concern state contract-based claims only.196
181  Carlson 1992, p. 840. 
182  Fahlbeck 1994, p. 4; Goldman 1996, p. 224. 
183  Borst 1966, p. 41; Bales 1997, p. 6. See also Jacobs 2003, p. 43 referring to the fallback of United 
Mine Workers from 700,00 members in 1940 to 30,000 in 2003. 
184  Befort 2002, p. 4-8; Befort 2003, p. 6.  
185  Borst 1966, p. 42;Jacobs 2003, p. 43. 
186  Jacobs 2003, p. 43. 
187  Fahlbeck 1994, p. 4-9. See also Borst 1966, p. 35. 
188  Carlson 1992, p. 782 and 840; Grodin 1998, p. 31. 
189  For the majority rule, see below under § 7.4.2. 
190  For the LMRA, see also below under § 7.3.1.   
191  For the FAA, see also below under § 7.5.1. 
192  Bales 1997, p. 2-5. 
193  Hardin 1997, p. 23.92. 
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Hence, bargaining-unit employees retain their right on state statutory and public 
policy claims, relating to violations of statutes,197 which can be resolved without 
interpreting the agreement.198 Furthermore, Bales refers to Gilmer (1991) to
illustrate that private-sector employees waive their federal statutory rights tried 
in court by becoming bargaining-unit employees. In this case, the US Supreme 
Court allowed a waiver of a federal statutory claim under an arbitration 
clause.199 Gilmer (1991), however, involved an employee in a non-union 
context. With regard to employees in the union context other court decisions 
apply. More specifically, in Wright (1998), the US Supreme Court held that 
Gardner (1974) is still the law in the union context and that Gilmer (1991) did 
not overrule Gardner (1974).200 In Wright (1998), the US Supreme Court held 
that for a union to waive employees’ rights to a federal judicial forum for federal 
statutory anti-discrimination claims, the agreement to arbitrate these claims must 
be clear and unmistakable.201 Private-sector employees, therefore, do not 
‘waive’ federal statutory claims that easily, as suggested by Bales, by becoming 
a bargaining-unit employee. 
7.3    The NLRA of 1935 
7.3.1 Legislative history 
In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Pullis case202 still served as the 
best American authority for the proposition that collective actions by employees 
for the purpose of increasing wages were unlawful per se, i.e. constituted a 
criminal conspiracy.203 By the middle of the nineteenth century, it was fairly 
well-established that workers could attempt to set wages by voluntary, collective 
agreement among themselves without committing a criminal conspiracy. The 
Sherman Act of 1890, nevertheless, still declared conspiracy illegal.  
Courts extended the Sherman Act to labor unions. These court decisions 
provoked Congress to adopt the Clayton Act of 1914, barring application of the 
Sherman Act to collective action by unions for ‘legitimate objects’. In brief, the 
196  With the exception of contract-based claims that are made during the time the employees did not yet 
join the union (Caterpillar,1987). See Bales 1997, p. 9 and 10. 
197  For public policy claims, see below under § 10.4.2. 
198  With regard to public policy claims, see Lingle (1987). In this case, the employee was discharged 
because she had filed a false workers’ compensation claim. The US Supreme Court held that 301 
preempts the application of state law in an action only if such application requires the interpretation 
of a collective bargaining agreement. The public policy claim did not require such. Consequently, 
Article 301 of the LMRA did not preempt the employee’s retaliatory public policy claim. 
199  Bales 1997, p. 13. 
200  Mitchell 1999, p. 4. 
201  The US Supreme Court in Wright (1998) refrained from the question whether such a ‘clear and 
unmistakable’ waiver would be enforceable. Fitzgibbon 2000, p. 2. 
202  See Carlson 1992, p. 796 referring to Commonwealth v. Pullis, Philadelphia Mayor’s Court (1806), 
reprinted in John R. Commons, ed, 3 Doc History of Am Ind Soc 59 (Russell & Russell, 2d ed 1910).  
203  Stege 2004, p. 338. 
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latter meant that so long as a union’s action was for the purpose of obtaining 
higher wages or better working conditions for strikers, its action was privileged, 
i.e. legitimate.204 Unions hereupon fought for the adoption of a federal labor 
statute that would govern the labor-management relations in the private sector in 
general. Subsequently, due to the lobbying of unions, and the efforts of Senator 
Wagner, who proposed and fought for a federal labor act, the NLRA was 
adopted by Congress in 1935, and is considered as the core of federal labor law 
in the United States.205 The Act, in fact, became known as the Wagner Act.206
The purposes of the NLRA are to (i) promote and to regulate collective 
action;207 and (ii) to give more bargaining power to private-sector employees by 
providing basic rights for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid or protection.208 The NLRA was revolutionary at the time. Soon after its 
enactment, however, the constitutionality of the Act was challenged. Under the 
constitutional doctrine, the US Supreme Court already struck down labor and 
employment laws, which were in conflict with the so-called due process clauses 
under the US Constitution.209 In brief, the Fifth Amendment – addressed to the 
federal government – and the Fourteenth Amendment – addressed to the states 
governments – contain the so-called due process clauses, holding that no person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process.210 As 
Goldman strikingly states 
‘The constitutional doctrine imposed was that a statute that limited the terms 
and conditions under which employees could sell and employers could buy 
their services constituted an impairment of the guaranty of freedom of contract 
and a taking without due process and without just compensation, of the 
property interest in one’s work output. Thus, the courts perversely struck down 
reforms in aid of workers under the guise of protecting the workers’ 
constitutional rights.’ 211
Consequently, the US Supreme Court struck down a federal act, prohibiting 
child labor in Hammer (1918), and a New York State Law limiting the hours 
bakers could work per week in Lochner (1905).212
 In 1937, however, the nation was in the midst of the Great Depression. 
Under pressure of President Roosevelt, the US Supreme Court had no other 
204  Carlson 1992, p. 799-802; Stege 2004 p. 345 and 346. 
205  Goldman 1996, p. 37; Player 1988, p. 37; Carlson 1992, p. 810; Stege 2004, p. 358. 
206  For public employees, see Goldman 1996, p. 31 and 330-332; Jacobs 2003, p. 31, 101 and 102. 
207  Stege 2004, p. 339 and 364. 
208  Turner 2000, p. 7, footnote 164, referring to Clyde W. Summers, Questioning the Unquestioned in 
Collective Labor Law, 47 Cath. U. L. Rev. 791, 791-92 (1998). For the basic rights under the NLRA, 
see further below under § 7.3.3. 
209  Goldman 1996, p. 32. 
210  Blok 2002, p. 178 and 179. 
211 Goldman 1996, p. 32. 
212 Adair (1908). See Player 1988, p. 2 footnote 6; Goldman 1996, p. 33. 
39
option than to withdraw the constitutional barriers to social-economic legislation 
as an essential condition of industrial peace.213 Subsequently, in West Coast 
Hotel (1937), the US Supreme Court held that, based on the Commerce Clause 
of the US Constitution,214 Congress has the power to regulate commerce, i.e. the 
power to enact all appropriate legislation for the protection of the public interest, 
which involves the welfare of American citizens. Therefore, it continued, 
Congress could establish minimum wages designed to counteract the unequal 
bargaining position of workers.215 In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin (1937) the US 
Supreme Court upheld the NLRA, in effect, for the same reason.216 In fact, the 
foregoing decisions induced Congress, in 1938, to enact the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA), which was originally designed as a federal labor as well. 
The FLSA, in brief, sets a floor for wages, hours, and child labor, i.e. set 
collective bargaining minimums from which unions could bargain upward.217 In 
practice, this Act, however, always has been considered as an employment, 
rather than a labor act.218
In 1947, the NLRA was substantially revised by the Labor Management 
Relations Act (LMRA). The latter also became known as the Taft-Hartley Act, 
deriving from the names of the senators who initiated the Act. The need of the 
Act was that the NLRA had become too heavily weighted in favor of the unions. 
The LMRA amendments sought to restore the balance in labor relations. For 
example, the NLRA forbade unfair labor practices for employers only. The 
LMRA added a series of unfair labor practices by unions. 219 Because the 
NLRA, when revised in 1947, was enacted as Title I of the LMRA, the NLRA 
also is often referred to by the latter name. Either reference title – NLRA or 
LMRA – is correct.
Last, in 1959, another significant revision of the NLRA took place with 
the adoption of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
(LMRDA). This Act, known as the Landrum-Griffin Act, provided for detailed 
regulation of internal union affairs, and was a result of the disclosures of the 
McClellan Committee, which compiled a record of wrongdoings on the part of 
certain unions and their officers.220
213  See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin (1937), 300 U.S. 1, 42. 
214  For the Commerce Clause, see above under § 6.2. 
215 West Coast Hotel (1937), 300 U.S. 379, 399 and 400; Stege 2004, p. 363 and 364. For an in-depth 
discussion of this case, see below under § 27.1.1. 
216 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin (1937), 300 U.S. 1, 30-32. For an in-depth discussion of this case, see 
below under § 27.1.1. 
217  Hardin 1997, p. 23.5-6; Corbett 2002, p. 4; Stege 2004, p. 363. 
218  Player 1988, p. 37-38; Goldman 1996, p. 32 and 35. 
219  Another significant amendment under the LMRA was that the so-called closed shop had been 
forbidden. Under a ‘closed shop provision’, an employer is obliged to hire union members only, and 
to dismiss non-union members. See Jacobs 2003, p. 48. For an overview of all changes, see Borst 
1966, p. 33; Hardin 1977, p. 23.45; Kahn 1994, p. 2 and 3; Cox 2001, p. 87-92. 
220  Player 1988, p. 37 and 38; Kahn 1994, p. 4 and 5; Goldman 1996, p. 35-38; Cox 2001, p. 92 and 93; 
Jacobs 2003, p. 46-48. 
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7.3.2 Coverage 
In sum, major non-government employers, and their – private-sector – 
employees not covered by the Railway Labor Act of 1926 (RLA), are subject to 
the NLRA. The RLA covers workers in the railway and the airline industries.221
The coverage of the NLRA, however, as Cox correctly states, is by no means 
all-embracing in its coverage of American workers.  
In general, the sole requirement for employers to fall within the scope 
of the NLRA is that their operations affect interstate commerce, which is almost 
always the case.222 On the other hand, many employers are excluded under 
Section 2(2). The most significant group exluded are public employers, 
including federal, state, country and municipal governments.223 Also, small 
employers are excluded, in that the NLRB has used its administrative discretion 
to fix limits as regards gross annual volume of business beyond which it will not 
tread.224
Section 2(3) further excludes certain employees. The exclusion of these 
employees by the way does not prohibit these employees from unionizing. It 
merely frees the employer from any obligation to deal with them relating to 
collective bargaining.225 In brief, whereas the NLRA statutorily defines an 
employee to include any employee of the employer, it explicitly excludes
agricultural workers, domestic workers, supervisory employees, and 
independent contractors. The exclusion of agricultural and domestic workers has 
no logical basis and is due to the fact that they had little political clout when the 
legislation was enacted.226 Supervisors227 and independent contractors, on the 
other hand, have been explicitly excluded by the Taft-Hartley amendments in 
1947, for, in effect, being employers.228 Additionally, the US Supreme Court 
221  Player 1988, p. 37; Stege 2004, p. 365. 
222  For the Commerce Clause, see above under § 6.2.  
223  It concerns about twenty million public employees. Most of them are accorded rights to unionize and 
to engage in collective bargaining (with the common exception of the right to strike), modeled upon 
those accorded to private-sector employees by the NLRA. See Player 1958, p. 37; Cox 2001,  
p. 94-96; Stege 2004, p. 366 and 367. 
224  For example, for a manufacturing company the test is $ 50,000 annual receipts from or shipments to 
other states and for retail firms the test is $ 500,000 gross annual volume of business. Kahn 1994,  
p. 19 and 20; Jacobs 2003, p. 31 and 32. 
225  Cox 2001, p. 99. 
226  Clark and Ansay 2002, p. 118. For the influence of political powered groups, see also above under  
§ 6.2.
227  A supervisory employee is defined under the statute in § 2 as ‘any individual having authority, in the 
interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, 
or discipline other employees, or responsible to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or 
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such 
authority is not a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires use of independent judgment.’ See 
also Cox 2001, p. 99; Krukowski and Costello 2002, p. 2. 
228  Cox 2001, p. 99-101; Clark and Ansay 2002, p. 119; Stege 2004, p. 367. 
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excluded managerial employees from the scope of the NLRA.229 These 
employees make policies. According to the US Supreme Court, Congress would 
not have intended to invite the conflict of interest that would flow were such 
managerial employees to organize and bargain with the employer.230
Last, so-called confidential employees, who have access to confidential 
labor-relations information of the employer, have been excluded from the scope 
of the NLRA, because they may frustrate the normal operations of the collective 
bargaining process.231
In practice, most difficulties with regard to exempted employees arise on the 
question whether or not an employee can be qualified as an independent 
contractor. In general, labour arbitrators apply the common law right-to-control 
test to answer the question. Under this test, the assumption is that the less an 
employer has a right to control the employee, the more the employee is 
considered as an independent contractor. The common law test focuses on  
               
x the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which 
the product is accomplished;  
x the skill required;  
x the source of the instrumentalities and tools;  
x the location of the work;  
x the duration of the relationship between the parties;  
x whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects 
to the hired party;  
x the extent of the hiring party’s discretion over when and how long 
to work;  
x the method of payment;  
x the worker’s role in hiring and paying assistants;  
x whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;  
x whether the hiring party is in business;  
x the provisions of employee benefits, and  
x the tax treatment of the hired party.232
The Reporters in the Fourth Draft on a Restatement for Employment Law, in 
effect, apply the same test. Section 1.01 determines that an individual is an 
employee whenever  
229  The NLRB defines managerial employees as ‘those who formulate and effectuate management 
policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer, and those who have 
discretion in the performance of their jobs independent of their employer’s established policy’. In 
practice, it concerns executive-type positions and those who are closely aligned with management as 
true representatives of management. See Cox 2001, p. 101 and 102. 
230  Cox 2001, p. 101 referring to NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
231  Cox 2001, p. 103; Stege 2004, p. 369. 
232  Cox 2001, p. 97 and 98; Carlson 2001, p. 14; Befort 2003, p. 5. See also Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance (1992).
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‘(a) the individual intends to serve, at least in part, the interests of the  
employer; (b) the employer consents to receive the services of the individual;  
and (c) the individual’s services to an employer are not rendered as part of an  
independent business. An individual’s services to an employer are not rendered  
as part of an independent business if the employer has the power to control (i)  
the means and manner of the individual’s work; or (ii) the extent to which the  
individual can be enriched for performing the services.’233
7.3.3  Basic rights  
Section 7 of the NLRA holds the basis rights of the Act, i.e. the right to self-
organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, and to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid 
or protection. As the US Supreme Court once held  
‘[The] right of employees to self-organization and to select representatives of 
their own choosing for collective bargaining or other mutual protection without 
restraint or coercion by their employer (…) is a fundamental right. Employees 
have as clear a right to organize and select their representatives for lawful 
purposes as the respondent has to organize its business and select its own 
officers and agents. Discrimination and coercion to prevent the free exercise of 
the right of employees to self-organization and representation is a proper 
subject for condemnation by competent legislative authority. Long ago we 
started the reason for labor organizations. We said that they were organized out 
of the necessities of the situation; that a single employee was helpless in 
dealing with an employer; that the was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage 
for the maintenance of himself and family; that, if the employer refused to pay 
him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the 
employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment: that union was essential to 
give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer.’ 234
The right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations need no 
further explanation. Like in the Netherlands, this right emphasizes the need to 
preserve the employees’ free choice to become affiliated with a union.235 The 
right to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection is less clear. In brief, for employees 
to be protected, Section 7 in this respect requires that 
x the activity in question must be concerted, meaning that the – 
individual – employee must be acting with or on behalf of other 
employees;236
233  ALI Employment Law Draft No. 4, Chapter 1 p. 4. 
234 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin (1937), 300 U.S. 1, 33. 
235  For an in-depth discussion of this right, see Cox 2001, p. 115-250. 
236 NLRB v. Deauville Hotel (1985, CA1) 751 F2d 1562. 
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x the concerted activities must be for the objective of mutual aid or 
protection; and  
x the nature of the activity must not be unlawful, too disloyal to the 
employer, in breach of contract, or such that it undermines the 
authority of a labor organization representing a majority of the 
employees in a bargaining unit.237
This right on protection of concerted activities, for example, covers the right to 
strike.238 It is noteworthy to mention that it, too, offers protection to non-
bargaining-unit employees. As Corbett puts it, the scope of coverage of Section 
7 and its application to all private-sector employees, including bargaining and
non-bargaining-unit employees, may have been one of the best-kept secrets of 
labor law.239 The cases below will show that non-bargaining-unit private-sector 
employees, objecting against arbitrary dismissal, may have a cause of action 
under the Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA, however, against dismissal for 
concerted activity only.  
7.3.4   Unfair labor practices 
Under the Sections 7 and 8, employees must state that the employer committed 
an unfair labor practice. Section 8(a) enumerates unfair labor practices of the 
employer; Section 8(b) enumerates unfair labor practices of the union.240 In light 
of the interest of this thesis, I will concentrate on unfair labor practices of 
employers only. Under Section 8(a), it shall be an unfair labor practice for an 
employer  
‘(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in Section 7;  
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor 
organization or contribute financial or other support to it;  
(3) to encourage or discourage union membership by discriminating with 
respect to hiring, job tenure or any other condition of employment;  
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee for having filed 
charges or given testimony under the NLRA; and/or  
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively and/or in good faith with the exclusive 
agent i.e. the representative of the employees.’241
Subsequently, in case of an unfair labor practice, an employee can address the 
NLRB,242 however, through the bargaining unit’s exclusive agent only.243 The 
237  Corbett 2002, p. 6. 
238  Goldman 1996, p. 327; Jacobs 2003, p. 89; Stege 2004, p. 407. 
239  Corbett 2002, p. 3, 6 and 9. See also Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 979; Fisk 2002, p. 3 and 4. 
240  Goldman 1996, p. 169. 
241  Player 1988, p. 38; Kahn 1994, p. 33; Goldman 1996, p. 176 and 185; Hardin 1997, p. 23.58; Corbett 
2002, p. 6; Jacobs 2003, p. 45. 
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latter can order the employer to take affirmative action, including reinstatement 
of employees with or without back pay under Section 10 of the NLRA.244
Disobedience of a decision of the NLRB does not result in penalties. The NLRB 
or one of the parties has to obtain an enforcement order with the federal Court of 
Appeals, in that disobedience of a court’s decision is considered as contempt of 
court and is punishable by fine or imprisonment.245
As said, also non-bargaining-unit employees can invoke the Sections 7 and 8 of 
the NLRA. For example, in Timekeeping Systems (1997), Leinweber, an 
employee, offered comments to a company’s chief officer’s e-mail in which the 
officer proposed a new vacation policy. In reply, Leinweber sent an e-mail to all 
other employees, in which he demonstrated that the chief officer’s assertion that 
the proposed plan would result in more days off each year was wrong, and that 
he could prove the chief officer’s statement to be false. The chief officer was not 
pleased with Leinweber’s response and said that his e-mail message was in 
violation of a company employment manual provision, stating that failure to 
treat others with courtesy and respect could result in immediate dismissal. The 
chief officer gave Leinweber the opportunity to correct his actions, which 
Leinweber failed to do, after which he was discharged. Leinweber had no legal 
cause of action under federal or state law, so it seemed. However, he then filed 
an unfair labor practice charge, alleging a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the 
NLRA for discharge, stating he engaged in protected, concerted activity 
according to Section 7. Leinweber won. The remedy offered by the 
administrative law justice, and affirmed by the NLRB, ordered the employer to 
offer Leinweber reinstatement with all the benefits he had and to make him 
whole for any losses he suffered. The NLRB concluded that Leinweber satisfied 
all requirements of Section 7, which included the concerted requirement, 
because his e-mail was intended to incite other employees to help him keep the 
old vacation policy. The e-mail was not considered as violent or serious enough 
to render the employee unfit for service.246
In Allstate (2000), a female employee was operating as an agent of the 
company. She had participated in a program of the company for which she had 
to contribute large amounts of her money to the company, however, through 
which she obtained debts only. When she and other employee-participants were 
interviewed by Fortune magazine, they were critical of the program. After 
publication, the employer issued a disciplinary warning to the employee. She 
then filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging a violation of Section 8(a)(1). 
The NLRB concluded that the employee’s conduct satisfied all requirements of 
Section 7, which included the requirement that the action was concerted, 
242  Kahn 1994, p. 1, 25 and 33; Clark and Ansay 2002, p. 116; Stege 2004, 365. 
243  For the exclusivity rule, see below under § 7.4.2. 
244  Hardin 1997, p. 23.4; Cox 2001, p. 250-263; Jacobs 2003, p. 29-31 and 75. 
245  Player 1988, p. 39 and 40; Goldman 1996, p. 364-370; Hardin 1997, p. 23.44-45; Jacobs 2003, p. 45. 
246  Corbett 2002, p. 10. 
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because she was initiating or inducing group action with the objective to alert 
others in the program to the problems she had encountered and that she, 
therefore, could ask for the remedies under the NLRA, including 
reinstatement.247
The cases above show that non-bargaining-unit employees, too, can obtain 
protection against arbitrary dismissal under the Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA in 
case of concerted activities. Like with discriminatory and retaliatory discharges,  
the Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA do not provide protection against arbitrary 
dismissal in general.  
It bears mentioning that to the extent the right to strike is protected 
under these Sections, its protection is limited as well. Based on Mackay (1938),
the US Supreme Court held that it was not an unfair labor practice to replace the 
striking employees in an effort to carry on the business. Put differently, although 
the employer may not interfere with the right to strike, it does not follow that an 
employer herewith lost the right to protect and continue his business by 
supplying places left vacant by strikers. On the other hand, an employer who 
reinstated six out of eleven employees, committed an unfair labor practice under 
the Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(4) of the NLRA – prohibiting discriminatory 
discharge based on union membership, and discharges for invoking these 
rights248 – when the five employees in question who were not reinstated were all 
union members, and the six who were reinstated, were non-union members.249
7.4   Collective bargaining agreements 
In the United States, collective bargaining agreements generally hold standard
working conditions. Under these conditions, employers are not allowed to 
deviate from provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.250 In contrast, in 
the Netherlands, collective bargaining agreements, in general, hold minimum
working conditions. Under these conditions, employers are allowed to deviate 
from provisions of the collective bargaining agreement for the benefit of the 
employee.251 Likewise, collective bargaining agreements in both countries 
supersede conflicting individual employment contracts.  
7.4.1 The NLRA with respect to collective bargaining agreements
In the late nineteenth century, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) was one 
of the largest unions at the time, representing workers in their strive to obtain 
better working conditions through strikes, collective bargaining, and signing 
247  Corbett 2002, p. 12 and 13. 
248  For an overview of NLRB decisions regarding discriminatory discharges, see Cox 2001, p. 221-240. 
See also Cox, p. 250. 
249  For an in-depth discussion of this case, see Stege 2004, p. 407-410. 
250  Goldman 1996, p. 49 and 51; Hardin 1997, p. 23.68 and 23.74. 
251  Jacobs 2003, p. 73. 
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labor agreements.252 Private-sector employees eventually obtained these basic 
rights under Section 7 of the NLRA.253 Moreover, Section 8(d) of the NLRA 
encompasses the duty to bargain, i.e. the obligation to meet and confer at 
reasonable times in good faith. The latter means that parties must have serious 
intentions to reach an agreement,254 i.e. must negotiate with the intent to bring 
about the agreements which the NLRA, in principle, does not attempt to 
compel.255
When parties have reached an agreement, the collective bargaining 
agreement applies to all employees of the bargaining unit – which term will be 
explained below –, provided that these employees meet the definition of an 
employee on the one hand, and are not exempted under the NLRA on the 
other.256 Put differently, an employee, unionized or non-unionized, who belongs 
to a bargaining unit is bound by the collective bargaining agreement that applies 
to the bargaining unit. For a non-unionized bargaining unit employee this has a 
positive side. Just cause and arbitration provisions in collective bargaining 
agreements generally provide protection against arbitrary dismissal in general. A 
negative aspect, however, is that if this employee does not wish to be bound by 
other provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, he has no alternative but 
to quit the bargaining unit, which generally means quitting his job.257 It, thus, is 
important to understand when an employee becomes a bargaining-unit 
employee. 
7.4.2 Bargaining units, the majority rule, and the exclusivity rule258
Under the NLRA, the NLRB must order elections to establish a bargaining unit. 
In practice, employees themselves form a unit in deciding to accept a union’s 
representation. This unit, in principle, constitutes the bargaining unit, which at 
the same time is the extent of the union’s representation.259 Subsequently, a 
union on behalf of these employees approaches the employer to ask for 
recognition of this bargaining unit by showing the employer authorization cards 
signed by the majority of employees of that unit. If an employer refuses to 
recognize the union, the latter must file a petition with the NLRB, in which it 
must show that at least 30 percent of the employees in the unit wants to be 
represented by that union.260
252  Van Wezel Stone 2000, p. 358 and 359; Stege 2004, p. 337 and 340. 
253  For these rights, see above under § 7.3.3. 
254  Cox 2001, p. 385 and 386. 
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Hereupon, the NLRB will examine whether the bargaining unit satisfies the 
standard of an appropriate bargaining unit. A bargaining unit is appropriate if 
the employees in this unit share a sufficient community of interest. Important 
factors in this respect are  
x the skills and duties of the employees affected;  
x the terms and conditions of employment;  
x employee interchange;  
x functional integration;  
x geographic proximity;  
x centralized control of management and supervision; and  
x bargaining history.261
Once the appropriate bargaining unit is established, the NLRB orders a secret 
ballot election to see which union will be the exclusive representative of the 
bargaining unit. Under the majority rule, the union with 50 percent plus one of 
all votes receives the NLRB certification as the exclusive bargaining agent of 
the employees in the bargaining unit.262
Subsequently, the Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of the NLRA provide 
that the employer must bargain with this union and vice versa.263 Under Section 
9(a), the exclusive union shall be the representative of all employees in this unit 
with respect to pay, wages, hours of employment and other terms or conditions 
of employment.264 Hence, under the majority rule, bargaining-unit employees, in 
principle, cannot exercise their rights independently. Put differently, the union 
as its exclusive agent has the exclusive right to control the prosecution of claims 
in labor arbitration cases and/or unfair labor practices under the NLRA.265 In 
avoiding partiality between union and non-union members, the NLRA 
determines that in prosecuting these claims the exclusive agent has to fairly 
represent all members of this bargaining unit.266 The duty of fair representation, 
however, does not mean that the exclusive agent of the bargaining unit has a 
duty to proceed any claim of a bargaining-unit employee. For example, when the 
exclusive agent is of the opinion that a case is weak, he may decide not to 
proceed with the claim. This is allowed so long as the exclusive agent does not 
act in bad faith.267
p. 190 and 192 and 357; Hardin 1997, p. 23.45-52; Clark and Ansay 2002, p. 120 and 121; Jacobs 
2003, p. 50 and 51. 
261  Fahlbeck 1994, p. 16 and 19; Goldman 1996, p. 358; California Labor Law Digest 1997, p. 353; 
Dempster 2002, p. 1; Jacobs 2003, p. 52; Stege 2004, p. 383-385. 
262  Carlson 1992, p. 847-849. The union can appeal from this decision of the NLRB to a federal court, 
and ultimately the US Supreme Court. Other unions may interfere. Fahlbeck 1994, p. 14. 
263  See also Carlson 1992, p. 779. 
264  Summers 1998, p. 42. 
265  Fahlbeck 1994, p. 17-19; Jacobs 2003, p. 74 and 75. 
266  Hardin 1997, p. 23.93-94; Jacobs 2003, p. 75. 
267  Fahlbeck 1994, p. 16-20; Bales 1997, p. 4; Jacobs 2003, p. 74and 75. 
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7.4.3   Bargaining subjects 
It should be noted that the employer and the exclusive agent have a duty to 
bargain on mandatory subjects only. These subjects are broadly described in the 
Sections 8(d) and 9(a) of the NLRA as wages, hours and other terms and 
conditions of employment.268 From decisions of the NLRB it can be derived that 
these mandatory subjects include vacations, safety rules, work rules, drug 
testing, non-discrimination, discipline, grievance, arbitration and job security.269
As regards the latter, most collective bargaining agreements have a just cause 
standard.270 On the other hand, not all decisions made by management, which 
affect the job security of employees fall within the scope of mandatory 
bargaining subjects.271 For example, layoffs due to a – partial – shutdown of the 
enterprise are considered as permissive bargaining subjects.272 However, in 
general, collective bargaining agreements, too, often hold clauses as regards 
layoffs, the principle of seniority and severance payments.273 Moreover, Section 
8(a)(3) prohibits layoffs motivated by anti-union animus.274 Hence, the union 
has control over the decision to lay off employers when this decision is 
motivated by an intent to harm the union.275
 The difference between mandatory and permissive bargaining subjects 
is important. From Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA derives that parties may not 
alter mandatory terms or conditions, without first negotiating in good faith the 
proposal to an impasse with the union.276 For example, when an employer 
unilaterally alters a just cause provision, before an impasse, the NLRB can order 
that all employees who are discharged based on this unilateral altered provision 
will be reinstated with back pay.277 When an employer alters a permissive 
subject, the union can base its claim on a breach of contract, and ask for contract 
damages ‘only’.278
268  Player 1988, p. 39; Goldman 1996, p. 260; Hardin 1997, p. 23.69; Jacobs 2003, p. 66 and 67; Cox 
2001, p. 428; Stege 2004, p. 411. 
269  Kahn 1994, p. 68-73, referring to National Licorice Co. (1940) regarding job security; Hardin 1997, 
p.  23.72-73; Cox 2001, p. 455. 
270  See below under § 7.4.4. 
271  Heinsius 1999, p. 62 and 63. It bears mentioning, that mass layoffs, involving at least one-third of the 
employer’s workforce or at least 50 employees or 500 or more employees, are subject to the federal 
Workers Adjustment and Notification Act of 1989 (WARN). In brief, this Act allows for a plant 
closing or mass layoff – based on economic reasons – under certain requirements. For a discussion of 
the WARN, see Hardin 1997, p. 23e.1-23e.20; Aaron 1997, p. 275-283; Heinsius 1999, p. 62-65; 
Heinsius 2004, p. 21. 
272  Clark and Ansay 2001, p. 126 and 127; Cox 2001, p. 466; Stege 2004, p. 411-426. 
273  Heinsius 1999, p. 66. 
274  Cox 2001, p. 464. 
275  Cox 2001, p. 465. 
276  Player 1988, p. 47; Goldman 1996, p. 262; Cox 2001,p. 429; Stege 2004, p. 403 and 404. 
277  For this example, see Player 1988, p. 47, footnote 54, referring to Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. 
v. NLRB, 379 US 203. 
278  Player 1988, p. 47 footnote 42; Hardin 1997, p. 23.72. 
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7.4.4 Just cause and grievance arbitration provisions  
Virtually all collective bargaining agreements hold just cause and grievance 
arbitration provisions.279 In fact, private-sector employees in the United States, 
represented by a union, typically enjoy protection against arbitrary dismissal in 
general, through just cause provisions in collective bargaining agreements, and 
labor arbitration.280
A just cause provision generally prohibits discharge or other 
disciplinary action after completion of the probationary period, except when 
there is ‘good cause, proper cause, sufficient cause or just cause’. The terms just 
cause and good cause are used interchangeably in collective bargaining 
agreements.281 In contrast, civil courts distinguish between just cause and good 
cause in applying common law exceptions to the at-will rule, explicitly referring 
to the interpretation by arbitrators of the standard under collective bargaining 
agreements, and the interpretation of this standard by civil courts, 
respectively.282
Additionally, collective bargaining agreements generally provide grievance 
procedures, which include the right of appeal to arbitration,283 calling for all or 
specified disputes arising under the contract between the parties, eventually to 
be submitted to arbitration. The latter is considered as the best available 
alternative for settling disputes under collective bargaining agreements. In fact, 
it is seen as intolerable to management and impossibly burdensome when unions 
would resort to a strike to resolve all their disputes.284
The arbitration clause generally also provides the procedure to be 
followed, the subjects covered, the place of arbitration and the manner of 
selecting the arbitrators. Most commonly, the arbitrator is selected by the parties 
on an ad hoc basis each time a new case is submitted to arbitration, with 
reference to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and/or the 
American Arbitration Association as agencies from which the parties will 
receive names of available third parties.285 In large units, however, the volume 
of grievances generally induces parties to select a permanent arbitrator, often 
also called umpire, referee or impartial chairman.286 In effect, the labor arbitrator  
directly derives his authority from the arbitration clause. This is not as self-
evident as it seems. Only after the so-called Steelworkers Trilogy in 1960, the 
279  Brand 1999, p. 29. 
280  See above under § 7.3.3. and § 7.4.4. 
281  Player 1988, p. 52. 
282  See below under § 11.3.3. and § 12.3.3. 
283  Iest 1991, p. 107-109;  Stieber and Rodgers 1994, p. 72, 76 and 77; Cox 2001, p. 717; Stege 2004,  
p. 437. 
284  Cox 2001, p. 717. 
285  Goldman 1996, p. 397; Kahn 1994, p. 134; Cox 2001, p. 717. 
286  Fitzgibbon 2000, p. 2; Stege 2004, p. 437. 
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US Supreme Court held that agreements to arbitrate in collective bargaining 
agreements became enforceable.287
7.5       Labor arbitration 
7.5.1    Arbitral authority 
Still, problems may occur under collective bargaining agreements with regard to 
arbitral authority. First, a problem may occur when the employer’s conduct 
results both in a breach of the collective bargaining agreement subject to 
arbitration and an unfair labor practice subject to consideration by the NLRB. 
The NLRB has settled this dispute under the Collyer doctrine.288 In brief, it 
refers parties to the arbitration procedure under the existing collective 
bargaining agreement289 when
x there is a stable collective bargaining relationship between parties;  
x there is no claim that the employer is rejecting collective bargaining 
principles or the organizational rights of its employees;  
x the dispute is arbitral and both parties are willing to arbitrate; and  
x the dispute centers on the interpretation or application of the terms 
of the collective bargaining contract.290
Second, a problem may occur when the subject of the unfair labor practice 
already has been decided on in an arbitration proceeding. Under the Spielberg 
doctrine,291 the NLRB refers parties to the arbitral award on the condition that 
x the arbitrator considered the issue in the charge filed with the 
Board;  
x the arbitration proceedings appear to have been fair and regular;  
x all parties agreed to be bound by the award; and  
x the arbitration decision was not clearly repugnant to the purposes of 
the NRLA.292
287  For an in-depth discussion of United Steelworkers I, II and III, see Stege 2004, p. 440-445. See also 
Bales 1997, p. 13-14 and 20;  Turner 2000, p. 9-11. 
288 Collyer (1971).
289  Most, if not all, collective bargaining agreements hold grievance-arbitration procedures for resolving 
disputes that may arise between the parties concerning interpretation or application of the terms of 
the contracts. Disputes relating to rights under the collective bargaining agreement usually are settled 
under a grievance procedure and, if that fails, by arbitration. Kahn 1994, p. 131; Hardin 1997,  
p. 23.87. 
290  Hardin 2003, p. 23c.75-76. 
291 Spielberg (1955).
292  The NLRB, however, will refuse to defer to arbitral awards when resulting in an infringement of 
protected rights of individual employees such as a discharge for invoking or participating in the 
processes of the NLRB. Kahn 1994, p 136-137; Hardin 2003, p. 23c.76-77. 
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Third, a problem may occur, in that primarily federal courts are authorized to 
decide on disputes under collective bargaining agreements under Article 301 of 
the LMRA. The US Supreme Court has settled the dispute, determining that 
arbitrators will decide on claims which require interpretation of the collective 
bargaining agreement.293
7.5.2   Interpretation of just cause  
Most single cases decided by labor arbitrators are discharge and disciplinary 
matters.294 What one arbitrator has previously decided in a discharge case need 
not be followed by another arbitrator, but usually is. The principle of stare 
decisis,295 therefore, does not apply to labor arbitration.296 A second arbitrator, 
in other words, has discretion to reconsider the matter. In practice, labor 
arbitrators, nonetheless, often adhere to earlier arbitration awards.297
Subsequently, from arbitral awards one can derive that just cause stands 
for fair and reasonable,298 and that just cause protection does not depend on the 
sole existence of a just cause provision. To the extent collective bargaining 
agreements do not explicitly prohibit the employer from disciplining or 
discharging employees without just cause,299 arbitrators in the absence of 
specific contract language have found that a just cause provision can be implied 
in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. Hence, the just cause 
requirement is so well accepted under labor arbitration, that often it is found to 
be implicit in collective bargaining agreements.300
In the past, a problem for labor arbitrators has been that only few collective 
bargaining agreements provided a definition of just cause.301 In 1964, Daugherty 
was one of the first arbitrators who tried to crystallize the definition of just cause 
into seven independent questions. If the answer to any of these questions was 
‘no’, just cause did not exist. Although the main criticism was that the test was 
too mechanistic, the test still provides a good tool for arbitrators to determine the 
existence of just cause. The questions under the Daugherty test are 
293  For Article 301 of the LMRA, see above under § 7.2. 
294  Seniority, pay disputes, and work assignment disputes are other significant categories. See Stieber 
and Rodgers 1994, p. 77; Goldman 1996, p. 400. 
295  For the rule of stare decisis, see above under § 5.2.2.
296  Kahn 1994, p. 134; Clark and Ansay 2002, p. 128. 
297  Kahn 1994, p. 134; Clark and Ansay 2002, p. 128. 
298  Hill and Westhoff 1999, p. 6; Brand 1999, p. 6, 29 and 30, 33 and 34, 37 and 61. 
299  According to Kittner and Kohler, in 2000, 97% of all collective bargaining agreements in the United 
States held a just cause provision. Kittner and Kohler 2000, p. 4. 
300  Hardin 1997, p. 23.87; Brand 1999, p. 29. See also Owens 2001, p. 4, referring to Trailmobile (2000),
in which the court stated that absent express inclusion to the contrary in the collective bargaining 
agreement, a discharge is subject to an arbitrator’s determination of just cause. 
301  Abrams and Nolan 1985, p. 2; Hill and Westhoff 1999, p. 6; Brand 1999, p. 29. 
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1. did the employer forewarn or foreknowledge the employee of the 
possible or probable disciplinary consequences of the employee’s 
conduct;
2. was the employer’s rule or managerial order reasonably related to 
the orderly, efficient, and safe operation of the company’s business;  
3. did the employer, before administering discipline to an employee, 
make an effort to discover whether the employee violated or 
disobeyed a rule or order of management;  
4. was the employer’s investigation conducted fairly and objectively;  
5. did the employer obtain substantial evidence or proof that the 
employee was guilty as charged;  
6. has the employer applied its rules, orders, and penalties 
evenhandedly and without discrimination to all employees; and  
7. was the degree of discipline administered by the employer 
reasonably related to (a) the seriousness of the employee’s proven 
offense; and (b) the record of the employee’s service?302
The next step in the evolution of a uniform just cause definition was taken by 
the arbitrators Abrams and Nolan. Under their theory, a discharge for just cause 
exists when an employee fails to meet a fundamental obligation, deriving from 
the employment relationship, which in their opinion is to provide satisfactory 
work, consisting of 
x regular attendance;
x obedience to reasonable work rules;  
x reasonable quality and quantity of work; and  
x avoidance of conduct that would interfere with the employer’s 
ability to carry on the business effectively.303
Both tests have been – and still are – used by labor arbitrators.304 In effect, two 
principles derive from these tests and are employed by labor arbitrators. First,
the principle of due process that relates to procedural guarantees such as (i) 
timely action by the employer; (ii) a fair investigation; (iii) a precise statement 
of the charges; and (iv) a right to be heard. Second, the principle of progressive 
discipline that relates to progressive steps in order to correct the unacceptable 
behavior of the employee through (i) oral warning; (ii) written warning; (iii) 
suspension; and (iv) discharge, respectively.305
302  Hill and Westhoff 1999, p. 6 and 7; Brand 1999, p. 31 and 32. 
303  Abrams and Nolan 1985, p. 8-13; Brand 1999, p. 29-30, 33-34, 37 and 61. 
304  These tests are also included in American Arbitration Association training manuals for lawyers and 
arbitrators. See Brand 1999, p. 33. 
305  Hill and Westhoff 1999, p. 6; Brand 1999, p. 6, 29 and 30, 33 and 34, 37 and 61; Cox 2001, p. 726. 
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Additionally, labor arbitrators require two separate considerations (1) whether 
the employee is guilty of misconduct; and (2) assuming guilt, whether the 
discipline imposed is a reasonable penalty under the circumstances of the 
case,306 considering factors as307
x whether the employee is a repeat offender: most arbitrators have 
overturned discharge when it was based on the employee’s first 
offense;  
x the reason of absenteeism: illness usually is covered in collective 
bargaining agreements and does not constitute just cause;308
x whether the employers’ standards are unreasonable: discharge for 
failure to meet quality standards generally is reversed;309 and
x whether the employee’s conduct constitutes misconduct: 
inappropriate language, for example, usually is evaluated according 
to its setting, e.g. whether it was private or public, or whether it was 
a result of provocation or not; language that is acceptable among 
employees may be unacceptable when addressed to the 
employer.310
In practice, the majority of arbitration proceedings involves the (in)capacity 
and/or (mis)conduct of the employee, e.g. regular absence, job performance 
problems and refusals to perform work.311
It is noteworthy to mention that under labor arbitration it has become a 
customary practice that the employer carries the burden of proof of just cause in 
a discipline or discharge case.312 This does not apply to civil cases. In fact, 
courts generally hold that the rules as applied in arbitration hearings are not 
applicable in civil wrongful termination lawsuits, although the shift of burden of 
proof would mean a great advantage for non-bargaining-unit employees under 
common law.313
7.6     Conclusion 
Private-sector employees enjoy protection against discriminatory and retaliatory 
dismissals under the Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA. Furthermore, they enjoy 
protection against arbitrary dismissal in case of concerted activities. These 
Sections do not provide protection against arbitrary dismissal in general, 
306  Hill and Westhoff 1999, p. 8. 
307  Brand 1999, p. 93. 
308  Brand 1999, p. 97 and 98. 
309  Brand 1999, p. 138 and 139. 
310  Brand 1999, p. 279-281. 
311  Goldman 1996, p. 309 and 310. 
312  Hill and Westhoff  1999, p. 8. 
313  See also below under § 12.3.3. 
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however. Only private-sector employees who belong to a so-called bargaining 
unit, about ten percent of the private workforce, typically enjoy just cause 
protection under just cause provisions in collective bargaining agreements, and 
through labor arbitration. State courts, in principle, are free to look at the 
practice of labor arbitrators in providing just cause protection to non-bargaining-
unit employees, but are not willing to do so. This is why it is often said that 
those who are not subject to a collective bargaining agreement are left without 
the just cause protection that bargaining-unit employees enjoy. In the following 
paragraphs, I will examine to what extent these non-bargaining-unit employees, 
also referred to as at-will employees can obtain just cause protection under 
federal anti-discrimination law (paragraph 8), state statutory law (paragraph 9) 
and/or common law (paragraph 10). 
8    Federal anti-discrimination law 
8.1     Federal anti-discrimination statutes 
8.1.1 Introduction 
Discharge is the most commonly litigated employment dispute in employment 
discrimination law.314 In this Section, I will focus on anti-discrimination law 
related to protection against arbitrary dismissal. Although it is true that anti-
discrimination law prohibits discrimination for specified reasons only, thus,
obviously does not constitute protection against arbitrary dismissal in general, I, 
nonetheless, wish to – briefly – discuss the field of anti-discrimination law. 
First, in determining the scope of what constitutes just cause, it is as important to 
have knowledge of what constitutes bad cause in the United States. Second, 
based on decisions of the US Supreme Court, once an employee establishes a so-
called prima facie case of prohibited discrimination an employer must come 
forward with a legitimate, that is, a non-discriminatory reason for the dismissal. 
This Section examines to what extent this non-discriminatory reason must 
constitute just cause. Last, this Section serves to answer the question why 
federal anti-discrimination statutes could have been enacted ‘so easily’, where 
this seems almost impossible for national just cause legislation. 
 The emphasis in this thesis is on federal anti-discrimination law related 
to protection against arbitrary dismissal. In this respect, Congress enacted, in 
chronological order, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 amended in 1991 (Title VII); 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (the ADEA); the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1974 (the PDA); and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990 (the ADA).315 As Jacobs correctly states, to gain a complete view on 
discriminatory grounds in the United States, one should also consider state anti-
314  Player 1988, p. v; Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 837. 
315  Also, the ILO enumerates these acts as most important for private-sector employees in providing 
protection against an unjustified dismissal. See above under § 6.1. 
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discrimination statutes that may cover other discriminatory grounds.316
However, for the purpose of this thesis, this is not necessary. First, federal and 
state anti-discrimination statutes remain limited to the same ground for 
dismissal, namely discrimination. Second, federal anti-discrimination statutes 
apply to all states, thus, indicate what constitutes bad cause in the United 
States.317 Nevertheless, I will pay attention to California anti-discrimination law, 
the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)318, but this is to make 
comprehensible the relationship between federal and state anti-discrimination 
law only. 
8.1.2  Historical background 
Federal anti-discrimination statutes, providing protection against arbitrary 
dismissal have been enacted from the mid-twentieth century. This immediately 
raises the question why federal anti-discrimination statutes could have been 
enacted ‘so easily’, compared with national just cause legislation. The answer 
lies in the history of slavery. Due to the fact that slavery was not abolished by 
the US Constitution of 1789, and Congress was not given the power to abolish 
it, an agricultural economy based on slavery in the South could develop, and 
could spread into new Southern states. The Northern industrial states 
disapproved of slavery, but for Congress the issue of slavery was not a point of 
discussion. Each new state’s admission raised the question only whether a state 
would be admitted as a slave or a free state.319
The situation between the North and the South became critical after 
judicial decisions in which courts disapproved of slavery.320 In reaction, eleven 
Southern states ‘withdrew’ from the Union as established under the US 
Constitution of 1789. This resulted in the Civil War between the Southern and 
the Northern states, which lasted from 1861 to 1865, resulting in the surrender 
of the South.  
The legal impact of this war was spelled out in the so-called Civil War 
Amendments. In brief, the Thirteenth Amendment (1865) ended slavery; the 
Fourteenth Amendment (1868) provided that state governments could not 
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process nor could 
deny to any person the equal protection of its laws; and, the Fifteenth 
Amendment (1870) assured voting rights to the newly freed slaves.  
The Fourteenth Amendment, in particular, had a great impact on the 
development of federal and state anti-discrimination law. In fact, ever since the 
316  Jacobs 2003, p. 122. 
317  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 355. Jacobs, for example, refers to state age anti-
discrimination statutes, broadening the ADEA in a manner that it covers employees below the age of 
40 as well. Jacobs 2003, p. 122. 
318  Berkowitz and Emert 2001, p. 5. 
319  Burnham 1995, p. 5. 
320  Burnham 1995, p. 24 referring to Dred Scott v. Stanford, 60 US 393 (1857). 
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Fourteenth Amendment, race has been considered to be at the core of equal 
protection laws. In fact, immediately after the end of the Civil War, Congress 
enacted the first Civil Rights Act to advance the goals of the Civil War 
Amendments, which, as today, are still used to attack employment race 
discrimination.321  These are the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981) 
and of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1985 and § 1986), and the Ku Klux Klan Act (42 
U.S.C. § 1983).322
Hereafter, the actual implementation for all American citizens in federal anti-
discrimination statutes was largely neglected for close to one hundred years. 
After World War II, the issue of discrimination, however, again occupied much 
legislative and judicial attention.323 Politicians started to explicitly reject 
discrimination. On 9 September 1957, Congress in this respect created the Civil 
Rights Commission and the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. 
Subsequenty, President John F. Kennedy, in 1963, through his Minister of 
Justice, announced that the time had come for a major civil rights bill. In June, 
1963, President Kennedy transmitted the Bill to Congress. In continuing the 
fight for civil rights, more than 200,000 people gathered in front of the Lincoln 
Memorial in which Martin Luther King, on 28 August 1963, delivered his 
famous I have a dream speech.324 Less than halfway through the legislative 
consideration of the Bill, on 22 November 1963, President Kennedy was shot. 
When Congress approved the Bill and President Lyndon Johnson signed the Bill 
into law on 2 July 1964, this was partly seen as a tribute to President Kennedy, 
being its initiator.325
The Bill resulted in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 of which Title VII 
deals with discrimination in the employment relationship.326 Still, Title VII is 
the broadest federal employment discrimination statute outlawing discrimination 
based on race, color, sex, religion and national origin.327 It was especially unique 
for prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex, because this ground was not 
previously recognized as a prohibited basis of discrimination in areas outside of 
voting. The discriminatory grounds of race, religion and national origin – in 
respect of the abolition of slavery – already had a solid foundation under 
constitutional law.328 Hereupon, almost every year after the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress enacted federal anti-discrimination statutes, 
321  Burnham 1995, p. 24 and 25, 30 and 340; Goldman 1996, p. 30. 
322  Lindemann and Grossman, p. 921; Goldman 1996, p. 145;  Hardin 1997, p. 23.152; Jacobs 2003,  
p. 127.
323  Goldman 1996, p. 30. 
324  Goldman 1996, p. 144; Ivancevich 2001, p. 70-73.
325  Lindemann and Grossman 1996, p. xiii and xvii. 
326  Player 1988, p. 199; Hardin 1997, p. 23.149.  
327  Hardin 1997, p. 23.152; Nolo’s Pocket 1997, p. 97; Termination of Employment 2000,  
p. 11,001-002. 
328  Barber 2002, p. 2.  
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of which I will now briefly discuss those which provide protection against 
arbitrary dismissal.329
8.2    The Civil Rights Act of 1964 amended in 1991 (Title VII) 330
Title VII applies to private-sector and public employers who are engaged in 
industry-affecting commerce.331 It applies to employers with fifteen or more 
employees for each working day in twenty or more calendar weeks in the 
current or preceding calendar year.332 State legislation may broaden the scope of 
Title VII. For example, the California anti-discrimination statute, the FEHA, 
covers employers who employ five or more employees.333
 In brief, Title VII protects private-sector employees against 
discriminatory and retaliatory discharges, i.e. against employers who violated 
one or more of the specific bases for discrimination vested in Title VII, and/or 
have discharged these employees for participating in procedures under Title VII 
and/or for opposing unlawful employment practices under Title VII.334
Subsequently, a court may order affirmative action, including reinstatement, 
back pay and/or attorney’s fees, and – since the amendment of Title VII through 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 – compensatory and punitive damages, the latter, 
however, with a cap of US$ 300,000 for each person.335 More specifically, Title 
VII determines that an employer violates the Act if he  
‘(1) uses an individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin as a basis 
for
(a) failing or refusing to hire an applicant for employment;  
(b) discharging or otherwise disciplining an employee;  
(c) determining an employee’s compensation, including fringe benefits or other 
terms, conditions or privileges of employment; or  
(d) limiting, segregating or classifying an employee or an applicant for 
employment in a way that would tend to deprive him or her of an employment 
opportunity or otherwise adversely affect his or her status as an employee; 
and/or
(2) discriminates against or discharges an employee or applicant for 
employment because he or she has filed a charge, testified, assisted or 
329  For a list of federal protective legislation, see Mendelsohn 1990, p. 3 and Appendix A, p. 23 and 24. 
330  42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.  
331  For the Commerce Clause, see above under § 6.2. 
332  Hardin 1997, p. 23.152; California Labor Law Digest 1997, p. 541; Sedmak and Vidas 1997, p. 13 
and 14; Kahn 1994, p.19. 
333  The 2000 California Employer, p. 31; Termination of Employment 2000, p. 20,901. 
334  Player 1988, p. 273; Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 999. For the law of retaliation, see also 
above under § 6.1. 
335  California Labor Law Digest 1997, p. 542; Termination of Employment 2000, p. 11,005. 
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participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under 
Title VII or has opposed any unlawful employment practice under Title VII.’336
Title VII provides a so-called BFOQ-defense (bona fide occupational 
qualification-defense). Under this defense, an employer is allowed to 
discriminate in employment on the basis of an employee’s religion, sex, or 
national origin if this ground is a so-called bona fide occupational qualification,
reasonably necessary for the normal operation of a business or enterprise.337 The 
BFOQ-defense, thus, does apply to religion, sex, or national origin only, hence, 
does not apply to race and color,338 or to harassment.339 An example of a BFOQ-
defense based on sex, for example, is if needs of rape victims necessitate to have 
a female security officer available to assist them.340
Harassment has become actionable through federal court decisions. In practice, 
most of discriminatory discharge cases involve sexual harassment cases, i.e. 
quid pro quo harassment cases and/or hostile work environment harassment 
cases.341 The essence of a quid pro quo claim is a ‘play or pay’ bargain by which 
an employee must choose between job benefits or submitting to sexual demands. 
The essence of a hostile work environment case is that an individual must endure 
a work environment that causes psychological – not necessarily economic – 
harm through offensive circumstances.342
As today, sexual orientation or sexual preference – concerning gay men 
and lesbians – is excluded from Title VII. State anti-discrimination legislation 
may include protection as regards sexual orientation.343 Hopkins v. Price 
Waterhouse (1989), on the other hand, is considered as a first victory in respect 
of sexual orientation. In this case, a woman was discriminated against for her 
failure to comply with societal expectations of feminity. In order to become a 
partner of the firm she was advised to walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled and wear jewelry. The US 
336  Player 1988, p. 269; Hardin 1997, p. 23.155-158; Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 649 and 650; 
California Employment Labor Digest, p. 541; Sedmak and Vidas 1997, p. 16; The 1998 National 
Employer, p. 418; Hardage 2002, p. 1. 
337  Under the FEHA, a Californian employer is allowed to discriminate based on a bona fide occupation 
qualification in respect of all discriminatory grounds. Termination of Employment 2000, p. 20,902. 
338  Sedmak and Vidas 1997, p. 35; Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 382; Termination of Employment 
2000, p. 11,003. A BFOQ-defense, however, is rarely available. See Hardin 1997, p. 23.158; Jacobs 
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Sedmak and Vidas 1997, p. 33; Nolo’s Pocket 1997, p. 107; Hardage 2002, p. 2. 
342  Lindemann and Kadue 1996, p. 10; Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 745 and 746; Hardin 1997,  
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Supreme Court held that such employment decisions based on sex-stereotypes 
are actionable under Title VII, because an employer who acts on the basis of a 
belief that a woman must not be aggressive – or that she must – has 
discriminated on the basis of gender, i.e. sex.344
8.3    The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 345
The ADEA applies to private-sector employers who are engaged in industry-
affecting commerce.346 The Act applies to employers with twenty or more 
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in 
the current or preceding year. Public employers are covered, regardless of the 
number of employees.347 The ADEA protects a private-sector employee against 
discriminatory and retaliatory discharge based on age. It, too, bans harassment 
based on age.348 The ADEA, as today, holds no upper age limit.349 Originally, it 
banned discrimination against employees aged 40 to 65. As from 1986, 
however, the ADEA covers all employees over 40. Earlier, in 1978, it already 
converted the upper age of 65 to 70. The rationale behind the age of 40 was that 
practice showed that discrimination in employment, in general, started from this 
age on. Consequently, the Bill particularly mustered support of those whose aim 
was to combat unemployment of elderly employees.350
More specifically, under the ADEA an employer commits an unlawful 
employment practice if he  
‘(1) places an employment notice or advertisement indicating a preference, 
limitation or specification based on age; and/or  
(2) uses an individual’s age as a basis for  
(a) filing or refusing to hire an applicant for employment;  
(b) discharging or disciplining an employee;  
(c) setting an employee’s compensation or other terms, conditions or privileges 
of employment;  
(d) limiting, segregating or classifying an employee or applicant for 
employment in a way that would tend to deprive him/her of an employment 
opportunity or otherwise adversely affect his/her status as an employee; or  
(e) reducing the wage rate of an employee to comply with other requirements of 
the ADEA; and/or  
344  Barber 2002, p. 2 and 3; Hardage 2002, p. 4-6. 
345  29  U.S.C. § 621 et seq. 
346  For the Commerce Clause, see above under § 7.3.2. 
347  Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 545 and 549; California Labor Law Digest 1997, p. 544; Sedmak 
and Vidas 1997, p. 23; The 1998 National Employer, p. 418. 
348  Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 999. For the law of retaliation, see above under § 6.1. 
349  Player 1988, p. 515; Sedmak and Vidas 1997, p. 24; Gerritsen SMA 1995/7/8, p. 433; California 
Labor Law Digest 1997, p. 544; Jacobs 2003, p. 129. 
350  Gerritsen 1995, p. 433. 
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(3) discriminating against – or discharging – an employee, or applicant for 
employment because she/he has filed a charge, testified, assisted or participated 
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or litigation under the ADEA.’351
Like Title VII, the ADEA contains a BFOQ-defense, i.e. allows an employer to 
discriminate in employment on the basis of age if this ground is necessary to the 
normal operation of a business or enterprise. For example, the ADEA allows a 
BFOQ-defense when raised to defend maximum hiring or mandatory retirement 
ages for jobs involving the public’s safety.352 In this respect, state legislation 
may allow for mandatory retirement at age 70 of physicians employed by 
professional medical corporations.353
The ADEA further follows the procedural track of Title VII, but differs in 
respect of its remedies, in that compensatory and punitive damage are not 
allowed under the ADEA. On the other hand, reinstatement, back pay, and 
attorney’s fees, plus front pay until the age of 70 are allowed.354
8.4   The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1974 (PDA) 355
Title VII left room for discussion whether employers could discharge a pregnant 
employee. An amendment of Title VII through the PDA in 1974 gave clarity,356
stating that the term because of or on the basis of sex ‘include, but are not 
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions’,357 herewith resolving an ongoing disagreement between the EEOC 
and the US Supreme Court.358 The EEOC, as from 1972, had maintained that 
employment practices, which adversely affected female employee because of 
pregnancy, constituted sex discrimination under Title VII. The US Supreme 
Court, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert (1976), held the opposite. By enacting 
the PDA as part of Title VII, Congress reversed the holding of this case.359
Subsequently, under the PDA, employers must reinstate women, being 
discharged based on pregnancy.360
351  Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 545, 556 and 557; California Labor Law Digest 1997, p. 544 and 
545; The 1998 National Employer, p. 418; Termination of Employment 2000, p. 11,006-007.
352  For examples, see Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 612; Gerritsen 1995, p. 433; The 2000 
California Employer, p. 47; Termination of Employment 2000, p. 11,008-009. 
353  Gov’t Code § 12941 and 12942. The 2000 California Employer, p. 31 and 47; Berkowitz and Emert 
2001, p. 6. 
354  Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 597, 641, 757, 1206; The 2000 California Employer, p. 40. 
355  42 U.S.C. § 2000k et seq. 
356  Feitshans 1994, p. 120. 
357  Feitshans 1994, p. 126; California Labor Law Digest 1997,  p. 554; Sedmak and Vidas 1997, p. 40 
and 41; Termination of Employment 2000, p. 11,036. 
358  For the EEOC, see below under § 8.6. 
359  Lindemann and Grossman  1997, p. 438-440; Sedmak and Vidas 1997, p. 40 and 41. 
360 California Federal Savings and Loan v. Guerra (1987), 479 U.S. 272, 287. See also Feitshans 1994, 
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 The PDA – being an amendment to Title VII – follows the same track 
as Title VII. In brief, it covers employers, which employ fifteen or more 
employees.361 It prohibits discriminatory and retaliatory discharges, and 
harassment claims. Title VII, too, provides a BFOQ-defense. Particularly 
employers in the airline industry terminate(d) the employment of pregnant 
women, stating that pregnant flight attendants undermine(d) passenger safety. 
As the concurring judges held in Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines (1979), a 
stewardess who is vomiting in the lavatory cannot participate effectively in an 
emergency evacuation.362 On the other hand, the US Supreme Court in Johnson 
Controls (1991) held that in case of so-called fetal protection policies of 
employers this is sex discrimination forbidden under the PDA, i.e. Title VII.363
Also, the PDA follows the procedures and remedies under Title VII.364
Additionally, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) preserves all 
employees’ rights to return to work after a birth or illness, due to pregnancy.365
8.5    The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)366
The ADA replaced the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The latter prohibited 
employers from discriminating against disabled persons. Its scope was 
restricted, in that it applied to employers who had federal contracts or who had 
received federal funding only. The ADA has a broader reach and applies to 
private, state or local government employers. Its scope, in turn, is restricted, in 
that it applies to employers with fifteen or more employees. State legislation, on 
the other hand, may broaden the scope of the ADA. The FEHA, for example, 
includes employers who employ five or more employees.367 In brief, the ADA 
prohibits employers to discriminate against a qualified individual with a 
disability with regard to the hiring procedure, promotions, employment 
terminations, job training, employee’s wages, and other terms and conditions of 
employment.368 Section 107 of the ADA adopts the powers, remedies, and 
procedures set forth under Title VII. Thus, like Title VII, it protects a private-
sector employee against discriminatory and retaliatory discharge and 
harassment.369 Unlike Title VII – and all other federal anti-discrimination 
statutes – the ADA compels an employer to make accommodations, providing 
361  Gardner 2002, p. 7. 
362  Feitshans 1994, p. 123-125, referring to Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 363 (1979). 
363 Johson Controls (1991), 499 U.S. 187, 200. See also Feitshans 1994, p. 128-130. 
364  Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 441. 
365  Feitshans 1994, p. 130 and 131. 
366  42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 
367  The 2000 California Employer, p. 49; Termination of Employment 2000, p. 20,910. 
368  Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 259; Sedmak and Vidas 1997, p. 27; The 1998 National 
Employer, p. 2; Berkowitz and Emert 2001, p. 15; Vargas 2002, p. 2; Termination of Employment 
2000, p. 11,050. 
369  Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 334; California Labor Law Digest 1997,  p. 614; Termination of 
Employment 2000, p. 11,054. 
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that no person can be discriminated against or prevented from equal enjoyment 
of goods, services, facilities and accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation operated by the private sector, because he or she is disabled.370
 An employee is considered as disabled under the ADA if (i) he has a 
physical or mental impairment, which substantially limits one or more of the 
major life activities; (ii) he has a record of such impairment, e.g. an alcoholic;371
or (iii) he is regarded as having such an impairment.372 AIDS and the HIV-
Infection are covered by the ADA. In Bragdon (1998), a sharply divided US 
Supreme Court resolved the question of whether a HIV-infection is a covered 
disability under the ADA. It held that, even in the asymptomatic phase, it is an 
impairment that substantially limits the major life activity of reproduction, and 
consequently is a disability under the ADA.373 State legislation may broaden the 
scope of the ADA. The FEHA, for example, prohibits all employers from 
discriminating based on an employee’s medical condition, including any health 
impairment related to or associated with a diagnosis of cancer, of which a person 
has been rehabilitated or cured, based on competent medical evidence.374
8.6    EEOC 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is charged with 
administering Title VII. Section 705 of Title VII created the EEOC. Meanwhile, 
the EEOC also enforces the ADEA, the PDA, the ADA and the EPA. In brief, 
an employee may file a charge of an employer’s violation of any of the 
foregoing federal anti-discrimination statutes – better known as an unlawful
employment practice – with any EEOC office within 180 days after the violation 
took place.375 If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe discrimination, it is 
required to attempt to conciliate between parties. If conciliation is not 
forthcoming, the EEOC will file a suit in a federal district court on behalf of the 
employee. However, more often it will issue a right-to-sue letter advising the 
employee to file a suit in federal court.376 A civil action must be filed by the 
employee within 90 days of receipt of the statutory notice of right to sue.377
 To answer the question if the EEOC, regardless of its backlog of cases, 
is effective, one can point to its large number of official guidelines that have 
370  California Labor Law Digest 1997, p. 553, 602 and 603 and 613; Lindemann 1997, p. 259; Lav 2002, 
p. 4; Termination of Employment 2000, p. 11,054. 
371  California Labor Law Digest 1997, p. 603; Termination of Employment 2000, p. 11,051; Page 2002, 
p. 7; Lav 2002, p. 4; Khasawneh 2002, p. 1 and 2; Vargas 2002, p. 3; Jacobs 2003, p. 130. 
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373  Jordan 1998, p. 135; Termination of Employment 2000, p. 11,055. 
374  The 2000 California Employer, p. 49; Termination of Employment 2000, p. 20,910. 
375  Player 1988, p. 200 and 201; Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 1205, 1206 and 1217; Sedmak and 
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198.
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persuasive authority, for example, on sex discrimination.378 Also, for example, 
can point at its fiscal year 1998, in which the EEOC resolved 101,470 claims in 
its caseload, received 79,591 new charges, filed 405 lawsuits, and won US$ 92.2 
million in monetary benefits for charging parties.379 As regards the latter, its 
most famous case is regarding Mitsubishi. This Japanese company decided to 
open a branch in the state of Illinois in 1990. In 1996, the EEOC sued the 
company on behalf of 350 women who worked on the assembly line. The 
Japanese managers were accused of sexual harassment, including discharge 
against those who refused, while doing nothing when the women in question 
complained. Mitsubishi eventually agreed to pay US$ 34 million, hence, the 
case became known as one of EEOC’s most successful claims.380
8.7    Disparate treatment and adverse impact 
In general, protection against discrimination under federal anti-discrimination 
statutes can be obtained under (i) the disparate treatment theory; or (ii) the 
adverse impact theory. Disparate treatment cases focus on discriminatory intent, 
adverse impact cases focus on discriminatory results.381
The vast majority in employment termination cases proceed under the 
theory of disparate treatment of which the essence is different treatment. As the 
US Supreme Court in Teamsters v. United States (1977) once held, under the 
disparate treatment theory the employer simply treats some people less 
favorably than others, e.g. based on their race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.382 Thus, the central question is whether the defendant’s actions were 
motivated by discriminatory intent. However, suppose an employer has 
illegitimate and legitimate reasons to discharge an employee. The Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, which amended Title VII gave clarity on these so-called mixed-
motive cases. First, it decided that the plaintiff-employee needs to establish that 
the discriminatory ground is a motivating factor in the employer’s decision. 
Hereupon, the employer bears the burden of persuasion that it would have 
reached the same decision otherwise. Consequently, liability is established only 
if the employer fails herein, in which case the court cannot award damages or 
order reinstatement, but can award attorney’s fees. In this respect, Congress 
overruled Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse (1989), in which the US Supreme Court 
ruled that an employer could avoid all liability in a successful mixed-motive 
case.383 Unlike the disparate treatment theory, the adverse impact theory focuses 
on discriminatory results. The adverse impact theory was introduced by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, codifying the adverse impact principles of Griggs
378  Player 1988, p. 200.  
379  Ivancevich 2001, p. 83 footnote 62. 
380  Press release EEOC of 21 January 1998. See also www.eeoc.gov.  
381  Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 81 and 857. 
382 Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15, 14 FEP 1514 (1977). See also Lindemann and 
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383  Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 40-42; Hardage 2002, p. 4-6; Barber 2002, p. 3. 
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(1971) in a new § 703(k) of Title VII. In Griggs (1971), the US Supreme Court 
held that Congress directed the thrust of Title VII to motivation and the 
consequences of employment practices.384 In adverse impact cases, the EEOC 
generally applies the so-called 80%-rule, i.e. adverse impact is likely to be 
present if a protected group is selected at a rate less than 4/5 (80%) of the 
allegedly preferred counterparts. However, this is only one of the selection 
methods. One single selection method, in general, is not considered enough to 
demonstrate adverse impact.385
8.8    Burden of proof 
In this paragraph, I willl discuss case law under which the employer must come 
forward with a legitimate, that is, a non-discriminatory reason for the dismissal, 
after an employee established a so-called prima facie case of prohibited 
discrimination under the disparate treatment theory. Before discussing this case 
law it should be stressed that, in general, it is easier for an employee to prove 
that the employment practice affected a protected group under Title VII, than for 
an employee to prove discriminatory intent of the employer, which brings me to 
the decision of the United Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas (1973). In this 
case, the US Supreme Court held that the complainant in a Title VII trial – an 
African-American who was laid off in the course of a general reduction in the 
company’s workforce and sought to be rehired – in a disparate treatment case 
must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case
of racial discrimination. This, according to the Court, may be done by showing 
that  
x he belongs to a racial minority;  
x he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was 
seeking applicants; 
x despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and  
x after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s 
qualifications.  
Once the employee has shown a prima facie case, which in principle is not 
difficult to do, the burden shifts to the employer, who needs to show a 
legitimate, that is, a non-discriminatory reason for the dismissal, to rebut the 
inference of discrimination. Once the employer meets this burden of production, 
384  Griggs (1971), 401 U.S. 424, 432. See also Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 81. 
385  Griggs(1971), 401 U.S. 424, 430-432. Player 1988, p. 228 and 229, 356 and 357; Goldman 1996,  
p. 160 and 161; Hardin 1997, p. 23.154-155; Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 81; Jacobs 2003,  
p. 124 and 125. 
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the US Supreme Court held that the burden shifts back to the employee to show 
that the reason stated by the employer was pretext.386
The foregoing became known as the McDonnell Douglas test, meanwhile, 
applied in other federal anti-discrimination disparate treatment cases as well.387
McDonnell Douglas (1973), however, left the question unanswered what would 
happen after the employee would have made clear that the reason stated by the 
employer was pretext.  
Subsequently, in Burdine (1981), the US Supreme Court made clear 
that the ultimate burden of proving discrimination rests with the employee. In 
Burdine (1981), a female alleged that her employer discriminated against her 
because of her sex in denying her a promotion and later terminating her. With 
reference to McDonnell Douglas (1973), the Burdine Court held that the 
plaintiff-employee has the burden of proving the evidence of a prima facie case 
of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff-employee succeeds in proving the 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection. Third, should the 
defendant-employer carry this burden, the plaintiff-employee must then have an 
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate 
reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for 
discrimination.388 The employee may succeed in this either (i) directly by 
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the 
employer; or (ii) indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered 
explanation is unworthy of credence.389
In Hicks (1993), however, the US Supreme Court made clear that a judgment 
should not automatically be entered for the employee when he has proven 
pretext of the reason stated by the employer. In this case, an African-American 
employee claimed that he has been discharged because of his race, and could 
prove that the non-discriminatory reasons given by the employer were false. The 
Eighth Circuit decided that in such a case the plaintiff-employee was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  
The US Supreme Court reversed the decision. In brief, it ruled that to 
the extent there is a triable question of falsity, this does not necessarily mean 
that there is a triable question of discrimination under the statute. An employer 
who discharges an older black worker because the worker is black does not 
violate the ADEA. The employee’s race is an improper reason, but it is improper 
386 McDonnell Douglas (1973), 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824. See also Goldman 1996, p. 50, 328-335; 
Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 13-17; Termination of Employment 2000, p. 12,101; Derum and 
Engle 2003, p. 4. 
387  For case law in this respect, see Hicks (1993), 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2757 among which alleged age 
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388 Burdine (1981), 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093; Hicks (1993), 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2757. See also Lindemann and 
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389 Burdine (1981), 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095. See alsoDerum and Engle 2003, p. 4. 
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under Title VII, not under the ADEA. Thus, when the plaintiff-employee 
initiates an ADEA action, claiming he has been discriminated against because of 
his age, and the employer claims that he dismissed the employee, because he 
was black, he has given a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason under the 
McDonnell Douglas test.390 In effect, the US Supreme Court held the same in 
Hicks (1993) as in Burdine (1981), regarding the burden of proof. In this respect, 
the Hicks Court held that  
‘But the Court of Appeals’ holding that rejection of the defendant’s proffered 
reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff, disregards the fundamental 
principle of Rule 301 that a presumption does not shift the burden of proof, 
[and] ignores our repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times 
bears the ultimate burden of persuasion.’391
The dissenting judges in Hicks (1993) in this respect held that the Court, in 
effect, repeated the truism that the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving 
discrimination, without ever facing the practical question of how the plaintiff 
without such direct evidence can meet this burden. In their opinion, Burdine
(1981) provided the answer, telling that a plaintiff-employee may succeed in 
meeting his ultimate burden of proving discrimination, either directly by 
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the 
employer, or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is 
unworthy of credence,392 upon which the court must enter judgment for the 
plaintiff-employee. I agree.393
Overall, it can be said that the employer’s non-discriminatory reason 
under McDonnell Douglas test does not need to constitute just cause. 
Nevertheless, the test provides some constraint on arbitrary action by employers, 
in that under McDonnell Douglas (1973) and in its progeny Burdine (1981) and 
Hicks (1993), the reason stated by the employer remains subject to scrutiny to 
determine whether it is the real reason or only a pretext.394 For example, when 
an employer’s motive for a dismissal is disputed on grounds of age 
discrimination, the employer cannot simply argue that it decided to downsize. 
Rather, the employer must address how it determined which employees to 
terminate, and which to retain.395
390  Goldman 1996, p. 150; Lindemann and Grossman 1997, p. 22-37 and 41 and 42; Termination of 
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391 Hicks (1993), 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749. 
392  Justices Souter, White, Blackmun, Stevens dissenting. See Hicks (1993), 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2761 and 
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394  Theodore St. Antoine 2001, p. 7. 
395  Berkowitz and Emert 2001, p. 6 referring to Guz (2000), 24 Cal. 4th, 317, 358. 
67
8.9    Conclusion 
Federal anti-discrimination law could develop, due to slavery. In brief, Title VII, 
the ADEA, the PDA and the ADA prohibit employers to discharge, harass 
and/or retaliate private-sector employees based on race, color, sex, religion and 
national origin (Title VII), age (ADEA), pregnancy (PDA), and disability 
(ADA). Private-sector employees can obtain protection under these acts, either 
under the disparate treatment theory that focuses on discriminatory intent, or the 
adverse impact theory that focuses on discriminatory results. Overall, the 
aforementioned statutes prohibit discharge for specified discriminatory reasons 
only. Hence, federal anti-discrimination statutes do not provide protection 
against arbitrary dismissal in general. Also, the McDonnell Douglas test that the 
US Supreme Court has introduced under federal anti-discrimination law to 
relieve the burden of proof for plaintiff-employees in disparate treatment cases, 
has not created just cause protection. Under this test, an employer can rebut the 
inference of discrimination by bringing forward a legitimate – that is a non-
discriminatory – reason. The latter, however, does not need to constitute just 
cause. It merely needs to be a reason that does not fall within the statute’s 
definition of discrimination.  
9  State statutory law 
9.1        Montana 
Montana is the only state which has enacted a general statute that requires a 
good cause for dismissal.396 The Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act 
(WDFEA) provides non-probationary employees protection against discharge 
without good cause.397 This is unique, as an explicit good cause rule is nowhere 
to be found under common law, neither in Montana, nor in any other state.398
Montana thereby became the first state in the United States that chose to modify 
by statute the termination-at-will doctrine of employment, which exists 
throughout the United States.399
 With the good cause standard the Montana legislature recognized that 
the statutory at-will presumption leaves employees overly vulnerable.400
Nevertheless, employers sought the adoption of a statute governing unjust 
discharges, due to the uncertainties of judicially developed law, and the 
396  Schramm 1990, p. 95. 
397  Cottone 2002, p. 7.   
398  Cottone 2002, p. 7. 
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1996, p. 376; Jarsulic 1999, p. 2;  Moberly 1999, p. 11; Cottone 2002, p. 7; Corbett 2003, p. 13; 
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exposure to large damage awards and legal expenses induced.401 Particularly, in 
the late 1970s, state supreme courts throughout the United States began to reject 
the previously dominant presumption of at-will employment by creating 
exceptions to the at-will rule known as wrongful discharge law.402 Montana, 
hereupon, articulated one of the broadest versions of the judicial exception of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,403 allowing plaintiff-
employees to claim punitive damages in a contractual relationship.404 Moreover, 
it read a job security into the exception.405 Subsequently, employers with 
effective lobbying organizations decided to seek legislative change in the law.406
Hence, the WDFEA was primarily reacting to an employer backlash against new 
doctrines under case law that provided just cause protection.407  By means of 
trade-off, the WDFEA included a good cause provision. However, it, too, put a 
cap on damages and preempted common law remedies that were previously 
successfully sought in Montana courts.408 In the following parargraphs, I will 
examine to what extent private-sector employees enjoy just cause protection 
under the WDFEA. 
9.2     Case law prior to 1987 
In this paragraph, I will examine case law in Montana prior to the Act. This is 
necessary for an understanding of the WDFEA. Moreover, case law prior to 
1987 may serve as a guideline for state courts that desire to provoke legislative 
action,409 hence, the WDFEA may serve as a model for state legislatures 
considering legislation in this area one day.410 In Montana, the first wrongful 
discharge case was Gates (1982), also known as Gates I. In this case, a private-
sector employee was terminated from a clerical position without advance 
warning, and was pressured into signing a letter of resignation. By not following 
its own written policies for discharging employees, the Montana Supreme Court 
concluded that the employer had violated the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing with the employee.411 Although the Montana Supreme Court held 
that the personnel manual was not itself an enforceable contract – it had not been 
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402  For a discussion of the common law exceptions to the at-will rule, see below under § 10.4. 
403  Leonard 1988, p. 15. 
404  Schramm 1990, p. 99. For an in-depth discussion of this exception to the at-will rule, see below under 
§ 10.4.3. 
405  See below under § 9.2. 
406  Schramm 1990, p. 108; Bierman, Vinton and Youngblood 1993, p. 371; Jarsulic 1999. For the 
legislative history of the WDFEA, also see below under § 9.3.1. 
407  Schramm 1990, p. 95. 
408  Robinson 1996, p. 376. 
409 Leonard 1988, p. 15; Robinson 1996, p. 377; Jarsulic 1999, p. 2 and 3; Cottone 2002, p. 3; Corbett 
2003, p. 13. 
410 Leonard 1988, p. 16; Bierman and Youngblood 1992, p. 54 and 55. 
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issued until two years after Gates was hired – the employer’s unilateral 
publication of certain procedures with regard to terminations created a standard 
of conduct by which the employer’s good faith should be measured.412 The case 
was revolutionary, because the Montana Supreme Court for the first time 
recognized an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment 
contracts as an exception to the at-will rule.413 Initially, Montana courts, as from 
the 1960s, recognized the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
relationships involving insurance companies and their insured only. In fact, until 
the late 1970s, courts had refused to extend any such covenant out of that 
context.414 As Schramm stresses, Gates I meant a major break from the old era 
of Montana employment law, which was dominated from early statehood by the 
statutory presumption that employment was an at-will relationship, which either 
party could end without cause upon a moment’s notice.415
 Already, in Keneally (1980), the Montana Supreme Court 
acknowledged a wrongful discharge claim. The Court, however, dismissed the 
claim. Nevertheless, it unanimously held – referring to the growing tendency of 
the judicial system to grant relief to persons who have been abusively or 
wrongfully discharged – that in a proper case a cause for wrongful discharge 
could be made by an employee.416 Subsequently, in Nye (1982), in which a 
public employee was involved, the Montana Supreme Court held that an 
employer’s violation of written personnel policies may provide a basis for a 
wrongful termination claim.417
In Gates (1983), known as Gates II, the Court extended the scope of the good 
faith covenant in the employment context, recognizing the breach of a covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing as a tort action, hence, allowing punitive damages. 
In effect, it followed the landmark case of Cleary (1980) of the California Court 
of Appeal.418 However, in 1988, the California Supreme Court in the landmark 
case of Foley (1988) held that the good faith covenant could sound in contract 
only, i.e. contract damages could be awarded only. By that time, Montana had 
already adopted the WDFEA, due to the decisions of the Montana Supreme 
Court in Gates I and II, and the  following cases extending the good faith 
covenant even further, starting with Dare (1984).419
In the latter, the Montana Supreme Court read a job security into the 
covenant. It allowed private-sector employees an action under the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, based on the employer’s oral and 
412 Leonard 1988, p. 14. 
413 Hubble 1987, p. 194; Leonard 1988, p. 14; Schramm 1990, p. 96. 
414 Hubble 1987, p. 193. 
415 Schramm 1990, p. 94 and 95. 
416 Leonard 1988, p. 14. 
417 Leonard 1988, p. 14 and 15; Regan 1995, p. 587. 
418  For Cleary (1980), see below under § 10.4.3. 
419  Hubble 1987, p. 194; Schramm 1990, p. 96 and 99. For an in-depth discussion of Foley (1988), see 
below under § 12.2.4. 
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unintended objective manifestations of job security. The Court took into 
consideration factors as a positive performance appraisal, and a salary increase 
based on which the employee had reason to believe that her job was secure so 
long as she performed satisfactorily.420 Subsequently, in Crenshaw (1984), the 
Montana Supreme Court extended the covenant to probationary employees. It 
held that unintended objective manifestations could be implied from the 
employee’s inclusion in a benefit program reserved for permanent employees 
only.421  The Court hereupon found that the employer had breached the covenant 
by relying on false charges that it should have investigated when it terminated 
the private-sector employee.422 Also, in Kerr (1987), the Montana Supreme 
Court found that unintended manifestations of job security as promotions and 
pay increases made it reasonable for a private-sector employee to believe that 
she had job security. It awarded a front pay over a period of five and a half 
years, the length of Kerr’s employment.423
The Montana Supreme Court seemed willing to restrict the expanding cause of 
action of good faith and fair dealing in the non-labor case of Nicholson (1985).
For a breach of the covenant it required a party to act arbitrarily, capriciously or 
unreasonably in order to imply a good faith covenant. Moreover, in Maxwell 
(1986), a federal court held that a private-sector employee had to prove that the 
employer had committed a breach of contract. In Nordlund (1987), the Montana 
Supreme Court affirmed this decision.424
Consistently, in Flanigan (1986), the Montana Supreme Court held that 
an employer breached the good faith covenant, and upheld an extraordinary 
damage award of $1.3 million as punitive damages, $94,000 in economic 
damages, and $100,000 for emotional distress. An expert testimony pointed out 
that the company had violated its own enforceable personnel policies regarding 
job security and job rights thirteen times when it terminated an employee who 
had performed satisfactorily for 28 years, and had failed to give the employee 
notice or a hearing or to recall her to fill vacant positions. The fact that the 
company subsequently changed its position as regards the reason for termination 
before and during the trial – evidently terminating her for a discriminatory 
purpose – had a negative impact on the case.425
420  Hubble 1987, p. 194; Leonard 1988, p. 15; Schramm 1990, p. 96. 
421  Leonard 1988, p. 15; Schramm 1990, p. 96. 
422  Hubble 1987, p. 194; Leonard 1988, p. 15. 
423  Leonard 1988, p. 15.  
424  Schramm 1990, p. 96-99. 
425  Hubble 1987, p. 195-197. 
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9.3  Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act of 1987 
(WDFEA)  
9.3.1 Legislative history 
At the end of the 1980s, employers and employees were in a state of confusion 
about Montana employment termination law.426 It was the decision in Flanigan 
(1986), in particular, that caused employers and insurance companies in 
Montana to decide to form the Montana Liability Coalition, and to turn for 
advice to the Montana Association of Defense Counsel. To a large extent this 
Counsel was made up of lawyers who defended employers and insurance 
companies. This cooperation resulted in a draft, which after some reworking, 
became the Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act of 1987.427 The 
WDFEA of 1987, as Regan states was 
‘(…) a response to two forces: First, employers and insurance companies 
sought to “reduce the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow” in order to 
eliminate unreasonably large wrongful discharge awards and marginal 
wrongful discharge claims. Second, due to the Montana Supreme Court’s 
unpredictable interpretation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, the drafters of WDFEA sought to provide certainty to employment 
discharge law in Montana.’428
The first draft on the side of the employers and the insurance companies 
incorporated the general principle that only lengthy employment entitled an 
employee to good cause protection from arbitrary discharge. The draft mandated 
that employees with five years seniority could only be terminated for good 
cause. Moreover, the Bill prohibited any discharge made in retaliation for the 
employee’s refusal to violate public policy or for reporting a violation of public 
policy.429
The legislature was able to make the Bill more favorable for 
employees.430 First, it expanded protections against wrongful discharge to cover 
any non-probationary employee, rather than only those who had been with an 
employer five years or more.431 Second, discharges in violation of an employer’s 
written personnel policies were made actionable.432 Last, the legislature 
expanded the amount of damages recoverable by a wrongfully discharged 
426  Leonard 1988, p. 15; Schramm 1990, p. 106. 
427  Schramm 1990, p. 108 and 109; Jarsulic 1999, p. 2. 
428  Regan 1995, p. 585. See also Schramm 1990, p. 110. 
429  Schramm 1990, p. 108 and 109. 
430  Berks points out the significant role of the legislature in offering bargaining power towards 
employers. Berks 2000, p. 14. 
431  Schramm 1990, p. 109. 
432  This was already common law. Schramm 1990, p. 109 and 110; Regan 1995, p. 587; Cottone 2002, 
p. 7. 
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employee from a maximum of two years, to four years’ wages.433 Although with 
the four-year cap the legislature was of the opinion that it protected employers 
from unreasonably large damage awards on the one hand, and that it 
compensated discharged employees during their search for new employment on 
the other,434 the latter caused a debate with regard to old-age employees. The 
argument was that these employees, contrary to younger discharged employees, 
would face significant barriers in the job market when searching for alternate 
employment, and generally remain unemployed longer than any other age 
group.435
The WDFEA was signed by the Governor of Montana on 11 May 1987. It went 
into force on 1 July 1987 as part of the Montana Annotated Code.436 The 
WDFEA contains 15 Sections (39-2-901 to 915 in 2004), i.e. § 901 (title); § 902 
(purpose); § 903 (definitions); § 904 (wrongful discharge); § 905 (exclusivity);  
§ 906 to 910 (reserved); § 911 (procedures); § 912 (exemptions); § 913 
(remedies); § 914 and § 915 (arbitration). With this Act, the legislature met the 
interests of employers and employees. A point of discussion, however, still is 
whether the WDFEA properly balances the rights of employers and 
employees,437 after the legislature agreed to make the WDFEA the exclusive
remedy for a wrongful discharge.438 Put differently, someone wrongfully 
discharged after 1 July 1987439 and covered by the WDFEA can no longer 
initiate a common law cause of action.440 While such a trade-off had been 
probably necessary for wrongful discharge legislation to achieve ‘political 
acceptability’ and to be enacted, in effect, it deprives employees of common law 
actions.441
 Consequently, Parker points out that armed with a just cause standard to 
entice employee interest groups, Montana employers successfully extinguished 
magnanimous jury awards by restricting recovery to a showing of no ‘good 
cause’, limiting compensatory damages to lost wages, and raising the level of 
proof for punitive damages.442 In fact, a significant number of people is still of 
the opinion that the WDFEA had done a great disservice to the employees of 
Montana with regard to the exemption of common law actions and the cap on 
433  Schramm 1990, p. 110. 
434  Regan 1995, p. 586. 
435  Regan 1995, p. 599 and 600. 
436  Schramm 1990, p. 113. 
437  Robinson 1996, p. 421. 
438  Schramm 1990, p. 110; Regan 1995, p. 585 and 586. 
439  When an employee is notified of its termination before 1 July 1987, however, dismissed after this 
date, the WDFEA does not apply. This was decided by the Montana Supreme Court in Martin 
(1990). See Bierman and Youngblood 1992, p. 69. 
440  This comes forward out of Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-902 and 913 (2004). See also Schramm 1990,  
p. 110; Peck 1991, p. 14;  Bierman and Youngblood 1992, p. 68. 
441  Bierman, Vinton and Youngblood 1993, p. 371. 
442  Parker 1995, p. 10 and 11. See also Bennett 1996, p. 121; Corbett 2003, p. 12. 
73
damages.443 Bierman and Youngblood, on the other hand, are of the opinion that 
the wrongful discharge law in Montana created a considerable degree of 
certainty for both employers and employees. It subsidized a better business 
climate by limiting damages and the ability of employees to bring common law 
actions on the one hand, and established that employers would generally no 
longer be able to discharge an employee without cause on the other.444
9.3.2 Constitutionality 
The fact that the WDFEA deprived private-sector employees from common law 
actions induced employees to challenge the constitutionality of the WDFEA. 
Meech (1989) was the first case in this respect. Meech, an employee, claimed 
that the WDFEA deprived him of his right to full legal redress under common 
law, established under Article II, Section 16 of the Montana Constitution, 
commonly referred to as the full legal redress clause.445 The WDFEA survived 
this constitutional challenge. First, the Montana Supreme Court stressed that 
there is no constitutional guarantee on job security. Second, the legislature has 
the authority to provide a substitute for a common law rule.446 Third, in 
overturning an earlier decision, the Montana Supreme Court choose not to test 
the WDFEA on the, heavier, compelling state interest test but on the rational 
basis test meeting a legitimate state interest.447 With this lower standard the 
Montana Supreme Court could uphold the constitutionality of the Act. In this 
respect, the Court held that the WDFEA was rationally related to legitimate state 
interests based on  
x the negative effect that wrongful discharge cases could have of 
discouraging employers from locating their businesses in Montana;  
x the positive effect of the Act, alleviating unreasonable financial 
threats to Montana employers; and  
x the positive effect of the Act, providing a reasonably substitute for 
the common law causes of action that it abrogated, including good 
cause protection for employees.448
In Johnson v. State (1989), the constitutionality of the WDFEA was challenged 
a second time. An employee asserted that no compelling state interest had been 
shown by the legislature to justify the deprivation of common law rights. With 
reference to Meech (1989), the Montana Supreme Court confirmed that the state 
443  Bierman, Vinton and Youngblood 1993, p. 379. 
444  Bierman and Youngblood 1992, p. 55-57. 
445  Schramm 1990, p. 112; Bierman and Youngblood 1992, p. 54-55; Barber 1993, p. 5. 
446  Robinson 1996, p. 378. 
447  Robinson 1996, p. 378. Footnote 9 holds the cases that were overruled by Meech (1989).
448  Bierman and Youngblood 1992, p. 55-57. 
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legislature had the power to alter common law cause of actions and remedies, 
without the need of demonstrating a compelling state interest.449
Subsequently, in Allmaras (1991), the constitutional challenge by 
plaintiff-employees was dismissed for lack of standing. Plaintiffs argued that the 
cap on damages violated the right of juries to determine damages. In effect, the 
jury left this question unanswered. The jury found that the plaintiffs were not 
wrongfully discharged and, therefore, they were not affected by the cap. Second, 
plaintiffs argued that bargaining-unit employees were exempted under Section 
912(2) of the Act, lacking common law remedies. With this, they argued, the 
WDFEA violated the equal protection clause of the Montana Constitution. In 
reply, the Court stressed that common law remedies, in principle, were not 
available to bargaining-unit employees before the Act either.450 Overall, 
although Allmaras (1991) left the first question unanswered, the constitutionality 
of the Act is considered to be well-established since Meech (1989).451
9.3.3 Scope 
The scope of the WDFEA is limited to employees. Independent contractors are 
exempted under Section 903. The latter prescribes an employee as a person who 
works for another for hire. Courts apply the common law  right-to-control test to 
determine whether a worker is an employee under the WDFEA, or an 
independent contractor.452
Initially, public employees were excluded as well. Until 1991, Section 
2-9-111 of the Montana Code Annotated held that governmental entities were 
immune to suits for their actions. Hence, suits of public employees against their 
employers under the WDFEA were not permitted. In a 1991 amendment of the 
Montana Code Annotated,453 the legislature made it possible for public 
employees to bring an action under the WDFEA to the extent that these suits are 
not statutorily preempted under Section 912(1).454 The latter exempts from 
coverage any discharge claim subject to another state or federal statute, which 
provides a procedure for challenging the discharge and/or provides a remedy for 
such a discharge.455 In practice, public employees generally enjoy good cause 
protection under a constitution and/or a statute, thus, generally lose their claim 
under the WDFEA under this Section.456
Additionally, the legislature exempted two categories of employees from 
coverage under Section 912(2) of the WDFEA. These are employees who did 
449  Barber 1993, p. 5. See also Bierman and Youngblood 1992, p. 54 and 57. 
450  Bierman and Youngblood 1992, p. 57-59. For case law in this respect, see below under § 9.3.3. 
451  Bierman and Youngblood 1992, p. 73. 
452  For the common law test, see above under § 7.3.2. 
453  Mont. Code Ann. § 2-9-111(c)(ii)(1991). See also Bierman and Youngblood 1992, p. 71. 
454  Bierman and Youngblood 1992, p. 71; Bennett 1996, p. 123. 
455  Regan 1995, p. 589. 
456  Bennett 1996, p. 123. 
75
not have a wrongful discharge action under common law before the enactment 
of the WDFEA either.457
First, employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement were 
excluded from common law actions under Brinkman (1986), affirmed in Fellows
(1990).458 The rationale behind this exemption was that contractual grievance 
procedures in collective bargaining agreements were considered effective and 
efficient forums for dispute settlements. Based on Lingle (1988), however, a 
bargaining unit employee may file a state claim before court, when it concerns a 
wrongful discharge tort claim that needs no interpretation of the collective 
bargaining agreement.459 Second, employees covered by an employment 
agreement for a definite period are excluded under Section 912(2). They are 
subject to the common law rule, which holds that a contract for a specific term 
automatically expires after termination of the period.460 This means that an 
employer does not have to show good cause when the contract is ‘terminated’, 
nor is he obliged to renew the contract after expiration, unless the contract 
determines otherwise.461 In contrast, when the employer terminates the contract 
during the period other than for good cause, the employee may file a suit in 
court based on breach of contract and ask for contract damages. The foregoing 
raises the question whether this means that an employer may enter into a 
contract for a specific term to establish that the WDFEA does not apply. The 
answer is positive. In Farris 1992, the Montana Supreme Court held that 
nothing in the WDFEA forbids parties from entering into a contract for a 
definite period, either or not with the aim to avoid renewing specific term 
contracts without a showing of good cause.462
9.3.4 Contents 
Section 904 of the WDFEA determines that a discharge is wrongful if  
x the employer retaliates the employee for refusal to violate public 
policy or for reporting a violation of public policy;  
x the discharge is not for good cause and the employee has completed 
the employer’s probationary period of employment; or  
x the employer violates express provisions of its own written 
personnel policy.463
457  Schramm 1990, p. 111; Regan 1995, p. 589. 
458  Robinson 1996, p. 401. 
459  Schramm 1990, p. 99 and 100; Robinson 1996, p. 401. See also above under § 7.2. 
460  Schramm 1990, p. 111. 
461  Termination of Employment 2000, Montana, § 20,100, p. 25,317 (December 1997). Leonard 1988,  
p. 16. 
462  Robinson 1996, p. 402; Bennett 1996, p. 122; Jarsulic 1999, p. 3. 
463  Schramm 1990, p. 110; Barber 1993, p. 4; Parker 1995, p. 10; Jarsulic 1999, p. 3; Cottone 2002, p. 7. 
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The good cause provision will be discussed in-depth in the next paragraph. 
Hence, I will now concentrate on the public policy exception and the handbook 
exception. In brief, under Section 903, public policy means a policy which is in 
effect at the time of the discharge, concerning the public health, safety, or 
welfare established by constitutional provision, statute, or administrative rule.464
In Wadsworth (1996), the Montana Supreme Court, citing Gantt (1992), a 
California case, added that public policy, too, must involve a matter that affects 
society at large, rather than a purely personal or proprietary interest of the 
plaintiff-employee or employer. In addition, the policy must be fundamental, 
substantial, and well-established at the time of discharge.465 As regards the 
handbook exception under the WDFEA, Montana, in fact, became the first state 
to hold by statute that written personnel policies were enforceable, i.e. legally 
binding, and that employer violation of written personnel policies were 
unlawful.466 Unclear under the WDFEA, however, is whether an at-will 
disclaimer in a handbook can negate good cause protection. In Prout (1989), the 
Montana Supreme Court considered a waiver valid that the employee had signed 
and was developed by the employer to protect him against implied covenant of 
good faith claims. Prout (1989), however, was still governed by case law prior 
to the WDFEA.467
 Under Section 905, the employee in case of a wrongful discharge can 
ask for damages, which are restricted to lost wages and fringe benefits468 for a 
period not to exceed 4 years from the date of discharge.469 The award of four 
years’ economic losses is not mandatory, however. Also, less or even zero can 
be granted, in that an employee has a duty to mitigate damages. For example, 
when an employee turns down a new job offer, he may be awarded less for the 
earnings the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence (Tyner, 
1995).470 A significant difference with the remedies prior to the WDFEA is that 
after 1 July 1987, punitive damages are no longer available for violation of the 
employment contract, a clear reaction to the excessive punitive damages 
awarded in Flanigan (1986). To the extent punitive damages are available, this 
is possible only when it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the 
employer engaged in actual fraud or actual malice in the discharge of the 
employee, in retaliation for the employee’s refusal to violate public policy or for 
reporting a violation of public policy.471 Other remedies than those under the 
464  Robinson 1996, p. 390 and 391. 
465  Robinson 1996, p. 391 and 392. 
466  Bierman and Youngblood 1992, p. 71; Bierman, Vinton and Youngblood 1993, p. 376; Regan 1995, 
p. 587.
467  Schramm 1990, p. 104 and 117. 
468  Fringe benefits is defined in the WDFEA under Section 903 as ‘the value of any employer-paid 
vacation leave, sick leave, medical insurance plan, disability insurance plan, life insurance plan, and 
pension benefit plan into force on the date of the termination’. 
469  Parker 1995, p. 10. 
470  Robinson 1996, p. 396 and 397; Jarsulic 1999, p. 3. 
471  Leonard 1988, p. 16; Bierman, Vinton and Youngblood 1993, p. 371 and 373. 
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WDFEA are exempted under Section 913. An exception to this rule was made in 
Beasly (1993). In this case, the Montana Supreme Court held that an employee 
can claim damages, besides those mentioned under the WDFEA, in case of 
breach of contract that occurred prior to and independent of the discharge. In 
this case the employee was promised, but never given his stock options.472
Last, Section 911 holds the procedure that must be followed under the Act when 
wrongfully discharged. Under this Section, an action under the Act must be filed 
within one year after the date of discharge, which begins upon notification of 
termination.473 Previously, the employee has to exhaust written internal appeals 
procedures in order to file a lawsuit under the Act.474 On the other hand, the 
employee must be informed of the existence of these procedures, within seven 
days of the discharge. If the employer fails to do so, the employee does not need 
to exhaust written internal appeals procedures in order to file a lawsuit under the 
Act. An employer’s failure to give notice is excused when the employee files 
suit on the very day of discharge.475 The rationale behind Section 911 is to give 
the employer a chance to gather information and to eventually reverse the 
decision. Also, it aims to reduce the period of uncertainty for the employer, 
because internal grievance procedures usually require an employee to file a 
claim within a certain time frame.476 Bennett acknowledged that this provision, 
indeed, makes an employer think twice. On the other hand, he states, the internal 
procedure may prove to be just another hurdle for the employee seeking redress 
for wrongful discharge.477
 Subsequently, once a lawsuit has been properly filed under the 
WDFEA, the Sections 914 and 915 encourage the use of arbitration by using the 
threat of imposition of attorney fees and costs. It, thus, does not compel 
arbitration.478  In brief, these Sections determine that either the employer or the 
employee may make a written offer to arbitrate within 60 days after a complaint 
is made under the Act. This offer needs to be accepted in writing within 30 days 
after the date that the offer is made. If the employer does not accept the 
employee’s offer, and the employee wins the case, the employee is entitled to 
reasonable attorney fees as from the date of the offer. Conversely, if the 
employee refuses to accept the employer’s offer, and the employer wins the 
case, the employer is entitled to reasonable attorney fees as from the date of the 
offer.479 If both decide to litigate, parties have to pay their own attorney fees.480
472  Robinson 1996, p. 403 and 404. 
473  For example, see Martin (1990), Walch (1993), Redfern (1995), overruling Allison (1992). See also 
Robinson 1996, p. 398 and 399. 
474  Cottone 2002, p. 7. 
475  For example, see Hoffman (1992). See also Robinson 1996, p. 399 and 400. 
476  Leonardo 1988, p. 16; Schramm 1990, p. 118. 
477  Bennett 1996, p. 123. 
478  Bierman, Vinton and Youngblood 1993, p. 373 and 374. See also above under § 6.3. 
479  Jarsulic 1999, p. 3. 
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9.3.5 Good cause provision 
As regards the statutory definition of good cause under the WDFEA, it bears 
mentioning that in Medicine Horse (1991), the Montana Supreme Court still 
held that the good cause provision in the WDFEA did not nullify the at-will rule 
set forth in Section 39-2-503 of the Montana Code.481 In Whidden (1999),
however, the Montana Supreme Court reversed its decision and held that the 
WDFEA, by providing that an employer may not discharge an employee without 
good cause, has effectively eliminated at-will employment and impliedly 
repealed Section 39-2-503. Subsequently, the 2001 legislature codified the 
holding of Whidden (1999) by explicitly repealing the at-will Section of the 
Montana statute.482
9.3.5.1  Statutory definition 
Section 904 holds that a discharge is wrongful if the discharge is not for good 
cause, provided the employee had completed the employer’s probationary period 
of employment. Hence, before one is able to discuss the good cause standard, 
the question what constitutes a probationary period needs answering first. All 
the more so, when one realizes that during this period the employment may be 
terminated at will.  
The WDFEA does not define the probationary period. The Act, in other 
words, leaves the length of the employee’s probationary period to the discretion 
of the employer. In fact, it allows the employer to establish the length of the 
probationary period from a few days to a few years; in the most extreme case the 
employer may even keep an employee perpetually on probation.483 The reason 
for the legislature not to define the probationary period is, that it did not want to 
upset the probationary period systems.484 In 2001, the legislature partially met 
this problem through an amendment of Section 904 of the WDFEA. Under this 
Section, the legislature assumes that there is a probationary period of six months 
from the date of hire, when an employer does not establish a specific 
probationary period or provides that there is no probationary period prior to, or 
at the time of the hire.   
481  Robinson 1996, p. 379 and 380. 
482 Whidden (1999), 981 P.2d 271, 275. 
483  Schramm 1990, p. 116 and 117; Bierman, Vinton and Youngblood 1993, p. 377; Bennett 1996,  
p. 122; Jarsulic 1999, p. 3. 
484  Schramm 1990, p. 116 footnote 134. 
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More specifically, the WDFEA defines good cause as 
‘(…) reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to 
satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the employer’s operation, or 
other legitimate business reason.’485
At first sight, the good cause standard under the WDFEA is an equivalent of the 
just cause standard as is common in collective bargaining agreements, implicitly 
referring to (in)capacity, (mis)conduct and operational requirements of the 
undertaking.486 Also, like in arbitral proceedings, incapacity and misconduct 
results in good cause only when this has been documented by the employer, and 
resulted in warnings that discharge would occur if improvement was not seen.487
The WDFEA is unclear about what constitutes other legitimate business reason,
though. From legislative history, it can be derived that this phrasing is to afford 
employers the discretion to make employment decisions, due to lack of work or 
elimination of the job. However, this definition is already subsuming the other 
two phrases in the definition ‘a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties’ and 
‘disruption of the employer’s operation’.488 Hence, a plain reading of the 
WDFEA and a study of its spare legislative history does not clarify the term 
other legitimate business reason. There is one exeption. The WDFEA, as from 
1993, determines that the legal use of a lawful product by an individual of the 
employer’s premises during non-working hours is not a legitimate business 
reason, unless the employer acts within the provisions of 39-2-313(3) or (4) of 
the Montana Code.489 In brief, employees who smoke or drink alcoholic 
beverages are granted protection from discharge in case of legal use of these 
products during non-working hours. The WDFEA, nonetheless, allows 
employers to impose limits or prohibit employment of smokers or drinkers of 
alcoholic beverages because of job-related responsibilities or bona fide 
occupational requirements, or because of conflict with the purposes of a non-
profit organization.490
 The legislature further, thus, left it to the courts to determine what 
constitutes other legitimate business reason. In Cecil (1990) and Buck (1991),
the Montana Supreme Court gave clarity. In Cecil (1990), the Court held that the 
elimination of a position, due to business needs, being an economic reason, 
constitutes a legitimate business reason. In this case, a 57-year-old top 
executive, after having been promoted as company executive vice president, was 
dismissed without any prior warning or indication of poor performance. The 
485  Section 903. The Montana Supreme Court earlier defined ‘good cause’ as such in Koepplin (1994).
See Cottone 2002, p. 7 footnote 173. See further Parker 1995, p. 10. 
486  Leonard 1988, p. 16. 
487  For example, see Peter (1990), and Miller (1992). See also Robinson 1996, p. 389 and 394. 
488  Schramm 1990, p. 110. 
489  See also Schramm 1990, p. 116;  Bierman and Youngblood 1992, p. 59. 
490  Robinson 1996, p. 389. 
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reason  for the employer to terminate the employee was an anticipated decline in 
the price of crude oil that would result in less production and cutbacks on 
expenditures. Cecil admitted that when he was terminated, crude oil prices were 
indeed falling. In reply, Cecil argued that his employer did not act fairly or 
honestly when claiming economic necessity. The Montana Supreme Court held 
that it is well-settled under case law prior to the Act that economic conditions 
constitute a ‘legitimate business reason’.491 It stressed that an employer should 
not be foreclosed from engaging in legitimate reductions in force, necessary to 
maintain the company’s economic vitality.492 Subsequently, in Buck (1991), the 
Montana Supreme Court defined other legitimate business reason as a legitimate 
business reason that is neither false, whimsical, arbitrary nor capricious, and 
must have some logical relationship to the needs of the business.493
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, applying 
Montana law, in Marcy v. Delta Airlines (1999), defined what is not a legitimate 
business reason. These criteria – which will be discussed below – derived from 
summary judgment cases on good cause protection in Montana. A significant 
difference between these cases and so-called trial cases is that in the latter, the 
employee generally initiates the wrongful discharge claim. Hence, the employee
has the burden of proof that the employer discharged the employee without good 
cause.494 In contrast, summary judgment cases are generally initiated by the 
employer in order to dismiss the action by the employee. Therefore, in summary 
judgment cases, an employer has to show sufficient facts there was good cause 
to terminate the employment, after which the burden of proof shifts to the 
employee, who has an obligation to respond with sufficient facts to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact that termination was for some reason other than 
for good cause.495 In brief, in Marcy v. Delta Airlines (1999), the federal court 
under Montana law held that the employee can defeat the grant for summary 
judgment by showing that the reason given by the employer either  
x is false, whimsical, arbitrary or capricious, and with no logical 
relationship to the needs of the business;  
x is invalid as a matter of law under the WDFEA;  
x rests on a mistaken interpretation of the facts; or  
x is not the honest reason for the discharge, but rather a pretext for 
some other illegitimate reason.496
491 Cecil (1990), 797 P.2d 232, 234. 
492  See also Kestell (1993), 858 P.2d 3, 7, referring to Cecil (1990), 797 P.2d 232, 234. 
493  Bierman and Youngblood 1992, p. 60 and 61; Robinson 1996, p. 387; Bennett 1996, p. 129. For the 
facts in Buck (1991), see below under § 9.3.5.2. 
494  Robinson 1996, p. 420. 
495  Jones v. Peabody (1991).
496 Marcy v. Delta Airlines (1999), 166 F.3d 1279, 1283. See also Robinson 1996, p. 394. 
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These defenses may serve the employee in summary judgment cases and trial 
cases, hence,  will be discussed in the next Section. 
9.3.5.2   Statutory case law  
The reason is false, whimsical, arbitrary or capricious, and with no logical 
relationship to the needs of the business 
In Buck (1991) – one of the leading Montana Supreme Court decisions since the 
adoption of the WDFEA – a definition was given of the term other legitimate 
business reason to constitute a reason that is neither false, whimsical, arbitrary 
nor capricious, and must have some logical relationship to the needs of the 
business.497 In this case, a top executive in Montana was discharged when a new 
owner in Louisiana purchased the car dealership. The new owner wanted to keep 
supervision on operations outside the state, and as a long standing policy, put his 
own employees in the top dealership jobs of these operations, including 
Montana. Buck filed suit under the WDFEA. The Court held that when 
employers seek to fill sensitive managerial or confidential positions, they may 
properly look to their own employees. Therefore, this reason constituted a 
legitimate business reason for it was not false, whimsical, arbitrary nor 
capricious and for having a relationship to the need of the business.498 The Court 
emphasized that Buck (1991), in principle, did not apply to non-managerial 
employees.499 In principle, it was confined to those employees who occupy 
sensitive managerial or confidential positions.500 In this respect, the Buck Court 
stressed that a company’s interest in protecting its investment and in running its 
business as it sees fit is not as strong when applied to lower-echelon employees, 
which rather must be outweighed by their interest in continued, secure 
employment.501
 In Kestell (1993), the Montana Supreme Court, however, seemed to 
apply the standard for lower-echelon employees to a highly qualified 
professional and experienced supervisor. The Court held that an employer’s 
legitimate right to exercise discretion over whom it will employ must be 
balanced against the employee’s – in this case, the supervisor’s – equally 
legitimate right to secure employment. This balance, the Court continued, 
should favor an employee who presents evidence, and not mere speculation or 
denial, upon which a jury could determine that the reasons given for his 
termination were false, arbitrary or capricious, and unrelated to the needs of the 
497 Marcy v. Delta Airlines (1999), 166 F.3d 1279, 1283, referring to Buck (1991), 811 P.2d 547, 540. 
See also Bierman and Youngblood 1992, p. 60 and 61; Robinson 1996, p. 387; Bennett 1996,  
p. 129. 
498 Buck (1991), 811 P.2d 537, 541. 
499  Bierman and Youngblood 1992, p. 59-62 and 69; Bennett 1996, p. 129. 
500 Buck (1991), 811 P.2d 537, 541. See also Robinson 1996, p. 387. 
501 Buck (1991), 811 P.2d 537, 541. See also Bennett 1996, p. 129. 
82
business.502 The Montana Supreme Court held that Kestell presented evidence, 
demonstrating that the hospital’s ostensible reasons for replacing him were false, 
arbitrary or capricious and unrelated to the needs of the business.503 In brief, the 
evidence that was brought forward by Kestell showed that the hospital had not 
eliminated Kestell’s position, due to business needs, but merely replaced Kestell 
with another person whose job description was identical to Kestell’s and for 
which he received the same base pay.504
The reason is invalid as a matter of law 
In Buck (1991), a discussion of an invalid reason as a matter of law was 
presented. In this case the employee, in effect, challenged whether on the face of 
it, the policy of the new owner was a valid business reason under the WDFEA. 
The Montana Supreme Court held that the employer was entitled to arbitrarily 
replace the manager with a person of his own choosing from within his own 
business organization, regarding sensitive managerial or confidential positions. 
For to conclude otherwise, the Buck Court held, would be to force a new owner 
of a business to retain someone it did not know or perhaps even trust to manage 
a large dollar investment.505
The reason is based on mistaken facts 
In Heltborg (1990), a case litigated on pre-WDFEA facts and law, the Montana 
Supreme Court accepted a good-faith defense of an employer. In this case, Mr. 
Heltborg had worked for Modern Machinery for twenty-two years when he was 
discharged in connection with a necessary reduction of the workforce. The 
reason was not disputed. In fact, the employer had sustained large losses for 
several years. On behalf of her husband, who had died in the meantime, Mrs. 
Heltborg filed a complaint based on a breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing and negligence. The jury ruled in favor of Mr. Heltborg and 
awarded damages in the amount of US$ 170,608.  
On appeal, the employer objected to jury instructions that were given, 
containing that the employer’s right to reduce its personnel does not excuse its 
obligation to act fairly and in good faith or to use ordinary and reasonable care 
in the process and manner of termination of employment.506 The Montana 
Supreme Court agreed with the employer. It held that there is no justification for 
giving a jury the authority to review whether reasonable care was utilized in a 
reduction in force based on economic conditions. In fact, when an employer 
502 Kestell (1993), 858 P.2d 3, 7. See also Robinson 1996, p. 387 and 388; Bennett 1996, p. 129 and 130. 
503 Kestell (1993), 858 P.2d 3, 9. 
504 Kestell (1993), 858 P.2d 3, 8. 
505 Buck (1991), 811 P.2d 537, 541. See also Robinson 1996, p. 387. 
506 Heltborg (1990), 795 P.2d 954, 959. 
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sustains large losses, the employer who acts in good faith should be the sole 
justice to carry out decisions concerning employment, according to the Court.507
Heltborg (1990) is still the law in Montana, regardless of Marcy v. Delta 
Airlines (1999). In the latter, a private-sector employee claimed that Delta’s 
reason for terminating her, i.e. for intentional falsification of payroll records to 
obtain non-earned salary as part of an intentional plan to defraud the company 
rested on a mistaken interpretation of the facts. After three ‘mistakes’, the 
employer, without further investigation, discharged Marcy assuming that her 
actions were intentional. However, Marcy claimed, the mistakes on her payroll 
records were unintentional, common in Delta’s payroll system, and the 
employer’s usual practice was to call employees to clarify discrepancies. The 
United States Court of Appeals held that Marcy provided sufficient evidence to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact that her recording errors were 
unintentional. In this respect, referring to Morton (1994) and Howard (1995), it 
refused to protect the good-faith employer.508
Its decision has been severely criticized. Critics – which endorse the 
good-faith defense of Heltborg (1990) – state that Morton (1994) and Howard 
(1995) did not hold that a good-faith employer is not protected under Montana 
Law.509 Rather, they continue, Marcy v. Delta Airlines (1991), shows similarity 
with Prout (1989). In this case, the Montana Supreme Court held that the record 
cards on time-keeping and payment gave the employer the right to dismiss the 
employee without cause, but not the right to dismiss an employee for a false 
cause. In case of the latter, the discharged employee must be given the 
opportunity to prove the charge of dishonesty false.510 Furthermore, they refer to 
the legislative history of the WDFEA. During the realization of this Act the 
good-faith defense under the definition of the good cause standard was rejected. 
Apparently, they state, the legislature felt no need to codify the law.511 Their 
argument has been most convincing, i.e. when legislative history does not give 
the answer, it has to be assumed that the legislature in 1987 did not intend to 
strip employers of a good-faith defense already available to them.512
The reason is not the honest reason, but a pretext for an illegitimate reason 
An employee may come forward with evidence that the reason is a pretext and 
not the honest reason for the discharge. In Mysse (1996), a driver who drove for 
the county used her own vehicle. When she was ordered to drive a new bus 
purchased by the county, she refused. After she had been given repeated 
507 Heltborg (1990), 795 P.2d 954, 961 and 962. See also Kizer (1991), 824 P.2d 229, 235. 
508 Marcy v. Delta Airlines (1999), 166 F.3d 1279, 1287. 
509 Morton (1994), 868 P.2d 576, 580. 
510 Prout (1989), 722 P.2d 288, 292. 
511 Marcy v. Delta Airlines (1999), 166 F.3d 1279, 1283 and 1284. 
512  See Kizer (1991), 825 P.2d 229, 236. 
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warnings, she was discharged for disobeying the order. She filed a claim under 
the WDFEA. Mysse argued that the county used her refusal to drive the county 
bus merely as a pretext to discharge her for an illegitimate reason. Mysse 
overheard other senior citizens discussing that she may be too old to drive the 
bus and that her employer should hire a man to drive the bus, she assumed that 
her employer’s actions were based on age discrimination. However, she did not 
offer more evidence than that her employer ‘attempted to make her the 
scapegoat for their improvident purchase of the bus’.513 The Montana Supreme 
Court upheld summary judgment for the employer where Mysse showed mere 
speculation, which does not rise to the level of pretext.514
9.3.6   Effectiveness 
In 1992, the effectiveness of the WDFEA was examined by Bierman, Vinton 
and Youngblood. They sent a questionnaire to all 2,063 current member 
attorneys of the Montana State Bar. Responses to the questionnaires were 
received from 636 members, just over 30.8 percent of those surveyed, which is a 
fairly good response for a questionnaire. The surveyed plaintiffs’ and 
defendants’ attorneys were divided almost equally and were generally familiar 
with the issue of wrongful termination.515
One of the questions was whether the cap on damages influenced 
attorneys to decline a case under the WDFEA. Nearly half of the surveyed stated 
that they had personally declined a case for the fact that, in general, the 
compensation available in wrongful discharge cases did not adequately reflect 
the time and complexity of the work involved. In fact, according to some, cases 
were not worth taking, unless some sort of malicious action could be proven.516
Another question was whether attorneys considered the arbitration clause 
effective, to the extent the legislature had assumed that this provision under the 
WDFEA would generally induce employees to make an offer to arbitrate 
because it would benefit speed, cost and informality,517 and employers would 
tend to accept the offer to avoid attorney fees.518 The question was posed, 
because anecdotal evidence suggested that aggrieved parties have been largely 
avoiding arbitration and, instead, taking WDFEA disputes to court.519 More 
specifically, the question was whether the advice of attorneys towards clients 
was either to take their case directly to court, or to go to arbitration. Over 60 
percent of the surveyed stated that they advised clients to take their case directly 
to court without first offering to go to arbitration. The reasons were that 
513 Mysse (1996), 926 P.2d 765, 772. 
514 Mysse (1996), 926 P.2d 765, 771. See also Cecil (1990), 797 P.2d 232, 235. 
515  Bierman, Vinton and Youngblood 1993, p. 368-370. The results of the survey were published in 
Montana Law Review, Volume 54 No. 2, Summer 1993, p. 367-384. 
516  Bierman, Vinton and Youngblood 1993, p. 373. 
517  Bierman, Vinton and Youngblood 1993, p. 375 and 376. 
518  Schramm 1990, p. 118-119; Bierman, Vinton and Youngblood 1993, p. 374. 
519  Bierman, Vinton and Youngblood 1993, p. 373 and 374. 
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attorneys thought it more convenient to try the case before a jury, because (i) 
they were more familiar with, and had more confidence in court procedure than 
arbitration; (ii) they felt discovery is better in a lawsuit; (iii) the possibility of 
success was higher in litigation than in arbitration; and, (iv) they felt some 
arbitrators were biased. Overall, attorneys were of the opinion that the 
arbitration clause was not effective under the Act.520
In 1999, the effectiveness of the Act was examined a second time. Jarsulic 
analyzed data on wrongful discharge litigation and arbitration in Montana during 
the period 1983 to 1997. He concluded that, compared to the pre-WDFEA 
wrongful discharge regime, the Act had reduced the value of jury awards to 
plaintiff-employees from about US$ 165,000 to US$ 35,000. The Act further 
had reduced the average time it takes to litigate a wrongful discharge case from 
4 to 2 years. According to Jarsulic, by simplifying the law and reducing the 
grounds for suit, the cases were likely to be resolved more easily. Moreover, 
employees had become aware that they received significantly lower awards 
under the WDFEA, hence, there was less reason for them to pursue time-
consuming and expensive discovery and litigation strategies.521
A negative side was that the limits on damage awards made it 
unattractive for attorneys to accept the case on contingency fees, unless the 
employer has violated a public policy.522 Consequently, in good cause cases, an 
employer who refuses an offer of a blue-collar worker to arbitrate will likely 
cause the employee to go away for reason that the employee cannot afford an 
attorney. Jarsulic calculates that a wrongful discharge case costs about US$ 
150,000 to litigate. He adds that employees who can afford an attorney, do not 
opt for arbitration either. They see juries – made up mostly by employees like 
themselves – as ‘their shot at getting something’.523 Based on the foregoing, 
Jarsulic correctly raises the question that to the extent employers simply refuse 
to arbitrate, and attorneys only accept cases in which the employer has violated a 
public policy, whether the WDFEA provides good cause protection in 
practice.524
9.4  Conclusion 
With the Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act of 1987 (WDFEA), 
Montana became the first, and so far the only state in the United States to 
provide statutory good cause protection for employees against wrongful 
discharge. The majority of private-sector employees in Montana are covered by 
520  Bierman, Vinton and Youngblood 1993, p. 375 and 376. 
521  Jarsulic 1999, p. 2-5. 
522  In 1990, Harvard law Professor Weiler already pointed out the fact that the cap under the WDFEA 
would make it difficult for aggrieved employees to find lawyers willing to take their cases. See 
Bierman, Vinton and Youngblood 1993, p. 371 and 372. 
523  Jarsulic 1999, p. 3 and 6. 
524  Jarsulic 1999, p. 3. 
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the WDFEA. The Act excludes independent contractors, probationary 
employees, public employees, bargaining-unit employees and employees 
working on the basis of a contract for a definite period. At first sight, the good 
cause standard under the WDFEA constitutes an equivalent of a just cause 
standard as is common in collective bargaining agreements.  Under the Act, it is 
defined as reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to 
satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the employer’s operation, or other 
legitimate business reason. Based on statutory case law, the other legitimate 
business reason is a reason that is neither false, whimsical, arbitrary nor 
capricious, and must have some logical relationship to the needs of the business. 
On the other hand, Montana law still protects a good-faith employer. More 
specifically, so long as the employer acts in good faith, he is the sole judge to 
carry out decisions concerning employment. Also, the WDFEA appears to be 
illusory for blue-collar workers. In brief, when an employee – in accordance 
with the Act – makes an offer to arbitrate, and the employer refuses to arbitrate 
which is likely for strategy reasons, the employee can seek redress through the 
judiciary only. However, a blue-collar worker generally lacks the financial 
capability to hire counsel on an hourly basis. Therefore, whether private-sector 
employees, in practice, can enjoy good cause protection under the WDFEA, is 
doubtful. 
10    State common law 
10.1 Introduction 
The Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (WDFEA) was 
induced by employers. The uncertainties of judicially developed law, commonly 
referred to as wrongful discharge law,525 induced them to seek the adoption of 
this statute.526  In fact, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, courts throughout the 
United States formulated exceptions, which provided protection against arbitrary 
dismissal.527 Consequently, in the twentieth century, the at-will presumption 
came under fire in the United States. In brief, under the wrongful discharge 
theory, a private-sector employee may have a claim against the employer based 
on
525  CEB Wrongful Termination Book, Chapter 1, p. 3. 
526  See above under § 9.1 and § 9.3.1. 
527  West 1988, p. 12. 
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x violation of public policy;  
x breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and  
x breach of contract to discharge for good cause only, which either 
embraces (i) the handbook exception; or (ii) the implied-in-fact 
(good cause) contract exception.528
In the following paragraphs, I will examine to what extent private-sector 
employees enjoy just cause protection under these common law exceptions to 
the at-will rule. In brief, the state of California – being the largest and one of the 
most important economies with approximately 30 million inhabitants  is at the 
forefront of wrongful discharge law.529 In contrast, the state of New York – the 
second largest with approximately 18 million inhabitants  is one of the few 
states and perhaps the most conservative one to strictly adhere to the at-will rule 
and to leave changes of the at-will rule to the legislature.530 The majority of 
states – among which the state of Michigan with about 9 million inhabitants 
take the middle course. These states accept the public policy exception and the 
handbook exception and reject the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.531 Besides, a few states ‘only’ accept the implied-in-fact (good cause) 
contract exception.532
10.2 Short history of the at-will rule 
Until about 1870, the United States followed English common law with regard 
to employment contracts.533 More specifically, it followed the English Rule of 
the Statute of Labourers of 1562. This Act presumed that servants were hired for 
a one-year term, and prohibited employers from discharging employees without 
reasonable and sufficient cause during that one year of service, rebuttable in 
court by showing a contrary intent of parties.534 Thus, no master could put away 
his servant during this one-year term of employment, unless upon reasonable 
528  Termination of employment digest, ILO, 2000, p. 356 and 357; Rudy 2000, p. 1 and 2; Jacobs 2003, 
p. 212. 
529  See above under § 2.2. 
530  For example, whereas the New York Court of Appeals in Weiner (1982) established a judicially 
created exception to employment at-will, in Murphy (1983) it immediately held that any alteration of 
the at-will rule is an issue better left to resolution at the hands of the legislature. See Minda 1986,  
p. 2; Minda and Raab 1989, p. 2; Weinstein 1993, p. 9; The 2000 Tri-State Employer, p. 2.  See also 
Stolker 1992, p. 41 and 42, distinguishing between the controversies of judicial activism versus 
judicial restraint among judges. For an in-depth discussion of – the low amount of – case law on 
wrongful discharge of the state of New York, see further Minda (1986); Minda and Raab 1989; 
Nadler and Amera (1997); Ballam 2000. 
531  Postic 1994, p. xxiv-xxxv. 
532  See below under § 12.1. 
533  Peck 1991, p. 2 and 3. 
534  Weinstein 1993, p. 7; Summers 2000, p. 2. 
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cause and with reasonable notice.535 Hence, in the United States, the concept of 
just cause draws it origin from the Statute of Labourers. This English rule, 
which was brought to the American colonies by English settlers, was followed 
by most American jurisdictions. By 1870, the law in the United States was 
confused regarding this English rule, however. Courts went in diverse 
directions. Some held that if the pay was so much as a week, a month, or a year, 
there was a presumption that the hiring was for the period named (pay period 
presumption). Other courts rejected the use of any presumption, and determined 
that employment was at will.536 In fact, as from 1850, employers in the New 
England textile industry dismissed their employees at a moment’s notice.537 In 
spite of the foregoing, however, the employment at-will doctrine in the United 
States generally is attributed to a publication in 1877 of H. Wood’s Treatise on 
the Law of Master and Servant, in which he said that  
‘With us, the rule is inflexible, that a general hiring or indefinite hiring is prima 
facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the 
burden is on him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, 
month or year; no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no 
presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for 
whatever time the party may serve.’538
Peck thinks it is wrong to attribute the at-will rule to Wood, not only because the 
cases Wood cited did not support his statement, but also because the New 
England’s employers had accepted the at-will rule long before 1877. Moreover, 
David Dudley Field and Alexander Bradford had already set out a similar at-will 
rule in their proposed New York Civil Code, which was adopted – with some 
amendments: but not with regard to this rule  by the California legislature in 
1872 as the California Civil Code.539 The majority of states, nonetheless, first
followed the at-will rule after Wood’s Treatise.540 Most famously the 
employment at-will rule was articulated in Payne (1884), in which the 
Tennessee Supreme Court held that 
‘Men must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they please, and 
to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause or for no cause, or even 
for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se.’ 541
Under the classic version of the at-will rule an employer, therefore, can 
discharge an employee for any cause, no cause, or even a cause morally wrong, 
535  Peck 1991, p. 2. 
536  Summers 2000, p. 2. 
537  Peck 1991, p. 3; Barber 1993, p. 3. 
538  Peck 1991, p. 3; Barber 1993, p. 3; Summers 2000, p. 2. 
539  Peck 1991, p.3. 
540  Mendelsohn 1990, p. 3; Barber 1993, p. 3; Weinstein 1993, p. 7. 
541  Peck 1991, p. 2; Autor 2001, p. 3; Jacobs 2003, p. 219 and 220.  
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without being liable. Still, in 1891, the New York Court of Appeals applied the 
pay period presumption. Four years later, also this court, quoting Wood’s 
Treatise, held that an employee hired for an annual salary could be discharged in 
mid-year without cause. Because of the prestige of the New York Court of 
Appeals – the highest court in the state of New York – the decision gave 
credibility and dominant authority to the employment at-will doctrine. By 1930, 
the doctrine had become embedded in American law, and remained embedded 
ever since,542 all the more so, after the decision of the US Supreme Court in 
Adair (1908). In this decision, it gave the doctrine of at-will constitutional 
protection.543
10.3 At-will rule: a contract principle 
The employment agreement is subject to general principles of contract law.544
From the beginning of the adoption of the at-will rule, however, courts have 
ignored the elementary principles of contract interpretation. As regards the 
latter, general contract principles determine that the at-will rule is not to be 
applied from the language of the contract itself when it is evident that the intent 
of the parties is that it should at all events continue for a certain period.  
In contrast, courts have enlarged the rule of interpretation into a 
substantive rule, which overrides the parties’ intent. Courts, thus, regardless of 
what the employer promised or lead to reasonably believe, ruled that  unless 
the contract specified a definite term545  the employee, could be discharged at 
any time, without cause and without prior notice.546 On the other hand, courts 
consistently applied the traditional contract rules with regard to the formation of 
a contract. Subsequently, practically every state requires that 
x there must be two parties;  
x these parties must have the legal capacity to incur contractual 
duties;
x there must be a manifestation of assent by all parties to the contract; 
and
x there must be consideration supporting a contractually enforceable 
promise.547
In brief, there must have been acceptance of an offer, supported by 
consideration.548 The latter is a return promise for which the promisor has 
542  Summers 2000, p. 3. 
543  Barber 1993, p. 3; Goldman 1996, p. 33. For an in-depth discussion of Adair (1908), see below under 
§ 27.1.1. 
544  See also above under § 10.3. See also Farnsworth 1987, p. 109; Burnham 1995, p. 379.  
545 In general, those who work on the basis of an employment agreement for a definite period enjoy just 
cause protection. Jacobs 2003, p. 212 and 224. 
546  Summers 2000, p. 3 and 4. 
547  Brody 1978, p. 123. 
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bargained, and which he has received in exchange for the promise.549 In  
general, the exchange of labor versus wages is considered as to constitute the 
required consideration in the employment agreement.550
Case law shows that the traditional contract principles do not always fit 
in the employment context. This led courts – and judges within courts – to go in 
diverse directions, for example, with regard to just cause provisions in 
handbooks.551 Judges either strictly apply traditional contract principles, or – to 
establish an exception to the at-will rule – apply modern contract principles. 
Some advocate an amendment of contract law. For example, when the majority 
of the Alabama Supreme Court in Meeks (1984) did not hold a just cause 
provision in a handbook enforceable for lack of consideration, four dissenting 
judges held that the time was ripe to reconsider the unlimited right of employers 
to unilaterally dismiss an employee, hence, to adapt the law of contracts to meet 
the changing needs of society and the business community.552
10.4 Common law exceptions to the at-will rule: wrongful discharge law 
10.4.1 The decline of the at-will rule 
In the late 1970s, and the early 1980s, courts became responsive to the cry for 
just cause protection.553 Given the harshness of the employment at-will doctrine, 
the decline of unions, and the lack of any comprehensive legislative responsive 
holding a just cause requirement, the judiciary tried to find ways to whittle away 
at the harsh rule.554 Subsequently, in the early 1990s, most state courts had 
recognized one or more of the three exceptions to the at-will rule under the law 
of wrongful discharge.555
Already, in 1964, one of the first to call for protection against arbitrary 
dismissal was Blumrosen. Moreover, in 1967, Blades called for the development 
of a tort remedy to protect employees from abusive exercise power by 
employers.556 This call for tort remedies was revolutionary, considering the fact 
that under old case law breach of contract could lead to contract damages 
only.557 In 1976, one of the first to call for a just cause standard under federal 
548  Burnham 1995, p. 379. 
549  Farnsworth 1987, p. 111; Burnham 1995, p. 382; Finkin 1995, p. 174. 
550  Finkin 1995, p. 174; Jacobs 2003, p. 212. 
551  For the handbook exception, see below under § 11. 
552  Kohn 2003, p. 3. 
553  Barber 1993, p. 4; Summers 2000, p. 4. 
554  Weinstein 1993, p. 7. 
555  Autor 2001, p. 3 and 4. See also above under § 10.1. 
556  Peck 1991, p. 4, referring to Blumrosen, Employer Discipline, U.S. Report, 18 Rutgers L. Rev. 428 
(1964) and Blades, Employment at-will v. Individual Freedom, On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of 
Employer Power, 67 Colum. L.Rev. 1404 (1967). See also Grodin 1990, p. 3. 
557  Friedman 1981, p. 22. 
91
law was Summers.558 In 1980, thirteen years later, Blades’ call was heard by the 
California Supreme Court in Tameny (1980), awarding tort damages for 
violation of public policy. Most jurisdictions now recognize the public policy 
exception as a tort action. The public policy exception, however, does not
protect an employee against arbitrary dismissal in general. Rather, it constitutes 
what is a bad cause for dismissal, as the following paragraphs will show.  
10.4.2 Public policy 
10.4.2.1 General 
The California Court of Appeal planted the wrongful discharge doctrine seed in 
Petermann (1959). In this case, it recognized the first common law exception to 
the at-will rule, better known as the public policy exception.559 Petermann 
(1959) imposed a significant condition upon the employer’s broad power of 
dismissal by nullifying the right to discharge when an employee refuses to 
perform an unlawful act.560 Petermann, a business agent for a labor union, was 
terminated for his refusal to commit perjury as a witness in proceedings, 
investigating union corruption. He sued his employer, arguing that courts should 
declare the firing wrongful, because it violated the public policy as contained in 
the state penal statutes making perjury a criminal act. His employer’s defense 
was that the employment was at will. The California Court of Appeal agreed 
with Petermann. It recognized his cause of action, holding that the right to 
discharge an employee under a contract at will may be limited by statute or ‘by 
considerations of public policy’. The Court held that the discharge, due to the 
fact that Petermann refused to commit perjury, was contrary to public policy.561
 Courts in other states did not immediately adopt the public policy 
exception after Petermann (1959). States slowly started to adopt this exception 
after the 1967 publication of the 1967 law review Article by Blades, in which he 
called upon courts to use their ability to create the tort of abusive discharge. In 
brief, Blades argued that the new tort needed to be recognized, because 
industrialization destroyed the classical ideal of complete freedom of contract, 
hence, had made an anachronism of the absolute right of discharge. The law 
needed to counter that power imbalance by protecting employees from being 
discharged when the employer’s motive was wrongful.562 The majority of states, 
first followed when the California Supreme Court affirmed the Petermann 
holding in Tameny (1980), however.
558  Summers 1976. 
559 Cleary (1980), 111 Cal.App. 3d 443, 454. 
560 Tameny (1980),  27 Cal. 3d 167, 173. 
561  Ballam 2000, p. 3. 
562  Ballam 2000, p. 3, referring to Blades. For Blades, see above under § 10.4.1. 
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In Tameny (1980), an employee of 15 years’ standing was urged to participate in 
an illegal scheme to fix retail gas prices in violation of federal law. When the 
employee refused, the employer terminated the plaintiff-employee for his 
refusal.563 The Tameny court stated that the case closely paralleled Petermann 
(1959). Similarly, the employer had instructed the employee to engage in 
conduct, which constituted a criminal offense, after which the employee had 
refused to violate the law and suffered discharge as a consequence of that 
refusal.564 Additionally, the Tameny Court awarded tort damages for violation 
of a public policy. The Court rejected the employer’s argument that an action for 
wrongful discharge could sound in contract only. It held that an obligation of an 
employer to refrain from discharging an employee who refuses to commit a 
criminal act does not depend on any express or implied promises set forth in the 
employment contract, but reflects a duty imposed by law on all employers to 
implement the fundamental public policies embodied in the penal statutes.565 It 
held that if the cause of action arose from a breach of a promise set forth in the 
contract, the action was ex contractu, but if it arose from a breach of duty 
growing out of the contract it was ex delicto. The Tameny Court concluded that 
the public policy action was ex delicto.566 Consequently, it allowed tort 
damages.567
In Foley (1988), the California Supreme Court affirmed that tort 
damages were the appropriate remedy, in that contract actions are created to 
enforce the intentions of the parties to the agreement, and tort law is primarily 
designed to vindicate ‘social policy’.568
In accepting the public policy exception, state courts generally apply the 
traditional contract principle of proof based on which the plaintiff must prove all 
elements of the cause of action. Only some jurisdictions seem willing in public 
policy cases to place the ultimate burden on the employer. For example, in 
Brockmeyer (1983), in which an employee alleged he had been wrongfully 
discharged in violation of public policy, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, without 
adhering to its decision, held that once the plaintiff-employee has demonstrated 
that the conduct that caused the discharge was inconsistent with a clear and 
compelling public policy, the burden of proof then shifts to the defendant-
employer to prove that the dismissal was for just cause.569
 By the early 1980s, twenty-two states had accepted the public policy 
exception. In contrast, courts in five states – Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, 
Louisiana and New York – explicitly refused to recognize the public policy 
563  Postic 1994, p. 70. 
564 Tameny (1980), 27 Cal. 3d 167, 174. 
565 Tameny (1980), 27 Cal. 3d 167, 168. 
566 Tameny (1980), 27 Cal. 3d 167, 175, 178. 
567  Peck 1991, p. 4. 
568 Foley (1988), 47 Cal.3d 654, 683 referring to Prosser, Law of Torts (ed. 1971), p. 613. 
569 Brockmeyer (1983), 335 N.W.2d 834, 841. See also Rasch (1985), above under § 11.3.4. 
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exception. These states took the position that creating a broad, new public policy 
exception should not be done by the judiciary, but, instead, were best and most 
appropriately explored and resolved by the legislative branch of the 
government.570 Furthermore, they argued that the meaning of ‘contrary to public 
policy’ was vague, and could not justify the judicial creation of a new tort. 
Subsequently, the Illinois Supreme Court in Palmateer (1981) stated that the 
‘Achilles heel’ of the public policy exception laid in the definition of public 
policy.571
10.4.2.2 Definition of public policy 
In Petermann (1959), the California Court of Appeal did not define nor indicate 
which requirements were needed for a claim based on violation of a public 
policy. The Court solely cited two authorities for the cause of action, a 
California case, Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks International Association, and 
the legal encyclopedia, Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.). In brief, the Safeway 
Court focused on the public and the public good, while the C.J.S. definition 
focused on the good for the community and what contravenes good morals or 
established interests of society. Based on these citations, the Petermann Court 
concluded that the cause of action for wrongful dismissal must be recognized, 
because to do otherwise would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and 
contrary to public policy and sound morality. Although the Petermann Court 
noted that the public policy prohibiting perjury was contained in a state statute, 
the decision did not appear to require such a link.572
In Tameny (1980), the California Supreme Court reiterated Petermann’s 
principles, without defining public policy either. A footnote (8) in the decision 
of the Tameny Court, however, led several lower courts in California to believe 
that public policy, as a basis for a wrongful discharge action, needed to be 
rooted in a statute or constitutional provision. Several California Courts of 
Appeal began limiting the holding of Tameny (1980) to policies that derived 
from a statute. Other courts, on the other hand, concluded that public policy, as a 
basis for a wrongful discharge action, need not be rooted in a statute or 
constitutional provision. In Foley (1988), the question whether or not a public 
policy need to be rooted in a statute or constitutional provision remained 
unsolved.573 Instead, the Foley Court pointed out another requirement to state a 
cause of action under the public policy theory. In Foley (1988), an employee had 
informed his employer that his supervisor was under investigation by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation for embezzlement. After the employment 
agreement had been terminated, Foley brought an action against the employer 
for wrongful discharge, alleging a tort cause of action based on discharge in 
570  Ballam 2000, p. 4 and 5. 
571  Weinstein 1993, p. 9. 
572  Ballam 2000, p. 3. See also Tameny (1980), 27 Cal.3d 167, 174. 
573 Foley (1988), 47 Cal.3d 654, 669.  
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violation of public policy.574 The Foley Court held there was no statutory duty 
requiring an employee to report information relevant to his employer’s interest. 
The Foley Court referred to past decisions – including those of other states 
recognizing a tort action for discharge in violation of public policy, by 
protecting the employee 
x who refuses to commit a crime (Tameny, 1980)(Petermann, 
1959);
x who reports criminal activity to appropriate authorities 
(Garibaldi, 1984)(Palmateer, 1981); or
x who discloses other illegal, unethical, or unsafe practices 
(Hantzel, 1982).575
Furthermore, the Foley court held that when the duty of an employee to disclose 
information to this employer serves the private interest of the employer only, the 
rationale underlying the Tameny cause of action is not implicated.576 The Foley 
Court, in other words, required a policy of public and not merely private
concern, i.e. a clear mandate of public concern to state a cause of action based 
on violation of public policy.577
Subsequently, in Gantt (1992), the California Supreme Court required that the 
policy must be ‘fundamental and substantial’ and ‘embodied in a statute or 
constitutional provision’.578 In this case, an employee was terminated for the fact 
that he had supported a co-worker’s sexual harassment claim. The Court 
examined whether an employee who was terminated in retaliation for supporting 
a co-worker’s claim of sexual harassment had a cause of action for tortuous 
discharge in violation of public policy. In its decision, the Gantt Court first 
observed the four categories a public policy case could fall into. These contained 
the employee’s refusal  
x to violate a statute;  
x to perform a statutory obligation;  
x to exercise a constitutional or statutory right or privilege; or  
x to report a statutory violation for the public’s benefit.579
After observing that all four categories involved statutory provision, the Gantt 
Court limited Tameny’s application to cases in which a plaintiff’s public source 
574 Foley (1988), 47 Cal.3d 654. 
575 Foley (1988), 47 Cal.3d 654, 670. 
576 Foley (1988), 47 Cal.3d 654, 670, 671. 
577  Feliu 1996, p. 185. 
578 Gantt (1992), 1 Cal. 4th, 1083, 1090. 
579 Gantt (1992), 1 Cal. 4th, 1083, 1090, 1091. 
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is tethered to either a specific constitutional or statutory provisions.580 In Gantt
(1992), the statutory basis for the policy was found in provisions of the 
California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and in particular the 
Section prohibiting obstruction of the agency’s investigation of a charge.  
The rationale behind the new requirement was that in the opinion of the 
California Supreme Court employers should at least know of the fundamental 
public policies, found in constitutional and statutory law. In this respect, Gantt
(1992) has been seen as narrowing the scope of the public policy exception.581 In 
Green (1998), the California Supreme Court, at first sight, expanded the public 
policy exception to administrative regulations, however, these, too, must derive 
from statutes.582
The foregoing California landmark cases show that public policy cases are 
generally limited to claims finding support in an important fundamental and 
substantial public policy, based on a statutory or constitutional provision, 
providing a clear mandate, and serving a public concern. In general, other states 
apply the public policy exception in a similar way. For example, the state of 
Connecticut will not support a claim that the termination violates public policy 
in the absence of a specific statutory right or duty on which the termination has 
more than an incidental impact.583 The state of Hawaii requires that the 
termination violates a clear mandate of public policy.584 The state of Illinois 
requires that the employer’s termination of the employee must be for activities 
engaged in by the employee. Moreover, the termination must contravene a clear 
mandated public policy, that strikes the heart of a citizen’s social rights, duties, 
and responsibilities contained in a constitutional provision, statute, or judicial 
decision.585 The state of Michigan requires that for a termination to be 
actionable as a violation of public policy, the employee must prove that his or 
her termination was in violation of explicit legislative statements prohibiting the 
discharge, discipline, or other adverse treatment of employees who act in 
accordance with a statutory right or duty.586
Overall, courts have used the public policy exception in situations as to 
protect employees who were discharged for serving on a jury (Nees 1975), for 
filing claims for workplace injuries (Frampton 1973), for refusing to join in the 
employer’s illegal practices (Peterson 1992), for objecting to their superiors 
about legal violations (Sheets 1980), for reporting such violations to public 
authorities (Boyle 1985), for refusing to lobby the legislature for legislation 
sought by their employer (Novosel 1983), for refusing to submit to sexual 
580 Gantt (1992), 1 Cal. 4th, 1083, 1095. 
581  The 2000 California Employer, p. 9 
582  Vanse 2000, under II.
583  Postic 1994, p. 124. 
584  Postic 1994, p. 185. 
585  Postic 1994, p. 211 and 212. 
586  Postic 1994, p. 350 and 351. 
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advances of supervisors (Lucas 1984), and for refusing to participate in games 
involving indecent exposure (Wagenseller 1985).587 By 2001, the judicial public 
policy exception was recognized by 41 of the 49 states (Montana excluded).588
Still, some conservative states reject the public policy exception.589 In fact, 
initially, the Reporters of the Third Draft on a Restatement of Employment Law 
wished to narrow the scope of the public policy exception. Section 4.02 
determined that a discharge violated public policy if the employer discharged an 
employee for  
‘(a) refusing to commit an illegal act; 
(b) fulfilling an obligation imposed by law;  
(c) claiming a benefit arising from employment; or  
(d) reporting or planning to report conduct that the employee reasonably and in 
good faith believes to be illegal.’590
One must admit that an advantage of exhaustive grounds is that it is clear what 
the law is. On the other hand, an enumeration may also freeze the development 
of law as regards unanticipated situations. Apparently, in light of the latter, the 
Reporters in the Fourth Draft on a Restatement of Employment Law included a 
new phrase in Section 4.02, determining that a discharge, in general, violates 
public policy if the employer discharges an employee for (e) another reason that 
directly and substantially harms the public interest beyond that of the employee 
or employer.591
10.4.2.3 Whistleblowing 
Whistleblower claims make up a large number of challenges to the at-will 
doctrine on public policy grounds, which is why special attention will be paid to 
this category.592 The term whistleblowing is derived from the act of an English 
bobby, blowing the whistle upon becoming aware of the commission of a crime 
to alert other law enforcement officers and the public within the zone of 
danger.593 Like this enforcement official, the employee-whistleblower sounds 
the alarm when wrongdoing occurs within the firm.594 In brief, private-sector 
employees in the United States enjoy whistleblowing protection against their 
employers, under state whistleblower legislation – modeled after the federal act, 
the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) of 1989 which applies to public 
587  Summers 2000, p. 4. 
588  Autor 2001, p. 7. 
589  Alabama, Delaware, Maine and New York. See Author 2001, Appendix 6. 
590  ALI Employment Law Draft No. 3, Chapter 4, § 4.02, p. 15-31. 
591  ALI Employment Law Draft No. 4, Chapter 4, § 4.02, p. 11 and 12. 
592  Feliu 1996, p. 206. 
593  Feliu 1996, p. 205; Goldman 1996, p. 73; Cavico 2004, p. 3.  
594  Feliu 1996, p. 205; Goldman 1996, p. 73; Outten and Filippatos 1999, p. 1; Cavico 2004, p. 1. 
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employees595  and/or the public policy exception under common law.596 Both 
need to be discussed, because to understand whisteblower protection under 
common law, one must understand whistleblower protection under legislation. 
Before discussing both, the following remarks must be made. 
First, as regards legislation, Congress has not promulgated federal 
whistleblowing legislation, which protects private-sector and public employees 
in the same manner as, for example, federal anti-discrimination law.597 An 
exeption are anti-retaliation provisions in federal and state statutes, which 
protect private-sector employee in respect of whistleblowing.598 Furthermore, 
distinct from whistleblower protection against the employer is the False Claims 
Act (FCA), and states’ versions thereof. The FCA was enacted by Congress and 
signed into law by President Lincoln in 1863 to combat fraud against the 
government by Civil War contractors, who mixed sawdust with the gunpowder 
provided to the armed forces. After an amendment in 1986, the Act provides a 
significant financial incentive for private citizens for reporting contractor fraud 
against the government, to discourage fraud against the government and to 
encourage those with knowledge of fraud to come forward.599 It further is 
important to distinguish between private-sector and public employees.600 Federal 
public employees are covered by a federal act, the Whistleblower Protection Act 
(WPA) of 1989, being an amendment to the Civil Service Reform Act (CRSA) 
of 1978. The WPA protects federal government employees who appropriately 
alert the public with respect to what they reasonably believe to be violations of 
law, gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds or abuse of authority that pose 
substantial and specific danger to the public.601 In fact, the latter brings me to a 
significant difference between private-sector and public employees, in that the 
disclosing of waste, fraud, and mismanagement in the private sector generally 
will not entitle the employee to legal protection. The reason is that these 
wrongdoings in the private sector generally do not affect the public, causing tax 
595  Westman 1991, p. 51-53; Feliu 1996, p. 209 and 210 referring among others to California, New York 
and Michigan; Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 355. 
596  Feliu 1996, p. 205 and 210; Outten and Filippatos 1999, p. 20. 
597  Kohn 2001, p. 1; Cavico 2004, p. 2. The new federal whistleblowing law, part of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, commonly known as the ‘Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection 
Act’, cannot be considered as general whistleblowing legislation.  This Act applies to employees of 
publicly traded companies only providing evidence of only a certain type of fraud that amounts to a 
violation of federal securities law i.e. congressional securities law, or any rule or regulation of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission or any provision of federal law relating to fraud against 
shareholders. Cavico 2004, p. 2-5; Van Uden 2004, p. 17; Putker-Blees 2006. 
598  Outten and Filippatos 1999, p. 3-8 referring to anti-retaliation provisions that prohibit employers to 
retaliate against employees who disclose employer conduct in federal anti-discrimination statutes;  
p. 10 footnote 38 referring to federal statutes that address public health and safety. See also Goldman 
1996, p. 73 and Kohn 2001, p. 79-98. 
599  Feliu 1996, p. 212; Goldman 1996, p. 74; Outten and Filippatos 1999, p. 12-13; Kohn 2001,  
p. 203-216; Cavico 2004, p. 3. 
600  Feliu 1996, p. 207. 
601  Westman 1991, p. 49; Feliu 1996, p. 209; Goldman 1996, p. 74;  Outten and Filippatos 1999, p. 8 and 
9; Kohn 2001, p. 100-103. 
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monies are wasted. Furthermore, federal, state, and local government employee-
whistleblowers may invoke the First Amendment of the US Constitution, which 
protects the freedom of speech, involving issues of public concern.602 Hence, 
private-sector employees do not enjoy the broad protection public employees 
enjoy.603 In fact, private-sector employees will think twice before disclosing any 
wrongdoing of the employer,604 all the more so since the majority of private-
sector employees in the United States are hired at will.605 Nevertheless, these 
employees may find protection under state whistleblower laws or common law. 
In discussing state whistleblower laws, it is not my intention to discuss the 
whistleblower law of each state, rather to point out the similarities and the 
differences. This to give a general idea on whistleblower protection for private-
sector employees under state statutory law. Also, an in-depth discussion of the 
whistleblower law of each state is not necessary for the purpose of this thesis. 
From a discussion of the public policy exception in the previous paragraph, it 
derives that the public policy exception does not constitute good cause. Rather it 
constitutes what is a bad cause for a dismissal. It, however, too, is important to 
examine which claims fall outside the scope of just cause protection, to 
determine the scope of just cause protection. 
 An overview of state statutes show that whistleblower protection vary 
in various aspects. First, some are specific and narrow as to the subject matter 
for whistleblowing; others are phrased as more generally protective 
whistleblower statutes.606 For example, in Louisiana, the whistleblower statute 
pertains only to whistleblowing on issues concerning public health and safety.607
Tennessee, in fact, has one of the most, if not the most, limited statutory 
protection; it extends coverage only to those employees who report the misuse 
of public education funds. In California, on the other hand, violations of law, 
gross waste of public funds, abuse of authority, or acts that pose a substantial 
risk to public health or safety are protected activities.608 Second, some statutes 
typically center on the private sector employer’s violation of federal or state 
constitutional and/or statutory law; others extend the scope of coverage to 
federal and state agencies rules and regulations and even to county codes and 
municipal ordinances.609 Third, statutes may vary, in that some require that the 
employee-whistleblower acts in good faith, i.e. possesses a reasonable belief as 
to the wrongdoing of the employer.610 Others require that an actual violation 
602  Outten and Filippatos 1999, p. 11; Kohn 2001, p. 119. 
603  Feliu 1996, p. 209. 
604  Cavico 2004, p. 1. 
605  Feliu 1996, p. 212; Outten and Filippatos 1999, p. 2; Cavico 2004, p. 3 and 4. 
606  Outten and Filippatos 1999, p. 1 and 2 and 20; Cavico 2004, p. 4. 
607  Outten and Filippatos 1999, p. 20. 
608  Feliu 1996, p. 210. 
609  Cavico 2004, p. 5. 
610  Cavico 2004, p. 8; Kohn 2001, p. 43 referring, for example, to the New Hampshire Whistleblowers’ 
Protection Act of 1987. 
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occurs.611 Fourth, some statutes require a whistleblower to give prior notice to 
the employer about its wrongdoing to afford the employer to correct the 
wrongdoing; others require the employee-whistleblower to report the 
wrongdoing directly to a governmental agency. Florida, for example, only 
protects those employees who blow the whistle publicly.612 Fifth, statutory 
damages may vary from state to state. In general, compensatory damages, 
including  reinstatement, back pay and a restoration of benefits,613 are provided 
for.614 Texas, on the other hand, is one of the few states to provide for both 
compensatory and punitive damages.615 Finally, state whistleblower statutes 
may preempt public policy based whistleblowing claims under common law; 
other jurisdictions may allow two distinct causes of actions.616
From the foregoing derives that state whistleblower statutes, in general, do not
provide for punitive damages. Consequently, because most states consider the 
public policy exception as a tort action,617 most employees will choose the 
common law public policy exception over a whistleblower statute, unless the 
state statute preempts common law actions.618 Under common law, for 
whistleblowers in the private sector to obtain protection under the public policy 
exception, most states require that the employer has contravened a clearly 
articulated, mandated, substantial or well-established public policy of the 
jurisdiction. The problem – as we have seen in the previous paragraph – is that 
there is no precise definition of what constitutes a clearly articulated, mandated, 
substantial or well-established public policy. In general, courts in this respect 
ordinarily look for clear direction from a legislature in constitutions, statutes, 
administrative rules and regulations.619 Hence, some states require a 
constitutional or statutory basis for the public policy.620 For example, California 
courts require that a whistleblower’s allegations of misconduct be explicitly 
tethered to a specific constitutional or statutory authority, and that the concerns 
be public in nature, affecting society at large.621 In addition, most states require 
that public policy involves the public interest. So long as employee’s actions are 
not merely private, but, instead, seek to further the public good, the decision to 
611  Cavico 2004, p. 9; Kohn 2001, p. 45 and 46 referring, for example, to the New York Whistleblower 
Statute of 1984. 
612  Outten and Filippatos 1999, p. 20, 22 and 23; Cavico 2004, p. 9 and 10. 
613  Kohn 2001, p. 329. 
614  Feliu 1996, p. 210; Kohn 2001 p. 31 referring, for example, to the Florida Whistleblower’s Act of 
1991. 
615  Feliu 1996, p. 210. 
616  Cavico 2004, p. 7, 12 and 13. 
617  In Arkansas and Idaho, the public policy exception sounds in contract (damages). Cavico 2004, p. 19 
footnote 317. 
618  Kohn 2001, p. 21. For an overview of all states, see Kohn 2001, p. 25 and 56. 
619  Kohn 2001, p. 21; Cavico 2004, p. 14-16. 
620  Outten and Filippatos 1999, p. 28. 
621  Kohn 2001, p. 28. 
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expose wrongdoings of the employer is generally protected.622 Private, internal, 
management or business problems or disputes ordinarily cannot form the basis 
for a whistleblowing action under wrongful discharge law, however, complaints 
regarding workplace safety, conduct that harms the health and welfare of the 
public can.623 In general, employees who blow the whistle on wrongdoing, 
implicating public health or safety stand the best chance.624
 A heavily disputed issue in whistleblower cases is whether good faith
must be protected. In general, a reasonable belief in the truth of the claim has 
generally been found to be sufficient, whether or not the claim ultimately turns 
out to have merit. However, a number of jurisdictions still require there be an 
actual violation of the law and not merely an employee’s reasonable or good 
faith belief that a violation has occurred.625 Moreover, a heavily disputed issue 
in whistleblower cases is whether internal reporting of the alleged illegal or 
unsafe activities of employers is an act in the public interest. In general, the 
whistleblowing employee must complain to outside government officials – not 
to the media – in order to take advantage of the public policy exception. The 
background is that whistleblowers whose claims are made directly to public 
agencies are more to be found to be acting in the public interest. However, other 
jurisdictions require internal reporting of the alleged illegal or unsafe activities 
of employers. These courts look more favorably on employees who first seek to 
resolve disputes internally as most effectively and expeditiously, prior to going 
public with it, unless to do so would be demonstrated fruitless. In fact, under this 
conception, whistleblowers who go directly to a public agency without first 
attempting to address their claims internally run the risk of claims of 
disloyalty.626
10.4.3    Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
10.4.3.1 General 
The second judicial exception to the at-will rule has been the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. Under Section 205 of the (Second) Restatement of 
Contracts, every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing in its performance and its enforcement.627 Under the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, parties have a duty to avoid impairing the other 
side’s opportunity to receive the fruits of the agreement in accordance with the 
principles of good faith and fair dealing.628
622  Feliu 1996, p. 206; Cavico 2004, p. 17. 
623  Cavico 2004, p. 16 and 17. 
624  Outten and Filippatos 1999, p. 26 and 32. 
625  Feliu 1996, p. 206; Outten and Filippatos 1999, p. 1 and 28; Cavico 2004, p. 17. 
626  Feliu 1996, p. 206-207; Outten and Filippatos 1999, p. 31; Cavico 2004, p. 17. 
627  Peck 1991, p. 10. 
628  Goldman 1996, p. 68. 
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This covenant was first recognized in the employment context in 
Fortune (1977) by the Massachusetts Supreme Court.629 In this case, a salesman 
was discharged by the employer to avoid paying the full commission earned on 
a five million dollar sale. The Fortune Court held that the at-will rule did not 
permit the employer to first obtain the fruits of the employee’s services rendered 
in reliance upon the promise of a commission, and then discharge the employee 
to deprive him of a part of that commission. This act by the employer was 
dishonest, therefore, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.630 In Metcalf (1989), the Idaho Supreme Court was the second among  
the highest state courts to apply the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing to an employment contract terminable at will. With reference to Fortune
(1977), the Metcalf Court held that  
‘The implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing protects the right of 
the parties to an agreement to receive the benefits of the agreement that they 
have entered into. The denial of a party’s right to those benefits, whatever they 
are, will breach the duty of good faith implicit in the contract. […] We (…) 
recognize an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the 
employment-at-will contract, although that covenant does not create a duty for 
the employer to terminate the employee only for good cause. The covenant 
does not protect the employee from a ‘no cause’ termination because tenure 
was never a benefit inherent in the at-will agreement. The covenant does 
protect an employee for a discharge based on an employer’s desire to avoid the 
payment of benefits already earned by the employee, such as the sales 
commissions in Fortune  (…).’631
The first features of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an at-
will employment contract, thus, can be discerned from the landmark cases 
Fortune (1977) and Metcalf (1989).632 According to Holloway and Leech, and 
Sprang, however, the root meaning of the duty of good faith and fair dealing 
already was evident in Monge (1974). In this case, an employee was discharged 
for refusing to date her foreman. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that 
the termination by the employer of a contract of employment at will was 
motivated by bad faith, malice, and/or based on retaliation. It condemned this 
exploitative use of the employment relationship – because the employer 
discharged a woman for an immoral reason having no connection with 
employment – as a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.633
However, in Cleary (1980), the California Court of Appeal took one of the 
broadest approaches among state courts towards the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. An employee was dismissed without cause after eighteen 
629  Peck 1991, p. 10. 
630  Weinstein 1993, p. 9; Holloway and Leech 1993, p. 102 and 103. 
631  Holloway and Leech 1993, p. 96. 
632  Holloway and Leech 1993, p. 98. 
633  Holloway and Leech 1993, p. 102. 
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years of employment. The Cleary Court held that termination of employment 
without legal cause after such a period of time offends the implied-in-law 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in all contracts, including 
employment contracts. Subsequently, it held that the longevity of the 
employee’s service, together with the expressed policy of the employer, operates 
as a form of estoppel, which precludes any discharge of such an employee by 
the employer without good cause.634 The California Court of Appeal herewith 
impressed a job security standard on the employment contract as a matter of 
law,635 in effect, altering the employment relationship from one of at will to one 
of just cause.636
In Foley (1988), the California Supreme Court explicitly refused to read 
job security into the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception, 
overruling Cleary (1980).637 In Metcalf (1989), the Idaho Supreme Court 
followed Foley’s holding, stressing that by no means the covenant could create a 
duty for the employer to terminate the employee only for good cause.638 In Guz 
(2000), in footnote 18, the California Supreme Court, in fact, seemed to suggest 
that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied by law in every 
contract, exists merely to prevent one contracting party from unfairly frustrating 
the other party’s right to receive the benefits of the agreement actually made. 
For example, if termination of an at-will employee is a mere pretext to cheat the 
worker out of another contract benefit to which the employee was clearly 
entitled, such as compensation already earned.639
At first sight, the Reporters of the Third Draft on the Restatement of 
Employment Law hold likewise 
‘(a) Every employment contract imposes on each party an implied duty of good 
faith and fair dealing, whereby each agrees not to hinder the other’s 
performance under the agreement; (b) In at-will employment contracts, the 
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing must be read consistent with the at-
will nature of the relationship; (c) Even in at-will employment contracts, an 
employer breaches its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing when the 
employer terminates, or seeks to terminate, the employment relationship in 
order to (1) prevent the vesting of an employee right or benefit, or (2) retaliate 
against the employee for faithfully performing the employee’s obligation under 
the contract.’ 640
634  Under the promissory estoppel theory, the employer must make promises upon which the employee 
relied to his detriment. See Holloway and Leech 1993, p. 98; Sprang 1994, p. 5. 
635  Holloway and Leech 1993, p. 98. 
636  Peck 1991, p. 10; Fabiano 1993, p. 3; Weinstein 1993, p. 9;  Goldman 1996, p. 71. 
637 Guz (2000),  D.A.R. 10929, 10938. See also Foley (1988), 47 Cal.3d 654, 698, footnote 39. 
638  Holloway and Leech 1993, p. 96. 
639 Guz (2000),  D.A.R. 10929, 10938. Foley (1988), 47 Cal.3d 654, 698, fn. 39. See also Holloway and 
Leech 1993, p. 99 and 100. 
640  ALI Employment Law Draft No. 3, Chapter 3, § 3.06, p. 28. In the Fourth Draft, the Reporters made 
minor changes. See ALI Employment Law Draft No. 4, Chapter 3, § 3.06, p. 31 and 32. 
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Consequently, the Reporters state that the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing can only serve as a supplementary aid to implement the intentions of 
the parties, but cannot override or undermine an express term or the essence of 
the agreement, hence, does not prevent either party to terminate the employment 
relationship without cause.641
 The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception in the 
employment context is rejected by the majority of jurisdictions.642 In fact, in 
1989, only twelve states recognized the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in employment at will.643 In 1994, even fewer states had adopted the 
covenant, i.e. California, Idaho and Utah only. It is very restrictively applied by 
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Delaware and Massachusetts.644 The argument of the 
majority most heard is that it makes no sense to imply an obligation of good 
faith in the employment context when an employer has an unfettered right to 
terminate the employment at will.645
10.4.3.2 Tort or contract? 
In general, the public policy exception is considered as a tort action. The 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, in general, is not. In the past, 
however, a heavily disputed issue has been whether the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in the employment context needed to be considered 
as a contractually-based exception for which contract damages are appropriate, 
or as an implied-in-law obligation in every contract for which tort damages – 
including punitive damages  are appropriate.646 Those who claim that the 
implied covenant is a contractually-based exception, for which contract damages 
are appropriate, refer to Section 355 of the (Second) Restatement of Contracts. 
The latter provides that punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of 
contract, unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which 
punitive damages are recoverable.647
In 1983, the Montana Supreme Court, as the first among the highest 
state courts considered the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a 
tort action.648 Previously, in Cleary (1980), the California Court of Appeal had 
already permitted tort recovery for a breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, inspired by Tameny (1980).649 In Tameny (1980), the California 
641  ALI Employment Law Draft No. 3, Chapter 3, § 3.06, p. 28. 
642  Postic 1994, p. xix-xx; see also Perry 1992, p. 3; Goldman 1996, p. 69; Autor 2001, p. 7. 
643  Peck 1991, p. 10, referring to the State Rulings Chart, 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:51-52 (Aug. 
1989). 
644  Postic 1994, p. xxiv-xxxv. 
645  McGowan 1998, p. 8-9. 
646  Summers 2000, p. 5. 
647  Dodge 1999, p. 2. 
648 Gates (1983).  See also above under § 9.2. 
649  Jung and Harkness 1989, p. 2 and 6; Walker 1993, p. 3; McGowan 1998, p. 5.  
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Supreme Court, in footnote 12, implicitly held that a violation of the public 
policy in the employment context could result in a tort action,650 holding that   
‘ (…) we believe it is unnecessary to determine whether a tort recovery would 
additionally be available under (…) a breach of the implied-in-law covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing inherent in every contract. We do note in this regard, 
however, that (…) California [insurance: VA] cases have held that a breach of 
this implied-at law covenant sounds in tort as well as in contract (…).’ 
In Foley (1988), the California Supreme Court, however, held that tort remedies 
were not the appropriate remedy for a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in the employment context.651
10.4.4 Breach of contract to discharge for good cause only 
The last exception to the at-will rule that I wish to discuss is the breach of 
contract to discharge for good cause only.652 This exception includes both the 
handbook exception and the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception. 
The handbook exception is accepted by a majority of states.653 In contrast, the 
implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception is good law in California, and is 
followed by a few states ‘only’.654 For reason that these exceptions to the at-will 
rule will be discussed in-depth in the paragraphs 11 and 12, respectively, I will 
only briefly discuss them in this Section. 
10.4.4.1 Handbook exception 
In general, the employer’s personnel policy is embodied in a handbook. 
However, this policy, too, may be embodied in a formal personnel or 
supervisor’s manual, or a personnel department memorandum. It may simply be 
a well-known company policy. Whatever the form is, the employer’s policy 
holding a just cause provision is generally referred to as the handbook 
exception. In a wrongful discharge case, the first question that needs answering, 
is whether the policy is enforceable as a contract.655 Initially, courts flatly 
rejected the notion that a contractual obligation could arise out of an employee 
handbook. The Kansas Supreme Court in Johnson v. National Beef Packing 
(1976) reflects the view of the majority of courts at the time. In this respect, the 
Johnson Court held 
650  Horvitz 1993, p. 2; Walker 1993, p. 2; Vanse 2000, p. 2.  
651  Grodin 1992, p. 2 and 3; Rancourt 1996, p. 10; McGowan 1998, p. 5. For an in-depth discussion of 
Foley (1988), see below under § 27.1.2. 
652  Leonard 1988, p. 3. 
653  Fabiano 1993, p. 7 and 8; Summers 2000, p. 4; Autor 2001, p. 4. For the handbook exception, see 
further below under §  11. 
654  For the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract, see below under § 12. 
655  Holloway and Leech 1993, p. 33. 
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‘It was only a unilateral expression of company policy and procedures. Its 
terms were not bargained for by the parties and any benefits conferred by it 
were mere gratuities. Certainly, no meeting of the minds was evidenced by the 
defendant’s unilateral act of publishing company policy.’  
In fact, if an employee wanted to bind an employer to a handbook provision, 
promising to terminate for good cause only, the employee needed to provide the 
employer with a benefit outside the regular duties associated with the job, to 
meet the general contract principle requirement of consideration.656
 In Toussaint (1980), the Michigan Supreme Court, as the first among 
the highest state courts held that a handbook could bestow enforceable rights on 
an employee.657 The employee successfully had sued for breach of contract to 
discharge for good cause only, by citing an internal personnel policy handbook, 
indicating that it was the employer’s policy to terminate employees for just 
cause. Although the employee, Toussaint, was unaware of the handbook when 
hired, the Toussaint Court held that the handbook implied a binding contract.658
It did not require express negotiations between the employer and its employees. 
Rather  
‘[I]t is enough that the employer chooses, presumably in his own interest, to 
create an environment in which the employee believes, whatever the personnel 
policies and practices, they are established and official at any given time, 
purport to be fair, and are applied consistently and uniformly to each 
employee.’659
In Pine River (1983), the Minnesota Supreme Court, too, accepted the handbook 
exception, however, applied general contract principles, requiring consideration 
and mutual assent. In brief, it held that the formation of a unilateral employment 
contract requires that the handbook promises be specific enough to constitute an 
offer, and that such promises are communicated to the employee by 
dissemination of the handbook. The Pine River Court held that the choice to 
continue work after the unilateral offer supplied the consideration, required to 
support the employer’s promises in the handbook.660
10.4.4.2 Implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception 
The California Court of Appeal, in Pugh (1981), added the last cause of action 
for the discharged employee to the existing ones.661 In this case, the California 
656  Kohn 2003, p. 3. See also below under § 11.1.1 
657  Weinstein 1993, p. 8; Estlund 2002, p. 6. 
658  Kohn 2003, p. 4. 
659  Termination of Employment 2000, p. 24,516. 
660  Kohn 2003, p. 5. 
661  Peck 1983, p. 13; Hitchcock 1983, p. 2; Jung and Harkness 1989, p. 1; Walker 1993, p. 2; Postic 
1994, p. xix; Parker 1995, p. 3. 
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Court of Appeal was the first among state courts to apply a modern contract 
approach to protect an employee in an at-will setting, based on an implied-in-
fact (good cause) contract analysis.662 Through the application of modern 
contract law principles it disposed the problem of independent consideration 
under traditional contract principles.663 In Foley (1988), the California Supreme 
Court held that the Pugh Court had correctly applied basic contract principles in 
the employment context.664 As regards the latter, the Pugh Court had held that 
‘(…) there is no analytical reason why an employee’s promise to render 
services, or his actual rendition of services over time, may not support an 
employer’s promise both to pay a particular wage and to refrain from arbitrary 
dismissal.’665
Consequently, the good cause contract implicitly may derive from the 
circumstances of the case. The genius of Justice Grodin’s opinion in Pugh 
(1981), according to Cameron, was that Grodin charted new territory simply by 
drawing the map as though it were covering familiar landscape, and that it did 
not attempt to overturn California Labor Code Section 2922,666 but, instead, took 
up the less controversial task of applying the existing statute to the facts of 
Pugh’s employment contract.667
10.5 Conclusion 
Until about 1870, the United States followed the just cause rule under English 
common law. As from then, the at-will doctrine was widely accepted by courts 
in the United States, after A Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant in 1877 
by H.G. Wood. As today, the at-will rule is the basic premise in the United 
States undergirding the employment relationship. In its classic form, an 
employer can discharge an employee for any cause, no cause, or even a cause 
morally wrong, without being liable. However, the development of judicial 
exceptions to the at-will rule in the late 1970s, and the early 1980s, presented the 
prospect that the at-will doctrine would be ‘swept away’. In brief, state courts 
created three exceptions to the at-will rule (1) the public policy exception; (2) 
the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) the 
breach of the contract to discharge for good cause only, which includes the 
handbook exception and the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception.  
662  Tully 1983, p. 5 and 6. 
663  Grodin refers to 1 Corbin on Contracts (1963) par. 125, pp. 535-36 and the Second Restatement of 
Contracts 81 (1965). See also Cameron 2001, p. 6. 
664 Foley (1988), 47 Cal.3d 654, 676, 677.  
665  Cameron 2001, p. 6. 
666  This Section codifies the presumption that an agreement for an indefinite term of employment is 
presumed to be at will, and, therefore, terminable at the will of either party. See also Cameron 2001, 
p.4
667  Cameron 2001, p. 5.  
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More specifcally, the public policy exception was recognized by the 
California Court of Appeal in Petermann (1959). Meanwhile, it is recognized by 
virtually all states as a tort action. Under this exception, an employee can ask for 
compensatory and punitive damages if an employer has violated a public policy 
by discharging the employee. The public policy exception does not constitute a 
just cause for dismissal, however. Rather, it constitutes what is a bad cause for 
dismissal. The California Court of Appeal, in Cleary (1980), hereupon was the 
first among state courts to accept the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing applied in the employment context, holding a promise of providing just 
cause protection. In Foley (1988), the California Supreme Court, however, 
refused to interpret the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as some 
form of job security.668 The majority of the few states, accepting the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, are of the same opinion. In fact, ‘only’ the handbook 
exception and the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exceptions accepted by 
the Michigan Supreme Court and the California Court of Appeal in Toussaint 
(1980) and Pugh (1981), respectively, seem to provide just cause protection to 
private-sector employees. In the following paragraphs, I will examine to what 
extent private-sector employees enjoy just cause protection under these 
exceptions, focusing on the states of Michigan and California primarily.  
11 Michigan
11.1 The first state to accept the common law handbook exception 
In this Section, I examine to what extent private-sector employees enjoy just 
cause protection under the handbook exception. In answering this question, I 
will take the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Toussaint (1980) as a 
starting point, being the first to hold that an employee handbook could give rise 
to contractually enforceable job security rights.669
For at-will employees, the handbook exception was an important one. 
Consequently, with the Supreme Court’s decision in Toussaint (1980), Michigan 
earned a reputation as a leader in the expansion of the common law rights of 
employees.670 Employers, on the other hand, were suddenly confronted with 
employees who could invoke just cause protection under handbooks. In fact, in 
the time the handbook exception was accepted, almost every employer had a 
handbook providing for just cause protection – in the belief that it was 
unenforceable  mainly as an effort on the part of employers to avoid 
unionization.671
668  Holloway and Leech 1993,  p. 100. 
669  Berks 2000, p. 13. 
670  Smith 1986, p. 773. 
671  Berks 2000, p. 8-10. 
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As today, courts in nearly every jurisdiction recognize the handbook 
exception.672 The Fourth Draft on the Restatement of Employment Law, too, 
holds a provision, which determines that agreements providing for terms other 
than at-will employment may take the form of a unilateral statement by the 
employer, establishing employer obligations.673
The handbook exception was a unique feature under contract law, 
however. In fact, until the decision of Toussaint (1980), it was considered that 
by its very nature a handbook could not form an enforceable contract, because it 
was not bargained for. The traditional contract principles of offer-acceptance-
consideration did not fit, therefore, statements in handbooks were considered as 
unilateral statements by the employer only, hence, unenforceable.674 The way 
courts at the time generally reasoned is best represented in Johnson v. National 
Beef Packing (1976), in which a discharged employee argued that the policy 
manual determined that no employer shall be dismissed without just cause, and 
that this provision was binding on the employer. Consequently, the Kansas 
Supreme Court held that employment was at an at-will basis, and if an employee 
wanted to bind an employer to just cause protection under a handbook, the 
employee needed to show additional, i.e. independent consideration outside the 
job performance, according to traditional contract principles.675
In Toussaint (1980), the Michigan Supreme Court took another avenue. It no 
longer required mutual assent for provisions in the handbook to become 
enforceable. The Alabama Supreme Court in Hoffman-La Roche v. Campbell 
(1987) summarized this new approach as ‘one of estoppel, invoking the idea of 
reliance’.676 In brief, under the estoppel theory, parties do not need to mutually 
agree on just cause protection. On the other hand, under traditional contract 
principles, promissory representations must be reasonably relied upon by the 
employee and acted upon to his detriment to estop the employer from reneging 
on those representations.677 Contrasting with traditional contract principles, the 
Michigan Supreme Court in Toussaint (1980) did not require mutual assent 
according to contract principles nor did it require reliance to the detriment of the 
employee under the estoppel theory. Therefore, its decision was not consistent 
with traditional contract principles, and courts of other states had difficulty to 
follow Toussaint (1980). The majority of states rather followed Pine River 
(1983) for being consistent with contract principles. In the latter, the Minnesota 
672  Winters 1985, p. 5;  Kohn 2003, p. 3. 
673  ALI Employment Law Draft No. 4, Chapter 3, § 3.02, p. 6. 
674  Winters 1985, p. 2; Berks 2000, p. 4; Kohn 2003, p. 3. 
675  See also above under § 10.4.4.1. 
676 Hoffman-La Roche v. Campbell  (1987), 512 So.2d 725, 730. See also Winters 1985, p. 5; Pratt 1990, 
p. 214. 
677  Pratt 1990, p. 214 and 215, referring to Second Restatement of Contracts § 90 Section 1 (1979). 
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Supreme Court, too, accepted the handbook exception, but applied the unilateral
contract theory according to contract principles.678
In the following paragraphs, I will examine to what extent private-
sector employees obtain just cause protection under the handbook exceptions of 
Toussaint (1980), and Pine River (1983).
11.2 Toussaint
11.2.1 Facts and holding 
Blue Cross hired Charles Toussaint as an assistant to the company treasurer. His 
duties consisted of analyzing and preparing certain financial reports. Having 
been employed for five years, he was discharged by the employer, who had 
difficulty with Toussaint administering a company car program. Toussaint 
denied alleged unsatifisfactory performance. Toussaint claimed that the 
discharge violated his employment agreement, which permitted discharge only 
for cause. He stated that when he was hired, he asked about job security and was 
told he would be with the company ‘so long as I did my job’. This in his opinion 
constituted an agreement not to discharge except for good cause. Also, Blue 
Cross handed a manual to Toussaint, which reinforced the oral assurance of job 
security. The manual stated that it was the policy of the company to release 
employees for just cause only.  
 The Michigan Supreme Court held that if an employer, for whatever 
reason, creates an atmosphere of job security, those promises are enforceable 
components of the employment relationship.679 Consequently, it held that a 
provision of an employment contract, providing that an employee shall not be 
discharged except for cause is legally enforceable, although the contract is 
indefinite, and that such a provision may become part of the contract either (i) 
by express agreement, oral or written; or (ii) as a result of employee’s legitimate 
expectations grounded in an employer’s policy statement.680 It held that the 
employer had violated an employment agreement that permitted discharge only 
for cause. With regard to this newly established legitimate expectation theory in 
the employment context it held that 
‘(…) where an employer chooses to establish such policies and practices and 
makes them known to its employees, the employment relationship is 
presumably enhanced. The employer secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal 
work force, and the employee the peace of mind associated with job security 
and the conviction that he will be treated fairly. No pre-employment 
negotiations need take place and the parties’ minds need not meet on the 
subject; nor does it matter that the employee knows nothing of the particulars of 
678  Moise 1991, p. 2; Sullivan 1995, p. 281; Kohn 2003, p. 817. For a discussion of the unilateral 
contract theory, see below under § 11.3.1. 
679  Kohn 2003, p. 814 and 815. 
680 Toussaint (1980), 292 N.W.2d  880, 885. 
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the employer’s policies and practices or that the employer may change them 
unilaterally. It is enough that the employer chooses, presumably in its own 
interest, to create an environment in which the employer believes that, whatever 
the personnel policies and practices, they are established and official at any 
given time, purports to be fair, and are applied consistently and uniformly to 
each employee. The employer has then created a situation instinct with an 
obligation.’681
As mentioned above, the majority of courts did not follow Toussaint (1980) for 
being inconsistent with contract principles.682 In this respect, footnote 25 
explicitly held that parties’ minds need not meet on the subject.683 To the extent 
states followed Toussaint (1980), they at least required detrimental reliance 
under the estoppel theory, according to general contract principles. For example, 
the Washington Supreme Court in Thompson (1984) held that if an employer 
creates an atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with promises of 
specific treatment in specific situations and an employee is induced thereby to 
remain on the job and not actively seek other employment, those promises are 
enforceable components of the employment relationship.684
11.2.2 Implied agreement: personnel policies 
The Toussaint Court held that the intention of the employer was irrelevant for 
the creation of enforceable rights under a handbook.685 Herewith, the Toussaint 
Court accepted an implied handbook exception to the at-will rule. In Miller
(1923), the Michigan Supreme Court held that a contract is implied to the extent 
its intention is not manifested by direct or explicit words between parties, but is 
to be gathered by implication or proper deduction from the conduct of parties, 
language used or things done by them, or other pertinent circumstances 
attending the transaction.686
 In Toussaint (1980), the employer argued that the at-will rule could not 
be overruled by an implied contract. The Toussaint Court held the contrary, 
arguing that the at-will rule is not a substantive rule as the at-will doctrine seems 
to suggest, but a rule of construction. This means that it is presumed that, 
because the parties began with complete freedom, they intended to oblige 
themselves to a relationship at will. However, parties can decide otherwise by 
express or implied agreement.687 One year later, the California Court of Appeal 
in Pugh (1981) – which decision will be discussed in-depth in the next Section – 
681 Toussaint (1980), 292 N.W. 2d 880, 892. 
682  See above under § 11.1 
683 Toussaint (1980), 292 N.W. 2d 880, 892 footnote 25. 
684 Thompson (1984), 685 P.2d 1081, 1088. See also Moise 1991, p. 4, referring to the Ohio Supreme 
Court in Mers (1985).
685  Pratt 1990, p. 213. 
686  See Rowe (1991), 473 N.W.2d 268, 273. 
687 Toussaint (1980), 292 N.W.2d  880, 885. See also Rowe (1991), 473 N.W. 2d 268, 271. 
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followed this rationale of Toussaint (1980). Subsequently, it held that an 
employment contract intended to be terminable at will is subject, like any 
presumption, to contrary evidence, which may take the form of an agreement, 
express or implied, that the relationship will continue indefinitely, pending the 
occurrence of some cause for termination.688
11.2.3   Toussaint overruled? 
The majority of states followed Pine River (1983) for being consistent with 
contract principles.689 In this case, Mettile was hired as a loan officer with the 
Pine River State Bank in 1978. Late in 1978, he received a handbook that 
provided sections on job security. In 1979, he was discharged. The bank claimed 
that Mettile was discharged, due to loan errors, excessive sick leave and a 
reduction in force. Mettile alleged that he was dismissed because of a 
personality dispute with his superiors and that he had never received any 
complaints.690 The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in favor of the employee. It 
held that the restraints on termination of employees in an employee handbook 
were contractually binding on the employer, and that Mettile had been 
wrongfully terminated contrary to those provisions.691 In accepting the 
handbook exception, the Pine River Court applied the so-called unilateral 
contract theory. Under this theory, a handbook provision is considered as a 
unilateral offer by the employer, which is accepted by the employee through 
continuance of work performance. The latter, in itself, constitutes 
consideration.692 In this respect, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Pine River 
(1983) held that
‘Whether a handbook can become part of the employment contract raises such 
issues of contract formation as offer and acceptance and consideration. (…) 
Generally speaking, a promise of employment on particular terms of 
unspecified duration, if in form of an offer, and if accepted by the employee, 
may create a binding unilateral contract. The offer must be definite in form and 
must be communicated to the offeree. (…)  By continuing to stay on the job, 
although free to leave, the employee supplies the necessary consideration for 
the offer.’693
688 Pugh (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 324 and 325. See also Cameron 2001, p. 5. 
689  See above under § 11.2.1. 
690  See also Sullivan 1995, p. 275. 
691 Pine River (1983), 333 N.W.2d 622, 625. 
692  In a unilateral contract, the consideration rather concerns an exchange of an action (or inaction) for a 
promise; the promisee in other words accepts the contract by performing, not by promising to 
perform.  
693 Pine River (1983), 333 N.W. 2d 622, 625-627. See also Sullivan 1995, p. 276 and 277. 
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In effect, the Pine River Court relied on Pugh (1981), by applying modern
contract principles,  accepting that the single performance of the employee may 
furnish consideration for multiple promises.694
 Meanwhile, the Michigan Supreme Court realized that Toussaint (1980)
was troublesome for courts for not being consistent with contract principles. 
Subsequently, the Michigan Supreme Court revisited Toussaint (1980) in Rowe
(1991).695 Already, it attempted to clarify Toussaint (1980) in Valentine (1984).
In the latter, it held that Toussaint (1980) did not create a new job security right.  
It held that the only right held in Toussaint (1980) to be enforceable was the 
right that arose out of the promise not to terminate except for cause.696 In Rowe
(1991), it went one step further than in Valentine (1984). In fact, Cavanagh and 
Levin, the dissenting judges, considered Rowe (1991) as constituting a virtual 
overruling of Toussaint (1980).697 In contrast, the Rowe Court explicitly stated 
to elect not to do so.698
In Rowe (1991), an employee applied for a sales position at Montgomery. She 
stumbled in one day and was interviewed by a sales manager, who told here that 
she would have a job so long as she achieved her sales quota. Upon being hired, 
she signed a ‘Rules of Personal Conduct’ sheet that did not include a just cause 
provision or disciplinary guidelines. Later, however, Rowe received several
employee handbooks, which held disciplinary guidelines on the one hand, and 
explicit at-will language on issued sign-off sheets on the other, which Rowe, 
however, refused to sign. Rowe claimed that the oral statement was an express
agreement under which she could be dismissed for just cause only.699
 The Michigan Supreme Court commenced its decision with the 
statement that calling something a contract that is in no sense a contract cannot 
advance respect for the law. The Rowe Court apparently was in search of a 
resolution that was consistent with contract principles, relative to the 
employment setting on the one hand, while minimizing the possibility of abuse 
by either party to the employment relationship on the other. Subsequently, it 
addressed the question whether an employer’s oral statements and written policy 
statements could create an employment contract terminable only for cause.700
First, it held that for an express agreement to exist there must be mutual assent. 
To decide whether there is mutual assent, the expressed words of the parties and 
their visible acts are relevant.701 Second, the Rowe Court held that the statement 
must be clear and unequivocal to overcome the presumption of at will and when 
parties attach different meanings to the language, the starting point in analyzing 
694  See also above under § 12.1.1 
695  Luce 1992, p. 119. 
696 Valentine (1984), 362 N.W.2d 628, 629. See also Smith 1986, p. 774 and 775. 
697 Rowe (1991), 473 N.W.2d 268, 308. See also Luce 1992, p. 1 and 5. 
698 Rowe (1991), 473 N.W.2d 268, 278. 
699  See also Volz and Fayz 1993, p. 643 and 644. 
700 Rowe (1991), 473 N.W.2d 268, 269 and 270. See also Volz and Fayz 1993, p. 643. 
701 Rowe (1991), 473 N.W.2d 268, 271 and 273. 
113
a statement is the meaning that reasonable persons might have attached to the 
language, given the circumstances presented.702 In Toussaint (1980), Judge Ryan 
had already referred to just cause provisions in collective bargaining agreements 
that ‘clearly and forcefully indicate a mutual intention to limit the employer’s 
discretion in terminating the employment relationship’.  
Subsequently, the Michigan Supreme Court compared the circumstances with 
the facts in Toussaint (1980). Although the Court admitted that the ‘so long as’ 
statement in Rowe (1991) bore some resemblance to remarks made in Toussaint 
(1980), the Rowe Court found objective evidence lacking to permit a reasonable 
juror to interpret the employer’s statements and actions as a promise of 
termination only for cause, therefore, it denied Rowe’s claim. More specifically, 
the Rowe Court held that, unlike Toussaint, Rowe did not engage in pre-
employment negotiations regarding job security. Logic compels the conclusion 
that when parties expressly negotiate with offers and counteroffers, it is more 
reasonable to anticipate mutual assent. The Rowe Court herewith – 
unnecessarily  put heavy emphasis on the need for a negotiation before oral 
assurances could be given contractual status. Second, unlike Toussaint, Rowe 
upon being hired signed ‘Rules of Personal Conduct’, which did not contain any 
‘release for just cause only’ language as in Toussaint (1980).703 The Rowe Court 
could not find a just cause provision in the handbooks that were issued later 
either. In fact, the last handbook explicitly held at-will language.704
Consequently, the Rowe Court rejected that an ‘so long as’ statement per se 
constitutes an express contract that overcomes the at-will presumption.705
 Overall, the Michigan Supreme Court, based on the circumstances of 
the case, did not consider the statement in Rowe (1991) sufficient to rise to the 
level of an agreement providing termination only for just cause. In fact, it held 
that the statement of the sales manager that ‘so long as she achieved her sales 
quota, she would have a job at Montgomery’ was couched in general terms and 
vague, thus, that it did not clearly indicate to form a contract for permanent 
employment. Instead, the context suggested that the statement was merely 
intended to emphasize the number one priority of Rowe’s job: sales. What is 
striking, is that the Rowe Court contrasting with the legitimate expectations 
theory of Toussaint (1980) stated that
‘Consequently, we find no evidence from which reasonable minds could find 
that there was mutual assent on a term of employment terminable only for 
cause.’706
702 Rowe (1991), 473 N.W.2d 268, 273 and 275. See also Luce 1992, p. 145. 
703 Rowe (1991), 473 N.W.2d 268, 274-276. 
704 Rowe (1991), 473 N.W.2d 268, 275. 
705 Rowe (1991), 473 N.W.2d 268, 274 and 279 and 280. 
706 Rowe (1991), 473 N.W.2d 268, 275. 
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Under the legitimate expectations theory of Toussaint (1980), the Toussaint 
Court had not required mutual assent. It had not even required reliance to the 
detriment of the employee. Therefore, as the dissenting judges stressed, the 
Rowe Court ‘overruled’ Toussaint (1980), in that it did not consistently apply 
the legitimate expectations theory.707 On the other hand, one can also argue that 
the Rowe Court searched for an express instead of an implied agreement.708
11.3 Factors that determine the existence of good cause protection 
11.3.1 Good cause contract: requirements 
The legitimate expectations theory of Toussaint (1980) makes it relatively easy 
for an employee to prove a good cause contract. In brief, this theory solely 
requires that (i) there is an expectation; and (ii) that this expectation is 
legitimate. The claim, on the other hand, may be denied when an employee 
admits that he or she had no expectation at all, or an employer has more than 
once unilaterally modified the provision.709 More difficult for an employee is to 
prove a good cause contract under the unilateral contract theory of Pine River 
(1983). First, the language in the handbook must be examined to see if it is 
specific enough to constitute an offer. Second, the offer must have been 
communicated to the employee by issuance of the handbook, or otherwise. 
Third, the employee must have accepted the offer by retaining employment after 
he has become generally aware of the offer.710 Although job performance is easy 
to prove, an employee may prevail on the requirements of offer and 
communication. For example, in Pine River (1983), the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that the language in the handbook section entitled ‘Job Security’ did 
not constitute any offer and that it was no more than a general statement of 
policy. In its opinion, the language did not provide for more than at least an 
annual review of the employee’s work, and, in general, about the stability of 
jobs in banking.711
11.3.2 At-will disclaimers: with or without effect? 
At-will disclaimers may range from general statements that the handbook is not 
intended to form a contract, to explicit statements that employees are hired at 
will and may be discharged for any reason, with or without cause, and at any 
time without prior notice.712 In Toussaint (1980), the Michigan Supreme Court 
707  See Luce 1992, p. 150. 
708 Rowe (1991), 473 N.W.2d 268, 275; Toussaint (1980), 292 N.W.2d 880, 891. See also Bogas and 
Vogan 1989, p. 599. 
709  Smith 1986, p. 776 and 777, referring to Longley (1984) and Engquist (1984), respectively. 
710 Hoffman-La Roche (1987), 512 So.2d 725, 735, referring to Pine River (1983), 333 N.W. 2d 622, 
625. See also Winters 1985, p. 6 and 7. 
711 Pine River (1983), 333 N.W.2d 622, 625, 626 and 630. 
712  Berkowitz and Emert 2001, p. 115. 
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more than once stated that employers retained their right to unilaterally change 
the provisions of the handbook and that only policies in force needed to be 
uniformly applied.713 In Pine River (1983), the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled 
likewise. It held that unilateral contract modification of the employer may be a 
repetitive process, and that language in the handbook itself may reserve 
discretion to the employer in certain matters or reserve the right to amend or 
modify the handbook provisions.714
 Hence, the decisions of both the Toussaint Court and the Pine River 
Court left room for employers to insert at-will disclaimers.715 Subsequently, 
after Toussaint (1980), employers started to insert at-will disclaimers in 
handbooks. In this paragraph, I will discuss the effect of at-will disclaimers. In 
this respect, it is important to distinguish between  
1. an at-will disclaimer contained in the same document said to 
contain binding promises; and  
2. an at-will disclaimer inserted in a handbook afterwards to negate 
enforceable promises under (i) the legitimate expectations theory; 
or (ii) the unilateral contract theory.716
Under the first scenario, the handbook language generally will not result in 
legitimate expectations, nor will it constitute an offer.717 At-will disclaimers that 
have been inserted in handbooks afterwards to negate enforceable promises 
under the legitimate expectations theory and the unilateral contract theory give 
rise to more problems, and will be discussed below. 
Legitimate expectations theory 
The Michigan Supreme Court discussed the effect of at-will disclaimers in 
Bankey (1989). The certified question by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit to the Bankey Court was  
‘Once a provision that an employee shall not be discharged except for cause 
becomes legally enforceable under Toussaint (…), as a result of an employee’s 
legitimate business expectations grounded in the employer’s written policy 
statements, may the employer thereafter unilaterally change those written 
policy statements by adopting a generally applicable policy and alter the 
employment relationship of existing employees to one at the will of the 
employer in the absence of an express notification to the employees from the 
outset that the employer reserves the right to make such a change?’718
713 Toussaint (1980), 292 N.W.2d 880, 895. 
714 Pine River (1983), 333 N.W.2d 622, 627. 
715  Smith 1986, p. 775. 
716  See also Swanson (1992), 826 P.2d 664, 676. 
717  See also Conner (2002), 560 S.E.2d 606, 611; Heaton 2003, p. 3. 
718 Bankey (1989), 443 N.W.2d 112, 113. See also Luce 1992, p. 621. 
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The Bankey Court hereupon held that an employer may unilaterally change a 
written discharge for cause policy to employment at-will policy, even though the 
right to make such a change was not expressly reserved from the onset. 
However, to be effective, reasonable notice of change must be given to the 
employees affected.719 The fact that the plaintiff-employee did not sign the 
employment at-will disclaimer is not determinative.720 In Ferrera (1990), the 
Colorado Court of Appeals only, applying the legitimate expectations theory, 
followed the Bankey Court. Additionally, it held that an employer’s right to 
modify an employee handbook is presumed.721 In Bankey (1989), the Michigan 
Supreme Court ‘forgot’ to answer what should be understood by reasonable 
notice. In Rowe (1991), the Michigan Supreme Court partly clarified the term. 
The Rowe Court held that the existence of three handbooks sent to the employee 
nine months prior to termination constituted reasonable notice of employer’s 
policy.722
 In Demasse (1999), the Arizona Supreme Court, which applied the 
legitimate expectations theory as well, explicitly rejected Bankey (1989). It 
opposed the fact that unilateral contract modification was achieved by simply 
publishing a new handbook with an additional clause stating that the contract 
has been changed. The Demasse Court did not believe that contract law 
recognizes such a right,723 and that an employer may not unilaterally change a 
just cause policy.724 In this respect, the Demasse Court emphasized that implied 
agreements have the same legal effect as express contracts.725 Thus, an employer 
could not unilaterally change a contractual right under a handbook than with 
additional consideration beyond continued employment.726 In fact, in the 
opinion of the Court, nothing could be more illusory than to hold that after an 
employer makes contractual promises, he may issue a new handbook that 
unilaterally rescinds them.727
In Swanson (1992), the Washington Supreme Court took the middle course. It 
held that 
x at a minimum, the at-will disclaimer must state in a conspicuous 
manner that nothing contained in the handbook, manual, or similar 
document is intended to be part of the employment relationship and 
719 Bankey (1989), 443 N.W.2d 112, 120. See also Luce 1992, p. 622; Kohn 2003, p. 826 and 827. 
720 Rowe (1991), 473 N.W.2d 268, 277 and 278. 
721  Sullivan 1995, p. 286; Kohn 2003, p. 825. 
722 Rowe (1991), 473 N.W.2d 268, 277 and 278. 
723 Demasse (1999), 984 P.2d 1138, 1149. 
724  See also Sullivan 1995, p.281-284, referring to Thompson (1987).
725 Demasse (1999), 984 P.2d 1138, 1144. See also Luce 1992, p. 828. 
726 Demasse (1999), 984 P.2d 1138, 1145. 
727 Demasse (1999), 984 P.2d 1138, 1147. 
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that such statements are instead simply general statements of 
company policy;728
x that in order to be effective, the disclaimer must be communicated 
to the employee; 729
x there must be reasonable notice to the employee that the employer 
is disclaiming intent to be bound by what otherwise appear to be 
promises of employment conditions according to Bankey;730
x all of the circumstances, and the representations and practices of the 
employer must be examined in order to determine the effect of the 
disclaimer; and  
x the disclaimer may be negated by inconsistent employer 
representations and practices.731
The Swanson Court referred to Leikvold (1984) and Wagenseller (1985).732 At 
first sight, reliance on these cases seems an error in that Leikvold (1984) did not 
discuss the issue of an at-will disclaimer.733 In Wagenseller (1985), an at-will 
disclaimer was involved, however, as regards the modification of an at-will to a 
just cause policy.734
Unilateral contract theory 
Bankey (1989), Swanson (1992) and Demasse (1999) show the three possible 
approaches regarding at-will disclaimers under the legitimate expectations 
theory. In Fleming (1994), the South Carolina Court discusses the three possible 
approaches under the unilateral contract theory to negate just cause protection. 
The first approach – to allow a change without prior notice  – struck the Fleming 
Court as too harsh. The second approach – to impose a bilateral concept on a 
unilateral contract, thus, requiring mutual assent and additional consideration – 
was rejected for not being consistent with Pine River (1983). Hence, the 
Fleming Court settled on the third approach, which was consistent with 
unilateral contract principles and fair in a way that employers must have a 
mechanism that allows them to alter the employee handbook to meet the 
changing needs of both business and employees.735 This last – third – approach 
is followed in the majority of states. Under this approach, a modified provision 
is considered as a new offer, and the continuing performance of work by the 
employee as sufficient consideration to accept the offer of the employer to 
728 Swanson (1992), 826 P.2d 664, 672. 
729 Swanson (1992), 826 P.2d 664, 673. 
730 Swanson (1992), 826 P.2d 664, 672. 
731 Swanson (1992), 826 P.2d 664, 676. 
732 Swanson (1992), 826 P.2d 664, 676. 
733 Leikvold (1984), 688 P.2d 170, 174. 
734 Wagenseller (1985), 710 P.2d 1025, 1037 and 1038. 
735  See Pacific Bell (2000), 999 P.2d 71, 77, referring to Fleming (1994), 450 S.E.2d 589, 594 and 595. 
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modify the handbook, on the condition of reasonable notice of the alteration. 
Thus, a unilateral employment contract may be formed, so may it be 
modified.736
In Torosyan (1995), the Connecticut Supreme Court, based on the same 
grounds as the Demasse Court under the legitimate expectations theory,737
rejected this approach. It held that for a new manual to modify the preexisting 
terms of employment based on an implied contract, the employee must have 
consented to that modification, and that if the Court were to accept the 
employer’s argument to the contrary, an employee whose preexisting contract 
provided that his or her employment could be terminated only for cause would 
have no way of insisting on those contractual rights. The employee’s only 
choices would be to resign or to continue working, either of which would result 
in the loss of the very right at issue, i.e. the loss of the right to retain 
employment until terminated for cause.738
In Pacific Bell (2000), the California Supreme Court, in turn, rejected the 
approach of the Torosyan Court. Furthermore, it explicitly rejected Demasse 
(1999, although the latter involved the legitimate expectations theory. In Pacific 
Bell (2000), the telephone company in question issued a ‘Management 
Employment Security Policy’, which  held that ‘this policy will be maintained 
so long as there is no change that will materially affect Pacific Bell’s business 
plan achievement.’ Two years later, the company announced that it would 
terminate the policy, replacing it the same day with a new layoff-policy. 
Subsequently, employees were laid off and they then filed a wrongful 
termination claim. The certified question of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit to the Pacific Bell Court was  
‘Once an employer’s unilaterally adopted policy – which requires employees to 
be retained so long as a specified condition does not occur – has become a part 
of the employment contract, may the employer thereafter unilaterally terminate 
the policy, even though the specified conditions had not occurred?’ 739
The California Supreme Court’s answer was that an employer may unilaterally 
terminate a policy so long as the employer affects the change after a reasonable 
time, on reasonable notice, and without interfering with the employees’ vested 
benefits, herein following Fleming (1994).740
The three dissenting judges  George, Mosk and Kennard – however, 
emphasized that to argue that a contract is effectively modified simply because 
the same transactions, which led to its formation, have again occurred is an 
736  See Sullivan 1995, p. 285 referring to Sadler (1988); Kohnn 2003, p. 819, 820, 822 and 823. 
737  See Pacific Bell (2000), 999 P.2d 71, 77, referring to Demasse (1999), 984 P.2d 1138, 1141. 
738 Torosyan (1995), 662 A.2d 89, 99. 
739 Pacific Bell (2000), 999 P.2d 72. 
740 Pacific Bell (2000), 999 P.2d 73, 76. 
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overly simplistic and incorrect axiom.741 If an employer may unilaterally modify 
or terminate an employment security policy, simply by maintaining it for a 
reasonable time and giving reasonable notice of the proposed modification or 
termination, this, in fact, is contrary to basic principles of contract law. Under 
contract principles, an employer may not unilaterally modify or terminate a 
policy that has become part of the employment contract without providing 
additional consideration and obtaining the employee’s assent.742 Hence, parties 
need to agree with a modification of an existing contract743 as is the case with 
express contracts.744 Therefore, they continued, the fact that under California 
law implied contracts stand on equal footing with express contracts, mutual 
assent is needed to modify the contract.745
In literature, too, the majority approach towards unilateral modification has been 
severely criticized. In this respect, Pratt states that  
‘It must be recognized and emphasized that issuing a second, unilaterally 
modified handbook is not the same as issuing the first. The employer who 
issues a second handbook is not taking the employee out of an at-will situation 
by offering her an implied contract. Instead, the second handbook constitutes an 
offer to modify the existing implied contract. While such an offer may be 
accepted, an amended handbook does not become effective automatically upon 
issuance by the employer and continuation of work by the employee. Rather, 
the traditional requirements of contract modification-assent to modify and 
additional consideration (here from the employer) must be met. The reason that 
the requirement of additional consideration here is dissimilar to the simple 
work requirement necessary under the unilateral contract analysis for the 
original handbook lies in the differing contexts. With a first edition handbook, 
an employee must act to accept the employer’s offer embodied in the manual. 
However, an employee need not act to reject a subsequent modified 
handbook.’746
Sullivan agrees with Pratt, in that the modification of a contract is not analogous 
to its formation. He states that once there is a contract and the employer wishes 
to modify this existing contract, he must comport with the traditional principles 
of contract modification, hence, must provide consideration for and obtain 
assent to such modification.747 Like the dissents in Pacific Bell (2000), he argues 
that a contract formed by a handbook is no different from a contract formed by 
741 Pacific Bell (2000), 999 P.2d 71, 90. 
742 Pacific Bell (2000), 999 P.2d 71, 88. See also Kohn 2003, p. 837. 
743 Pacific Bell (2000), 999 P.2d 71, 94. 
744 Pacific Bell (2000), 999 P.2d 71, 91. 
745  Pacific Bell (2000), 999 P.2d 71, 91. See also Fabiano 1993, p. 402 referring to Foley (1988), 765 
P.2d 373, at 385 and Toussaint (1980), 292 N.W.2d 897, at 885. 
746  Pratt 1990, p. 221. 
747  Sullivan 1995, p. 11. 
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any other means, thus, there is no difference between an implied and express 
contract in this respect.  
In contrast, Section 3.04 in the Third Draft on the Restatement of 
Employment Law (still) provides that a unilateral statement by an employer 
reasonably establishing employer obligations towards employees is binding on 
the employer until modified or revoked. Section 3.05 further determines that an 
employer may modify or revoke an obligation established pursuant to a previous 
unilateral statement by notifying employees of the modification or revocation of 
the prior terms, hence, does not require reasonable notice as most courts 
require.748 Probably, because a Restatement of Law, in principle, reflects 
majority rules under common law, the last – Fourth – Draft Section 3.05 newly 
required that ‘The revocation or modification and any new terms become 
effective for employees hired thereafter and for employees who continue 
working after receiving reasonable notice of the change’. 749
11.3.3 Good cause: actual misconduct or good faith? 
What an employer must show in order to justify a dismissal of a protected 
employee is essential in determining how much protection an employee has 
from arbitrary termination.750 In this respect, it is important to know whether a 
court protects a good-faith employer, or whether it requires the employer to 
prove actual misconduct. This issue was addressed in Toussaint (1980). The 
Michigan Supreme Court held that in discharges based on misconduct, the jury 
must determine whether the employee actually did what the employer alleged.751
Subsequently, the Toussaint Court constructed a three-part test for determining 
just cause 
x did the employee do what he or she was accused of doing;  
x what was the true reason for the discharge; and  
x is this the kind of thing that justifies termination of the employment 
relationship?752
Hereupon, the Toussaint Court chose not to protect a good-faith employer, 
because a promise to terminate employment for cause only in its opinion would 
be illusory, if the employer were permitted to be the sole justice and final arbiter 
of the propriety of the discharge, thus, that there must be some review of the 
employer’s decision.753 According to the Toussaint Court, the jury should be 
able to make an independent, de novo fact finding, regarding the factual basis of 
748  ALI Employment Law Draft No. 3, Chapter 3, § 3.04 and 3.05, p. 17-27. 
749  ALI Employment Law Draft No. 4, Chapter 3, § 3.05, p. 24. 
750  Fabiano 1993, p. 404 and 405. 
751 Toussaint (1980), 292 N.W. 2d 880, 896. See also Delmondo 1991, p. 2 and 3; Fabiano 1993, p. 412. 
752  Bogas and Vogan 1989, p. 599. 
753 Toussaint (1980), 292 N.W. 2d 880, 896.
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the employee’s conduct.754 The majority of jurisdictions, however, reject the so-
called De Novo Standard of Toussaint (1980),755 protecting the good-faith 
employer to decide on managerial decisions, including dismissals.756
11.3.4 Burden of proof: employer or employee? 
The majority of state courts apply the general contract principle of proof to the 
employment agreement.757 Subsequently, the plaintiff must prove all elements of 
the cause of action.758 A plaintiff-employee who disputes the reason for his 
discharge, thus, must prove all elements of the cause of action, i.e. needs to 
prove the existence of a good cause contract, and subsequently, the lack of good 
cause.759 It needs no explanation that employees have substantially less 
protection when the burden rests with them to show lack of good cause, than 
when the burden rests with the employer to show good cause.760 In general, state 
courts do not wish to abandon the general rule of contract in wrongful 
termination cases, rather wish to adhere to the principle that the plaintiff-
employee in a trial case must prove all elements of his claim.761 In fact, in a 
minority of states only, among which Michigan, courts are divided on whether 
the burden of proof needs to rest with the employee to show lack of good cause, 
or with the employer to show good cause.762 For an employee the difference is a 
significant one.  
 As regards Michigan law, the Michigan Supreme Court, did not address 
the issue who carries the burden to prove the lack or existence of good cause.763
The sole remark of the dissenting judge, Ryan, in Toussaint (1980), was that the 
plaintiff-employee has the burden of proving that the just cause provision in the 
manual was part of his employment contract. Ryan, however, did not discuss 
who carries the further burden of proving whether the termination was for just 
cause.764 The Michigan Supreme Court, on the other hand, did hold that for 
discharges based on misconduct the jury must determine whether the employee 
actually did what the employer alleged. It then is logical to assume that when 
the employer alleges that the employee is guilty of misconduct, the burden rests 
with the employer to prove that the employee actually did what the employer 
754  Delmondo 1991, p. 3. 
755  For the term  ‘De Novo Standard’ or  ‘De Novo Rule’, see Cotran (1998), 948 P.2d 412, 418. 
756  See Cotran (1998), 17 Cal.4th. 93, 95, 102 and 103. For an in-depth discussion of the Cotran case, 
see below under § 12.3.3. 
757  With the exception of discriminatory causes of actions, see above under § 8.8. See also Finkin 1995, 
p. 171. 
758  See Baldwin (1989), 769 P.2d 298, 302. 
759  For example, see Wilkerson (1989), 212. Cal.App.3d 1217. 
760  Fabiano 1993, p. 404 and 405. 
761  Smith 1986, p. 782. See also Schwarze 1988, p. 548. 
762  Schwarze 1988, p. 6. 
763  Bogas and Vogan 1989, p. 600; Luce 1992, p. 125. 
764  See Rasch (1985), 367 N.W.2d 856, 859. 
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claimed.765 However, the Michigan Supreme Court did not explicitly decide on 
the issue, hence, a tension on this issue is still felt among the court of appeals.766
For example, in Obey (1984), the Michigan Court of Appeal applied the general 
rule, in that the employee had to prove that he was employed under a contract, 
requiring good cause for a termination, and consequently, had to prove the lack 
of good cause when the employer breaches the contract by terminating him 
without good cause.767
In Rasch (1985), the Michigan Court of Appeal – with a different 
membership with that from Obey (1984) – departed from this general rule of 
contract.768 The Rash Court held that in a wrongful discharge case, the plaintiff-
employee must make a prima facie case by proving the contract under the 
handbook exception, producing testimony that he had performed it up to the 
time of his discharge, and providing proof of damages. The defendant-employer 
then has the affirmative burden of proving the plaintiff-employee had breached 
the contract, and that the discharge was legal.769 The Rasch Court relied on cases 
that involved definite term contracts, but there is a difference between indefinite 
and definite term contracts. As Schwarze correctly states, in the latter, parties 
agree that the employment relationship will continue for a fixed period of time. 
Thus, the employer needs to prove that there is good cause to terminate the 
contract before the fixed period has expired.770 Courts, therefore, find it difficult 
to follow Rasch (1985). For example, the reason for the Washington Supreme 
Court to reject the rule under Rasch (1985) is that the shift of the burden to 
prove just cause to the employer could encourage employers to remove all such 
language from handbooks to retain effective control of the workplace.771 In 
Duke (1987), the federal District Court held that to follow the rule from Rasch 
(1985), in effect, would place a lighter burden on employers accused of race 
discrimination than employers faced with wrongful discharge claims. This 
makes little sense in light of the relatively greater protection the law has tried to 
afford alleged victims of race discrimination.772
11.4 Conclusion 
In Toussaint (1980), the Michigan Supreme Court was the first among the 
highest state courts to accept the handbook exception. Based on the so-called 
legitimate expectations theory, the Toussaint Court accepted just cause 
protection based on legitimate expectations coming forward out of the 
765 Wilkerson (1989), 212 Cal.App.3d 1217, 1230. 
766  See Duke (1987), 668 F.Supp.1031, 1040. 
767 Obey (1984), 360 N.W.2d 292, 296. See also Duke (1987), 668 F.Supp. 1031, 1040. 
768  See also Schwarze 1988, p. 547 and 548. 
769 Rasch  (1985), 367 N.W.2d 856, 858. See also Smith 1986, p. 782. 
770  Schwarze 1988, p. 549. See also Smith 1986, p. 782. 
771 Baldwin (1989), 769 P.2d 298, 303. 
772 Duke (1987), 668 F.Supp. 1031, 1040. 
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circumstances of the case. For being inconsistent with contract principles, the 
majority of jurisdictions preferred to follow the unilateral contract theory under 
Pine River (1983). In the latter, the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted the 
handbook exception, however, based on – modern – contract principles. Under 
this theory, it held that the employee’s performance of work supplied the 
necessary acceptance and consideration to make a binding unilateral contract. In 
obtaining just cause protection under this handbook exception, private-sector 
employees need to overcome various hurdles, however. First, an employee 
needs to prove that the provision constitutes an offer, and that the provision is 
communicated to him. Second, the employee based on the general rule of 
contract needs to prove the existence of a good cause contract and the lack of 
good cause. Third, most jurisdictions protect a good-faith employer to decide on 
managerial decisions. Last, employers started to insert at-will disclaimers to 
negate job security under this exception. These disclaimers, in general, are 
considered valid.  
12 California 
12.1 The first state to accept the common law implied-in-fact  
(good cause) contract exception 
In this Section, I will examine to what extent private-sector employees can 
obtain just cause protection under the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract 
exception. Moreover, I wish to show that this exception is not as vague as 
presumed by the Reporters of the Third Draft. The latter held that 
‘This Restatement does not adopt vague, conceptually ungrounded doctrines 
such as the “implied-in-fact” contract theory, which enjoyed support for a time 
in the California courts.’ 773
The implied-in-fact contract theory is still good law in California, and adopted 
among others in Kansas, New Mexico, Utah, Idaho, Connecticut and Arizona.774
The rationale behind the rejection of this exception by other states is that they 
believe that to accept this exception, this, in effect, would eliminate the 
requirement of mutuality of obligation – the exchange of independent 
consideration – under the contract.775
 In examining the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception, I will 
take the decision of California’s Court of Appeal in the landmark case of Pugh 
(1981) as a starting point, because this Court was the first in the United States to 
hold that an implied-in-fact (good cause) contract could overcome the 
presumption of at will. In brief, it held that from the totality of circumstances it 
773  ALI Employment Law Draft No. 3, Chapter 3, § 3.02, p. 6. 
774 Morriss (Kan 1987); Kestenbaum (N.M. 1988); Berube (Utah 1989); Metcalf (Idaho 1989); Torosyan 
(Conn. 1995); Demasse (Ariz. 1999). See also Cameron 2001, p. 4. 
775  See Berube (1989), 771 P.2d 1033, 1045. 
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may derive that an employer may discharge an employee with good cause only. 
The California Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Pugh (1981) in Foley
(1988).776
12.2 Pugh
12.2.1 Facts and holding 
Wayne Pugh began working for See’s in 1941 as a dishwasher. In thirty-two 
years of employment with See’s, he worked his way up the corporate ladder 
from dishwasher to production manager, to vice-president in charge of 
production, and member of the Board of Directors. When Pugh started work for 
See’s in 1941, the President frequently told him that ‘if you are loyal and do a 
good job, your future is secure.’ His successors, too, had a practice of only 
terminating administrative personnel for good cause. During the entire period of 
his employment, there had been no formal or written criticism of Pugh’s work. 
No complaints were voiced at the annual meetings preceding each holiday 
season, and he was never denied a raise or bonus. He neither received notice that 
there was a problem that needed correction, nor any warning that any 
disciplinary action was being contemplated. In 1973, in a meeting with the 
President, where he had been expected to be told of another promotion after 
being congratulated on the increased production in the 1973-edition of See’s 
newsletter, Pugh was dismissed without a reason. When Pugh asked the 
President for a reason, he was told that ‘he should look deep within himself to 
find the answer’. Pugh brought the case to trial before a jury. He alleged he had 
been dismissed in breach of contract and for reasons, which offended public 
policy. The employer filed for a motion for non-suit based on lack of sufficient 
evidence to establish a breach of contract or violation of public policy.777 The 
trial superior court granted the employer’s motion. Subsequently, Pugh went to 
the Court of Appeal, for which Justice Grodin wrote the decision.  
 The Court of Appeal held that it was error to grant the motion for non-
suit with regard to breach of contract. The employee had presented sufficient 
evidence to justify that he could be terminated only for good cause. The Court of 
Appeal held that, if parties have agreed, expressly or impliedly, the employee 
could be terminated for good cause only, the employee had presented enough 
evidence. The Pugh Court held that in the case before it, there were facts in 
evidence from which the jury could determine the existence of an implied
promise, deriving from the duration of plaintiff’s employment, the 
commendations and promotions he received, the apparent lack of any direct 
criticism of his work, the assurances had been given of continued employment 
and the employer’s acknowledged policies.778
776 For Foley (1988), see below under § 12.2.4. See also Estreicher and Robbins 1989, p. 2. 
777  Black’s Law Dictionary defines a motion as a written or oral application requesting a court to make a 
specified ruling or order. 
778 Pugh (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 316-319. 
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12.2.2 At-will rule: presumption 
In building up its theory, the Pugh Court reviewed the legal history of the at-will 
rule. It held that, historically, the ancient law of master and servant did not 
provide an at-will rule. Based on the English Rule, the presumption was that 
employment was for a period of one year, which employment could be 
terminated for cause only.779 The law of master and servant in the United States, 
however, underwent remodeling into at-will employment in the nineteenth 
century. Contrary to most countries, which decided to enact just cause 
legislation to protect employees against the negative effects of the Industrial 
Revolution, the undergirding principle of employment contracts in the United 
States became the at-will rule.780 In effect, the superior bargaining power of the 
employer became a device for guaranteeing to management unilateral power to 
make rules and exercise discretion. This development brought with it a gradual 
weakening of the traditional presumption of the one year rule, to a rule that 
general hiring is prima facie a hiring at will as reflected in the California Labor 
Code Section 2922.781
Still, the Pugh Court stressed, the at-will rule is a presumption only. In 
this respect, it pointed at just cause provisions in collective bargaining 
agreements, which had placed limitations on the employer’s unilateral right of 
termination, and the variety of statutory limitations established upon the 
employer’s power of dismissal.782 Consequently, the Pugh Court held that the 
mere fact that a contract is terminable at will, does not give the employer the 
absolute right to terminate it in all cases.783 Consistently, it held that an implied-
in-fact (good cause) contract can overcome the at-will presumption.784
12.2.3 Implied-in-fact (good cause) contract: circumstances of the case 
In Pugh (1981), the California Court of Appeal held there was enough evidence 
to enable the jury to find the existence of an implied-in-fact promise that the 
employer would not discharge employees arbitrarily, based on the totality of 
circumstances, including the duration of employee’s employment, the 
commendations and promotions he had received, the apparent lack of any direct 
criticism of his work, the assurances he had been given, and the employer’s 
779 Pugh (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 319. For the history of the one year rule and the at-will rule, see 
also above under § 10.2. 
780  See also above under § 1.2.1. 
781 Pugh (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 319 and 320. Section 2922 of the California Labor Code provides 
that ‘an employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice 
to the other. Employment for a specified term means an employment for a period greater than one 
month’. 
782 Pugh (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 320. 
783 Pugh (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 321 and 322. 
784  See also Tully 1983, p. 5 and 6. 
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acknowledged policies.785 In this respect, the Pugh Court referred to a number of 
cases, relying on Cleary (1980) in particular.786 In Cleary (1980), the California 
Court of Appeal held that the longevity of service, and the expressed policy of 
the employer set forth in the regulation, justified an exception to the at-will rule. 
More specifically, it held that an employer who dismissed an employee for 
alleged theft after eighteen years of satisfactory service, in violation of published 
company policy, which required a fair, impartial and objective hearing in such 
matters, had violated an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.787 Also, 
Pugh (1981) shows strong resemblance with Toussaint (1980), which is known 
and cited principally as Michigan’s equivalent of Pugh (1981). The Toussaint 
Court, too, adopted the rule that an implied-in-fact good cause term can limit the 
common law at-will employment rule.788
12.2.4 Pugh confirmed! 
The California Supreme Court affirmed Pugh (1981) in Foley (1988).789 In the 
latter, an employee was hired in 1976 as a computer expert by Interactive Data 
Corporation, a subsidiary of Chase Manhattan Bank in California. At the time of 
hiring, Foley signed two agreements concerning non-competition and disclosure 
of proprietary information. In addition, the employer maintained written 
termination guidelines that set forth express grounds for discharge and a 
mandatory, seven-step procedure to follow leading up to discharge. After Foley 
had worked for the employer for almost seven years, receiving steady 
promotions and pay raises, he was suddenly discharged. He alleged that his 
supervisors repeatedly assured him that he had job security so long as his 
performance remained adequate. He also alleged that on the basis of the 
documents he signed and the termination procedure, he believed he would not 
be discharged except for good cause. Subsequently, Foley sued his employer for 
wrongful discharge.  
In brief, Foley stated that in 1983, he had gone to his previous 
supervisor to tell him that he had learnt that his new supervisor was under 
investigation for embezzlement from his former employer, and that he was 
worried about the new supervisor’s suspected criminal conduct. The former 
supervisor had told Foley not to discuss rumors and to forget what he had heard. 
Shortly thereafter, Foley’s supervisor informed him that the company had 
decided to replace him for ‘performance reasons’, but that he had an option to 
transfer from California to another position in Massachusetts. Two weeks later, 
Foley was abruptly discharged.790 The employer filed for a demurrer,791 which 
785  Winters 1985, p. 3; Linzer 1986, p. 10. 
786 Pugh (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 327. See also Peck 1983, p.13; Hitchcock 1983, p. 2 and 4; Jung 
and Harkness 1989, p. 5. 
787 Pugh (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 328. 
788 Cotran (1998), 17 Cal.4th 93, 102. 
789 Foley (1988), 47 Cal. 3d 654, 676 and 677. See also Barnhart 1998, p. 4. 
790  Estreicher and Robbins 1989, p. 2. 
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the state Superior Court granted and which the California Court of Appeal 
affirmed. The California Supreme Court agreed to hear the Foley case in 
appeal.792 The California Supreme Court addressed three questions in Foley 
(1988)
x when does discharge of an employee violates public policy so as to 
give rise to tort liability;  
x when do promises in employment manuals and related documents 
create an implied-in-fact contract that an employee at will not be 
dismissed except for good cause; and  
x what is the measure of damages for breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing?793
With regard to the breach of an implied-in-fact (good cause) contract – which is 
of interest in this thesis – Foley alleged that over the course of his nearly seven 
years of employment with the bank, the company’s own conduct and personnel 
policies gave rise to an oral contract not to dismiss him without good cause. In 
contrast, the employer in Foley (1988) urged the California Supreme Court to 
reverse the decision of Pugh (1981), and to hold that California law required an 
express contract provision, requiring good cause for termination, supported by 
independent consideration beyond work performance.794
The California Supreme Court held that the Pugh Court had correctly applied 
basic contract principles in the employment context, and that these principles 
were applicable to the employee’s employment agreement with the employer.795
First, it stressed that under the fundamental principle of freedom of contract, 
employers and employees are free to agree upon a contract terminable at will, or 
to agree upon a contract subject to limitations. Second, whereas the California 
Labor Code Section 2922 holds a presumption of at-will employment, this may 
be overcome by evidence, that despite the absence of a specified term, parties 
reached consensus on limiting the employer’s power to dismiss employees, for 
example, by a requirement that termination be based on good cause only.796
 As regards the requirement of independent consideration, the Foley 
Court admitted that there may be some historical basis for imposing independent 
consideration beyond work performance.797 However, it stressed that any such 
basis has been eroded by the development of modern contract law and that 
791 Black’s Law Dictionary defines a demurrer as a pleading stating that although the facts alleged in a 
complaint may be true, they are insufficient for the plaintiff to state a claim for relief and for the 
defendant to frame an answer. 
792  Estreicher and Robbins 1989, p. 2; Burden 1989, p. 1. 
793  Estreicher and Robbins 1989, p. 2. 
794 Foley (1988), 47 Cal.3d 654, 671. 
795 Foley (1988), 47 Cal.3d 654, 676. See also Cameron 2001, p.5. 
796 Foley (1988), 47 Cal.3d 654, 677. 
797  For case law, see Hitchcock 1983, p. 1and 2; Tully 1983, p. 4 and 6.  
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accordingly, it is inappropriate in the modern employment context. In citing 
Pugh (1981), the Foley Court held that there is no analytical reason why 
                         
x an employee’s promise to render services, or his actual rendition of 
services over time, may not support an employer’s promise both to 
pay wage and, for example, to refrain from arbitrary dismissal; and  
x in the employment context, factors apart from consideration and 
express terms may not be used to ascertain the existence and 
content of an employment agreement, including the personnel 
policies or practices of the employer, the employee’s longevity of 
service, actions or communications by the employer reflecting 
assurances of continued employment, and the practices of the 
industry, in which the employee is engaged.798
12.3   Factors that determine the existence of good cause protection 
12.3.1   Good cause contract: requirements 
To obtain just cause protection under the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract 
exception, private-sector employees must meet the so-called totality of 
circumstances test. In this respect, the Pugh Court held that while oblique 
language will not, standing alone, be sufficient to establish agreement, it is 
appropriate to consider the totality of the parties’ relationship. It stressed that 
this agreement may be shown by the acts and conduct of the parties, interpreted 
in the light of the subject matter and of the surrounding circumstances.799 In 
Foley (1988), the California Supreme Court upheld this test. In Guz (2000), the 
California Supreme Court, however, stressed that with its confirmation of the 
totality of circumstances test in Foley (1988), it did not suggest that every vague 
combination of Foley factors, shaken together in a bag, necessarily allowed a 
finding that the employee had a right to be discharged only for good cause.800
The Guz Court held that the mere passage of time in the employer’s 
service, even where marked with tangible indicia that the employer approves the 
employee’s work, cannot alone form an implied-in-fact (good cause) contract 
that the employee is no longer at will.801 In Guz (2000), the employee pointed at 
the length of service (twenty years), his satisfactory performance, and the 
testimony of the President of BNI-MI, who believed that Bechtel terminated 
workers with good reason only.802 The California Supreme Court denied Guz’s 
claim. The Guz Court held that there was no evidence that Bechtel’s employees 
were aware of an unwritten at-will policy. Moreover, it flied in the face of 
798 Foley (1988), 47 Cal.3d 654, 678-680. See also Pugh (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 327. 
799 Pugh (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 329. 
800 Guz (2000), D.A.R. 10929, 10933; 24 Cal.4th 317, 337. 
801 Guz (2000), D.A.R. 10929, 10935; 24 Cal.4th 317, 341 and 342. 
802 Guz (2000), D.A.R. 10929, 10930; 24 Cal.4th 317, 328. 
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Bechtel’s general disclaimer in written personnel policies. Further, Guz had not 
received individual promises or representations that Bechtel would retain him 
except for good cause, nor did Guz seriously claim that the practice in Bechtel’s 
industry was to provide job security. According to the California Supreme 
Court, Guz, in effect, argued that by retaining him for over twenty years, and by 
providing him with steady raises, promotions, commendations, and good 
performance reviews during his tenure, Bechtel had engaged in actions 
reflecting assurances of continued employment.803 In contrast, the Guz Court 
stressed that in the absence of other evidence of the employer’s intent, longevity 
and raises and promotions are their own rewards for the employee’s continuing 
valued service. They do not, in and of themselves, additionally constitute a 
contractual guarantee of future employment security. Such a rule granting such 
contract rights on the basis of successful longevity alone would discourage the 
retention and promotion of employees. The Guz Court, on the other hand, held 
that long and successful services are not necessarily irrelevant to the existence of 
an implied-in-fact (good cause) contract. Over the period of an employee’s 
tenure, by its written and unwritten policies and practices, or by informal 
assurances, seniority and longevity can create rights against termination at will. 
The issue is whether the employer’s words or conduct, on which an employee 
had reasonably relied, gave rise to this specific understanding.804
By approving the totality of circumstances test, and by stating that the length of 
service is just one factor in the totality of circumstances test, the Guz Court 
affirmed Foley (1988). Like the Foley Court, the Guz Court held that no fixed 
length of employment is necessary.805 Consequently, courts  still reach various 
results806 on how long one must have been employed for, in order for the 
contract to be implied: thirty-two years as in Pugh (1981); eighteen as in Cleary 
(1980) on which Pugh (1981) expressly relied; or six years, as in Foley 
(1988)?807
 As this thesis reached its completion, a minority of states accepted the 
implied-in-fact (good cause) contract. In Morris (1987), the Kansas Supreme 
Court held that the understanding and intent of the parties in this respect is to be 
ascertained from several factors, which include oral or written negotiations, the 
conduct of the parties from the commencement of the employment relationship, 
the usages of the business, the situation and objective of the parties giving rise to 
the relationship, the nature of the employment, and any other circumstances 
surrounding the employment relationship, which would tend to explain or make 
clear the intention of the parties at the time said employment commenced. Like 
803 Guz (2000), D.A.R. 10929, 10934-10937; 24 Cal.4th 317, 339-348. 
804 Guz (2000), D.A.R. 10929, 10935; 24 Cal.4th 317, 342. 
805 Guz (2000), D.A.R. 10929, 10935; 24 Cal.4th 317, 342. 
806  For contrasting cases, see Zilmer (1989) (31 years sufficient) and Miller v Pepsi-Cola (1989) (11 
years insufficient absent policies supporting an implied-in-fact contract). 
807  Hitchcock 1983, p. 4. 
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the Pugh Court, it considered the entire record in the case.808 In Kestenbaum 
(1988), the New Mexico Supreme Court, following Pugh (1981), too, 
considered the totality of the party’s relationship.809 The evidence presented by 
Kestenbaum was sufficient as a matter of law to establish an implied contract 
that required a good reason to terminate the employment relationship, based on 
initial employment negotiations, statements of the operations manager and the 
vice-president and the manual.810 Likewise, in Berube (1989), the Utah Supreme 
Court that followed Pugh (1981), considered factors as personnel policies or 
practices of employer, the employee’s longevity of service, actions or 
communications by the employer reflecting assurances or continued 
employment, and the practices of the industry in which the employee is engaged, 
in determining the existence of an implied-in-fact (good cause) contract.811 The 
Berube Court upheld the claim of the employee based upon a disciplinary action 
policy, actions of the employer that were consistent with an implied-in-fact term 
of the employment contract, limiting dismissal to situations providing just cause, 
statements of superiors, promotions, and a climb in salary.812 In Metcalf (1989),
the Idaho Supreme Court found the existence of the implied-in-fact (good cause) 
contract exception in the manual, the employee handbook and oral statements.813
Finally, in Torosyan (1995), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial 
court was not erroneous in finding the existence of an implied-in-fact (good 
cause) contract, based on the facts that the employee had been invited to work 
with the employer, in job interviews the employee had informed that he would 
not make the move unless the employer could guarantee him job security, one 
interviewer told him to examine the manual which he did when he started 
working, and the manual included the right to discharge for good cause only.814
12.3.2 At-will disclaimers: with or without effect? 
In Pugh (1981), there was no at-will disclaimer involved. If so, it has been 
argued, the decision may have been otherwise. For this reason, it is said that the 
implied-in-fact (good cause) contract theory has limitations, because employers 
may specifically provide in manuals that employment is at will.815 Indeed, after 
Pugh (1981), many employers tried to avoid the creation of an implied-in-fact 
(good cause) contracts by including at-will disclaimers in their personnel 
manuals and employee handbooks.816 California courts, however, generally take 
808 Morris (1987), 738 P.2d 841, 848 and 849. 
809 Kestenbaum (1988), 766 P.2d 280, 286. 
810 Kestenbaum (1988), 766 P.2d 280, 285. 
811 Berube (1989), 771 P.2d 1033, 1045. 
812 Berube (1989), 771 P.2d 1033, 1047 and 1048. 
813 Metcalf (1989), 778 P.2d 744, 746 and 647. 
814 Torosyan (1995), 662 A.2d 89, 93-95. 
815  Peck 1991, p. 9. 
816  See also above under § 11.3.2. 
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the approach that an at-will disclaimer in an employee handbook cannot 
establish the nature of the employment relationship as a matter of law.817
In Guz (2000), the California Supreme Court held that courts in 
California and elsewhere have held that at-will provisions in personnel 
handbooks, manuals, or memoranda do not bar, or necessarily overcome, other 
evidence of the employer’s contrary intent. The reasoning, express or implied, is 
that parole evidence is admissible to explain, supplement, or even contradict the 
terms of an unintegrated agreement, and that handbook disclaimers should not 
permit an employer, at its whim, to repudiate promises it has otherwise made in 
its own self-interest, and on which it intended an employee to rely. The Guz 
Court, therefore, held that disclaimer language in an employee handbook or 
policy manual does not necessarily mean an employee is employed at will. 
However, it continued, nor can such a provision be ignored in determining 
whether the parties’ conduct was intended, and reasonably understood, to create 
binding limits on an employer’s statutory right to terminate the relationship at 
will. Like any direct expression of employer intent, communicated to employees 
and intended to apply to them, such language must be taken into account, the 
Guz Court stressed, along with all other pertinent evidence, in ascertaining the 
terms on which a worker was employed.818
Other jurisdictions, which have adopted the implied-in-fact (good cause) 
contract exception generally take the same approach as the Guz Court. For 
example, in Morriss (1987), the employer heavily relied on an at-will disclaimer 
in the manual that held that ‘nothing in this policy manual should be construed 
as an employment contract or guarantee of employment’. The Kansas Supreme 
Court held that the ultimate decision of whether there was an implied contract 
not to terminate the employee(s) without cause must be determined from all the 
evidence presented by the parties on that issue. The disclaimer in the 
supervisor’s manual did not as a matter of law determine the issue for reason 
that it has not been established that the disclaimer was brought to the personal 
attention of its employees, or that it was intended by the employer to create an 
unqualified employment-at-will relationship, especially in view of other 
provisions in the manual and the statement made by the employer’s supervisors 
to the employees.819
Subsequently, in Adelmeyer (1995), which explained Morriss (1987),
the Court of Appeal, Tenth Circuit, held that the jury had to evaluate the 
disclaimer in conjunction with additional extrinsic evidence to determine 
whether the parties intended to form an implied contract as both are part of the 
totality of circumstances analysis.820
817  Barnhart 1998, p. 5. 
818 Guz (2000), D.A.R. 10929, 10934; 24 Cal.4th 317. 
819 Morris (1987), 738 P.2d 841, 849. 
820 O’Loughlin (1997), 972 F.Supp. 1352, 1370. 
132
12.3.3 Good cause: actual misconduct or good faith? 
Like in the majority of states, California law protects a good-faith employer. In 
Pugh (1981), the California Court of Appeal established an objective good-faith 
standard for discharges under employment contracts holding implied-in-fact 
promises to terminate only for good cause.821 Under this standard 
‘good cause connotes a fair and honest cause or reason regulated by good faith 
on the part of the party exercising the power, whereby care must be taken not to 
interfere with the legitimate exercise of managerial discretion.’ 822
Additionally, in Wood (1990), the California Court of Appeal held that if the 
reasons advanced by the employer for the discharge were trivial, capricious, 
unrelated to business needs or goals, or pretextual, the finder of fact may 
properly find that the stated reason for termination was not a fair and honest 
cause or reason regulated by good faith. An employer, in other words, does not 
have an unfettered right to exercise discretion in the guise of business judgment. 
In fact, in the opinion of the Court, an implied-in fact promise to dismiss an 
employee for cause only, would be illusory if the employer were permitted to be 
the sole justice and final arbiter of the propriety of the policy giving rise to the 
discharge.823
 Subsequently, in Scott (1995), the California Supreme Court defined the 
term good cause, combining Pugh (1981) and Wood (1990). Although this case 
did not involve a wrongful discharge – but a demotion of two employees, in 
which the employer had breached an implied contract term not to demote 
employees without good cause – the standard, initially, was used in wrongful 
termination cases as well. The Scott Court held that
‘good cause essentially connotes a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by 
good faith on the part of the party exercising the power, as opposed to one that 
is trivial, capricious, unrelated to business needs or goals, or pretextual.’824
First, in Cotran (1998), the California Supreme Court defined the good-faith 
standard in wrongful discharge cases. The wish to resolve the issue was due to a 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Wilkerson (1989), which had caused great 
confusion among the Courts of Appeal in California.  
821 Pugh (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 330. See also Handelman 2001, p. 3; Hitchcock 1983, p. 4. 
822 Pugh (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 330. See also Hitchcock 1983, p. 4. The dissenting judge Kozinski 
in Sanders (1990) invoked this standard – under Alaska Law where actual violation is required – as 
appropriate for employees who occupy safety-sensitive positions, as well in order to provide 
managers with flexibility to ensure that hazardous workplaces can be kept free of possibly dangerous 
workers. See Fabiano 1993, p. 408 and 409. 
823 Wood (1990), 218 Cal.App.3d 661, 670 and 671. 
824 Scott (1995), 11 Cal.4th 454, 467. 
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The decision in Wilkerson (1989), in effect, was a reaction to Pugh (1988). In  
the latter, which case is also known as Pugh II, the California Court of Appeal 
furthered the good-faith standard, as defined in Pugh I, as ‘the state of mind of 
the employer, which is honest of purpose, free from an intention to defraud, and 
in keeping with one’s duty or responsibility’.825 More specifically, it held that an 
employer must have wide latitude in making independent, good-faith judgments 
about high-ranking employees without the threat of a jury second-guessing its 
business judgment. Thus, although the jury must assess the legitimacy of the 
employer’s decision to discharge, it should not be thrust into a managerial 
role.826
In contrast, the Wilkerson Court held that in a wrongful termination suit 
by an employee terminable for good cause only, the employer must prove, as 
part of his defense burden, that misconduct leading to dismissal actually 
occurred, citing from Toussaint (1980), although not explicitly referring to it.827
This caused confusion, because the decision of Wilkerson (1989) was in contrast 
with the majority of court decisions in California, and most other jurisdictions. 
In general, the majority suggested that the jury’s role was to decide whether the 
employer concluded misconduct occurred ‘fairly, honestly, and in good faith’.828
In Cotran (1998), the California Supreme Court explicitly rejected Wilkerson
(1989),829 and adopted the so-called objective reasonableness good-faith 
standard,830 combining the formulations in Scott (1995) and Pugh (1981).831
Under this standard, an employer must have reasonable grounds to believe that 
sufficient cause existed to justify the employee’s termination, rather than that the 
employer must have good-faith belief that employee’s misconduct actually 
existed.832 In effect, the Cotran Court took the middle course. It did not believe, 
unlike the majority in Toussaint (1980) and Wilkerson (1989), that permitting 
juries to decide the factual basis for allegations of employee misconduct is the 
only way to give meaning and substance to an employer’s promise to terminate 
for ‘good cause’, or that barring such fact finding leaves just cause provisions 
toothless.833
Consequently, it held that the proper inquiry for the jury is whether the 
factual basis on which the employer concluded a dischargeable act had been 
committed was reached honestly, after an appropriate investigation and for 
reason that are not arbitrary or pretextual.834 The proper inquiry to the jury, thus, 
825 Pugh (1988), 203 Cal.App.3d 743, 762. 
826 Pugh (1988), 203 Cal.App.3d 743, 769. See also Cotran (1998), 17 Cal.4th 93, 101. 
827 Cotran (1998), 17 Cal.4th 93, 102 and 103. 
828 Cotran (1998), 17 Cal.4th 93, 95. 
829 Cotran (1998), 17 Cal.4th 93, 102. 
830 Cotran (1998), 17 Cal.4th 93, 102 and 103. 
831  Handelman 2001, p. 4. 
832 Kestenbaum (1988), 766 P.2d 280, 287. See also Cotran (1998), 17 Cal.4th 93, 104 and 105. 
833 Cotran (1998), 17 Cal.4th 93, 102. 
834  Handelman 2001, p. 5. 
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the Court continued, was not ‘did the employee, in fact, commit the act leading 
to dismissal?’ as is the case in labor disputes835, but ‘was the factual basis on 
which the employer concluded a dischargeable act had been committed reached 
honestly, after an appropriate investigation and for reasons that are not arbitrary 
or pretextual?’ 836
In establishing the objective reasonableness good-faith standard, the California 
Supreme Court referred to Kestenbaum (1988). In the latter, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court ‘adopted a standard much like the majority rule exemplified by 
Simpson, Vargas and Baldwin’.837 The reference to Kestenbaum (1988) is clear, 
in that the New Mexico Supreme Court did not require actual misconduct, but 
good-faith belief of the employer, having reasonable grounds to believe that the 
employee had committed misconduct.838 The implicit reference to Simpson, 
Vargas and Baldwin by the Cotran Court, however, is less clear. 
In Simpson (1982), the Oregon Supreme Court, in applying a good-faith 
standard, applied a subjective good-faith standard.839 The Simpson Court left the 
power to determine whether the facts constituted cause for termination 
completely with the employer.840 The court needed only to find that the 
employer acted on the basis of its determination that facts constituting just cause 
for discharge existed, but the court needed not find that the facts constituting just 
cause for discharge actually existed.841 In Vargas (1995), the Nevada Supreme 
Court applied an objective good-faith standard, but carried the ruling of the 
Cotran Court one step further. In this case an employee was accused of sexual 
harassment and claimed to be discharged without just cause, contrary to a 
provision within employer’s employee handbook. The Vargas Court held that a 
discharge for good cause is one which is not for any arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal reason and which is one based on facts (1) supported by substantial 
evidence, and (2) reasonably believed by the employer to be true.842 It, in fact, 
cited Baldwin (1989), in which the Washington Supreme Court had combined 
the subjective good-faith standard of Simpson (1982) with the De Novo 
Standard of Toussaint (1980).843
In Fabiano’s opinion, only the Baldwin standard is comparable, at least on 
paper, to the test employed by arbitrators in interpreting the just cause clauses of 
collective bargaining agreements.844 In contrast, the Cotran Court explicitly 
835  For examples, see Brand 1999, p. 234. 
836 Cotran (1998), 17 Cal. 4th 93, 107 and 108. 
837 Cotran (1998), 17 Cal.4th 93, 103-106. 
838 Kestenbaum (1988), 766 P.2d 280, 287 and 288. 
839  See Vargas (1995), 901 P.2d 693, 700. 
840 Simpson (1982), 643 P.2d 1276, 1279. See also Delmondo 1991, p. 836; Fabiano 1993, p. 404. 
841 Simpson (1982), 643 P.2d 1276, 1277. 
842 Vargas (1995), 901 P.2d 693, 701. 
843 Baldwin (1989), 769 P.2 298, 304. 
844  Fabiano 1993, p. 405. See also Delmondo 1991, p. 848. 
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distinguished the good cause standard from the just cause standard under labor 
arbitration. Justice Mosk wrote 
‘I note that nothing in the majority opinion is intended to alter the different 
manner, in which the term good cause is construed by arbitrators pursuant to a 
collective bargaining agreement between unions and employers. In such 
agreements the contract is express, the remedies more limited, the role of the 
arbitrator in policing collective bargaining agreements well-established both 
contractually and customarily, and the contractual language supplemented by a 
well developed body of arbitration law concerning the meaning of good cause 
that the parties can be presumed to be aware of at the time they entered the 
agreement  (…) The majority’s good cause standard does not extend beyond 
the context, in which it is articulated, i.e., implied contracts between employers 
and individual employees.’845
In Pugh (1981), the California Court of Appeal, in footnote 26, too, emphasized 
that for courts to apply the same standards as labor arbitrators may prove overly 
intrusive in some cases, because arbitrators are selected by the parties, partly on 
the basis of the faith that the parties have in their knowledge and judgment 
concerning labor relations matters.846 One may argue, that the Cotran Court and 
the Pugh Court hold that civil courts cannot apply the same just cause standard 
under collective bargaining law to non-bargaining units employees. On the other 
hand, one may argue that the Pugh Court and the Cotran Court merely indicate 
that the rules as applied under labor arbitration, in principle, do not apply in civil 
wrongful termination lawsuits, considering it as inappropriate to allow a jury to 
do the same as a labor arbitrator for reason that the latter is chosen by the 
parties, presumably for his knowledge of labor-management relations and 
dependent upon the parties for his future selection, to pass judgment upon the 
dismissal. As a matter of law, nothing stands in the way to apply the same just 
cause standard under collective bargaining law to non-bargaining-unit 
employees.  
 Schwarze is of another opinion. He objects to the application of the 
good cause standard standard under labor law to civil cases, referring to the fact 
that an arbitration hearing is different from a courtroom trial. In a courtroom, the 
employer has only one opportunity to present his case, where in the arbitration 
setting he is afforded the opportunity to first state his claim and later present a 
rebuttal. In his opinion, it then is unfair for the employer to bear the burden of 
proof on this issue, since the employee retains the advantage of having the first 
and last word. Another difference he points out is that arbitration allows a 
neutral arbitrator to decide whether just cause was present. Thus, arbitrators may 
sympathize with an employee who lost his job and his house, however, their 
decisions will not reflect it. Jurors, on the other hand, he states, generally have a 
purely emotional reaction seeing the helpless employee up against the powerful 
845 Cotran (1998), 17 Cal.4th 93, 110.  
846 Pugh (1981), 116 Cal.App.311, 330, footnote 26. 
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employer. Hence, the employee should retain the burden of proof to help 
compensate for this bias.847
12.3.4 Burden of proof: employer or employee? 
In Pugh (1981), the California Court of Appeal clearly stated that the burden of 
proof rests with the employer to prove good cause. In this respect, it held that 
‘(…) after an [employee] has demonstrated a prima facie case of wrongful 
termination in violation of his contract of employment. The burden of coming 
forward with evidence as to the reason for [employee’s] termination now shifts 
to the employer. [Employee] may attack the employer’s offered explanation, 
either on the ground that it is pretextual (and that the real reason is one 
prohibited by contract or public policy (…), or on the ground that it is 
insufficient to meet the employer’s obligations under contract or applicable 
legal principles. [Employee] bears, however the ultimate burden of proving that 
he was terminated wrongfully.’848
It referred to McDonnell Douglas (1973) and Cleary (1980). In brief, in Cleary 
(1980), the California Court of Appeal held that the employee has the burden to 
prove that he was terminated unjustly. In reply, the employer has the opportunity 
to demonstrate that he exercised good faith and fair dealing with respect to the 
employee. Only if the employee should sustain his burden of proof, will he have 
established a cause of action for wrongful discharge.849 McDonnell Douglas 
(1973) did not involve a common law wrongful termination claim. It held a 
claim under federal anti-discrimination law.850 The Pugh Court, so it seems, 
wished to stress that to the extent Congress has tried to afford alleged victims of 
race discrimination relatively greater protection, it makes little sense to place a 
lighter burden on employers accused of race discrimination than employers 
faced with wrongful discharge claims.851
 At first sight, the California Supreme Court, too, does not intend to 
abandon the general rule of contract, under which a plaintiff has to prove all 
elements of his claim.852 Also, other courts, which accepted the implied-in-fact 
(good cause) contract, in general, adhere to the general rule of contract regarding 
the burden of proof.853 For example, in Berube (1989), the Utah Supreme Court 
explicitly held that the burden of proof in case of an implied-in-fact (good 
cause) contract resides upon the plaintiff-employee.854 Also, the Nebraska 
847  Schwarze 1988, p. 548 and 549. 
848 Pugh (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 329 and 330. See also Schwarze 1988, p. 547. 
849 Cleary (1980), 111 Cal.App.3d 443, 456. 
850  For an in-depth discussion of McDonnell Douglas (1973), see above under §  8.8. 
851  See also above under § 11.3.4. 
852 Foley (1988), 47 Cal.3d 654, 676 and 682; Guz (2000), D.A.R. 10929, 10932; 24 Cal.4th 317, 335. 
853  For example, see Kestenbaum (1988), 766 P.2d 280, 287. 
854 Berube (1989), 771 P.2d 1033, 1044. 
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Supreme Court, in Schuessler (1993), referring to Stiles (1989),855 held that the 
burden to prove the existence of an employment contract and all the facts 
essential to the cause of action is upon the person who asserts the contract.856
12.4 Conclusion 
In Pugh (1981), the California Court of Appeal was the first among state courts 
to hold that an implied-in-fact (good cause) contract could overcome the 
presumption of at will. In brief, it held that based on the totality of 
circumstances, an employer may discharge an employee with good cause only, 
deriving from personnel policies or practices of the employer, the employee’s 
longevity of service, actions or communications by the employer reflecting 
assurances of continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which 
the employee is engaged. In Foley (1988), the California Supreme Court 
affirmed Pugh (1981). In Guz (2000), the California Supreme Court, however, 
stressed that – in the absence of other evidence of the employer’s intent – 
longevity, raises and promotions are their own rewards for the employee’s 
continuing valued service. They do not, in and of themselves, constitute an 
additional contractual guarantee of future employment security. Overall, the 
foregoing case law shows that the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract 
exception is still good law in the state of California, and in a number of other 
jurisdictions. A weakness of the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception 
is that like with the handbook exception, at-will disclaimers in handbooks, too, 
may negate job security. Unlike with the handbook exception, however, at-will 
disclaimers under the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception, generally, 
are considered merely as one of the factors in the totality of circumstances test. 
Nevertheless, it can be a factor to negate good cause protection, which leaves 
the employee under the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract with less just 
cause protection than generally assumed. All the more so when one realizes that 
the majority of jurisdictions place the burden with the employee to prove an 
implied-in-fact (good cause) contract, and lack of good cause. Another hurdle is 
that the majority of states protect the good-faith employer, although the reason 
given by the employer is subject to scrutiny, at least, in California and New 
Mexico.  
13 American dismissal law:  
just cause protection for private-sector employees? 
13.1 At-will dismissal system 
By 2007, the United States is one of the few developed industrialized countries 
in the world that still embraces the employment at-will doctrine. Under the 
855 Stiles v. Skylark Meats, Inc., 231 Neb. 863,865; 438 N.W.2d 494, 496 (Neb. 1989). 
856 Schuessler (1993), 500 N.W.2d 529, 538. 
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classic version of the at-will rule, an employer can discharge an employee for 
any cause, no cause, or even a cause morally wrong, without being liable. The 
pure concept of employment at will, however, has been eroded by exceptions to 
the at-will rule under federal and state (statutory and common) law. 
13.2 Federal labor law and collective labor law 
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA) is the core of labor law in 
the United States. Private-sector employees can obtain job security under the 
Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA. These Sections provide protection against 
dismissal on specified grounds, and in specified situations only. These Sections, 
thus, do not offer protection against arbitrary dismissal in general, nor does any 
other provision of the NLRA.  
Collective bargaining agreements, on the other hand, generally contain 
just cause and arbitration provisions under which employees, subject to a 
collective bargaining agreement, i.e. the so-called bargaining-unit employees, 
typically enjoy just cause protection. However, collective bargaining agreements 
apply to a minority – about ten percent – of the workforce only. The majority of 
the workforce, the so-called non-bargaining-unit employees, also referred to as 
at-will employees, are empty-handed in this respect. All the more so, because 
courts do not seem willing to apply the just cause standard under labor 
arbitration to dismissals of at-will employees. 
13.3   Federal anti-discrimination law 
Federal anti-discrimination statutes provide protection against arbitrary 
dismissals under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 
prohibiting discriminatory discharge based on race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 
prohibiting discriminatory discharge against employees of forty years of age or 
older; the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1974 (PDA), prohibiting 
discriminatory discharge based on pregnancy; and, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), prohibiting discriminatory discharge based on 
disabilities. State anti-discrimination statutes generally broaden the scope of 
these statutes, but ultimately cover the same ground for a dismissal: 
discrimination.  
In general, to the extent it can be said that anti-discrimination statutes 
have modified the at-will relationship, protecting private-sector employees 
against arbitrary dismissal, anti-discrimination statutes rather constitute what is a 
bad cause for dismissal. Also, the shift of burden as accepted by the US 
Supreme Court did not change the at-will status of the private-sector employees. 
Under the McDonnell Douglas test, employers have to bring forward a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. The latter, however, does not need to 
constitute just cause. It merely needs to be a reason that does not fall within the 
statute’s definition of discrimination. 
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13.4     State statutory law 
With the Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act of 1987 (WDFEA), 
Montana became the first, and is so far, the only state in the United States to 
provide just cause protection for (non-bargaining unit) private-sector employees. 
At first sight, the good cause standard under the WDFEA appears to constitute 
an equivalent of a just cause standard, as is common in collective bargaining 
agreements. In practice, the WDFEA leaves workers with less just cause 
protection than generally assumed. First, Montana still protects a good-faith 
employer, being the sole judge to decide on managerial decisions. Second, 
surveys show that blue-collar workers, in effect, lack just cause protection under 
the WDFEA. Whereas the Act offers private-sector employees the possibility of 
arbitration, in practice, when an employee makes an offer to arbitrate and the 
employer refuses to arbitrate, the employee has no other option than to address 
the judiciary. In general, blue-collar workers lack financial means to hire 
counsel on an hourly basis, leaving blue-collar workers, in effect, empty-handed. 
Therefore, whether private-sector employees – besides those exempted under the 
Act – can enjoy just cause protection under the WDFEA, in practice, is 
doubtful. 
13.5  State common law 
In Petermann (1959), the California Court of Appeal was the first among state 
courts to adopt the first common law exception to the at-will doctrine, the public 
policy exception. This tort action, among others, applies to situations, in which 
an employee is discharged for refusing to violate a statute, to perform a statutory 
obligation, to exercise a constitutional or statutory right or privilege, or to report 
a statutory violation for the public’s benefit. From case law derives that the 
public policy exception does not provide protection against arbitrary dismissal in 
general, but – like discriminatory grounds – rather constitutes what is a bad
cause for dismissal.  
 In Cleary (1980), the California Court of Appeal – again – was the first 
to hold that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applied in the 
employment context. Initially, this exception held a promise of protection 
against arbitrary dismissal in general, requiring good cause for discharge. In 
Foley (1988), which decision was followed by the majority of jurisdictions, the 
California Supreme Court, however, refused to interpret the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing as some form of job security.857 Moreover, it held 
that recovery could not be in tort, but only in contract, hence,  violation of this 
covenant could result in contract damages only. Additionally, in Guz (2000), the 
California Supreme Court further restricted the application of the covenant, 
referring to the situation only, in which an at-will employee is discharged as a 
857  Holloway and Leech 1993,  p. 100. 
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mere pretext to cheat the worker out of another contract benefit to which the 
employee was clearly entitled, such as compensation already earned. The 
majority of the few states that accepted the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, too, are of the opinion that this exception no longer includes job 
security.
In Toussaint (1980), the Michigan Supreme Court introduced the handbook 
exception based on the legitimate expectations theory. Under this theory, a just 
cause provision in a handbook becomes enforceable based upon reliance by the 
employee. The majority of courts did not follow Toussaint (1980),  for not being 
consistent with contract principles. They preferred to follow the decision of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in Pine River (1983), which applied contract 
principles. Under the unilateral contract theory of the Pine River Court, a 
handbook provision is considered as a unilateral offer by the employer that is 
accepted by the employee through continuance of work performance. The 
weakness of this theory is that job performance, in turn, is also held sufficient to 
accept a modification of a just cause to an at-will policy.  Consequently, after 
Toussaint (1980), employers started to insert at-will disclaimers in handbooks to 
negate just cause protection, which are generally considered as valid by courts. 
Hence, the handbook exception leaves private-sector employees, in practice, 
with less just cause protection than primarily assumed.  
 The so-called implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception under 
common law offers a more solid basis, in that an at-will disclaimer is considered 
as just one of the factors to determine the existence of a good cause contract. 
This new cause of action against wrongful termination was added in Pugh 
(1981), and affirmed by the California Supreme Court in Foley (1988). In brief, 
the California Court of Appeal held that under the totality of circumstances – 
supported by oral assurances, promotions, salary increases, and reliance upon 
personnel policies and manuals – an employer may discharge an employee with 
good cause only. 
13.6 Conclusion 
This part of the thesis examined to what extent private-sector employees in the 
United States enjoy just cause protection under legislative and judicial 
exceptions to the at-will rule. The conclusion is that private-sector employees in 
the United States obtain protection against arbitrary dismissal, however, not in 
general, under the NLRA, federal and state anti-discrimination statutes, and 
under common law based on public policy grounds. These grounds rather 
constitute what constitute a bad cause for dismissal. Nevertheless, they limit the 
unfettered right of employers to dismiss employees under the at-will rule. In 
contrast, private-sector employees who are subject to a collective bargaining 
agreement, enjoy protection against arbitrary dismissal in general. They, 
however, form a minority of the workforce. Besides, private-sector employees in 
the state of Montana enjoy just cause protection under the Montana Wrongful 
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Discharge From Employment Act (WDFEA). In practice, however, this  
protection appears without effect for blue-collar workers. Also, the handbook 
exception under common law provides less just cause protection than one 
primarily assumes. This protection can be simply negated through at-will 
disclaimers. The implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception under common 
law offers a sounder basis. Under this exception, an at-will disclaimer is 
considered as merely one of the factors, which determines the existence of the 
good cause contract.  
 Overall, this Chapter shows that the general thought in the Netherlands 
that private-sector employees in the United States lack protection against 
arbitrary dismissal, is unjustified. In fact, this Chapter shows that besides 
protection against dismissal for bad cause, American courts gradually accept just 
cause protection, and that in the debate on a Restatement of Law on 
Employment, just cause protection, too, gains attention. However, it is true that, 
in practice, still, only a minority of workers in the United States enjoy 
protection against arbitrary dismissal in general. 
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III  DUTCH DISMISSAL LAW 
14  Introduction 
In this Chapter, I examine to what extent private-sector employees in the 
Netherlands find just cause protection under their system of private dismissal 
law. I will also pay attention to prohibitions on dismissal (ontslagverboden).
These in part determine the scope of a just cause for dismissal. In contrast with 
the United States – which is known for its at-will dismissal system, allowing 
employers to dismiss employees without cause – the Netherlands is known for 
its just cause dismissal system. In fact, the 1945 Special Decree on Labor 
Relations (Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen or BBA 1945) and Book 
7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code (Boek 7 Titel 10 Burgerlijk Wetboek) together 
comprise what is called the dual  just cause dismissal system.1
The outline of this Chapter is as follows. After a description of the legal 
system of the Netherlands in paragraph 14.1, I will focus on the general sources 
of employment (termination) law in paragraph 14.2. In paragraph 14.3, I will 
briefly describe the Dutch rules on employment termination, focusing on (i) the 
private-sector employee (ii) with an employment agreement for an indefinite 
period.2 In the subparagraphs 14.3.1 and 14.3.2, respectively, I will explain these 
terms. In the subparagraphs 14.3.3 and 14.3.4, I will briefly describe the two 
routes of employment termination under the dual just cause dismissal system. In 
subparagraph 14.3.5, I will discuss the prohibitions on dismissal. Subsequently, 
in the paragraphs 15 to 18, I will examine to what extent private-sector 
employees in the Netherlands enjoy just cause protection. First, I pay attention 
to the debate that took place in the past in the Netherlands in respect of just 
cause protection (§ 15.1). Second, I will describe the legislative history of the 
BBA 1945 (§ 15.2), and of Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code (§ 15.3). 
The reason to first focus on the BBA 1945 – although the Act of the 
Employment Agreement of 1907, later transformed in Book 7 Title 10 DCC, 
was enacted earlier – is that it is generally agreed that just cause protection was 
first introduced through the BBA 1945. Third, I will focus on the BBA 1945 as 
it applies today (§ 16). The emphasis will be on (i) Article 6 of the BBA 1945, 
requiring that an employer needs prior authorization to unilaterally terminate an 
employment agreement; (ii) the Dismissal Decree (Ontslagbesluit) that applies 
to the BBA 1945, requiring that a dismissal is justified; and (iii) the CWI 
Handbook on Dismissal (Beleidsregels Ontslagtaak CWI), which aims to 
establish that the regional offices of the CWI – the Centre for Work and Income, 
which decides on whether a dismissal is justified – uniformly apply the Articles 
of the Dismissal Decree.3 Fourth, I will focus on Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch 
Civil Code as it applies today. More specifically, I will discuss Article 7:681 
1  Tekst & Commentaar Arbeidsrecht (2006): BBA 1945, Art. 6 Section 1. 
2  For a justification of this restriction, see above under § 2.2. 
3  For  the CWI Handbook on Dismissal, see below under § 16.2. 
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DCC, providing a rule on a manifestly unreasonable dismissal (§ 17); and, 
Article 7:685 DCC, allowing employers and employees to address the Cantonal 
Court to ask for dissolution of the employment agreement based on serious 
cause (§ 18). Furthermore, throughout this Chapter, I will pay attention to (i) 
Article 7:669 DCC, which requires that the employer provides an employee with 
the reason for dismissal; (ii) the rules on employment termination during the 
probationary period; and (iii) case law that sees to a summary dismissal. The 
reason to particularly focus on Article 6 of the BBA 1945, Article 7:681 DCC 
and Article 7:685 DCC, is that it is generally assumed that private-sector 
employees enjoy just cause protection under these Articles. In this Chapter, I 
will examine whether this assumption is justified. 
14.1  The legal system of the Netherlands 
Important differences with the United States are (i) the Netherlands, being a 
constitutional monarchy since 1814; (ii) the Netherlands, having a tradition of 
great loyalty as regards the ratification of international treaties regarding social 
issues;4 and (iii) the influence of European law on Dutch law, the Netherlands 
being a member of the European Union. Both countries have in common that 
they distinguish between legislative, executive and judicial powers. 
14.1.1 Separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers 
Legal history5
To understand the governmental structure of the Netherlands, we need to go 
back to the French Revolution of 1789. The Netherlands was a republic then, but 
on its way to become a monarchy. The establishment of the Dutch Republic of 
the United Provinces took place in 1579, when seven northern provinces – 
Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland, Overijssel, Friesland and Groningen – 
allied themselves in the Union of Utrecht, to which Drente would join later. 
When they deposed the Spanish King Philip II through de Plakkaat van 
Verlatinghe of 26 July 1581, they became known as the Dutch Republic of the 
United Provinces. This Dutch ‘declaration of independence’ again inspired the 
colonist states of the United States when declaring their independency in 1776.6
The Dutch provinces continued to appoint Stadholders, however.7 This led to 
political, legal and fiscal privileges of leading classes in the provinces. Hence, in 
the second half of the eighteenth century, when the French Revolution started to 
spread over Western Europe, there was a growing discontent among Dutch 
citizens. Consequently, after the French invaded the Republic in 1795, Dutch 
4  Jacobs 2004, p. 33. 
5  For an in-depth discussion on the legal history of the Netherlands, see Van der Pot-Donner 1995,  
p. 84-120. 
6  See above under § 5.1. 
7  Taekema 2004, p. 41, 45 and 46; Jacobs 2004, p. 21. 
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patriots who earlier had chosen exile in France, returned to the Netherlands and 
proclaimed the Batavian Republic, enforcing a Constitution upon the Republic, 
modelled after the French.  
This Constitution of 1798 was heavily influenced by the ideas of the 
French philosophers Jean-Jacques Rousseau, proclaiming the sovereignty of the 
people, and Charles Montesquieu, proclaiming the separation of legislative, 
executive and judicial powers. The Constitution transferred the sovereignty of 
the Provinces to the Republic, formally abolishing the Provinces. The 1806 
Constitution, in turn, abolished the Republic, turning the Netherlands into a 
constitutional monarchy, although it still remained under the regime of the 
French. Napoleon Bonaparte, in fact, appointed his brother Lodewijk Napoleon 
in 1808 to be the first King of Holland, but called his brother back to France in 
1810, at the same time annexing the Netherlands to his French Empire. In 1813, 
when Napoleon Bonaparte’s power began to crumble and the French had left, 
William of Orange, son of the former Stadholder William V of Orange, was 
proclaimed Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands. Subsequently, the 1814 
Convention established a new Kingdom of the Netherlands and attributed the 
executive power to King William (of Orange) I. After amendments in 1815, 
1840, 1848 and 1983, the Dutch Constitution, as today, still reflects the French 
influence on the legal system of the Netherlands, i.e. the separation of 
legislative, executive and judicial powers.8
Legislative powers9
Under the Dutch Constitution, legislative powers are vested in the government 
and Parliament. The government is formed by the monarch and government 
ministers, als referred to as the Crown. The Parliament consists of the Upper 
House (Eerste Kamer), and the Lower House (Tweede Kamer). The Lower 
House, consisting of 150 members, directly elected by the people for four-year 
terms, has the authority to initiate and to amend bills. Members of the 
government, too, can take the initiative for introducing bills. The Upper House, 
composed of 75 members, elected by the Provincial Councils (Provinciale
Staten) for four-year terms, can approve or reject the bill, it cannot initiate or 
amend legislation. Before a bill becomes law, it first needs approval of the 
Lower House, followed by approval of the Upper House, and is finalized by the 
signature of the monarch and the appropriate minister(s). Subsequently, the law 
becomes enforceable through publication in the Statute Book (Staatsblad).
The(se) laws, enacted by the government and Parliament, are known as formal 
statutes (wetgeving in formele zin), and together with case law, are considered as 
8  Taekema 2004, p. 50 and 51; Loonstra 2004, p. 285; Jacobs 2004, p. 21. See also below under § 27.2. 
9  This part is adapted from an essay written by Van Arkel, in: Van Arkel en Loonstra 2004,  
p. 12.2-12.3 with permission from International Labor and Employment Laws, Vol. II, Second 
Edition, copyright © 2004, American Bar Association, published by the Bureau of National Affairs, 
Inc., Washington, D.C. For an in-depth discussion on the legislative powers, and Parliament in 
particular, see Bovend’Eert en Kummeling 2000; Van der Pot-Donner.1995, p. 393-436. 
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the main sources of employment (termination) law.10 Under the Province and the 
Municipal Act, the Provincial and the Municipal Council, respectively, have 
legislative powers. Their laws are known as ordinances. 
Executive powers11
Under the Dutch Constitution, the executive powers are vested in the 
government. The monarch – by 2007, Queen Beatrice of Oranje Nassau – can do 
no wrong and the ministers are responsible for government acts. The people can 
show their influence through Parliament, which has control over the executive 
powers of the government. In this respect, it is noteworthy to mention that 
Parliament has (1) the right of questioning: a member of either chamber can 
question a minister via the chairman; (2) the right of interrogation: at the request 
of the majority of either chamber, the chamber can ask a minister for 
information; and (3) the right of inquiry: at the request of the majority of either 
chamber, the chamber can start an inquiry with regard to an act of a minister. In 
a province or a municipality, the County Alderman (Gedeputeerde Staten) and 
the Court of Mayor and Aldermen (College van Burgemeester en Wethouders),
respectively, have executive powers, unless otherwise stated by the Province Act 
or the Municipal Act.  
Judicial powers12
The establishment, structure, and competence of the judicial branch are 
regulated by the Dutch Constitution, the Judiciary Act (Wet op de rechterlijke 
organisatie), and the Act on the New Civil Procedure (Wetboek van Nieuw 
Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering), which went into effect on 1 January 2002.13
Under the Constitution, the members of the highest judicial body, the 
Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), are appointed for life by royal decree, 
however, they can be dismissed upon request. The members are chosen from a 
list of recommendations prepared by Parliament. Under the Constitution and the 
Judiciary Act, the civil court system consists of – in order from lower to higher 
courts – 59 ‘District Courts, Cantonal Sections’, hereafter referred to as 
10  For employment (termination) law, see further below under § 14.1.2. 
11  Parts have been adapted from an essay written by Van Arkel, in: Van Arkel en Loonstra 2004,  
p. 12.3-12.4 with permission from International Labor and Employment Laws, Vol. II, Second 
Edition, copyright © 2004, American Bar Association, published by the Bureau of National Affairs, 
Inc., Washington, D.C. For an in-depth discussion of executive powers, see Van der Pot-Donner 
1995, p. 350-392. 
12  Parts have been adapted from an essay written by Van Arkel, in: Van Arkel en Loonstra 2004, p. 12.4 
and 12.11-12.13 with permission from International Labor and Employment Laws, Vol. II, Second 
Edition, copyright © 2004, American Bar Association, published by the Bureau of National Affairs, 
Inc., Washington, D.C.  For an in-depth discussion of judicial powers, see Van der Pot-Donner 1995, 
p. 437-453. 
13  The Act on the New Civil Procedure has been amended by Act of 8 September 2005, Stb. 2005, 455, 
which amendment(s) went into force on 15 October 2005, Stb. 2005, 484. 
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Cantonal Courts (Kantongerechten), 19 District Courts (Rechtbanken), five 
Courts of Appeal (Gerechtshoven), and one Supreme Court in the Hague, which 
serves as the highest court for the  Kingdom of the Netherlands.14 Cantonal 
Courts have exclusive jurisdiction in employment and labor cases. Hence, 
private-sector employees must file their claims with the Cantonal Court. If 
parties do not agree with its decision, they can, unless restricted by law, appeal 
to the Court of Appeal, and ultimately, they can file for review with the 
Netherlands Supreme Court. In summary proceedings, a judge of the District 
Court, either of the Cantonal or Civil Section, decides on employment 
(termination) cases (Voorzieningenrechter), with the possibility of appeal to the 
Court of Appeal, and ultimately the Netherlands Supreme Court. 
A review by the Netherlands Supreme Court is possible on limited 
grounds only, and the facts cannot be reviewed. Unlike the United States, the 
Netherlands Supreme Court does not have discretionary authority to grant or 
refuse review, but in civil cases must do so when the request meets the 
‘technical’ requirements of Article 398 of the Act on the New Civil Procedure. 
In brief, the plaintiff must have exhausted all forms of appeal. When the 
Netherlands grants review, it can issue a new decision or refer the case to the 
appellate court. The latter then must issue a new decision, and will take the 
decision of the Netherlands Supreme Court into consideration, although, 
formally, the principle of stare decisis does not apply. Unlike the US Supreme 
Court, the Netherlands Supreme Court is not allowed to a constitutional review 
of treaties and formal legislation. It can review the constitutionality of lower 
legislative instruments.15 The Netherlands also does not have a jury system. 
14.1.2 Labor and employment (termination) law 
In general, employment law, covering private-sector employees, compromises 
the fields of employment agreement law (arbeidsovereenkomstensrecht),
workers’ representation law (medezeggenschapsrecht), employment termination 
law or dismissal law (ontslagrecht), and collective bargaining law (CAO-recht).
The latter generally is referred to as labor law. Employment law (arbeidsrecht)
together with social security law (sociaalzekerheidsrecht), are generally referred 
to as ‘social law’ (sociaal recht).
14  Together with the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, the Netherlands forms the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. As from 1 July 2007, the Netherlands Antilles will be dismantled. As from  then 
Curaçao and Sint Maarten – like Aruba – gain a status aparte on the one hand, and Bonaire, Sint 
Eustatius and Saba become  municipalities (gemeenten) of the Netherlands on the other.  
15  Taekema 2004, p. 87. See also Jacobs 2004, p. 38 and 39. 
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Labor law 
For this thesis, the following labor acts, covering private-sector employees, are 
relevant (1) the Collective Labor Agreement Act (WCAO or Wet op de 
collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst); and (2) the Act on Administrative Extension 
and Non-Extension of Collective Labor Agreements (Wet AVV/OVV or Wet op 
het algemeen verbindend en het onverbindend verklaren van bepalingen van 
collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten).16
 With regard to collective bargaining agreements, the Central Office of 
the Labor Inspectorate (Arbeidsinspectie) plays an important role. It is part of 
the Ministry of Social Affairs. Collective bargaining agreements that are new, 
altered, or terminated must be reported to the Central Office. In this way, the 
government stays informed on the process and contents of collective bargaining 
agreements, which is important in forming its social policy. Unlike unions in the 
United States, unions deliberate with the government, in reaching compromises, 
known as the poldermodel.17 In this respect, reference is often made to the 
Akkoord van Wassenaar of 1982, in which the government and unions reached a 
consensus on wage restraint for employees in combating the negative effects of 
the Second Oil Crise.18 By 2007, union membership in the Netherlands is about 
twenty-six percent.19 To explain the low grade of unionization, Jacobs, among 
others, point at the low grade of unionization among new professions, part-time 
workers, the flexible labour force, young employees, female workers and 
migrant workers.20
Employment law 
For this thesis, the following acts, covering private-sector employees, are 
relevant in respect of employment termination (1) the BBA 1945 (Buitengewoon 
Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen 1945 or 1945 Special Decree on Labor Relations), 
regulating individual and collective dismissals; (2) Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch 
Civil Code (Boek 7 Titel 10 Burgerlijk Wetboek), regulating the indvidual 
relationship including individual dismissals; (3)  Books 3 and 6 of the Dutch 
Civil Code (Boeken 3 en 6 Burgerlijk Wetboek), covering  patrimonial law 
(vermogensrecht) and the law of obligations (verbintenissenrecht), respectively; 
16  For these Acts, see above under § 7.1. For a discussion of these and other sources of labor law, see 
Jacobs 2004, p. 32-39. In the Netherlands, the most important trade union confederations are the 
FNV, CNV and MHP. The most important employers’ associations are the VNO-NCW, Vakcentrale 
MKB Nederland (small and medium-sized businesses), and the Vereniging LTO Nederland 
(agricultural). 
17  Jacobs 2003, p. 78 and 79. 
18  See Jacobs 2006, p. 27 and 28; Nagelkerke en De Nijs 2006.  The Akkoord van Wassenaar, too, is 
considered as the starting point of the process of decentralization. See EK 1999-2000, No. 222a, 
Notitie (zelf) regulering, p. 3. 
19 Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek or CBS (Netherlands Bureau of Statistics). 
20  Jacobs 2004, p. 130 and 131. For the development of labor law in the Netherlands, see De Jong 1975, 
p. 150-183; Stege 2004, p. 11-61. 
149
and (4) the WMCO (Wet Melding Collectief Ontslag or Collective Redundancy 
Notification Act), regulating collective dismissals, which involve 20 or more 
employees within a CWI-district. 
14.2 General sources of employment (termination) law 
Besides national law, which will be discussed in-depth in the paragraphs 15 to 
18, international law is considered as an important source of Dutch employment 
termination law. It stands on the highest level in the Dutch hierarchy of sources 
of law.21 Subsequently, international law finds its way into national law through 
the articles 93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitution. In contrast, European
Community Law, formally being part of international law, finds its way into 
national law through case law of the European Court of Justice (Europees Hof 
van Justitie). In this Section, I will briefly pay attention to these sources of 
Dutch employment (termination) law. First, I briefly pay attention to national 
law in subparagraph 14.2.1, followed by a more in-depth discussion of 
international law in general in subparagraph 14.2.2, and of European 
Community Law in particular in subparagraph 14.2.3. In the subparagraphs 14.3 
and 14.4, respectively, I will briefly discuss international and national law with 
respect to just cause protection. An in-depth examination on the extent of just 
cause protection of private-sector employees in the Netherlands takes place in 
the paragraphs 15 tot 18.  
14.2.1 National law 
The most important national sources of employment termination law are (1) the 
BBA 1945, and (2) Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code, preceded by the 
Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907. The Civil Code has been 
interpreted by civil courts, and Cantonal Courts in particular, which brings me to 
the next important source of employment termination law, case law. Most 
important are the decisions of the Netherlands Supreme Court, however. These 
are binding on lower courts, although, as mentioned above, in the Netherlands, 
formally, the principle of stare decisis does not apply.22
21  See below under § 14.2.2.1. See also Jacobs 2004, p. 38 and 39. 
22  Brouwer e.a. 2004, p. 611 and 612; Taekema 2004, p. 68 and 69. For the term stare decisis, see 
above under § 5.2.2. 
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14.2.2 International law 
14.2.2.1 The moderate monistic system of the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, the government is under an obligation to respect labour
standards generally by virtue of its membership of the United Nations, the 
International Labour Organization, the Council of Europe,23 and the European 
Union.24 Whether the standards of these organizations must be implemented by 
the legislature of member states, or automatically becomes part of national law, 
is dependent on what constitutional law determines. In this respect, one, in 
general, distinguishes between a dualistic or monistic system. Under a dualistic 
system – e.g. the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland – 
treaties and national law are two distinctive legal orders. Hence, a treaty does 
not automatically become part of national law. Consequently, citizens can 
invoke rights under this treaty only after its standards have been translated into 
national law through legislative action. Under a monistic system, the treaty 
becomes automatically part of national law, hence, does not require legislative 
action.25
For example, the United States has a monistic system. Article VI of the 
US Constitution, the so-called Supremacy Clause, determines that federal law – 
including treaties, standing on the same level as federal law – made in pursuance 
of the US Constitution is ‘the supreme Law of the Land’ and that ‘Justices in 
every State shall be bound thereby’.26 Consequently, after a treaty has been 
submitted to and approved by two-third of the states and approved by Congress 
and the President, a treaty in the United States, in principle, becomes part of 
national law. As Judge Marshall correctly states 
‘It is consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of 
the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative 
provision.’ 
23  The European Council should not be confused with the – Council of the – European Union. The 
Council of Europe was the first international organization to be founded in Europe, partly inspired by 
a Winston Churchill speech in 1946. Established in 1949, its core mission is to strengthen democracy 
throughout its member states through setting and monitoring legally enforceable standards, notably in 
the field of human rights.  It has more members than the European Union (46 versus 25), again fewer 
members than the ILO. See also Gerard Quinn, The European Union and the Council of Europe on 
the Issue of Human Rights, 46 McGill L.J. 849 (2001).  
24  It bears mentioning, that together with the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, the Netherlands forms the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Netherlands only is part of the European Union. However, as from 
1 July 2007, the Netherlands Antilles will be dismantled. As from  then Curaçao and Sint Maarten – 
like Aruba – gain a status aparte on the one hand, and Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba become  
municipalities (gemeenten) of the Netherlands on the other. Hence, as from 1 July 2007, European 
law, in effect, probably will apply to Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba as well, being part of the 
Netherlands. Also, it is possible that all will gain the so-called status of ‘ultraperifere regio’ within 
the European Union. 
25  Burkens e.a. 1997, p. 301 and 302; Kooijmans 2002, p. 82-84.   
26  Leary 1982, p. 44 and 45. See also above under § 5.2.1.1. 
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However, Marshall continues  
‘(…) when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the 
parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the 
policital, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the 
contract before it can become a rule for the Court.’27
Put differently, treaties in the United States exist which are not self-executing.28
The distinction between a dualistic and monistic system, in other words, is not 
black and white. In fact, the Netherlands has a so-called moderate monistic 
system.29 In brief, a treaty in the Netherlands gets into force after explicit or 
implicit approval of Parliament and ratification by the government.30 In general, 
the Dutch government intends to first implement the standards and than to 
ratify.31 Hereupon, the ‘automatic’ incorporation of international law into 
national law takes place through the Articles 93 and 94 of the Dutch 
Constitution. These Articles determine that treaty provisions which are binding 
on anyone, have binding effect and priority over national law.32 Consequently, 
Dutch citizens can call upon these provisions before the national court.  
Citizens may call upon ratified treaty provisions, which have not (yet) 
been implemented, e.g. provisions addressed to the (member) states. This may 
turn out successful, in that Dutch courts recognize self-executing standards in 
treaties,33 allowing private parties to invoke ratified standards without (yet) 
being translated into national law. Whereas national courts only can decide 
whether standards are self-executing, a uniform answer to the question whether 
standards are self-executing, thus, cannot be given.34 On the other hand, as 
Jacobs correctly states, when the Dutch government does not want standards of 
a treaty applied by national courts without yet being implemented, the state 
government should not ratify it.35 As may be clear, under a dualistic system, 
27 Foster v. Neilson (1829), 27 U.S. 253, 314. See also Vierdag 1995, p. 118. 
28  Burnham 1995, p. 38. 
29  Burkens e.a. 1997, p. 303; Kortmann 2001, p. 173; Kooijmans 2002, p. 86. 
30  For an in-depth discussion on the closure, enforcement, and termination of treaties under Dutch law, 
see Vierdag 1995; Burkens e.a. 1997, p. 306-310;  Kortmann 200, p. 163-171; Kooijmans 2002,  
p. 90-109. 
31  Leary 1982, p. 30. 
32  For an in-depth discussion on the Articles 93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitution, see Vierdag 1995,  
p. 115-124; Kortmann 2001, p. 173-179. See also Leary 1982, p. 65-67; Jacobs 1985, p. 11-13;  
Burkens e.a. 1997, p. 303 and 304; Van Dooren 1997, p. 104-113; Betten 1993, p. 382 and 383; 
Kortmann 2001, p. Burger 1998, p. 2003. 
33  Van der Heijden 1999b, p. 36 – with reference to Jacobs – referring to GH Den Bosch 16 januari 
1974, NJ 1974, 229. For cases in which the existence of self-executing standards was explicitly 
overruled, see Pres.Rb. Den Haag 19 december 1980, NJCM-Bulletin 1981, p. 412; Pres. Rb. Den 
Haag 21 januari 1982, NJ 1984, 487. 
34  Van der Heijden 1999b, p. 35. 
35  Jacobs 1985, p. 53. 
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self-executing standards cannot exist, i.e. standards need legislative 
incorporation first before citizens are able to call upon these standards.36
One of the most famous cases in respect of self-executing standards in the field 
of Dutch employment (termination) law is the NS-case. In 1961, the Council of 
Europe adopted the European Social Charter.37 The Netherlands ratified it in 
1978; it entered into force in 1980. In question was, whether employees could 
directly call upon its standards, which were addressed to its (member) states, 
rather than to its citizens. The decision of the Netherlands Supreme Court in the 
NS-case was groundbreaking. In HR 30 mei 1986, NJ 1986, 688 (NS), the 
Netherlands Supreme Court recognized the (self-executing) right to strike for 
Dutch employees under Section 6.4 of the ESC, which holds the right to engage 
in collective action.38
 Unlike the European Social Charter, the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted by the 
Council of Europe in 1950 to stimulate economic and social progress, is 
considered as self-executing, meaning that citizens can directly rely upon 
provisions of this Convention.39 In effect, it embodies obligations, already 
provided for in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of the United 
Nations of 1948,40 however, being a promotional instrument only,41 holding 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.42 In contrast, the UN 
Covenants of 1966 are binding, i.e. the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.43 The Netherlands ratified both.44 With respect to the first, 
Article 26 has proven to be particularly interesting for employment (termination) 
law. This Article determines that all persons are equal before the law and are 
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.45 Finally, 
ILO Conventions may cover the same rights as the UN Covenants.46 The 
difference is that ILO Conventions provide in a more specific and detailed 
manner for the practical implementation at the national level of the series of 
36  See also Burkens e.a. 1997, p. 302. 
37  For the ESC, see Jenks 1960, p. 15; Swepston 2001, p. 141. 
38  For an in-depth discussion of this case, see Loonstra and Zondag 2006, p. 275 and 276. 
39  Nollkaemper 2004, p. 422. 
40  For the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights, see Davidson 2002, p. 1; Swepston 1994, p. 17 
and 18; Valticos 1998, p. 137. 
41  Jenks 1960, p. 13 and 15; Brownlie 1998, p. 68 and 69. 
42  Valticos 1998, p. 138. 
43  Swepston 1994, p. 17 and 18. 
44  Valticos 1998, p. 140; Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 70 and 71. 
45  See HR 13 januari 1995, NJ 1995, 430, JAR 1995/35 (Codfried/ISS). 
46  Valticos 1998, p. 138-140, further points at Articles in the Covenant which – like other ILO 
Conventions – apply to occupational safety and health; weekly rest, limitation of hours of work and 
holidays with pay; maternity protection. In this respect, see also Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 70 and 71. 
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principles, embodied in more general terms in the UN Covenants.47 The Dutch 
government, too, aims to implement its standards into national law before 
ratifying the Convention.48 However, it may occur that citizens call upon ratified 
standards, which have not (yet) been implemented. Reference can be made to a 
case of 1996 in which the highest Netherlands Court on Social Security 
(Centrale Raad van Beroep or CRvB) needed to decide on the standards of the 
ratified Conventions Nos. 102 and 103 on Social Security and Maternity 
Protection,49 respectively, which were not yet implemented. The Court 
concluded that the standards in question were self-executing, due to their 
formulation and imperative character in light of providing minimum social 
standards.50 However, in 1995, the Netherlands Supreme Court with regard to 
ILO Convention 143 on Migrant Workers did not consider a standard as self-
executing, because of its programmatic character.51 In general, so-called 
programmatic or instructional norms are considered to serve as binding legal 
obligations for member states only, hence, do not intend to give individual 
parties the right to invoke the provision before the national court.52 In 2003, the 
Netherlands Court on Social Security, nonetheless, with regard to ILO 
Convention No. 118 on Equality of Treatment (Social Security) of 1962 
considered such a standard as self-executing, based on the findings of the 
Committee of Experts.53
14.2.2.2 The (distinctive) legal order of European Community Law 
European Union 
The Netherlands is a member of the European Union. The latter is built upon the 
former European Economic Community, established by the Benelux countries 
(Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), the Federal Republic of West 
Germany, France and Italy through the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. 
Other countries have since joined this treaty. By 2007, there are 27 member 
states joining the European Union.54 The change in name from European 
47  Valticos 1998, p. 140. 
48  TK 1994-1995, TK 23 900 XV, No. 44, p. 8. 
49  This Convention has been revised in 2000. See ILO Convention 183 concerning Maternity 
Protection.
50  CRvB 10 juli 1996, RSV 1997, 9. See also Van der Heijden 1999b, p. 37. 
51  Van der Heijden 1999b, p. 37 and 38. See also Jacobs 1985, p. 50. 
52  See also Swepston 1996, p. 114, stating that not all Conventions are framed in terms of obligations 
on government to ensure the realization of the aims of the instruments, for example, Conventions 87 
and 98 speak of  ‘rights’.  
53  CRvB 14 maart 2003, RSV 2003, 114. 
54  As from 1957: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands; joined by 
Denmark, Ireland and Great-Britain (as from 1 January 1973); Greece (as from 1 January 1981); 
Portugal and Spain (as from 1 January 1986); Finland, Autriche, Sweden (as from 1 January 1995); 
Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Czech Republic (as from 1 
May 2004); Bulgaria and Romania (as from 1 January 2007). See also Barents en Brinkhorst 2006,  
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Economic Community into European Community took place with the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992; the change in name from European Community to 
European Union took place with the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. The European 
Community since then has been part of the European Union.55 Hence, the 
European Union is founded on three pillars ‘(1) the European Communities, 
which includes the European Community and Euratom, supplemented by the 
policies and forms of co-operation which the European Union establishes, 
namely (2) a common foreign and security policy, and (3) co-operation in the 
field of justice and home affairs’.56 The first pillar – also referred to as European 
Community Law – is important with respect to Dutch employment (termination) 
law. 57
European Community Law 
The term European Community Law refers to law enacted by the legislative 
body of the European Community, the Commission, interpreted by the European 
Court of Justice.58 From a formal point of view, as Kapteyn and VerLoren van 
Themaat correctly state, European Community Law belongs to international 
law. However, due to the distinctive legal order of the European Community, 
first recognized by the European Court of Justice in Van Gend & Loos (1963),
the traditional doctrines of international law do not apply. That is, under 
international law, the sovereignty of states is respected, in that member states are 
free under their monistic or dualistic system to decide how they wish to 
incorporate the treaty in question into national law. In contrast, European 
Community Law is supranational, meaning that – regardless of whether a 
country has a monistic or dualistic system – by becoming a member, European 
Community Law automatically becomes part of national law.59
Treaties60
The Treaty of Rome of 1957 is an important source of Dutch employment 
(termination) law. In principle, citizens may directly call upon provisions of this 
Treaty. However, this is possible only on the condition that the formulation of 
p. 25. 
55  Blanpain 2003, p. 41-43; Lauwaars en Timmermans 2003, p. 3-7; Barents en Brinkhorst 2006,   
p. 22-24. 
56  Kapteyn and Verloren van Themaat 1998, p. 45 and 46. 
57  See also Lauwaars en Timmermans 2003, p. 11, 54 and 55; Barents en Brinkhorst 2006, p. 22. 
58  See also Barents en Brinkhorst 2006, p. 180. 
59  HvJ EG 5 februari 1963, zaak 26/62, Jur. 1963, p. 1 (Van Gend & Loos), and HvJ EG 15 juli 1964, 
zaak 6/64, Jur. 1964, p. 1199 (Costa/ENEL). For a discussion of these cases, see Van Dooren 1997,  
p. 104; Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat 1998, p. 77-89; Van Nuffel 2000, p. 47;  Kooijmans 
2000, p. 255 and 256;  Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 30; Lauwers en Timmermans 2003, p. 22-31; Van 
den Brink 2004, p. 1; Prinssen 2004, p. 9-14. 
60  I focus on those related to employment (termination) law only. For a discussion on the relationship 
between economic and social aspects of treaties, see Goudswaard 2006. 
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the provision in question is sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional.61
Article 141 (former Article 119), for example, is self-executing and had an 
important impact on Dutch employment law. This Article that requires equal pay 
for men and women, performing the same work, resulted in provisions under 
Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code.62
 The Maastricht Treaty of 1992, too, introduced social provisions. It, 
among others, held rules to the establishment of the European Works Council, 
resulting in the Works Council Directive of 22 September 1994, which has been 
incorporated into Dutch law by the European Works Council Act (Wet op de 
Europese Ondernemingsraad).63 Subsequently, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 
subscribed to the importance of fundamental rights, earlier subscribed to by 
member states in Straatsburg.64 The European Top of Nice of December 2000, 
hereupon, proclaimed the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Charter holds 
provisions which are at the heart of labor and employment law, e.g. the rights of 
freedom and association, non-discrimination and equality between men and 
women.65 It was not given a formal legal status, however, hence, adopted as a 
political declaration only.66 The latter would change, in that the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2004 included the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.67
Article 30 of the Charter, at present Article II-90 of the European Constitution, 
is particularly interesting for this thesis. Initially, it held a ‘right to protection of 
termination of employment’, which later became ‘protection against unjustified 
dismissal’. It  provides that 
‘Every worker has the right to protection against unjustified dismissal, in 
accordance with Community law and national laws and practices.’ 
Unlike Article 4 of ILO Convention 158, it does not explicitly require a valid 
reason for dismissal connected with the employee’s capacity or conduct or based 
on the operational requirements of the undertaking on the one hand, and 
includes a failure to give a reasonable period of notice on the other.68 After 
ratification of the European Constitution by all member states, citizens, in 
principle, may directly call upon this provision, on the condition that the 
61  See HvJ EG 5 februari 1963, zaak 26/62, Jur. 1963, p. 1 (Van Gend & Loos). 
62  See Article 7:646 DCC. 
63  Council Directive 22 September 1994, Pb L 254 of 30 September 1994, implemented by Act of 23 
January 1997. 
64  Jacobs 1989, p. 132; Hendrickx 2006, p. 58. 
65  Hendrickx 2006, p. 59. For the Charter, see Van Erp en Smits2001, p. 37-46. For a discussion of 
these rights, see Bercusson 2002. 
66  Bercusson 2002, p. 7; Blanpain 2003, p. 35; Barents en Brinkhorst 2006, p. 24; Hendrickx 2006,  
p. 60. 
67  Bercusson, Clauwaert and Schömann 2002, p. 13 and 14; Hendrickx 2006, p. 60 and 61. 
68  For an in-depth discussion of article 4 of ILO Convention 158, see below under § 22. 
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formulation of the provision in question is sufficiently clear, precise and 
unconditional.69 Besides, as Bercusson, Clauwaert and Schömann stress, 
national courts must interpret national laws consistently with European 
Community Law, which include the rights guaranteed in the Charter 
incorporated into the Treaty.70 As this thesis reached its completion, the 
European Constitution is not (yet) binding. Although the European Constitution 
was signed by the member states of the European Union on 29 October 2004, it 
is binding only after ratification by all member states, which as today has not 
(yet) taken place.71
Council Directives 
Council Directives, enacted by the legislative body of the European Community,  
are an important source of Dutch employment (termination) law.72 Citizens may 
directly call upon Directives, however, against the state only.73 In brief, Council 
Directives provide uniform minimum labour standards to be pre-emptive, i.e. 
exceeding national legislation, imposing an obligation on its member states to 
transform their national laws within a certain time frame.74 De Wolff refers to 
the implementation of standards of Council Directives under Dutch labor and 
employment (termination) law on Parental leave and leave for family reasons 
(ouderschapsverlof),75 Part-time working (deeltijdarbeid),76 Obligation to 
inform on working conditions (informatieplicht arbeidsvoorwaarden),77 and 
Fixed-time work (bepaalde tijd).78 Additionally, one can refer to the Council 
Directives on Collective redundancies (collectief ontslag),79 Insolvency of the 
employer (insolventie),80 Transfers of undertakings (overgang van 
69  See HvJ EG 5 februari 1963, zaak 26/62, Jur. 1963, p. 1 (Van Gend & Loos). See also Bercusson, 
Clauwaert and Schömann 2002, p. 13 and 14. 
70  Bercusson, Clauwaert and Schömann 2002, p. 14. 
71  Barents 2002, p. 306; Kapteyn 2004; Jacobs 2005. 
72  See also De Ly 2006, 3 and 5.  
73  Van der Burg 2003, p. 119 and 120; Prinssen 2004, p. 14-16. 
74  See Lauwaars en Timmermans 2003, p. 109. For an in-depth discussion on Directives, see Prinssen 
2004; Hofhuis 2006. 
75  Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996, Pb L 145 of 19 June 1996. 
76  Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997, Pb L 14 of 20 January 1998. 
77  Council Directive 91/533/EEC of 14 October 1991, Pb L 288 of 18 October 1991. 
78  Council Directive 99/70/EC of 28 June 1999, Pb L 175 of 10 July 1999. 
79  Council Directives 75/129/EEC and 92/56/EEC replaced by 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998, Pb L 225 of 
12 August 1998. 
80  Council Directive 80/987/EEC amended by Directive 2002/74/EC (Parliament and Council) of 23 
September 2002, Pb L 270 of 8 October 2002. 
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ondernemingen),81 Posting of workers (detachering),82 and Equal treatment in 
employment and occupations (gelijke behandeling in werk en beroep).83
European case law 
Preliminary rulings (prejudiciële beslissingen) of the European Court of Justice, 
interpreting Council Directives, too, affect Dutch employment (termination) 
law. Under the Treaty of Rome of 1957, the European Court of Justice was 
given the authority to issue these preliminary rulings.84 In principle, these 
rulings must be requested by courts of EU member states, which must apply the 
decisions of the European Court of Justice without modification or distortion.85
A recent (Dutch) case in respect of employment law has been regarding an 
allowance in lieu of the minimum period of paid annual leave of four weeks. 
The Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment held that leave 
days, statutory as well as non-statutory, saved up from previous years exceed the 
minimum leave entitlement and can, therefore, be eligible for redemption. The 
European Court of Justice, however, held that the Ministry was wrong, in so far 
it concerned statutory leave days. It held that the entitlement to paid annual 
leave is an important principle of Community social law, and that according to 
this principle workers must be entitled to actual rest, with a view to ensuring 
effective protection of their safety and health. Only when the employment 
relationship is terminated, payment of an allowance in lieu of paid annual leave 
is permitted.86
 An important recent case in the field of employment termination law is 
Mangold (2005). In this case, a German employee alleged he had been 
discriminated based on age. The European Court of Justice held that the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age is a general principle of 
European Community Law. It continued that member states, nonetheless, might 
provide for differences of treatment and to consider them non-discriminatory, if 
they are justified objectively and reasonably by a legitimate aim. However, the 
means to achieving such objectives must be appropriate and necessary. The 
European Court of Justice held that the German law in question authorizes, in 
principle, without restriction, the conclusion of fixed-term contracts of 
employment once the worker has reached the age of 52. The Court recognized 
that the purpose of this legislation is plainly to promote the integration into 
working life of unemployed older workers, in so far as they encounter 
81  Council Directive 77/187/EEC and 98/50/EC replaced by 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001, Pb L 82 of 
22 March 2001. 
82  Directive 96/71/EC (Parliament and Council) of 16 December 1996, Pb L 18 of 21 January 1997. 
83  See also Blanpain 2003. 
84  Van der Burg 2003, p.145 and 146. 
85  For an in-depth discussion of the procedures with the European Court of Justice, see Kapteyn en 
Verloren van Themaat, p. 249-292; Lauwaars en Timmermans 2003, p. 79-81 Barents en Brinkhorst 
2006, p. 219-265. 
86  See HvJ EG 6 april 2006, C-124/05, JAR 2006/102 (Staat der Nederlanden/FNV). 
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considerable difficulties in finding work. An objective of that kind justifies, as a 
rule, ‘objectively and reasonably’, a difference of treatment on grounds of age. 
However, a provision of national law such as that contained under German law, 
goes beyond what is appropriate and necessary to attain the legitimate objective 
pursued. According to the Court, application of the national legislation at issue 
leads to a situation in which all workers who have reached the age of 52, without 
distinction, whether or not they were unemployed before the contract was 
concluded and whatever the duration of any period of unemployment, may 
lawfully, until their retirement, be offered fixed-term contracts of employment, 
which may be renewed an indefinite number of times. This significant body of 
workers, determined solely on the basis of age, is thus in danger, during a 
substantial part of its members’ working life, of being excluded from the benefit 
of stable employment which constitutes a major element in the protection of 
workers. Hence, the German law was considered to be in violation of the 
principle of non-discrimination.87
14.3 International law and just cause protection 
In this thesis, I focus on Article 4 of ILO Convention 158. One may wonder why 
I do not focus on the just cause standard of Article 24 of the (revised) European 
Social Charter of 1996 that, in contrast with Article 4 of ILO Convention 158, is 
binding for the Netherlands.88 In fact, the text of Article 24 sub a of the Charter 
is virtually similar to that of Article 4 of ILO Convention 158. More 
specifically, it determines that 
‘With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right of workers to 
protection in cases of termination of employment, the Parties undertake to 
recognise: (a) the right of all workers not to have their employment terminated 
without valid reasons for such termination connected with their capacity or 
conduct or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, 
establishment or service; (b) the right of workers whose employment is 
terminated without a valid reason to adequate compensation or other 
appropriate relief. To this end the Parties undertake to ensure that a worker who 
considers that his employment has been terminated without a valid reason shall 
have the right to appeal to an impartial body.’  
The reason to focus on Article 4 of ILO Convention 158, instead, is that both the 
United States and the Netherlands are members of the ILO, which makes the just 
cause standard of ILO Convention 158 a perfect gauge to compare just cause 
protection under American and Dutch dismissal law.89 The United States is not a 
member of the Council of Europe.  
87  See HvJ EG 22 november 2005, C-144/04, JAR 2005/289 (Mangold)
88  The revised European Social Charter went into force on 1 July 1999. See Trb. 2004, 13, G. The 
Netherlands signed the Revised Charter on 23 January 2004 (Trb. 2004, 13 and 14), and ratified it on 
3 May 2006 (see www.coe.int).  
89   The United States is not a member of the European Union and/or the Council of Europe. 
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Moreover, Article 4 of ILO Convention 158, in effect, has inspired 
Article 24 of the (revised) European Social Charter of 1996. From its 
Memorandum of Explanation on the Enforcement, it can be derived that Article 
24 is extracted from article 4 of ILO Convention 158.90 Article II-90 of the 
European Constitution,91 in turn, refers to Article 24. Hence, it is implicitly
extracted from Article 4 of ILO Convention 158. In fact, in literature, too, one 
consistently states that Article 4 of ILO Convention 158 inspired Article II-90 of 
the European Constitution.92 This now brings me to a discussion of the Dutch 
rules on employment termination in respect of just cause protection, to be 
gauged against Article 4 of ILO Convention 158 in the next Chapter. 
14.4 National law and just cause protection 
14.4.1 Private-sector employees  
In the Netherlands, the majority of private-sector employees are hired by 
employers for an indefinite period of time.93 Unlike private-sector employees, 
the government, i.e. the state, province or municipality, appoints public 
employees. Usually, they are hired for an indefinite period as well.94 To these 
employees the General Public Employee Regulation (Algemeen
Rijksambtenarenreglement or ARAR) applies. This Regulation holds limited
reasons for dismissal.95 However, this dismissal system is less limited than 
appears at first sight,96 in that it, too, includes the possibility to dismiss a public 
employee based on other serious grounds, e.g. breach of trust (‘incomptabilité 
des humeurs’).97 On a total of approximately 16 million inhabitants, the 
independent – employed and unemployed98 – workforce in the Netherlands 
amounts to approximately 6.5 million workers: about 4 million persons work in 
the private, and 1 million in the public sector. The remainder works in the so-
called g-and-g-sector, i.e. the field of healthcare and welfare (state subsidized 
establishments or gepremieerde en gesubsidieerde sector), or is unemployed.99
90  See Tractatenblad 2004/13, Memorie van Toelichting, p. 31. 
91  Previously, article II-30: see version of the Draft European Constitution, October 2004. 
92  Bruun 2002, p. 63. 
93  For the definition of an employment agreement on the basis of Art. 7:610 DCC – either for an 
indefinite or definite period –, see below under § 14.4.2. 
94  Korteweg-Wiers 1998, p. 172; Mulder 2002, p. 31 and 36; Lanting 2002, p. 64. For those who are 
appointed for a definite period, the ARAR determines that the employment automatically expires 
after the expiry date. Lanting 2002, p. 64. 
95  Recently, again, there is a discussion on whether public employees should have a distinctive 
dismissal system. See Velo 2006. 
96  For the various dismissal systems, see above under § 1.1.2. 
97  Mulder 2002, p. 36-38 and 48-50. See also Korteweg-Wiers 1998, p. 172-174. 
98  In 2004, about 500,000 persons. 
99  Verhulp 2002, p. 19 and 20; Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 21 and 22. 
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The term private-sector employees in the Netherlands refer to those who work 
on the basis of a verbal or written employment agreement. Article 7:610 DCC 
defines an employment agreement as  
x an agreement by which one party, the employee, commits himself;  
x to perform work;  
x in service of the other party, the employer;  
x in exchange for payment;  
x for a period of time.100
Additionally, Article 7:659 DCC determines that the work has to be performed 
by the employee in question, unless parties agree upon otherwise. In practice, 
the requirements under Article 7:610 and Article 7:659 DCC meet few 
difficulties, with one exception: the requirement of subordination 
(gezagsverhouding).101 In respect of the latter, the Netherlands Supreme Court 
assumes an employment agreement to exist when (a) the employer is entitled to 
give instructions to the employee; and/or (b) the working conditions of the 
employee are similar to those working with the employer on the basis of an 
employment agreement.102 The existence of an employment agreement is 
important, because it functions as an entrance ticket to employment 
(termination) law and social security law. For example, when a contract between 
parties can be qualified as an employment agreement, the dual just cause 
dismissal system applies to the employee.103 However, an employer may want to 
avoid these rules. Generally, the employer will do so by qualifying the contract 
as a contract for services (opdracht) according to Article 7:400 DCC, or a 
contract for work (aanneming van werk) according to Article 7:750 DCC.104 The 
name given to the contract by parties is not determinative, however.105 The 
Netherlands Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter to decide on the designation, 
100  Loonstra 1998, p. 39-41; Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 79-84. 
101  In the Netherlands, the requirement of subordination has been point of discussion since 1909, the 
year the Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907 went into force. See Jansen en Loonstra 1990,  
p. 363 and 364; Loonstra 1990, p. 36-41. In other countries it has been an issue as well. For Belgium, 
Germany and Great-Britain, see Loonstra en Zondag 2001. For the United States, see above under  
§ 7.3.2.
102  Important cases in this respect are (a) HR 14 juni 1991, NJ 1992, 173 (Kruis/Christelijk 
Gereformeerde Kerk), and; (b) HR 14 november 1997, NJ 1998, 149; JAR 1997/2633 
(Groen/Schoevers). For an overview of case law with regard to the existence of an employment 
agreement, see Loonstra 1990, p. 41-46; Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 79-91 (hereto I add: HR 10 
december 2004, JAR 2005/15, JIN 2005/51 m.n. CJL (Diosynth BV/Groot)). See also Jacobs 2004,
p. 47; Loonstra 2005b. For cases in the period 1909-1942, see Jansen en Loonstra 1990, p. 364, 
footnotes 27 and 30. 
103  Meijers 1972, p. 1030;  Asscher-Vonk 1996, p. 289. 
104  Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 84-86. 
105  See HR 8 april 1994, NJ 1994, 704, JAR 1994/94 (Agfa/Schoolderman); HR 10 oktober 2003, JAR 
2003/263 (Van der Male BV/Den Hoedt). 
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i.e. the existence of the employment agreement, based on the surrounding facts 
and circumstances.106
It bears mentioning that the Flexicurity Act of 1998 (Wet Flexibiliteit en 
zekerheid) that went into force on 1 January 1999,107 brought about a significant 
change for temporary workers (uitzendkrachten) and others, working on the 
basis of a triangular working relationship. As from 1 January 1999, these 
workers under the new Article 7:690 DCC, gained the status of employees as 
defined in Article 7:610 DCC. Moreover, Article 7:691 DCC provides these so-
called Article 690-employees with a special – flexible – regime, which applies 
to these workers only.  
The Flexicurity Act of 1998, too, brought about a significant change for 
contingent workers in general (flexibele arbeidskrachten). Based on a new 
Article 7:610a DCC, a working relationship is assumed to be an employment 
agreement if someone has been working for salary for a principal during a 
period of three months, either weekly – this can be as little as a day a week –, or 
at least 20 hours a month. Moreover, the Flexicurity Act of 1998 brought about 
another significant change for workers on call (oproepkrachten). Under a new 
Article 7:628a DCC, a worker on call must be paid salary for a minimum of 
three hours even though the job lasts less than three hours. Entitlement to three 
hours is when parties agreed upon a working relationship of less than 15 hours a 
week, without specifying the working times, or if the total number of working 
hours remained unclear.  
14.4.2 An employment agreement for an indefinite period 
In discussing the basic rules on employment termination for an indefinite period, 
one first needs to understand the rules on employment termination that apply to 
an employment agreement for a definite period. The reason is that contracts for a 
definite and indefinite period interact. As regards employment agreements for a 
definite period, the basic rule is relatively simple. In principle, this contract 
expires automatically after the date set by parties. An employer may not 
terminate the employment agreement prior to the expiry date. The employer who 
does, becomes liable. Only in the following cases the employment agreement 
can end in between, without the employer being liable (i) through the death of 
the employee; (ii) when mutually agreed upon by parties;108 or (iii) through a 
106  Loonstra 1998, p. 39; Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 86-91; Verhulp 2005;  Loonstra 2005b.  
107  Stb. 1998, 300 and Stb. 1998, 332. 
108  If an employer states that an employment agreement for a definite or indefinite period has expired 
through mutual consent and the employee is in denial, the employment agreement remains in place 
when the employer  fails to show that the – verbal or oral – statement of the employee is clear and 
unambiguous in this respect. Moreover, case law imposes a duty of investigation on the part of the 
employer, and awareness – and a period of reflection – on the part of the employee. Consequently, so 
long as the employee is prepared to perform work, the employee is entitled to salary. In this respect, 
see HR 14 januari 1983, NJ 1983, 457 (Hajziani/Van Woerden), HR 12 september 1986, NJ 1987, 
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valid condition subsequent (ontbindende voorwaarde).109 Moreover, on the basis 
of Article 7:667.3 DCC, parties can insert a provision in their contract, i.e. agree 
in writing that the employer and the employee may terminate the employment 
agreement prior to the expiry date. Still, the employer needs permission of the 
CWI under the BBA 1945. Parties, too, can ask the Cantonal Court to dissolve 
the employment agreement before the expiry date.110 Unlike employment 
agreements for a definite period, the basic rule for an employment agreement for 
an indefinite period is that an employer cannot unilaterally terminate the 
agreement than (i) with consent of the CWI; or (ii) through a decision of the 
Cantonal Court, dissolving the employment agreement.111 Like employment 
agreements for a definite period, the employment agreement for an indefinite 
period ends automatically (i) through the death of the employee; (ii) when 
mutually agreed upon by parties; or (iii) through a valid condition subsequent.  
 As mentioned above, the rules on employment termination, applying to 
an employment agreement for a definite and an indefinite period interact. As 
from 1 January 1999, a new Article 7:668a DCC determines that the third 
employment agreement for a definite period automatically converts into an 
employment agreement for an indefinite period when parties have concluded 
four contracts for a definite period, with a time frame of no more than three 
months in between. When an employment agreement – or more agreements – 
for a definite period exceed the three-year maximum the employment 
agreement, too, automatically converts to an employment agreement for an 
indefinite period.112 Article 7:668a.5 DCC determines that a collective 
bargaining agreement can set aside these rules. For example, Article 5.4 (b) of 
the Collective Bargaining Agreement for the Hotel and Catering Industry 
(Collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst voor het Horeca- en aanverwante bedrijf) of 
1 July 2005 to 31 March 2008 determines that parties can agree upon six
contracts for a definite period with a maximum time frame of one month in 
between; second, it contains a five-year maximum, including the periods in 
between with a maximum time frame of one month in between, instead of a 
three-year maximum, before the employment agreement converts to an 
employment agreement for an indefinite period. For parties, thus, it is important 
to know whether a collective bargaining agreement applies, as these rules may 
set aside the principal rule under Article 7:668a DCC.  
267 (Westhoff/Spronsen), and HR 8 april 1994, JAR 1994/95 (Van der Laan/LCS). For more case 
law, see Loonstra en Zondag 2006, p. 381-385.  
109  Conditions subsequent in an employment agreement for a definite or indefinite period are considered 
invalid under law under Art. 7:667(7) and (8) DCC when (i) the conditions stipulate that (a) marriage 
or registered partnership, and/or; (b) pregnancy or birth will terminate the employment agreement 
automatically. Conditions subsequent are considered invalid under case law when the conditions run 
counter to the rules that aim to protect an employee against a dismissal. For case law on conditions 
subsequent, see Loonstra en Zondag 2006, p. 376-379. See also below under § 28.2.1. 
110  Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 342-356. 
111  Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 278, 323-342. 
112  See Art. 7:668a DCC that was introduced by the Flexicurity Act of 1998 (Wet Flexibiliteit en 
zekerheid or Flexwet).
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14.4.3      Dismissal at the initiative of the employer 
The dual  just cause dismissal system became a fact on 15 October 1945, the 
date the BBA 1945 went into force,113 because the Act of the Employment 
Agreement of 1907 already existed. Although the BBA 1945 – as the Preamble 
explicitly states – was meant to be temporary only,114 during the parliamentary 
discussions in 1953, the government decided to maintain the BBA 1945.115
Initially, courts held that an employer needs prior authorization to terminate an 
employment agreement, after which he could ask for dissolution of the 
employment. In 1959, the Netherlands Supreme Court ruled otherwise. It 
decided that an employer could, alternatively, address to the public authority or 
the Cantonal Court.116 The employer who wishes to terminate the employment 
agreement against the will of the employee, thus, has a choice between the BBA 
1945-procedure and the dissolution procedure, according to the rules as 
described below. 
14.4.4 Permission of the CWI or dissolution by the Cantonal Court 
Article 6 of the BBA 1945 requires that an employer needs prior authorization 
of the Centre of Work and Income (CWI) to unilaterally terminate the 
employment agreement. According to the Dismissal Decree, this request must be 
in writing and must state all relevant information, such as the name of the 
parties, a copy of the employment agreement when in writing, and the 
justification for the termination.117 After receipt, the CWI forwards a copy to the 
employee pointing out the opportunity to respond in writing within two 
weeks.118 A Committee on Dismissal (Ontslagcommissie) primarily handles the 
case.119 The CWI takes into consideration the Committee’s findings and the 
rules of the Dismissal Decree in granting a permit. In practice, employers tend to 
voluntarily offer a severance payment. Occasionally, the CWI refuses the permit 
unless the employer offers a severance payment to the employee. However, this 
is more the exception than the rule.120 In principle, the CWI may not impose 
113  Dienske 1965, p. 5; Kuip 1993a, p. 123 and 124. 
114  Kuip 1993a, p. 124, footnote 6. 
115  Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 7 and 62. 
116  HR 2 april 1959, NJ 1959, 199. See also Loonstra 1996, p. 152 –154; Knegt en Wilthagen 1988,  
p. 263. For a contrasting view, see Kiewiet1982, p. 372. He argues that Art. 1639w is an exception to 
the main rule established under Art. 6 of the BBA 1945.  
117  For an in-depth discussion on the CWI-procedure, see Van Drongelen en Van Rijs 2003, p. 101-111. 
118  See Art. 2:2 of the Dismissal Decree.  
119  See Art. 2:5 of the Dismissal Decree. 
120  For a discussion of the few cases in which the – offer of a – severance payment has been 
determinative in either granting or refusing a permit, see Van Marwijk Kooy 1995. See also 
Koekkoek 1996. 
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severance payments upon the employer.121 It may either grant or refuse the 
permit. In general, the CWI will issue a permit within six to eight weeks after 
the request is made.122 The employer can make use of the permit within eight 
weeks after the date of delivery. Parties cannot appeal from the CWI’s 
decision.123 Alternatively, the employer can ask the Cantonal Court to dissolve
the employment agreement. Article 7:685 DCC determines that the Cantonal 
Court can dissolve an employment agreement based on serious cause. Serious 
cause embraces either (i) an urgent cause; or (ii) a change of circumstances, 
based upon which the employment agreement reasonably has to end 
immediately or on short notice. In case of a change of circumstances only, the 
Cantonal Court is allowed to impose a severance payment. In general, a court 
decision will be delivered approximately two months after the request is 
made.124  The date of the dissolution cannot be retroactive.125
 The reason(s) why an employer chooses for the BBA 1945-procedure or 
for a dissolution procedure under Article 7:685 DCC depends on the 
circumstances of the case. For example, an employer who wishes to terminate an 
employment agreement based on economic circumstances will want to keep his 
costs low. He will then address the CWI, because of the low procedure costs and 
because the CWI cannot impose severance payments.126 This seemingly ‘simple’ 
procedure can become rather complex for two reasons, however, based on which 
an employer, in turn, may prefer the dissolution procedure to the BBA 1945-
procedure. That is, after the employer has validly terminated the employment 
agreement with prior authorization of the CWI, the employee, nonetheless, can 
address the Cantonal Court to ask for damages,127 based on a manifestly 
unreasonable dismissal under Article 7:681 DCC.128 Second, the BBA 1945-
procedure can become complex when the employee initiates a dissolution 
procedure besides the BBA 1945-procedure. This is possible so long as the 
employment agreement exists, hence, regardless of whether the employer has 
obtained prior authorization to terminate the employment agreement.129 Another 
reason for the employer to prefer the dissolution procedure to the BBA 1945-
procedure is that a decision in a dissolution procedure is delivered on relatively 
short notice. Moreover, Article 7:685 DCC does not allow parties to appeal from 
121  See Beltzer, Knegt en Van Rijs 1998, p. 12-27 and 83-86; Dienske 1965, p. 51; Overkleeft-Verburg 
en Roijakkers 1976, p. 18; Beltzer, Knegt en Van Rijs 1998, p. 86. 
122  See SZW Ontslagstatistiek 2004, p. 10; Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 13; Grapperhaus 2006, p. 20. 
123  For the CWI-procedure in this respect, see Van Drongelen en Van Rijs 2003, p. 101-111. 
124  Jacobs 2004, p. 104; Grapperhaus 2006, p. 20. 
125  HR 26 mei 1966, NJ 1966, 345 (Schmitz/Schrijnemakers). 
126  Jacobs 2004, p. 103 and 104; Research voor Beleid 2000, p. 29. 
127  See below under § 17. 
128  Jacobs 2004, p. 101 and 102. For case law on a manifestly unreasonable dismissal, see below under  
§ 17.3. 
129  The main reason for an employee to initiate a procedure besides the BBA 1945-procedure is to obtain 
a severance payment under the Cantonal Formula (Kantonrechtersformule). Under Art. 7:685 DCC a 
Cantonal Court is allowed to grant a severance payment in case of a change of circumstances. For the 
latter, see below under § 18.2. 
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the decision than in exceptional cases only.130 Also, an employee cannot initiate 
a procedure based on manifestly unfair dismissal after the dissolution 
procedure.131 Employers, in fact, seem to be comfortable with the so-called 
Cantonal Formula, which Cantonal Courts apply in determining – the size of – a 
severance payment, in that it enables employers to roughly calculate the 
severance payment.132 Last, but not in the least, employers prefer Cantonal 
Courts for the higher success rate.133
14.4.5 Prohibitions on dismissal134
Discriminatory grounds 
In discriminatory discharges, employees can address the Cantonal Court. They 
can invoke the invalidity of termination of employment based on (i) gender; (ii) 
the number of hours of the employment agreement; and (iii) the duration of the 
employment agreement.135 Furthermore, the Act on Equal Treatment Based on a 
Handicap or Chronic Illness (Wet gelijke behandeling op grond van handicap of 
chronische ziekte) prohibits dismissal based on a handicap or chronic illness.136
The Act on Equal Treatment Based on Age (Wet gelijke behandeling op grond 
van leeftijd) prohibits discrimination based on age.137 Last, the General Act on 
Equal Treatment (Algemene Wet Gelijke Behandeling) of 1994 prohibits 
discharges based on religion, philosophy of life, political affiliation, race, 
gender, national origin, sexual orientation, and marital status.138 To have the 
termination declared void. the employee must invoke the invalidity of 
termination of employment within two months after the employment has been 
terminated. The employee, too, must timely invoke the invalidity of the 
termination when the employee has been dismissed for opposing the 
discriminatory dismissal, also known as vindicatory discharges (victimisatie-
130  Jacobs 2004, p. 105. See also below under § 18.2. 
131  See below under § 18.6. Also, see Knegt en Wilthagen 1988, p. 264 and 265; Scholtens 2001a, p. 6 
and 7; Grapperhaus 2006, p. 23. 
132  For the Cantonal Formula, see below under § 18.2. 
133  Research voor Beleid 2000, p. 30 and 31, 49 and 50; Grapperhaus 2006, p. 22 and 23. 
134  For an in-depth discussion of prohibitions on dismissal, see Kuip 1993a, p. 223-256.  
135  See Art. 7:646 to 649 DCC. 
136  The Act  went into force on 1 December 2003, Stb. 2003, 206 in furtherance of Directive 
2000/78/EC. For the term handicap, which refers to long-term illness only, see HvJ EG 11 juli 2006, 
C-13/05, JAR 2006/191 (Navas). For a discussion of this Act, see also Hendriks 2003a; Hendriks 
2003b; De Keizer 2004; Gijzen 2003; A.M. ten Bosch-Gerritsen, Wet gelijke behandeling op grond 
van handicap of chronische ziekte, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer. 
137  The Act went into force on 1 May 2004, Stb. 2004, 30 in furtherance of Directive 2000/78/EC. For  a 
discussion of this Act, see Van der Burg 2004; De Wolff 2004;  Cremers 2004; Gerritsen 2004; Van 
Gemerden 2004; Pranger 2005. 
138  The Act went into force on 1 September 1994, Stb. 1994, 230. For an in-depth discussion of this Act, 
see A.M. ten Bosch-Gerritsen, AWGB, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer.  See 
also Veldman 2001, p. 325. 
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ontslagen).139 If the invalidity is not invoked timely, the termination is valid. 
Also, an employee can address the Committee on Equal Treatment (Commissie
Gelijke Behandeling). Under the AWGB, this Committee can investigate 
violations of anti-discrimination on the initiative of parties, or on its own 
initiative. Although the Committee’s decision is not binding, it can carry weight 
with the Cantonal Court. In fact, to estimate their chances, employees, in 
general, will ask for a decision of this Committee, prior to the civil procedure 
with the Cantonal Court. 
 The question arises what action employees have if they have been 
discharged based on other grounds than those enumerated in the aforementioned 
statutes. In these cases, employees can base their claim on Article 7:611 DCC 
and Article 3:12 DCC, with reference to Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution. The 
latter determines that all people living in the Netherlands shall be treated equally 
in similar situations and that discrimination based on religion, philosophy of life, 
political affiliation, race, gender, or any other similar ground, is prohibited. 
Although the Constitution, in principle, regulates the relationship between 
government and public employees only, the Netherlands Supreme Court, 
meanwhile, has ruled that a private-sector employee can indirectly rely on the 
Constitution.140 In brief, an employee can claim that the employer, by 
discriminating the employee, has not behaved as befits a good employer 
according to Article 7:611 DCC, for violating the principles of fairness, among 
which the principle of non-discrimination under the Dutch Constitution, to be 
respected under Article 3:12 DCC.141
Non-discriminatory grounds 
Book 7 Title 10 DCC, too, include prohibitions on dismissal based on non-
discriminatory grounds. For ‘outsiders’, Article 7:670.1 DCC, is most striking. 
This Article prohibits dismissals during the first two years of illness.142 The 
139  For the rules on vindicatory discharges, see Art. 7: 647(1),7: 648(1) and 7:649(1) DCC regarding 
gender, the number of hours of the employment agreement, and the duration of the employment 
agreement, respectively; Art. 9 of the Act on Equal Treatment Based on A Handicap or Chronic 
Illness; Art. 11 of the Act on Equal Treatment Based on Age; Art. 8 of the AWGB. See also Art. 3 of 
the Act on the Adjustment of Working Time (Wet aanpassing arbeidsduur or WAA). For an in-depth 
discussion of case law on the WAA, see Van Arkel en Smits 2001; Van Arkel en Smits 2003. 
140  Loonstra en Zondag 2001 p. 217 and 218. 
141  For example, see HR 8 april 1994, NJ 1994, 704, JAR 1994/94 (Agfa/Schoolderman); HR 30 januari 
2004, JAR 2004/68 (Parallel Entry/KLM). See also De Wolff 2003a. 
142  The exceptions on Art. 7:670.1 DCC can be found in Art. 7:670.1.b DCC and 7:670b DCC, 
respectively. First, the prohibition on dismissal does not apply when the employee has become ill 
after the CWI already received the employer’s request for termination of employment. Second, under 
Art. 7:670b DCC the prohibition on dismissal does not apply (1) in case of a summary dismissal or 
during the probationary period; (2) the employee consents to termination of employment, or the 
company – i.e. the division where the employee works  closes; or, (3) the employee unfoundedly 
refuses to (a) comply with reasonable instructions of the UWV to reintegrate; (b) to perform suitable 
work the employer has offered; or (c) to make a plan to work (plan van aanpak) together with the 
UWV according to the Disability Insurance Act (Wet op de arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering or 
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rationale behind this provision is to protect ill employees against the 
psychological pressure of dismissal during a certain period of time, i.e. two 
years. Initially, the legislature’s intent was to protect employees against 
dismissal during one year of illness only. However, the Standing Committee for 
Private and Penal Law (Vaste Commissie voor Privaat- en Strafrecht) objected 
and stressed that some diseases needed more than one year of recovery, e.g. 
tuberculosis. The Minister finally bowed, as tuberculosis was a common disease 
at the time.143 I agree with those who state that tuberculosis is no longer a 
common disease, hence, the period of two years should be reconsidered.144 So 
long as this Article remains unchanged, however, an employee under Dutch 
dismissal law is protected against dismissal during the two years of illness.145
Besides, Book 7 title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code prohibits dismissals 
(ii) during pregnancy and up to six weeks after post-confinement maternity 
leave; (iii) during military service or alternative compulsory service; (iv) during 
membership in a (European) Works Council or related committees; (v) during 
membership in a union or performance of union activities; (vi) during political 
attendings of political bodies of which the employee is a member; (vii) 
exercising the right to parental leave; (viii) based on transfer of the enterprise; 
and (ix) based on a refusal to work on Sunday such within the margins of the 
Working Time Act (Arbeidstijdenswet or ATW).146 The employee must file a 
request with the Cantonal Court within two months to have these terminations 
declared void.147 It bears mentioning, that prohibitions on dismissal based on 
non-discriminatory grounds – unlike prohibitions on dismissal based on 
discriminatory grounds – do not apply to a summary dismissal or during the 
probationary period.148 This does not imply that the employee is empty-handed 
in these cases. Case law shows that when an employee is dismissed on non-
discriminatory grounds during the probationary period, an employee may have 
a cause of action under Article 7:611 DCC.149
WAO). The WIA (Wet werk en inkomen naar arbeidsvermogen) has replaced the WAO as from 29 
December 2005 (Stb. 2005, 619), but still entails this obligation.  
143  For an in-depth discussion of the legislative history regarding the period of two years, see 
Hoogendijk 1999, p. 148-153. 
144  Hansma 2005, p. 47. 
145  HR 24 oktober 1986, NJ 1987, 292 (Melchers/De Haan). See also Hoogendijk 1999, p. 176 and 177. 
146  As from 1 January 1999 most non-discriminatory prohibitions on dismissal can be found in Art. 
7:670 DCC. For the latter, see Klinckhamers 1998; Jacobs 2004, p. 106-108. The prohibitions can be 
found in, respectively Art. 7:670.2 (ii); 7:670.3 (iii); 7:670.4 (iv); 7:670.5 (v); 7:670.6 (vi); 7:670.7 
(vii); 7:670.8 (viii), and 7:670.9 (ix). 
147  Art. 7:677(5) DCC.  
148  Art. 7:670b(1) DCC. 
149  Van Arkel, Boontje en Loonstra 2003. See also below under § 15.3.3. 
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15  Legislative history of the dual just cause dismissal system 
15.1  The debate on a just cause for dismissal 
15.1.1    A just cause for dismissal, desirable or necessary? 
Drucker is considered as the ‘founding father’ of the Act of the Employment 
Agreement of 1907. In his draft(s), he already paid attention to a just cause for 
dismissal. He stated that to introduce a just cause standard would imply that the 
employer and the employee were required to state a reason for dismissal. He 
questioned whether this would be for the benefit of the employee. In his opinion, 
it would be virtually impossible for an employee to prove bad cause. Hence, the 
introduction of a just cause rule would be without effect.150 Instead, he preferred 
to adhere to the principle that was widely endorsed in the Netherlands at the 
time, i.e. to allow employers to dismiss employees, on the condition of prior 
notice, regardless of the reason. Consequently, the Bill underlying the Act of the 
Employment Agreement of 1907 did not require a just cause for dismissal. 
Parliament did not protest. In fact, it considered the new rules – compared to the 
past – as progressive, in that prior to the Act of the Employment Agreement of 
1907 employees with employment agreements for an indefinite period could be 
dismissed without prior notice, without being liable.151
The only attempt during the parliamentary discussions to have a 
discussion on just cause protection was by Ter Laan, Hugenholtz, Schaper, Tak 
en Troelstra. They proposed a provision, based on which an employment 
agreement could not be terminated if the employee was called for military 
service. With 39 against 25 votes the proposal was withdrawn.152 The only 
attempt, therefore, was without effect.153 Subsequently, the Act of the 
Employment Agreement of 1907, which went into force on 1 February 1909,154
allowed employers to dismiss employees with an employment agreement for an 
indefinite period without cause.   
In literature, Levenbach was the first to introduce the term iusta causa 
dimissionis – a just cause for dismissal – in the Netherlands.155 Although not the 
first to defend the introduction of this standard in the Act of the Employment 
Agreement of 1907,156 Levenbach is seen as its most important defender. In his 
inaugural lecture of 15 December 1926 at the University of Amsterdam, 
Levenbach stressed that a iusta causa dimissionis, related to the employee’s 
150  MvT O.D. Art. 44-47. See Bles IV, 1909, p. 7 and 8, 14. See also Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 26 and 
27; Kuip 1993a, p. 112 and 113. 
151  Ringeling 1953, p. 11. 
152  Bles IV, 1909, p. 49-58. See also Ringeling 1953, p. 11. 
153  See Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 33 and 34. 
154  For the legislative history of the Act, see below under § 15.3. 
155  Levenbach 1926a, p. 65. See also Ringeling 1953, p. 15; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 30. 
156  Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 29 and 30, referring to Van den Bergh 1924. 
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conduct or capacity, or related to economic circumstances, should be 
implemented in the Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907. In his plea for a 
just cause standard he referred to the standard that already was applied to civil 
servants law, and commonly used in collective bargaining agreements.157
Additionally, Levenbach referred to the Betriebsrätegesetz of 1920. Under this 
German Act, employees had a cause of action if 
x they were dismissed without cause;  
x they were dismissed for bad – discriminatory – cause, among which 
the duty to perform military service;  
x they were dismissed, because they refused to regularly perform 
other work than agreed upon; or  
x a dismissal resulted in unreasonable harsh consequences for the 
employee.158
In this respect, Mok was the first to distinguish between dismissals that took 
place without pirior notice, and dismissals that took place without a just cause 
for dismissal. He qualified the first as illegitimate (onrechtmatig), and the 
second as unjust (onrechtvaardig), stressing that a legitimate dismissal could be 
unjust.159 He, too, pled for a just cause standard. He referred to the standard in 
collective bargaining agreements, the Betriebsrätegesetz of 1920, and the 
doctrine of abus de droit under French law.160 Mok stressed that the Act of the 
Employment Agreement of 1907, in effect, allowed an employer to dismiss an 
employee for bad cause, emphasizing the unfairness of dismissals of employees 
who were called for military service.161
Considered as the appropriate remedy for unjust dismissal, the options 
were damages or reinstatement. De Gaay Fortman strongly opposed the remedy 
of reinstatement. He considered reinstatement to be without effect, because the 
surrounding circumstances of the dismissal would make it impossible to return 
to the workplace after the employee would have been dismissed for bad 
cause.162 Later, De Gaay Fortman nuanced his statement, considering 
reinstatement as the appropriate remedy for unjust dismissal, unless the 
circumstances made reinstatement impossible.163 In 1934, with the celebration 
of the 25th birthday of the Act of the Employment Agreement, Levenbach, 
again, asked attention for the introduction of a just cause standard in the Act of 
157  Levenbach 1926a, p. 65. See also Ringeling 1953, p. 12 and 13; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 30. 
158  Levenbach 1926a, p. 65; Ringeling 1953, p. 11. For the Betriebsrätegesetz of 1920, see Kuip 1993a, 
p. 292; Jansen en Loonstra 1992, p. 88. 
159  Ringeling 1953, p. 15 referring to RBA of 1 February 1934, XIX, p. 99. 
160  For this doctrine, see Meyers 1964, p. 44-63. 
161  Mok 1937, p. 105. See also Ringeling 1953, p. 15; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 30-32; Jansen en 
Loonstra 1992, p. 87 and 88. 
162  De Gaay Fortman 1936, p. 127. See also Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 32. 
163  See Ringeling 1953, p. 16 and 17. 
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the Employment Agreement of 1907.164 With the outbreak of the Second World 
War, however, the discussion on a just cause for dismissal in the Act of the 
Employment Agreement temporarily came to an end.165
15.1.2   A just cause for dismissal, a right to a job? 
In his lecture of 1926, Levenbach stated that when an employer is allowed to 
dismiss an employee without cause, a right to a job is lacking.166 This implies 
that the introduction of a just cause standard under dismissal law, in effect, 
creates a right to a job. In the Netherlands, Van den Heuvel is one of the first to 
defend that an employee has a right to a job, i.e. the just cause standard 
guarantees employees continuation of their employment. In defending his 
theory, he referred to Frederic Meyers and his classic study on the dismissal 
laws of Mexico, France, Great Britain and the United States. Meyers, in fact, 
considered the remedy of reinstatement as a symbol of ownership of the job,167
because this results in a right of the employee to continued employment.168 In 
using the term ‘ownership’, however, he emphasized that  
‘[it] is of course, used loosely, as an analogy to more traditional rights of 
property rather than as a category of them (...)  it implies a change in the system 
of rights and obligations surrounding employment and the relationship of 
employer to employee.’169
Van den Heuvel, too, acknowledges that ‘the right to a job’ cannot be seen as an 
absolute right.170 Nevertheless, he stressed that one cannot deny that employees 
have a right on continuation of employment under Dutch law to the extent that 
their rights and obligations are automatically being transferred to the new 
employer, in case of a transfer of an undertaking.171
 In my opinion, the discussion on whether an employee has a right to a 
job is a dogmatic one.172 From a judicial point of view, one cannot speak of a 
right to the job. In this respect, Heerma van Voss correctly states that property 
under Dutch law is an absolute right, which does not allow for intervention, 
unless the owner gives permission hereto. Dutch dismissal law does allow for 
164  Levenbach 1934, p. 20. See also Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 30. 
165  Phaff 1986, p 31. 
166  Levenbach 1926a, p. 65. 
167  Meyers 1964, p. 113. See also Hepple 1981, p. 76. 
168  Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 227-229. See Meyers 1964, p. 100. 
169  Meyers 1964, p. 1. 
170  Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 227 and 228. 
171  Transfers of business ownership, in whole or in part, are covered by the EC Directives on transfers of 
undertakings. The Netherlands has incorporated the first Directive 77/187/EEC into national law on 
27 July 1981 in the Art. 662 through 666, Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code.  
172  Rojot 2001, p. 429. See also Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 232. 
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intervention of the employer.173 In fact, the main principle under Dutch 
dismissal law is that an employer at all times must be able to terminate an 
employment agreement.174 This does not mean that the issue cannot be 
approached from a social point of view as well. In my opinion, Van den Heuvel 
and Meyers both look at the issue from a social point of view.175 In fact, the 
social approach is the only way, in which Article 1 of the European Social 
Charter and Article 19(1) of the Dutch Constitution can be interpreted. In brief, 
Article 1 provides a right to a job.176 Article 19(1) of the Dutch Constitution 
imposes the government to encourage full employment.177 In this respect, 
Hepple correctly states that a right to the job as established under law must be 
considered as an abstract, rather than as an absolute right of the individual. It 
does not guarantee a right. Rather, it enables employees to benefit equally with 
others of every opportunity to enter freely into any occupation available, hence, 
to be free to earn a living and to enjoy equally with others the benefits of state 
policies.178
15.2  Legislative history of the BBA 1945  
From a corner no one expected a just cause for dismissal was introduced in 
Dutch legislation through emergency legislation under the BBA 1495.179 The 
latter was meant to be post-war – emergency – legislation only. The following 
paragraphs describe its legislative history, and conversion from emergency into 
just cause legislation. 
15.2.1    Emergency legislation 
In effect, the BBA 1945 is a continuation of German legislation,180 introduced 
after the Germans invaded the Netherlands on 10 May 1940. Three days after 
the invasion, the Dutch Queen Wilhelmina and her government had left for 
London. By 15 May 1940, the Germans had occupied the Netherlands.181
However, before their departure, the Dutch government had authorized the 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the Netherlands, Winkelman, to 
173  Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 221 and 222. 
174  Bles IV, 1909, p. 93-117. See also A.M. Luttmer-Kat, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, 
Deventer, Art. 7:677 BW (DCC) § 2; Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 36 and 37; Van der Grinten 2002, p. 
249. See also HR 26 maart 1965, NJ 1965, 163 (Walsweer/Acmesa). 
175  See also Jacobs 1983, p. 4 and 19. 
176  Hepple 1981, p. 69. See also Rojot 2001, p. 428.  
177  Eizenga 1970, p. 3. 
178  Hepple 1981, p. 69.  
179  Mok 1946, p. 225; Van der Grinten en Haakman 1952, p. 27; Convent der Christelijke-Sociale 
Organisaties 1957, p. 4; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 45; Kuip 1993a, p. 128. 
180  Naber 1981, p. 59; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 43; Phaff 1986, p. 33. 
181  Körver 2004, p. 171. 
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take the necessary decisions in the public interest.182 Additionally, the Dutch 
government in exile could implement emergency legislation by Royal Decree 
since deliberations with Parliament were impossible.183
After the Germans invaded the Netherlands, Dutch companies started to 
reduce their costs by terminating employees.184 Subsequently, on the 
recommendation of the Department of Social Affairs, the Commander in Chief 
issued the Decree of 27 May 1940 to prevent mass unemployment.185 Under this 
Decree, employers were prohibited to cease their activities and/or to diminish 
working hours below 36 per week and/or to dismiss 25 or more employees 
within a period of 30 days, unless they had received prior authorization of the 
Director-General of Labor (Directeur-Generaal van de Arbeid) to terminate 
these employment agreements.186
The Decree of 27 May 1940 was granted a short life only.187 It was replaced by 
the First Implementing Order of 13 June 1940 (Eerste Uitvoeringsbesluit)188 that 
was based on the Ordinance of the Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart of 11 
June 1940.189 The latter resulted in three Implementing Orders.190 Through these 
orders the German occupier slowly succeeded in controlling the Dutch labour 
market, and in making Dutch workers subservient to the war.191
In brief, the First Implementing Order prohibited employers to dismiss 
employees, unless they had received prior authorization from, or had been 
released by the Director-General of Labor (Directeur-Generaal van de Arbeid),
or in case of a summary dismissal. The German invader, however, overlooked 
an important aspect. The Dutch Labour Inspectorate (Arbeidsinspectie) that was 
in charge of the execution of the Order rather acted in the interest of Dutch 
employees, than in the interest of the German enemy.192 Hereupon, under the 
182  Van Peijpe 1985, p. 294. 
183  Körver 2004, p. 171. 
184  Scholtens estimates the number of unemployed at the beginning of May 1940 at approximately 
150.000; at the end of May at approximately 270.000; in the summer of 1940 at approximately 
400,000 to 500,000. See Scholtens 2005a, p. 29. 
185  Ringeling 1953, p. 18 and 19; Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 64; Van Drongelen 1991, p. 280; Scholtens 
2005a, p. 31-33. 
186  Besluit van 27 mei 1940, Stb. O.801. 
187  Ringeling 1953, p. 19; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 42; Van Peijpe 1985, p. 294; Heerma van Voss 
1992, p. 64; Scholtens 2005a, p. 29 and 31-33. The request itself needed to be addressed to the 
District Head of the Labour Inspectorate (Districtshoofd van de Arbeidsinspectie). See Van 
Drongelen 1991, p. 281; Scholtens 2005a, p. 31. 
188  Stb. S.800. 
189  Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 64. 
190  Verordening van de Rijkscommissaris voor het bezette Nederlandse gebied betreffende het beperken 
van werk 11 juni 1940, Verordeningenblad 1940, No. 8. For the Ordinance, see Naber 1981, p. 340. 
See also Phaff 1986, p. 31; Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 64. 
191  Van der Grinten 1943, p. 21; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 43, referring to Ph.H.M. Werner, De 
ontslagvergunning, Arbeid 1946, p. 42; Phaff 1986, p. 32; Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 65 and 67. 
192  Eerste uitvoeringsbesluit, ingevolge de verordening betreffende het beperken van werk, 
Verordeningsblad No. 9/1940, Stb. S 800. See Ringeling 1953, p. 19; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 42, 
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Second Implementing Order (Tweede Uitvoeringsbesluit) of 24 September 1941, 
the German enemy established an Employment Office (Rijksarbeidsbureau) and 
district employment offices (gewestelijke arbeidsbureaus) to take over the duty 
of the Labour Inspectorate.193 Under the Third Implementing Order of 20 
February 1942 (Derde Uitvoeringsbesluit), which replaced the First,194 the 
newly established district employment offices were assigned with the issuance 
and the refusal of permits for dismissal.195 Elaborating on the Ordinance of the 
Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart of 1 March 1943,196 the Third Implementing 
Order required that (i) an employee, too, needed permission; (ii) any termination 
without permission would be invalid;197 (iii) termination of employment by 
mutual agreement without permission would be invalid;198 and (iv) the employer 
needed permission to dismiss and appoint employees.199
In 1944, the Dutch government realized that the end of the war was in sight. It 
imagined that Dutch prisoners in war would return to the Netherlands, and that 
this would result in chaos on the labour market. To meet this problem, the Dutch 
government in exile issued the Special Decree on Labor Relations of 17 July 
1944 (Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen or 1944 Special Decree),200
and four other Decrees.201 The 1944 Special Decree was based on drafts of the 
Minister of Social Affairs. After some deliberations and minor changes of the 
draft of November 1943, the final draft was sent to the Prime Minister on 10 
December 1943. Subsequently, the 1944 Special Decree went into force in 
September 1944 in the South, being first liberated. The 1944 Special Decree 
reached the occupied territory in March 1945.202
When the 1944 Special Decree reached this territory, the Committee of 
Confidants (College van Vertrouwensmannen), meanwhile, had appointed 
Scholtens, a former Secretary-General, to take measures, regulating the labour 
referring to M.G. Levenbach, De ontslagregeling, RBA of 1 August 1940, XXVI, No. 5, p. 33; Phaff 
1986, p. 31; Scholtens 2005a, p. 33-35. 
193  Tweede uitvoeringsbesluit, Verordeningsblad No. 64/1941. See Van Drongelen 1991, p. 283. 
194  Derde Uitvoeringsbesluit No. 14/1942 van de Secretaris-Generaal van het Departement van Sociale 
Zaken ingevolge de Verordening No. 8/1940, 20 februari 1942, Verondeningenblad 1942. 
195  Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 65 and 65, footnote 203, referring to Verordeningenblad 1942, No. 14, afl. 
5; Van Drongelen 1991, p. 282 and 283. 
196  Verordening van 1 maart 1943 van de Rijkscommissaris voor het bezette Nederlandse gebied 
betreffende de beperking ten aanzien van het veranderen van betrekking (Verordening Verandering 
van betrekking), Verordeningenblad 1943, No. 20, aflevering 7. For this Ordinance, see Naber 1981, 
p. 342-348. 
197  Van der Grinten 1943, p. 1 and 9. Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 43; Phaff 1986, p. 32; Van Drongelen 
1991, p. 283; Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 66. 
198  Dienske 1965, p. 13; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 42 and 43; Phaff 1986, p. 31 and 32; Heerma van 
Voss 1992, p. 66.  
199  Van der Grinten 1943, p. 21; Phaff 1986, p. 32. 
200  Ringeling 1953, p. 19 and 20; Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 68. 
201  For a discussion of these Decrees, see Scholtens 2005a, p. 37-46. 
202  Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 61; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 43; Phaff 1986, p. 33. 
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market after the war.203 This had resulted in a draft, better known as the 
Emergency Regulation of 1944 (Noodregeling Arbeidszaken 1944).204
Scholtens, Levenbach and representatives of employees ‘and employers’ 
associations, which had realized they needed to work together in light of the 
restoration of the Netherlands, designed the latter secretly during the war.205 On 
17 May 1945, this cooperation would result in the Labour Foundation (Stichting 
van de Arbeid or STAR).206 The Committee of Confidants strongly opposed 
when it received the 1944 Special Decree, because the Minister of Social Affairs 
had not taken into consideration the sentiment of the war. For example, the 
Minister had appointed the district employment offices to grant permits, 
neglecting the fact that these offices were strongly related to the German 
occupier.207 In spite of the Committee’s objections, the 1944 Special Decree 
remained unchanged and went into force in all parts of the Netherlands, once 
they were liberated.208 In brief, under the 1944 Special Decree the employer 
needed prior authorization of the Director of the District Employment Office 
(Directeur van het Gewestelijk Arbeidsbureau) to dismiss the employee.209 The 
reason for the Dutch government to adopt the 1944 Special Decree was that the 
situation on the Dutch labour market called for immediate measures. In addition, 
this Decree – through the amendment of 29 December 1944 – determined that 
employees, too, needed permission to terminate the employment agreement.210
The reason was the shortage of skilled employees after the war, resulting in a 
‘loan war’ between employers and frustrating the government’s income policy at 
the time.211
The Preamble of the 1944 Special Decree was clear, in that it was temporary – 
emergency – legislation only.212 Also the BBA 1945, replacing the 1944 Special 
Decree,213 was emergency legislation.214 Due to the latter, both, therefore, lack 
203  This Committee was appointed by the Dutch government in exile in 1944 to represent the 
government in the occupied territory during its absence. See Scholtens 2005a, p. 46. 
204  For this Emergency Regulation (Noodregeling Arbeidszaken 1944), see Naber 1981, p. 372-376; 
Scholtens 2005a, p. 46. 
205  Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 43 and 44 referring to M.G. Levenbach, Kanttekeningen bij het 
Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen, Sociaal Maandblad 1947, p. 38; Van Peijpe 1985,  
p. 312; Van Drongelen 1991, p. 289 and 290; Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 69. 
206  Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 62; Van Drongelen 1991, p. 288; Heerma van Voss 
1992, p. 68. 
207  Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 69, footnote 216, referring to Van Drongelen 1986, p. 104; Scholtens 
2005a, p. 46-54. 
208  Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 61; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 43; Phaff 1986, p. 33. 
209  Besluit van 17 juli 1944, houdende vaststelling van het Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen, 
Stb. 1944, E 52. 
210  Besluit van 29 december 1944, houdende wijziging van het BBA, Stb. E.157. 
211  Scholtens 2005a, p. 54-56. The Director was not allowed to refuse the permit when this would 
frustrate an improvement of the employee’s position.  See Phaff 1986, p. 33. 
212  Ringeling 1953, p. 19 and 20. 
213  Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen van 5 oktober 1945, Stb. F 214. See also Scholtens 
2005a, p. 56. 
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an Explanatory Memorandum (Memorie van Toelichting).215 From archives, 
however, it can be derived that the Minister of Social Affairs sent a draft 
underlying the BBA 1945 to the Labour Foundation on 25 July 1945. The 
Labour Foundation had reacted disappointed, due to the fact that the draft 
underlying the BBA 1945 strongly deviated from the Emergency Regulation of 
1944.216 In brief, the latter determined that an employer needed permission to 
terminate an employment agreement, a summary dismissal exempted. The 
Director-General of Labor (Directeur-Generaal van de Arbeid) was authorized 
to grant permits. The rationale behind the latter was the resistance of the Dutch 
population against the district employment offices, considering these offices as 
an invention of the German occupier.217 Last, the Emergency Regulation 
determined that to dismiss an employee in violation of the foregoing would be 
invalid, on the condition that its invalidity would be timely invoked by the 
employee within six months.218
Unlike the Emergency Regulation of 1944, the BBA 1945 determined 
that the employer and the employee needed permission to terminate the 
employment agreement. Moreover, it appointed the district employment offices 
to grant permits, due to their expertise on the subject.219 Hence, the protest of the 
Committee of Confidants was in vain. The BBA 1945 remained unchanged. 
After it had been sent to the Council of Ministers on 5 September 1945, the 
Queen signed it on 5 October 1945. It went into force on 15 October 1945.220
15.2.2   Just cause legislation 
In 1949, the Netherlands Supreme Court held that the BBA 1945 had legal 
force, referring to its necessity in light of the special circumstances of the war.221
This explains that the BBA 1945, as today, still exists although it was primarily 
emergency legislation. This paragraph examines when this emergency 
legislation, in effect, was converted into just cause legislation. The legislative 
history of the BBA 1945 started with the issuance of the Decree of 27 May 1940 
214  Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 62; Ringeling 1953, p. 21. 
215  A summary explanation can only be found in Wetsbesluiten tot stand gekomen tussen 24 juni en 23 
november 1945 met toelichtingen, Algemene Landsdrukkerij, Den Haag, 1947. See Dienske 1965,  
p. 13; Kuip 1993a, p. 124. 
216  For this Emergency Regulation (Noodregeling Arbeidszaken 1944), see Naber 1981, p. 372-376. For 
the Labour Foundation’s reaction, see its advice of 13 August 1945. 
217  Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 69, footnote 216, referring to Van Drongelen 1986, p. 104.
218  Phaff 1986, p. 33. 
219  Ringeling 1953, p. 21; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 62; Van den Heuvel 1983,  
p. 44; Van Drongelen 1991, p. 325 and 326; Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 69. 
220  Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 61; Dienske 1965, p. 13; Scholtens 2005a, p. 56-58. 
221 HR 18 januari 1949, NJ 1949, 551 (Arbeiders-Cooperatie Bouwwerken R’dam). See Dienske 1965, 
p. 13, footnote 3; Overkleeft-Verburg en Roijakkers 1976, p. 6; Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 69; Kuip 
1993a, p. 124. 
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by the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the Netherlands.222 The 
intent of this Decree was to prevent mass unemployment. The aim of this 
Decree, thus, was not to provide protection to employees against arbitrary 
dismissal in general.223 The First Implementing Order of 13 June 1940, which 
replaced the Decree of 27 May 1940, did provide just cause protection. 
Paragraph 2.2 of this Order in this respect held that a request, in which an 
employer asked for permission to terminate the employment agreement, needed 
to be well founded, which implies the requirement of a just cause for dismissal. 
The same requirement emerged from the Third Implementing Order of 20 
February 1942.224 Because the German enemy with one goal issued these Orders 
only, to control the Dutch labour market and to make Dutch workers subservient 
to the war, one cannot speak of just cause legislation.225
When the Dutch government in exile issued the 1944 Special Decree, 
this was not to create just cause legislation either. Rather, to prevent mass 
unemployment and to create social peace on the labour market after the war.226
To a certain extent, it provided just cause protection, however. Article 6 of the 
1944 Special Decree required a summary investigation on the cause for 
dismissal. In this respect, the 1944 Special Decree determined that an employer 
needed prior authorization of the Director of the District Employment Office to 
dismiss an employee, unless (i) the employee was dismissed based on urgent 
cause; (ii) parties had reached mutual consent on termination of employment; 
(iii) an employee had been involved with the German National-Socialist 
movement; or (iv) it concerned a female employee hired after 9 May 1940, who 
had replaced a male employee called for military service during the war.227 In all 
other cases, the 1944 Special Decree required a summary investigation on the 
cause for dismissal by the Director.228 Through the amendment of 29 December 
1944, the 1944 Special Decree, in fact, converted ‘a summary investigation’ into 
‘an investigation’.229 The general opinion, nonetheless, is that the BBA 1945 first 
introduced an administrative control on the side of the government to protect 
222 Naber refers to the German measure of 1 September 1939 – when Germany invaded Poland – as the 
true origins of the BBA 1945. For this measure, see Naber 1981, p. 24-27, 335 and 338. See also 
Scholtens 2005a, p. 30. 
223  Ringeling 1953, p. 19. 
224  Naber 1981, p. 38, referring to W.C.L. van der Grinten, Nieuw Ontslagrecht (moet zijn Nieuw 
Arbeidsrecht: VA), Alphen aan den Rijn 1942, p. 5; and, M.G. Levenbach, Waar staan wij met het 
arbeidsrecht?, Sociaal Maandblad 1946, p. 7 e.v. See also Scholtens 2005a, p. 35. 
225  Ringeling 1953, p. 19; Naber 1981, p. 38 and 45; Van Drongelen 1991, p. 283; Scholtens 2005a,  
p. 34-37. 
226  Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 61; Naber 1981, p. 56; Scholtens 2005a, p. 37-43. 
227  Van der Grinten en Haakman 1953, p. 37 and 38. 
228  Naber 1981, p. 55; Scholtens 2005a, p. 42-46. 
229  Ringeling 1953, p. 20; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 61; Naber 1981, p. 57-59; Van 
den Heuvel 1983, p. 44; Phaff 1986, p. 33; Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 68. To the extent the BBA 
1945 abolished this rule, it had been implemented through the Directives of the district employment 
offices again. See Ringeling 1953, p. 21; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 62. 
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employees against arbitrary dismissal in general.230 In this respect, the Circular 
Letter of the Director of the District Employment Office of 21 January 1946 
stipulated that the Director was authorized to grant permission to the employer 
only in case of (i) a surplus of workers; (ii) incapability of the worker; and (iii) 
breach of trust.231
The intent of the Dutch government behind the BBA 1945 was to serve the 
interests of employees and employers and the public.232 Hence, it does not 
protect employees only.233 In fact, the priority of these interests shifted over the 
years, dependent on the circumstances.234 For example, after the war, the 
restoration of the economy had the highest priority. The interests of employers, 
in turn, was best served during the period of economic recovery in the sixties 
and seventies.235 On the other hand, it was said that the BBA 1945 primarily 
provided protection to employees (i) after the decision of the Netherlands 
Supreme Court in 1948, which held that an employer could terminate the 
employment agreement only after having obtained prior authorization to dismiss 
the employee;236 and (ii) after a 1999 amendment of the BBA 1945, under which  
employees no longer need to ask for permission to terminate the employment 
relationship.237
In literature, the claim that the interests of the employer, and the public, 
would no longer play a role under the BBA 1945 is strongly denied, however.238
In fact, the Directives of 1974239 explicitly determined that the Director of the 
District Employment Office in granting permits must balance the interests of the 
employer and the employee against the public interest.240 The Dismissal Decree, 
which replaced the Directives in 1998,241 too, explicitly determines that the 
230  Ringeling 1953, p. 21; Convent der Christelijke-Sociale Organisaties 1957, p. 4; Haakman 1966,  
p. 147, referring to Dienske 1965, chapter III; Naber 1981, p. 389; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 44 and  
p. 46, referring to ‘Bijlagen Handelingen II 1951-1953, 881, No. 6, p. 6’; Kuip 1993a, p. 124 and 
125.
231  Ringeling 1953, p. 35; Naber 1981, p. 105 and 106; Kuip 1993a, p. 128.
232 Naber 1981, p. 104, 105, 117 and 118, referring to the Directives of 1954; Van der Heijden 1984,
p. 60; Kuip 1993a, p. 125, footnote 13: referring to ‘Memorie van Antwoord bij de Rijksbegroting 
van Sociale Zaken en Volksgezondheid voor het dienstjaar 1953, TK 1952-1953, II, 2800, Hoofdstuk 
XII, No. 10, p. 8’; and, in footnote 14: referring to ‘Wetsontwerp 881, Handelingen II, 19 februari 
1943, p. 2351.’  In the same sense: De Gaay Fortman 1949, p. 37. 
233  Naber 1981, p. 118, referring to Letter of the Director-General of Labor of 29 March 1947. 
234  Van der Heijden 1984, p. 60 referring to Directives of 1974 (Stcrt. 22 januari 1974, 15). 
235  Dienske 1965, p. 34; Naber 1981, p. 198; Van der Heijden 1984, p. 60; Kuip 1993a, p. 125. 
236  Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 71, footnote 232, referring to HR 19 november 1948, NJ 1949, 86 (De 
Kock/Van Heijst & Zonen). 
237  Stb. 1998, 300. 
238  See also the Netherlands Supreme Court in HR  8 januari 1971, NJ 1971, 129 (American 
Express/Mackay). See also HR 3 mei 1991, NJ 1991, 705 (Van der Hop/Muskens).
239  Stcrt. 22 januari 1974, 15. 
240  Van den Boom 1981, p. 850; Van der Heijden 1984, p. 60; Kuip 1993a, p. 126. 
241  Regeling van 7 december 1998, Stcrt. 1998, 238. 
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CWI242 – which grants and refuses permits – must balance the interests of the 
employer and the employee against the public interests under the Dismissal 
Decree. In collective dismissals, the public interest is to prevent mass layoffs. In 
individual dismissals, the public interest is preventing rash dismissals (i) to 
protect employees against loss of income, and to protect the weak in particular; 
and (ii) to restrict the number of applicants for invalidity and unemployment 
benefits.243
15.3  Legislative history of Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code 
15.3.1  The Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907 
To understand how the rules on employment termination under the BBA 1945 
and Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code interact, I will now describe the 
legislative history of the latter, which starts in 1891 when the Minister of 
Justice, Smidt, asked Drucker to prepare a draft of an Act of the Employment 
Agreement. Drucker hereupon submitted his first draft in 1894. Smidt resigned 
shortly after he received the draft, hence, could not pay significant attention to it. 
In 1898, Drucker received a renewed assignment from the new Minister of 
Justice, Cort van der Linden, who received the (second) draft on 17 October of 
that same year, which resulted in a Bill.244 Hereupon, the Minister of Justice sent 
the Bill to the Lower House on 7 May 1901. It was withdrawn that same year. 
The new Minister of Justice, Loeff, however, on 28 January 1904 sent to 
Parliament virtually the same Bill as submitted earlier in 1901. The Bill was 
discussed in Parliament under a new Minister of Justice, Raalte, who had 
succeeded Loeff in 1905.245 The Lower House adopted the Bill with 79 to 8 
votes against. On 10 July 1907, the Bill was adopted in the Upper House, with 
29 to 15 votes against, and approved by the Queen on 13 July 1907.246 The date 
242  The CWI replaced the Regional Director of Labor Services (Regionaal Directeur van de 
arbeidsvoorzieningsorganisatie or RDA) as from 1 January 2002. The Regional Director of Labor 
Services, in turn, replaced the Director of the district employment office (Directeur van het 
gewestelijk arbeidsbureau) as from 1 January 1999. See Van Drongelen en Van Rijs 2003, p. 19-21. 
243  To the extent the Dismissal Decree treats the elderly and the disabled as special categories it is 
argued to serve the public interest. See Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 45, referring to M.G. Levenbach, 
Kanttekeningen bij het Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen, Sociaal Maandblad 1947, p. 41; 
Van der Heijden 1984, p. 61. See also below under § 16.3. 
244  Bles I, 1907, p. v;  Canes 1908, p. 9 and 10; Meijers 1912, p. 40;  Phaff 1986, p. 9; Kuip 1993a,  
p. 25; Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 33; C.J. Loonstra, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, 
Deventer, Boek 7 Titel 10, Inleiding § 3.2. 
245  New provisions, which were introduced – compared to the draft of Drucker of 17 October 1898 – 
were those with regard to the exclusive jurisdiction and the venue of the Cantonal Court in 
employment and labor matters, and provisions with regard to the collective bargaining agreement 
(Art. 1637n).  See Bles I, 1907, p. vi-viii; Canes 1908, p. 12; Meijers 1912, p. 40, 41 and 73; Phaff 
1986, p. 9; Kuip 1993a, p. 25 and 26; Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 33. 
246  Canes 1908, p. 13 and 14; Meijers 1912, p. 41; C.J. Loonstra, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, 
Kluwer, Deventer, Boek 7 Titel 10, Inleiding § 3.2. 
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of entry into force of the Act of the Employment Agreement was set on 1 
February 1909.247
 The Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907 consisted of the 
Articles 1637a-1639dd. However, on 25 April 1947, Meijers was assigned by 
the government to design a New Dutch Civil Code (Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek
or NBW). Subsequently, Book 1 on the law of persons and family law 
(personen- en familierecht), and Book 2 on the law of legal persons 
(rechtspersonenrecht) went into force on 1 January 1970 and 26 July 1976, 
respectively.248 To the employment relationship, Book 3 on patrimonial law 
(vermogensrecht), and Book 6 on the law of obligations (verbintenissenrecht)
are important.249 These Books – together with Book 5 on the law of property 
(zakenrecht) – went into force on 1 November 1992.250 Subsequently, the 
Articles of the Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907, in turn, required 
adjustment to the Books 3 and 6. Consequently, the Act of the Employment 
Agreement of 1907 temporarily became Book 7A Title 7A of the Dutch Civil 
Code. Levenbach, meanwhile, already had been asked to revise the Articles of 
the Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907, to be incorporated in the New 
Dutch Civil Code. His draft of 1972 formed the basis251 for what would become 
Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code (Articles 610 to 689), of which the date 
of entry into force was set on 1 April 1997.252
The Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907 is preceded by a summary 
regulation on master and servants (huur van dienstboden en werklieden),
consisting of the Articles 1637 to 1639.253 Article 1585, too, applied to the 
employment relationship. At the time, one generally considered the employment 
relationship as one of rental of services under Article 1583, which Article 
distinguished between rental of goods (huur van goederen) and rental of 
services (huur van diensten). Article 1585 described the latter as an agreement 
by which one party, the servant, commits himself to perform work for the other, 
the master, in exchange of payment.254 The Articles 1637 to 1639 provided 
detailed rules for the rental of services. The Articles 1637 and 1638 derived 
from the French Code Civil, with the exception of Article 1639 that derived 
from Dutch ancient custom law (oud-vaderlands recht).255 Because the French 
Code Civil did not provide a rule on employment termination, the legislature 
247  KB 13 juli 1907.  
248  Van Zeben 1993, p. xi. 
249  See also below under § 28.3.1. 
250  For Books 3, 5 and 6, see KB 9 mei 1980, Stb. 430, 431 and 432, respectively. 
251  For both drafts, see Van der Heijden 1991: enclosures. 
252  Stb. 1996, 406 and 562. See also Van Slooten 1997, p. 284-288; Jacobs, Massuger en Plesser 1997.  
253  Meijers 1912, p. 3; Phaff 1986, p. 9; C.J. Loonstra, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, 
Deventer, Boek 7 Titel 10, Inleiding § 3.2. See also below under § 28.2.1. 
254  For an in-depth discussion of these Articles – in relation to Art. 1637 to 1639 – see Drucker 1894. 
See also Cornelissens 1959, p. 519 and 520.  
255  For an in-depth discussion of the legislative history of these Articles, see below under § 28.2.1. 
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had adopted the rule under Dutch ancient custom law.256 It, however, applied to 
employment agreements for a definite period only. In this respect, it is 
noteworthy to mention that, according to custom, parties generally did not agree 
upon contracts for an indefinite period.257
More specifically, under Article 1639, parties could terminate the 
employment agreement for a definite period, prior to the expiry date, with a 
legal reason (wettige reden) only.258 It determined that the servant who wished 
to terminate the contract prior to the expiry date, needed a legal reason to 
establish that he would be entitled to his salary until the expiry date. The master,
too, could terminate the contract prior to the expiry date, with a legal reason. 
However, in case the master terminated the contract without a legal reason, 
Article 1639 explicitly determined that the master needed to provide the servant 
with a severance payment of at least six weeks, and less, if the contract had 
lasted shorter than six weeks. Consequently, the Dutch Civil Code of 1838 did 
not provide rules on employment termination for employment agreements for an 
indefinite period. In contrast, French courts applied the doctrine of abus de droit
to employment agreements for an indefinite period, providing employees just 
cause protection. In the Netherlands, employers could still dismiss these 
employees at will.259 Only when parties had agreed upon a notice period, did 
they need to respect this period. However, in practice, parties did not agree upon 
a notice period, or agreed upon short notice periods only.260 Hence, the summary 
regulation led to abuse by employers of workers. First, the regulation did not 
provide rules on employment agreements for an indefinite period, or other 
important situations, e.g. non-competition. Second, the term ‘legal reason’ in 
Article 1639 was not defined, which caused insecurity for employers and 
employees.261 Last, Article 1638 was considered as ancient. This Article 
determined that a servant had to take the master on his word. This rule was 
effective in small settings, but not in bigger ones such as factories.262
To prevent abuse, the legislature enacted the Act of the Employment Agreement 
of 1907, which replaced the summary regulation.263 In brief, a new Article 1637 
enumerated three contracts of work (i) the employment agreement 
256  Cornelissens 1959, p. 36. 
257  In fact, until 1945 the employment agreement for a definite period was more attractive than an 
employment agreement for an indefinite period. See Loonstra 2004, p 30-32. 
258  Cornelissens 1959, p. 36. 
259  Cornelissens 1959, p. 36-38, referring to Rb. Amsterdam, 11 juli 1865, Weekblad voor het Recht no. 
2738; Rb. Leeuwarden, 18 juni 1885, Weekblad voor het Recht no. 5325; Rb. Utrecht, 11 januari 
1893, Weekblad voor het Recht no. 6284; Rb. Den Bosch, 19 april 1895, Weekblad voor het Recht 
no. 6726; Rb. Den Haag, 14 december 1897, Weekblad voor het Recht no. 7100. 
260  Meijers 1912, p. 200, footnote 1; Ringeling 1953, p. 11; Kuip 1993a, p. 20-25. 
261  See also above under § 15.3.1. 
262  For an in-depth discussion of Art. 1638, see Cornelissens 1959, p. 35, referring to Mannoury 1955. 
See also Koopmans 1962, p. 8; Kuip 1993a, p. 25; C.J. Loonstra, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, 
Kluwer, Deventer, Boek 7 Titel 10, Inleiding § 3.2.; Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 53-57. 
263  For an  in-depth discussion on the government’s motives behind the Act, see below under § 28.2.1. 
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(arbeidsovereenkomst); (ii) the contract for services (overeenkomst van 
opdracht); and (iii) the acceptance of work (aanneming van werk). In total, 78 
provisions (Articles 1637 to 1639x) applied to the employment agreement, and 4 
provisions (Articles1640 to 1643) to the acceptance of work. The contract for 
services did not (yet) hold detailed rules.264 The discrepancy in number of 
provisions between the employment agreement and the acceptance of work is 
striking. This difference is due to the subordination of employees under the 
employment agreement, which, too, explains that, the Articles 1639e to 1639x 
on employment termination, in total twenty, were virtually all fully mandatory
(vol-dwingend) to prevent employees from being abused by employers.265 Under 
the Act  
x parties could agree upon a contract for a definite period, which 
automatically expired after the expiry date and, in principle, could 
not be terminated in between;  
x parties could agree upon a contract for an indefinite period, which 
could be terminated at all times, provided they respected a notice 
period;  
x parties could agree upon a probationary period, which could be 
terminated at all times; and  
x contracts automatically came to an end through the death of the 
employee.  
The possibility of termination by mutual consent was not mentioned in the 
Act.266 To this situation, general contract principles applied.267 Other ways to 
terminate the employment agreement were through (i) unilateral termination of 
the contract with severance payment; (ii) dissolution of the contract by the court 
for serious cause; and (iii) dissolution of the contract by court based on breach 
of contract. As today, Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code reflects these 
ways of dismissal.268
Also, to conditions subsequent in employment agreements, general contract 
principles – of  Book 6 – of the Dutch Civil Code applied. Besides, the Articles 
1639e.3 and 4 (Articles 7:667.7 and 8 DCC) applied, determining that 
conditions subsequent in employment agreements are invalid when the 
conditions stipulate that marriage or registered partnership (Section 7) and/or 
264  Meanwhile, Book 7 Title 7 DCC contains specific rules on the contract for services. 
265  Meijers 1912, p. 3-31, 42 and 43; Pitlo 1977, p. 2 and 3; Phaff 1986, p. 9; Heerma van Voss 1992,  
p. 33. For the term and a justification of mandatory law, see below under § 28.2.2. See also above 
under § 1.4.3.4. 
266  Canes 1908, p. 265 and 266; Meijers 1912, p. 188. 
267 For an in-depth discussion of case law on this subject, see Van Heusden 2006, p. 45-111.   
268  Loonstra 2004, p. 28-30. 
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pregnancy or birth (Section 8) will render the employment agreement invalid 
automatically.269
Subsequently, advocates in the past stated that to the extent the 
legislature declared void certain conditions subsequent only, it allowed 
employers to agree upon other conditions subsequent.270 In contrast, Asscher-
Vonk was of the opinion that the exclusive character of the rules on employment 
termination (gesloten ontslagstelsel) excluded the possibility for employers to 
include a condition subsequent in the employment agreement, hence, the 
legislature intended to declare all conditions subsequent void.271 Van den 
Heuvel, too, argued that a condition subsequent could not set aside mandatory 
rules on employment termination.272 Coehorst and De Leede took the middle 
course, stating that whether conditions subsequent in the employment agreement 
are void depends on whether they are in violation of the – intent behind273 – 
mandatory rules on employment termination.274 With its decision on 6 March 
1992, in Mungra/Meir, the Netherlands Supreme Court, in effect, followed 
Coehorst and De Leede. The Court held that a condition subsequent in an 
employment agreement can be incompatible with the dismissal system, 
however, not perse, hence, this should be judged ad-hoc, dependent on the 
circumstances of the case.275 Hereupon, in literature, a discussion took place on 
which conditions subsequent in the employment agreement under case law could 
be considered as (in)valid.276 Subsequently, in Van Zijl/Van Koppen (1996),277
and Arrindell/Port de Plaisance (1998),278 the Netherlands Supreme Court 
declared conditions subsequent in employment agreements void, adding that a 
condition subsequent in an employment agreement is valid in rare cases only.279
The Netherlands Supreme Court in Monte/De Bank van de Nederlandse Antillen 
269  Stb. 1976, 295. The provisions went into force on 1 August 1976 (Stb. 1976, 388). See also Loonstra 
en Zondag 2004, p. 356-359. 
270  For example, see Arnold 1978, p. 624. 
271  Asscher-Vonk 1978, p. 328. 
272  Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 139. 
273 De Leede 1998, p. 253 en 254. 
274  Coehorst 1984, p. 349. 
275  HR 6 maart 1992, NJ 1992, 509, JAR 1992/10 (Mungra/Meir): the condition subsequent was 
considered valid. For an in-depth discussion of this case, see Kuip 1993b; Boersma 2003, p. 7 and 8. 
276  For an overview of the authors in question, see HR 13 februari 1998, NJ 1998, 708, JAR 1998/72 
(Arrindell/Port de Plaisance), Conclusion Advocate General, under  8. 
277  HR 24 mei 1996, NJ 1996, 685, JAR 1996/141 (Van Zijl/Van Koppen): the condition subsequent was 
considered invalid. For a discussion of this case, see Heerma van Voss en Van der Heijden 1996; 
Boersma 2003, p. 7 and 8. 
278  HR 13 februari 1998, NJ 1998, 708, JAR 1998/72 (Arrindell/Port de Plaisance): the condition 
subsequent was considered invalid. For an in-depth discussion of this case see Boersma 2003, p. 8 
and 9;  De Wolff  1999. 
279  For an overview of the authors in question, see HR 13 februari 1998, NJ 1998, 708, JAR 1998/72 
(Arrindell/Port de Plaisance), rov. 3.3.2. 
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(2002) affirmed the latter,280 although the condition subsequent in this case was 
held valid.281 The application of general contract principles in the employment 
agreement – like in the United States – thus can lead to problems. 
15.3.2  The amendments of 1953 and just cause 
The Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907 brought more security for 
employees,282 although the Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907 did not
change the at-will rule for employment agreements for an indefinite period. The 
only requirement under the new Article 1639g was that employers and 
employees needed to respect a notice period established by law, equal to the 
period between payments.283 In practice, employers generally paid their 
employees by week, hence, the notice period, in practice, were a short one.284
Moreover, the employer was not liable when the termination took place without
the notice period, i.e. when the party who terminated the contract (i) paid a 
severance payment to the other; or (ii) could bring forward an urgent reason for 
dismissal that justified the termination.285 In fact, under the new Article 1639o 
an employer could still dismiss an employee without cause or even for a bad 
cause.286 The legislature of 1907 did not opt for the introduction of a just cause 
for a dismissal, because this did not (yet) reflect the general opinion in the 
Netherlands.287 In fact, it is said that the Act of the Employment Agreement of 
1907 abolished the just cause rule that applied to employment agreements for a 
definite period. In brief, under the new Article 1639e in conjunction with the 
Articles 1639o and 1639r, an employer was prohibited to terminate an 
employment agreement for a definite period prior to the expiry date. Under 
Article 1639 old, the employer could terminate the employment agreement prior 
to the expiry date with a legal reason. The result was the same, however. In both 
cases, the employer was liable when he terminated the employment agreement 
in between without cause.  
 The absence of a just cause standard in the Act was severely criticized. 
Dismissals of employees who were called for military service were especially 
considered as unfair. Objection was also made to the short notice periods, which 
280  HR 1 februari 2002, NJ 2002, 607, JAR 2002/45, rov. 3.7 (Monte/De Bank van de Nederlandse 
Antillen): the condition subsequent was considered valid. For an in-depth discussion of this case, see 
Boersma  2003, p. 9 and 10. See also Duk 2005, p. 8 and 9. 
281  For an overall discussion on the four cases of the Netherlands Supreme Court on conditions 
subsequent in the employment agreement, see Christe 2002. 
282  Meijers 1934, p. 8; Ringeling 1953, p. 11. 
283  Under the law, the notice period could not extend six weeks, unless parties had agreed upon 
extension with a maximum of six months. Bles IV, 1909, p. 7-11, referring to Art. 1639g; De Gaay 
Fortman 1936, p. 127; Meijers 1912, p. 190 and 191; Naber 1984, p. 12. 
284  Canes 1908, p. 286; Bles IV, 1909, p. 93;  Meijers 1912, p. 198; Naber 1984, p 11 and 13. 
285  Mok 1934, p. 75; Phaff 1986, p. 12 and 17. 
286  Canes 1908, p. 286; Bles IV, 1909, p. 93; Meijers 1912, p. 198; Naber 1984, p 11 and 13. 
287  Meijers 1912, p. 190; Ringeling 1953, p. 11 and 18; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 25; Phaff 1986, p. 11 
and 12. See also above under § 15.1.1. 
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applied to employees, regardless of the years of service.288 Subsequently, in 
1935 the Minister of Justice had to promise the Lower House to install a 
Committee, which was to become the Committee Limburg, to consider the rules 
with regard to employment termination. This Committee concluded that the Act 
of the Employment Agreement of 1907 needed to undergo changes in both 
aspects. Unfortunately, the Bill that the Minister of Justice had prepared could 
not be discussed in Parliament, due to the Second World War.289
After the Second World War, the discussion on a just cause for dismissal and the 
short notice periods sparked off again. Also, a new debate arose on the 
interaction of the rules on employment termination under the Act of the 
Employment Agreement of 1907 and the BBA 1945. In brief, one was of the 
opinion that the principal rules of the Act of the Employment Agreement of 
1907 and the BBA 1945 contradicted each other. The Act of the Employment 
Agreement of 1907 endorsed the idea that an employment agreement was 
considered without effect, when one of the parties lost his trust in the other.290
Consequently, its principal rule was that parties at all times should be able to 
terminate the employment agreement with prior notice, regardless of the reason, 
and without intervention of a third party.291 After the BBA 1945 went into force, 
Article 6 crossed this rule, because it did not allow employers and employees to 
terminate the employment agreement than with prior authorization of a public 
authority, requiring a just cause for dismissal.292 Because the Preamble of the 
BBA 1945 held that it was temporary only, the debate, in effect, revolved 
around what the contents of the Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907 
would be after the BBA 1945 had been withdrawn.  
 After the Second World War, the Dutch government was not able to 
give clarity when the BBA 1945 would be withdrawn. It realized that the Act of 
the Employment Agreement of 1907 needed to undergo changes on short notice, 
however. Consequently, Queen Wilhelmina, on behalf of the government, in her 
speech on 23 July 1946, announced that a Bill on a revision of rules on 
employment termination would be sent to Parliament. In her speech, the Queen 
stressed that the aim of the revision would be to give workers with a long state 
of service more social security. Three days later, on 26 July 1946, the Minister 
of Justice, Van Maarseveen, asked the Labour Foundation for advice in this 
matter.293 On 2 August 1946, the Board of the Labour Foundation installed a 
288  Ringeling 1953, p. 11; Levenbach 1954, p. 2; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 6; 
Naber 1984, p. 12. See also above under § 15.1.1. 
289  Levenbach 1954, p. 2; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 6; Phaff 1986, p. 39. 
290  Meijers 1912, p. 197 and 198; Mok 1934, p. 74, referring to Bles IV, 1909, p. 96; Naber 1984, p. 11; 
Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 36 and 37. 
291  Naber 1984, p. 11. 
292  Levenbach 1954, p. 5. 
293  Ringeling 1953, p. 22; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 6; Levenbach 1954, p. 2; Van 
den Heuvel 1983, p. 46 and 47; Naber 1984, p. 24; Phaff 1986, p. 39; Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 72. 
See also STAR-Advies 1947, p. 3. 
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tripartite Committee, the Committee Slotemaker, to prepare an advice. Besides 
representatives of employers and employees, also principal officers of the 
Ministries of Justice, and Social Affairs took part in the Committee, among 
whom De Gaay Fortman. The latter was one of the principal officers within the 
Ministry of Justice, and an important defender of the iusta causa dimissionis.294
Initially, the intent of the Committee of the Labour Foundation was to pay 
attention to the Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907 and the BBA 1945. 
However, when the Minister of Justice made clear that he wished to receive 
advice on the necessary amendments in the Act of the Employment Agreement 
of 1907 first – the idea was still that the BBA 1945 would be invoked – the 
Committee decided to focus on the Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907 
only.295 On 29 July 1947, the Labour Foundation presented its report to the 
Minister of Justice.296 The Labour Foundation advised to  
x extend the notice periods dependent on years of service;  
x prohibit dismissal based on absence, due to military service or 
illness;
x introduce a  just cause for dismissal in general through an action 
based on manifestly unreasonable dismissal;   
x enable courts to reinstate the employee when the dismissal would 
be manifestly unreasonable; and  
x introduce the possibility for an employee to obtain compensation 
from the employer in case the employee was still bound by a 
competition clause after termination of the employment 
agreement.297
On 24 September 1947, the Minister of Justice installed a Committee to design a 
Bill based on the Report of the Labour Foundation. Levenbach, like De Gaay 
Fortman an important defender of the iusta causa dimissionis, was appointed 
Chairman of this Committee. Its Report was presented to the Minister of Justice 
on 24 March 1948. On 30 June 1948, the Minister of Justice sent the Bill to the 
Lower House, which adopted the Bill virtually unamended on 20 February 
1953.298 The Upper House adopted the Bill on 15 December 1953.299
294  STAR-Advies 1947, p. 6-8; Ringeling 1953, p. 22; Levenbach 1954, p. 2; Van den Heuvel 1983,  
p. 46 and 47; Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 72. 
295  STAR-Advies 1947, p. 6-8; Levenbach 1954, p. 5. 
296  Ringeling 1953, p. 22; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 6; Van den Heuvel 1983,  
p. 47; Naber 1984, p. 24. 
297  STAR-Advies 1947. See also Ringeling 1953, p. 22; Naber 1981, p. 256; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 46 
and 47; Naber 1984, p. 24. 
298  Ringeling 1953, p. 23-28; Levenbach 1954, p. 3; Gerbrandy 1954, p. 3; Centraal Sociaal 
Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 7; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 47 and 48; Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 72 
and 73. 
299  Levenbach 1954, p. 3 and 4; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 7. 
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The Act of 17 December 1953, holding the Revision of rules on 
employment termination (Wet van 17 December 1953, houdende wijziging van 
de bepalingen omtrent het ontslag bij arbeidsovereenkomsten) went into force 
on 1 July 1954.300 The Act was based on the Report of the Labour Foundation of 
29 July 1947.301 Its most important provision in light of the interest of this thesis 
is the introduction of a manifestly unreasonable dismissal under Article 1639s, 
which will be discussed in-depth in paragraph 17.302  For the time being, this 
provision ended the debate on a requirement of a just cause for dismissal.  
15.3.3  The amendments of 1999 and just cause 
At the end of the twentieth century, the debate on a just cause for dismissal 
revived. Employers stated that the dual just cause dismissal system restricted 
them to act flexibly to changes on the market, which was needed to strengthen 
their competitive position in the international context. The VNO-NCW, the 
largest employers’ association, advocated the abolition of the BBA 1945.303
With the Flexicurity Act of 1998, the legislature partly met the need of 
employers. Besides that it held amendments, it provided ‘new rules’, including 
Article 7:669 DCC.304 In this paragraph I will focus on the latter, due to its 
implicit link with the just cause standard.  
Article 7:669 DCC 
Article 7:669 DCC determines that an employer is obliged, at the request of an 
employee, to provide the employee in writing with the reason for dismissal. 
Article 7:669 DCC intended to make it easier for employees to initiate an action 
based on manifestly unreasonable dismissal under Article 7:681 DCC.305
Initially, the government was of the opinion that the new Article should not
apply during the probationary period, because an employer, as transpired from 
legislative history, should be able to dismiss an employee without cause during 
this period.306 Therefore, the employer needed not provide the employee with a 
reason for dismissal during the probationary period. The VNO-NCW subscribed 
to this point of view. In its letter of 8 September 1997 to the government, 
however, the FNV, the largest employees’ association questioned whether this 
meant that an employer could also dismiss an employee for bad cause during the 
300  KB 30 januari 1954 (Stb. 1954, 26). See also Levenbach 1954, p. 4; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-
Verbond 1954, p. 7. 
301  Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 7. For a comparison between the Report and the Act 
of 17 December 1953, see Gerbrandy 1954; Levenbach 1954; Phaff 1986, p. 39-49. 
302  Ringeling 1953, p. 15-18; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 30 and 89; Van den Heuvel 2000a, p. 254; Kuip 
1993a, p. 169. 
303  VNO-NCW 1995, p. 12. See also below under § 28.2.3. 
304  This rule can already be found in Bill 21 479. See also TK 25 263, 1996-1997, No. 3, p. 27. 
305  Kuip en Scholtens 1999, p. 628. For an in-depth discussion of Art. 7:681 DCC, see below under § 17. 
306  TK 25 263, 1996-1997, No. 6, p. 42; TK 25 263, 1996-1997, No. 7, p. 1. 
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probationary period. With reference to Article 4 of ILO Convention 158, the 
FNV stressed that although the Netherlands had not (yet) ratified this 
Convention, it has an obligation to seriously examine to what extent it can meet 
the standards of this Convention, including the just cause rule. The Netherlands, 
it continued, in effect, already adopted a just cause standard according to Article 
4 of ILO Convention 158.307 Subsequently, Rosenmöller of Groen Links, a 
political party, filed an amendment, which held that Article 7:669 DCC also 
would apply to a dismissal during the probationary period, to be found necessary 
in light of, for example, discriminatory discharges.308 The amendment was 
adopted. The date of entry into force was set on 1 January 1999. Surprisingly, no 
one paid attention to the fact that ILO Convention 158 itself allows workers 
serving a probationary period to be excluded from its protection on the 
condition, that the probationary period is determined in advance, and of 
reasonable duration.309 In this respect, it bears mentioning that as from 1 January 
1999, a probationary period under Article 7:676 DCC is valid only when agreed 
upon in writing, and the probationary period is one month for employment 
agreements for a definite period, and two months for employment agreements 
for an indefinite period.310
 No one discussed the sanction on dismissal without good cause during 
the probationary period. As mentioned above, Article 7:669 DCC intended to 
make it easier for employees to initiate an action based on manifestly 
unreasonable dismissal under Article 7:681 DCC. However, Article 7:681 DCC 
does not apply to a dismissal during the probationary period.311 The question 
arises what cause of action an employee then has when he is dismissed without 
good cause during the probationary period. In my opinion, as I and two other 
authors already defended in 2003, based on legislative history and the following 
case law, an employee in these cases can rely on Article 7:611 DCC (1638z old), 
which determines that an employer must at all times behave as befits a good 
employer. In fact, in parliamentary discussions it has been stressed more than 
once that Article 7:611 DCC applies during the probationary period.312 Loonstra 
correctly states that nothing, in fact, justifies that an employer may behave as a 
bad employer during the probationary period.313 The Netherlands Supreme 
307  With regard to the contents of the letters of the FNV and VNO-NCW, see Kuip en Scholtens 1999,  
p. 109, 629-632. 
308  TK 25 263, 1997-1998, No. 11. See also Kuip en Scholtens 1999, p. 632. 
309  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 40. 
310  Art. 7:652 DCC determines that, as regards an employment agreement for a definite period, parties 
can agree upon a probationary period longer than one month through a collective bargaining 
agreement. 
311  See Art. 7:676 DCC. 
312  See also Van Arkel, Boontje en Loonstra 2003, p. 45. 
313  Loonstra 2004, p. 37. 
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Court seems of a same opinion.in Codfried/ISS (1995),314 and Triple P/Tap 
(2000).315
In Codfried/ISS (1995), an employer dismissed an employee during her 
probationary period after the employer had discovered that the central office in 
hiring the woman, who was 65 years old, had made a mistake. The policy of ISS 
was not to hire employees at or over the age of 65. In pursuance of this policy, 
ISS dismissed Codfried as from 22 July 1991, the date on which she was 
initially hired. Codfried claimed before the Netherlands Supreme Court that (i) 
the dismissal was discriminatory because of age; and (ii) the dismissal was in 
violation of the employer’s duty to behave as befits a good employer. The first 
ground caught most attention in Dutch literature, because at the time there was 
no prohibition on dismissal based on age under Dutch law.316 The second 
ground is more interesting for this thesis. In appeal, the court in this respect held 
that the employer had violated his duty to behave as befits a good employer, 
because the employer could have known that Codfried was 65 when it hired her. 
The Netherlands Supreme Court did not explicitly rejected the statement of the 
lower court that Article 7:611 DCC applied to a dismissal during the 
probationary period.317
 In Triple P/Tap (2000), the employee, Tap, who had been in service of 
Triple P for eight years decided to leave the company, but returned on the basis 
of an employment agreement of two years with a probationary period of two 
months. The reason to return to Triple P was that the employer had offered Tap 
a job in England, which was convenient to the employee who had his girl friend 
and his son living in England. Shortly before he would start to work, Triple P 
announced that the job in England was cancelled. As an alternative, the 
employer offered Tap a job in Belgium. Tap, however, rejected the job, hence, 
was dismissed during the probationary period. The lower court held that a 
dismissal during the probationary period can be unreasonable according to 
Article 7:611 DCC. Subsequently, it held that the employer had violated its duty 
to behave as a good employer based on the facts that (i) the employer should 
have given the employee some time to think over the job in Belgium; and (ii) the 
employer did not point out to Tap that he would be dismissed if he refused the 
job in Belgium, being aware that it was important for the employee to obtain the 
job in England. Also, in this case, the Netherlands Supreme Court did not 
explicitly rejected the statement of the lower court that Article 7:611 DCC, in 
effect, applied to dismissals without good cause during the probationary period. 
314  HR 13 januari 1995, NJ 1995, 430, JAR 1995/35 (Codfried/ISS). 
315  HR 10 november 2000, JAR 2000, 249 (Triple P/Tap).
316  On 1 May 2004, the Act on Equal Treatment Based on Age went into force (Stb. 2004, 30), i.e. an 
implementation took place of EC Directive 2000/78/EG (PbEG 2003, 29). See also above under
 § 14.4.5. 
317  For an in-depth discussion of HR 13 januari 1995, NJ 1995, 430, JAR 1995/35 (Codfried/ISS), see 
Loonstra 2002. 
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Overall, Codfried/ISS (1995) made clear that an employer is not allowed to 
dismiss an employee for bad cause during the probationary period. 
Subsequently, Triple P/Tap (2000), in effect, made clear that an employer must 
behave as befits a good employer during the probationary period. The latter can 
also be derived from the fact that Article 7:669 DCC applies during this 
period.318 This, in turn, raises the question, when an employer is not behaving as 
befits a good employer during the probationary period. The Advocate General 
(Advocaat-Generaal)319 in Codfried/ISS (1995) implies that this is the case when 
the reason for dismissal is not related to an objective examination of the 
capability and capacity of the employee. The Netherlands Supreme Court did 
not follow the Advocate General, in that it only held it as impossible to dismiss 
an employee for a bad cause during the probationary period.320 It did not hold 
that employees, in general, have a claim on the basis of Article 7:611 DCC when 
they are dismissed for a reason that is not related to an objective examination of 
the employee’s capability and capacity. In Triple P/Tap (2000) the Netherlands 
Supreme Court, nonetheless, seems to leave room to base a claim on Article 
7:611 DCC when the employee dismisses an employee for other than 
discriminatory reasons, including reasons, which are not related to an objective 
examination of the employee’s capability and capacity.  
Elaborating on the foregoing decisions, Loonstra argues that the law 
must be amended, in that an employer can only dismiss an employee during the 
probationary period when the reason for dismissal is related to an objective 
examination of the employee’s capability and capacity. Personally, I do not 
advocate restricting the use of the probationary period as Loonstra proposes, or 
to abolish the probationary period under the dismissal system as others 
advocate.321 From the discussion on Article 7:669 DCC it can be derived that the 
legislature explicitly refers to Article 4 of ILO Convention 158. This 
international just cause standard includes more than the employee’s 
(in)capability and (in)capacity.322 Moreover, when the employee is dismissed for 
other reasons than the foregoing, the above case law provides sufficient 
protection. Employees can either ask for damages under Article 7:611 DCC, or 
reinstatement, based on discriminatory discharge.323 Finally, an employer and
employee, in general, prefer to have a short period to examine whether they 
wish to continue their employment relationship before the strict rules on 
employment termination apply.   
318  For an in-depth discussion of HR 10 november 2000, JAR 2000/249 (Triple P/Tap), see Boontje 
2001. 
319  The Advocate General writes a legal opinion, in effect, advising the Netherlands Supreme Court. In 
general, the latter follows the Advocate General.  
320  See also Loonstra 2004, p. 36 and 37. 
321  See Christe 1979; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 130; Nelissen-Roy 1988. 
322  See below under § 22. 
323  For  a discussion on the (different) remedies, see Van Arkel, Boontje en Loonstra 2003. 
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16  The 1945 Special Decree on Labor Relations (BBA 1945): 
 just cause protection? 
If the BBA 1945 were to be abolished, it is important to know to what extent 
private-sector employees enjoy just cause protection under Book 7 Title 10 of 
the Dutch Civil Code. This will be examined in the paragraphs 17 and 18. If 
private-sector employees are lacking just cause protection under Book 7 Title 10 
of the Dutch Civil Code, this, in fact, may be an argument not to abolish the 
BBA 1945 (yet). Although Phaff in her 1986 dissertation – in which she paid 
little attention to the Directives, and studies on the subject – concludes that 
private-sector employees enjoy just cause protection under the BBA 1945, 
together with Article 1639s (7:681 DCC), it is justified to re-examine this 
question twenty years later.324
16.1  Scope of Article 6 of the BBA 1945 
Article 6.1 of the BBA 1945 determines that an employer needs prior 
authorization of the CWI to dismiss an employee against his will. Additionally, 
the Netherlands Supreme Court held that the employer could terminate the 
employment agreement only after having obtained permission hereto.325 If the 
employer terminates the employment agreement without prior authorization, this 
does not automatically render the termination void. According to Article 9, the 
employee must invoke the invalidity of the termination within six months. 
Consequently, if the employee does not timely invoke the invalidity, the 
termination is valid.326 In the past, there was still discussion whether an 
employee could ask for reinstatement, or could claim for damages only. The 
issue was resolved in 1942 when the Third Implementing Order made clear that 
termination of employment without prior authorization resulted in an invalid 
termination, hence, the employee could ask for reinstatement, as defended 
earlier by Levenbach in 1940.327
Prior authorization of the CWI is not required in case of a summary 
dismissal; during the probationary period; when parties mutually agreed upon 
324  Phaff 1986, Chapters 6 and 7, particularly p. 88 and 89. 
325  HR 19 november 1948, NJ 1949, 86 (De Kock/Van Heijst & Zonen). See Van der Grinten en 
Haakman 1954, p. 28 and 46; Naber 1981, p. 147-150. 
326  Kuip 1993a, p. 123 and 124, footnote 4, referring to J. Hijma, Nietigheden in het vermogensrecht, 
Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis 1992, p. 406 and 407. 
327  M.G. Levenbach, Enkele civielrechtelijke kwesties in verband met de ontslagverordening, RBA 
XXVI, no. 6, p. 41, 1 September 1940 in debate with H.W.L. Vrind, De ontslagverordening en de 
Wet op het arbeidscontract, RBA XXVI, no. 8, p. 59, 1 November 1940; W.J.M. Weersma, De 
ontslagverordening en de Wet op het arbeidscontract, RBA XXVI, no. 9, p. 65, 1 December 1940; 
W.C.L. van der Grinten, Nieuw Arbeidsrecht, NJB 1940, p. 643. See also M.G. Levenbach, Naschrift 
bij W.J.M. Weersma, De ontslagverordening en de Wet op het arbeidscontract, RBA XXVI, no. 9, p. 
65, 1 December 1940. See also Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 42 and 43; Phaff 1986, p. 31 and 32; 
Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 66.  
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termination of employment; the employment agreement has expired 
automatically; or, the employment agreement has been dissolved by court. 328
Article 6 of the BBA 1945 applies to employees according to Article 7:610 
DCC, and to employees who perform work for another person.329 On the other 
hand, exempted from its scope are (a) those who perform work for at least three 
persons; (b) those who are assisted by at least three persons; or (c) those who 
perform work, but the labor in question does not involve their core labor. In 
general, freelancers are exempted under Article 6 of the BBA 1945. A 
freelancer, nonetheless, may fall within the scope of the BBA 1945. A problem 
may rise when his relationship cannot be qualified as an employment agreement 
under Article 7:610 DCC. A good example is Sijthoff/Ouwerkerk (1996).330 In
this case, a publisher, Sijthoff, wished to terminate the working relationship with 
one of its freelance-journalists, Ouwerkerk. The latter was working for one of its 
magazines that were distributed in The Hague. The reason to terminate the 
contract was that Ouwerkerk had decided to move outside The Hague. 
Hereupon, Sijthoff decided to address the RDA who refused to give permission 
to terminate the contract solely on this ground. Subsequently, Sijthoff addressed 
the Cantonal Court to ask for dissolution of the contract. The latter, however, 
declared the request inadmissible, stating that the relationship could not be 
qualified as an employment agreement. Subsequently, the question with the 
Netherlands Supreme Court became whether the contract between Sijthoff and 
Ouwerkerk, nonetheless, could be dissolved by the Cantonal Court under Article 
1639w or, instead, based on the general contract principle of Article 6:258 DCC. 
Under this Article, a court can dissolve an agreement in case of unforeseen 
circumstances, with retrospective effect, if based on principles of fairness and 
reasonability one, in effect, can no longer ask the other to continue the contract.  
The Netherlands Supreme Court decided to choose for the latter. It held 
that Article 1639w applied to employment agreements only, hence, Article 
6:258 DCC applied to the contract. The Netherlands Supreme Court, however, 
must have realized that the application of this general contract principle to the 
contract between Sijthoff and Ouwerkerk would cause difficulties, in that 
Article 6:258 DCC according to case law can be applied in rare cases only. 
Subsequently, the Netherlands Supreme Court held that the contract between 
Sijthoff and Ouwerkerk under Article 6:258 DCC could be applied ‘with no 
more reservation than the Cantonal Court in applying Article 1639w’. In two 
aspects the general and special rule clash, however. First, Article 1639w is 
widely used. Article 6:258 DCC, on the other hand, can only be applied to rare 
cases. Hence, it is unclear whether a court, under Article 6:258 DCC, can 
dissolve the contract based on breach of trust. Second, Cantonal Courts cannot
dissolve an employment agreement under Article 1639w with retrospective 
328  See Art. 6.1 and 2 of the BBA 1945, respectively . See also Van Drongelen en Van Rijs 2003, p. 61-
67.
329  See Art. 1.b under 1 and 2 of the BBA 1945. 
330  HR 8 november 1996, NJ 1997, 217, JAR 1996/249 (Sijthoff/Ouwerkerk). 
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effect. In contrast, the court can dissolve a contract with retrospective effect 
under Article 6:258 DCC.331 Due to these problems, one argues that freelancers 
who, in effect, are economically and socially dependent, analogous to 
employees should enjoy the same treatment with regard to just cause 
protection.332 This case, too, shows that  – similar to conditions subsequent – the 
application of general contract principles in the employment agreement can lead 
to problems. 
Article 2 of the BBA 1945 excludes the following workers – either or not with 
an employment agreement – from its scope (i) public employees and others, 
working in service of a public agency; (ii) teachers in the broadest sense; (iii) 
priests, whether performing ecclesiastical services or, in effect, performing as 
welfare workers; and (iv) cleaning personnel in service of private persons, 
performing labor fewer than three days per week.333 In literature, one has serious 
doubts on the rationale behind the exemption of these workers. In brief, they 
argue that when there is a special dismissal regime that applies to these workers, 
the exemption is understandable. Article 2, however, also excludes those who 
are not subject to a special dismissal regime.334 Also, in Parliament one raises 
serious doubts to these exemptions under Article 2 of the BBA 1945. To the 
extent the legislature wishes to respect constitutional rights as the freedom of 
education (see under ii) or the freedom of religion (see under iii), they argue that 
these exempted workers also include sports teachers, driving instructors, and 
teachers of dancing and music, hence, one can doubt the rationale to exclude 
these workers based on the freedom of education and religion, respectively.335
 Last, managing directors (statutair directeuren) are exempted from the 
scope of the BBA 1945.336 They are subject to Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code, 
being appointed and dismissed by the general meeting of shareholders 
(algemene vergadering van aandeelhouders: besloten vennootschap) or the 
board of supervisory directors (raad van commissarissen: naamloze 
vennootschap). Those who work on the basis of an employment agreement, are 
subject to the rules of Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code.337 This often 
331  For an in-depth discussion of this case, see Boerlage en Allegro 1997; Jansen en Loonstra 1997; 
Vegter 1997; Loonstra en Zondag 2006, p. 293 and 294. 
332  Loonstra en Zondag 2006, p. 293.  
333  See also Koopmans 1962, p. 274-276; SER-Advies 1970/9, p. 22 and 23. 
334  HR 11 december 1998, NJ 1999, 494, JAR 1999/32 (Siegel/NOvA). See also HR 20 maart 1992, NJ 
1992, 725 (Driessen/KUN); HR 19 oktober 1979, NJ 1980, 57 (Beijer/Smit). 
335  TK 2005-2006, 29 738 and 30 370, No. 22. See also Loonstra en Zondag 2006, p. 294-296. 
336  Art. 6. 9 of the BBA 1945 allows the Minister to release certain employees from Art. 6.1 (preventive 
review). This took place with regard to managing directors (statutair directeuren) by Ministerial 
Decree of November 21, 1972 (Stcrt. 1972, 234). 
337  For the dual character of the relationship of managing directors as employees, see HR 13 november 
1992, NJ 1993, 265, JAR 1992/133 (Levison/MAB), HR 8 oktober 1993, NJ 1994, 211, JAR 
1993/244 (Mooij Verf), HR 15 april 2005, NJ 2005, 483, JAR 2005/153 (Bartelink/Ciris), HR 15 
april 2005, NJ 2005, 484, JAR 2005/117 (Unidek) and HR 3 februari 2006, JAR 2006/66 
(Seebregts/NH Corporate Training). For a discussion of the decisions of 15 April 2005, see 
Ruizeveld 2005; Verburg 2005b; De Bock 2006; Bennaars 2006. 
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leads to discussions among academics. In general, managing directors are 
considered as economically and socially independent, having sufficient 
bargaining power to determine their own terms. Hence, in literature one states 
that managing directors should be excluded from the rules under Book 7 Title 10 
of the Dutch Civil Code, which primarily see to dependent employees.338 Others 
plead for a special regime for managing directors under Book 7 Title 10 of the 
Dutch Civil Code.339 Already, a debate on this subject took place during the 
parliamentary discussions of the Bill on the Act of the Employment Agreement. 
In fact, Drucker in an 1894 publication – in the same year he produced his first 
draft underlying this Act340 – stated that managing directors could not be 
qualified as dependent workers.341 The reason to, nonetheless, apply the Act of 
the Employment Agreement of 1907 to managing directors as well, was that the 
Act wished to cover all workers in service of employers.342
16.2 The Directives, the Delegation Decree and the Dismissal Decree 
Article 6.1 of the BBA 1945 does not require a just cause for dismissal. 
However, under Article 6.3 – that determines that the Minister of Social Affairs 
can further the rules of the BBA 1945 – the Minister of Social Affairs issued the 
Dismissal Decree. The latter applies up to today.343 More specifically, Article 
3:1 of the Dismissal Decree determines that the CWI must decide whether a 
dismissal is justified.344 The Delegation Decree (Delegatiebesluit),345 the 
Directives (Richtlijnen),346 and so-called Circular Letters (Circulaires)347
338  Van der Heijden en Noordam 2001, p. 120-122; Loonstra en Zondag 2006, p. 297-299. See the 
suggestion of the Committee Tabaksblat in its draft on the Dutch Corporate Governance Code of 
December 2003, prescribing that managing directors are not allowed to agree upon an employment 
agreement, but on a contract for services (overeenkomst van opdracht) only. See also Boot 2005c,  
p. 87-91. 
339  Boot 2005c, p. 77-91 and p. 355-357.  
340  See above under § 15.3.1. 
341  Drucker 1894, p. 519 and 520.  
342  See also Loonstra 1990, p. 35 and 36. 
343 The Dismissal Decree of 7 December 1998 went into force on 1 January 1999, Stcrt. 1998, 238, 
amended by Stcrt. 2000, 137; Stcrt. 2000, 248;  Stcrt. 2001, 249;  Stcrt. 2002, 53; Stcrt. 2002,175; 
Stcrt. 2003, 5; Stcrt. 2003, 49; Stcrt. 2005, 242. 
344  In the past, the Directives, and Art. 8 of the Delegation Decree provided a similar rule. Van der 
Grinten en Haakman 1952, p. 41-43 (Directive 1948); Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, 
p. 78 and 79 (Directive 1954); Dienske 1965, p. 47-49 (Directive 1964); Van der Heijden 1984, p. 60 
and 61 (Directive 1974). See also Van den Boom 1992, p. 195; Kuip 1993a, p. 281; Van der Sluis 
1997; Beltzer, Knegt en Van Rijs 1998, p. 11. 
345  Delegatiebesluit van 20 december 1990, Stcrt. 1990, 252 amended in 1993, Stcrt. 1993, 11. 
346  Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 63; A.M. Luttmer-Kat, Losbladige 
Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, BBA 1945, Art. 6 BW (DCC) § 12. 
347  Ringeling 1953, p. 34, footnote 34, referring to ‘(a) Circulaire R.A.B. No 921 Afd. I en N betreffende 
het aangaan en het beëindigen der arbeidsverhouding (BBA.’45) d.d. 21 januari 196 and (b) 
Circulaire R.A.B.  Afd. BA No 11966 betreffende toepassing van de artikelen 1 tot en met 6, 21 en 
26 van het Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen 1945 d.d. 1 december 1948’. 
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preceded the Dismissal Decree. Contrary to the Delegation Decree348 and the 
Directives,349 the Circular Letters were issued by the German enemy – i.e. the 
Director-General of the Employment Office – to control the Dutch labour 
market. Hence, in light of just cause protection, the focus in this thesis will be on 
the Directives, the Delegation Decree and particularly the Dismissal Decree. 
 The Directives applied until 1 January 1991. The reason to replace the 
Directives by the Delegation Decree is that under Article 6 old of the BBA 
1945, the Directors of the District Employment Offices were allowed to grant 
permits as they pleased, in that the Directives were meant as instructions only.350
Being in service of the government, however, most Directors considered the 
rules of the Directives as mandatory. In literature, this hybrid situation was often 
criticized.351 Consequently, as from 1 January 1991, the Minister of Social 
Affairs has been authorized to grant permission and to delegate his authority to 
the Regional Directors of Labor Services.352 Subsequently, under the Delegation 
Decree – which replaced the non-binding Directives – the Minister authorized 
the Regional Directors to grant permits. The Delegation Decree was binding.353
On 7 December 1998, the Delegation Decree was replaced by the Dismissal 
Decree, to which the Regional Directors of Labor Services were bound, like 
with the Delegation Decree.354 Subsequently, the Regional Directors’ authority 
as from 1 January 1999 derives directly from the BBA 1945.355 As today, the 
CWI – to whom the authority to grant permits has been transferred to as from 1 
January 2002 – must apply the Dismissal Decree.356 Additionally, as from 1 
October 2005 the regional offices of the CWI must apply the CWI Handbook on 
Dismissal to establish that they uniformly apply the provisions of the Dismissal 
Decree.357
348  The Minister of Social Affairs issued the Delegation Decree. Stb. 1990, 403. 
349  The Director-General of Labor Services (Arbeidsvoorziening), later the Minister of Social Affairs,  
        issued the Directives. See Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 63; A.M. Luttmer-Kat,  
        Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, BBA 1945, Art. 6  BW (DCC) § 12. 
350  For example, see the Directives of 1954, which explicitly determined that the Directors could deviate 
from these Directives. See Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 63 and 64;  A.M. Luttmer-
Kat, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, BBA 1945, Art. 6 BW (DCC) , 12. 
351  Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 63; Overkleeft-Verburg en Roijakkers 1976, p. 11; 
Van der Heijden 1984, p. 64; A.M. Luttmer-Kat, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, 
Deventer, BBA 1945, Art. 6 BW (DCC) §  12; Kuip 1993a, p. 123 and 128, footnote 28, referring to 
M.G. Levenbach, Delegatie bij de toepassing van het B.B.A., Sociaal Maandblad 1951, p. 284; Van 
Drongelen en Van Rijs 2003, p. 19. 
352  Artikel 14 Invoeringswet Arbeidvoorzieningswet, Stb. 1990, 403. 
353  Van Drongelen en Van Rijs 2003, p. 20. 
354  See Art. 8:1 of the Dismissal Decree.  
355  A.M. Luttmer-Kat, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, BBA 1945, Art. 6 BW 
(DCC) § 12. 
356  The authority to grant permits has been transferred to the CWI as from 1 January 2002,  pursuant to 
the Act on the Implementation Structure for Work and Income (Wet Structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie 
werk en inkomen or SUWI). Stb. 2001, 642. See also Van Drongelen en Van Rijs 2003, p. 20 and 21. 
357  For the underlying decree, and in the enclosure the CWI Handbook on Dismissal, see Stcrt. 
2005/195, p. 11 amended by Stcrt. 2006/122, p. 19. 
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16.3   A justified dismissal  
The Articles 3 to 5 of the Dismissal Decree determine whether there is a just 
cause for dismissal. Article 6 determines when there is bad cause. Under the 
latter, the CWI does not give permission to dismiss former358 members of a 
Works Council, based on this ground only. In this respect, the employer must 
convince the CWI that the wish to terminate the employment agreement is not 
related to the employee’s membership. In examining just cause protection the 
focus will be on the Articles 3 to 5 only.  
 Article 3:1 of the Dismissal Decree, which requires that the CWI must 
decide whether a dismissal is justified (redelijk), applies to all reasons of 
dismissal. In determining whether a dismissal is justified, Article 3:1 determines 
that the CWI must balance the interests of the employer and the employee, and 
other public interests deriving from the Dismissal Decree. Regarding collective
dismissals, the public interest is to prevent mass layoffs. Regarding individual
dismissals the public interest is to prevent rash dismissals to protect employees 
against loss of income, and in particular to protect the weak, and to restrict the 
number of invalidity and unemployment benefit claimants.359 In brief, the 
Articles 4 and 5 of the Dismissal Decree provide detailed rules on specific 
reasons of dismissal. Article 4 refers to dismissals based on economic 
circumstances (bedrijfseconomische omstandigheden). Article 5 refers to 
dismissals based on unsatisfactory performance (disfunctioneren) and breach of 
trust (verstoorde arbeidsverhouding).
16.4 Economic circumstances 
The Articles 4:1 to 4:5 of the Dismissal Decree provide rules for dismissals 
based on economic circumstances. 
16.4.1 A marginal test 
Article 4:1 determines that the CWI shall grant a permit when the position of 
one or more employees within the company becomes redundant due to 
economic circumstances. The CWI Handbook on Dismissal distinguishes 
between
x financial problems;  
x reduction of work and/or turnover;  
x technological changes;  
358  The term ‘former’ applies to employees, who were members of a works council not longer than two 
years ago. 
359  See also Van Minnen 2003, p. 380. 
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x reorganization (i) in light of the employer’s bad financial position; 
or (ii) in light of a new strategy to prevent a bad financial position 
in the (near) future;  
x closure of the company; or  
x relocation of the company.  
Subsequently, to obtain a permit, the employer must substantiate, respectively 
x financial need through (financial) data;360
x whether the reduction of work and/or turnover is permanent or 
temporarily only, through (financial) data over the previous two 
years, and expectations for the future six months;361
x the essence of the technological changes;362
x (i) financial need through (financial) data; and (ii) the essence of 
the new strategy and its underlying reasons;363
x the – underlying – reasons of the closure;364
x the – underlying – reasons of the relocation.365
From the CWI Handbook on Dismissal it can be derived that the CWI applies a 
marginal test with regard to the choice of operational requirements only. In this 
respect, the CWI examines whether the employer’s choice is fair and reasonable. 
The rationale behind this is that the CWI does not wish to tread on the 
employer’s freedom of business policy. Contrary to Zondag, who advocates that 
the CWI – to prevent rash dismissals – interferes with the employer’s policy.366
Hence, the CWI rejects a conclusive test (volle toets). In this respect, it argues 
that under the marginal test, the employer must still substantiate the existence of 
the alleged reason.367 Subsequently, the CWI examines whether the reason is 
false, i.e. non-existent, in which case it rejects the request. It is not treading on 
the employer’s freedom of policy in this respect either.This is according to the 
legislative history of just cause protection.368 A simple statement that due to 
economic circumstances prior authorization of the CWI is required, thus, does 
not suffice.369 The employer must substantiate that the alleged reason for 
dismissal exists, and must lead to the dismissal of the employee in question.  
360  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 9-3. 
361  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 9-4. 
362  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 9-4. 
363  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 9-4. 
364  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 9-4 and 9.5. 
365  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 9-6. 
366  CWI Handbook on Dismissal  (2006), p. 9-7, referring to Zondag  2004b, p. 113.
367  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 9-2 and 9-3. See also Kouwenhoven 2005, p. 19. 
368  See above under § 15.1.1 and below under § 17.2. 
369 See also Van Minnen 2003, p. 381. 
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 The BBA 1945 does not only apply to individual dismissals. Article 4:1 
authorizes the CWI in dismissals based on economic circumstances, involving 
one or more employees. It must, too, respect the rules of the Collective 
Redundancy Notification Act of 1976 (Wet Melding Collectief Ontslag or 
WMCO) if a collective dismissal exceeds twenty employees in its district. In 
brief, employers must notify the CWI of this intent. Subsequently, an employer 
is obliged to deliberate with unions on alternatives or solutions during one 
month in order to reach consensus on the necessity to lay off employees, and on 
the size of severance payments in a Redundancy Plan (Sociaal Plan). This 
period is lengthened so long as the employer in question has not met this 
obligation. After this period the CWI can handle the requests.370
As from 1 March 2006, when it involves a collective dismissal under the 
WMCO, and an employer meets the following requirements under the new 
Article 4:1 of the Dismissal Decree, the CWI does not have to examine (i) 
whether economic circumstances exist; (ii) the number of positions which have 
become redundant due to these circumstances,. The new requirements under 
Article 4:1 of the Dismissal Decree are that  
x the employer notified the CWI of the collective dismissal; and  
x the unions affirm the existence of economic circumstances and 
number of positions which have become redundant due to these 
circumstances.  
The CWI believes this examination to be superfluous when the employer 
already convinced the unions.371 In my opinion, the interests of employees are 
best served when an independent authority examines these issues. On the other 
hand, the employer must still substantiate that the economic circumstances must 
lead to the dismissal of the employee in question.372 In determining the latter, 
the CWI examines whether the employer correctly applied the principle of 
reflection, and seriously examined all options to replace the employee in another 
position, as will be described below. 
16.4.2  Principles of reflection and seniority  
As from 1 March 2006, the new Article 4:2.1 of the Dismissal Decree 
determines that the employer must apply the principle of reflection in collective 
dismissals, regardless of the number of employees involved.373 Prior to 1 March 
2006, the CWI still had to apply the principle of seniority, the so-called  ‘last in, 
370  For an in-depth discussion on the procedure under the WMCO, see Heinsius 2004, p. 170-192; 
Heinsius 2005, p. 75-86; CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 25-1 to 25-12. 
371  Stcrt. 2003, 13 december 2005, 242, p. 24 and 25. See also TK 2005-2006, 30 370, No. 3, p. 4. 
372  Stcrt. 2003, 13 december 2005, 242, p. 24 and 25.  
373  Stcrt. 2005, 242, p. 24. For the application of the ‘new’ principle of reflection, see Kouwenhoven 
2006. 
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first out’ (lifo) rule. To understand why the government decided to replace the 
rule of seniority by the principle of reflection, I will describe the ‘old’ situation 
first.374   
 Under the principle of seniority, the employer had to dismiss the last 
employee he hired for interchangeable positions (uitwisselbare functies) per 
establishment (bedrijfsvestiging). Interchangeable positions – which must be 
distinguished from interchangeable persons375 – refer to positions equal in 
nature, contents, job rating, reward and working conditions.376 The term 
establishment refers to an organizational bond acting as an independent unity 
within the society.377 A problem was that the principle of seniority particularly 
protected elderly employees because these, in general, were longer in service.378
The Dismissal Decree already contained the principle of reflection. Under this 
principle, an employer was allowed to, in effect, apply the principle of seniority 
to categories within the company based on age (15-25; 25-35; 35-45; 45-55; 55 
and older). Until 1 March 2006, the principle of reflection only applied to 
collective dismissals involving ten or more employees within a district of the 
CWI. Employers who dismissed fewer than ten employees were bound by the 
principle of seniority.379
Critics stated that the principle of seniority as the main rule was 
outdated.380 Zondag pointed at surrounding European countries with protective 
dismissal systems that did not apply this rule in the strict manner as the CWI.381
Hansma added that the principle of seniority virtually makes it impossible for 
employers to choose the right person in the right place, hence, selection based 
on quality is a better alternative to meet an employer’s financial need.382
Dijkstra, finally, stressed that it seems unfair to prefer an employee based on the 
principle of seniority who has not performed well to one who performs 
satisfactorily, only because of the years of service.383 Another argument has 
been that the principle of seniority did not meet the requirement of flexibility in 
374  For an in-depth discussion on the (replacement of the) principle of seniority, see Dijkstra 2005; 
Zondag 2005b. 
375  See also Van Minnen 2003, p. 383-385; Kouwenhoven 2005, p. 23 and 24. 
376  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 13-1 to 13-8. Van Minnen pleads that interchangeable 
positions must also be equal in education, taking into consideration the role of the new position 
within the company after the reorganization. Van Minnen 2003, p. 384. 
377  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 12-1 to 12-6. 
378  STAR-Advies 04/13, par. 3. 
379  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 12-1 and p. 15-1. 
380  Hansma 2004. See also Zondag 2005b, p. 465 and 466. 
381  Zondag 2005b, p. 467 and 468. 
382  In the ABN-collective bargaining agreement of 26 Februari 2004, a selection took place on the basis 
of quality as regards changes of position, and on the basis of age and quality when it involved equal 
positions. See Hansma 2004, p. 1484. For advocates of this ‘new’ criterium of selection based on 
quality in the Dismissal Decree, see Loonstra en Kruit 2006, p. 22; Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 63 
and 68. 
383  Dijkstra 2005, p. 15. 
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smaller companies. Last, an argument has been that the principle of seniority, in 
effect, discriminates against younger people.  
The absence of flexibility for smaller companies induced a few members of the 
Lower House to file a motion, in which they asked the Minister of Social Affairs 
to reconsider the principle of seniority as a starting point in collective 
dismissals. The Lower House passed this motion on 18 December 2003.384 The 
Minister of Social Affairs suggested that the principle of reflection would 
become the starting point in collective dismissals, regardless of the number of 
employees involved. Subsequently, the Minister asked the Labour Foundation 
for advice.385 The latter was divided. The majority advised that the principle of 
reflection be applied to collective dismissals with fewer than ten employees. In 
collective dismissals with ten or more employees, employers would have a 
choice. The employers’ representatives within the Labour Foundation preferred 
that employers would have a choice between the principle of seniority and the 
principle of reflection in collective dismissals, regardless of the number of 
employees involved. Hence, they opposed the principle of reflection being a 
starting point in collective dismissals, as the government suggested.386 In Bill 30 
370 the government, nonetheless, held that the principle of reflection would 
become the starting point in collective dismissals, regardless of the employees 
involved.387
As from 1 March 2006, Article  4:2.1 of the Dismissal Decree holds this 
new rule.388 In addition, the employer needs to apply the principle of seniority to 
categories based on age within interchangeable positions. Prior to 1 March 
2006, the employer needed to apply the principle of seniority to categories based 
on age within the establishment. According to the government, the old rule was 
inefficient and the new rule is easier to apply and to control.389 The application 
of exceptions to the principles of reflection and seniority remained unchanged. 
Under these exceptions, the principle of reflection does not apply when  
x the employer substantiates that an employee with specific, i.e. 
unique qualities must be exempted, because his or her absence will 
severely frustrate the operation of the company (Article 4:2.5 of the 
Dismissal Decree; as from 1 March 2006 Article 4:2.4);390 or 
384  Motie-Verburg, Weekers, Bakker en Noorman-den Uyl, TK 2003-2004, 29 200 XV, No. 48. See also 
Hoorn, Schabos en Van Hoeckel 2005; Zondag 2005b, p. 469. 
385  For the Letter and Memorandum of the Minister of Social Affairs to the Labour Foundation, see 
STAR-Advies 2004/13: enclosure 1. 
386  STAR-Advies 2004/13. See also Veldman 2005, p. 47; Zondag 2005b, p. 469 and 470. For an in-
depth discussion on the principle of seniority, see Dijkstra 2005; Hoorn, Schabos en Van Hoeckel 
2005; Zondag 2005b. 
387  TK 2005-2006, 30 370, No. 3, p. 4. 
388  Stcrt. 2005, 242, p. 24. 
389  Stcrt. 2005, 242, p. 24. 
390  See also the CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 19-1 to 19-8; Kouwenhoven 2005, p. 25 and 26. 
See also Stcrt. 2006, 59, p. 23. 
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x an employee compared to the employee next in line needs to be 
exempted, due to poor chances on the labour market (Article 4:2.6 
of the Dismissal Decree; as from 1 March 2006 Article 4:2.5).391
Also, flexible rules (still) apply to cleaning agencies (schoonmaakbedrijven) and 
temporary agencies (uitzendbureaus).392 Important to stress is that as regards 
temporary agencies, the Court of Appeal of The Hague in its decision of 29 
November 2002, KG 2002/966 (CMG) held that these flexible rules applied to 
other agencies with a three-party construction as well. The Minister of Social 
Affairs held otherwise, and amended the Dismissal Decree – which amendment 
still stands – determining that these rules apply to temporary agencies only, in 
effect, overruling the decision of the Court of Appeal. For agencies with a three-
party construction other than temporary agencies, the Minister provided a so-
called hardship clause in Article 4:2.4 of the Dismissal Decree (as from 1 March 
2006, Article 4:2.3).393 Based on this Article, the principle of reflection does not
apply to employees who work under the supervision of a third party, and 
replacement reasonably cannot be effectuated.394
16.4.3 Requirement of replacement 
Under the CWI Handbook on Dismissal, the CWI must examine whether the 
employer has considered all possible options to replace the employee in another 
position, before he determines that the position of the employee in question has 
become redundant due to economic circumstances. In this respect, the CWI 
examines whether the employer has behaved as befits a good employer by 
resorting to a dismissal as an ultimum remedium.395 In effect, the requirement of 
replacement derives from Article 4:1 of the Dismissal Decree. Under this 
Article, the CWI must examine the necessity of the dismissal of the employee in 
question.
391  See also the CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 20-1 to 20-4; Kouwenhoven 2005, p. 26. See 
also Ktg. Maastricht 28 september 2004, RAR 2005/10, which dissolved the employment agreement 
after the CWI had refused the permit on the basis of Art. 4:2.5 of the Dismissal Decree and a 
reorganization was needed and it was impossible to replace the disabled employee in the same, 
adjusted or another position in the new structure. See also Stcrt. 2006, 59, p. 23. 
392  For cleaning agencies, see the Dismissal Decree: enclosure A. For temporary agencies, see the 
Dismissal Decree: enclosure B. See also CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 17-1 to 17-14 
(temporary agencies). As from 1 March 2006, the principle of reflection in these cases is the starting 
point as well. See Stcrt. 2005, 242, p. 24. 
393 See also Stcrt. 2006, 59, p. 23. 
394  See the Letter of the Minister to the Chairman of the Lower House of 10 March 2003, 
AV/IR/2003/20105, and the Advisory Letter of the Labour Foundation of 4 March 2003 
(Ontslagregels in uitzendrelaties), advising to amend the Dismissal Decree. The Dismissal Decree 
was amended as from 13 March 2003 ((Stcrt. 2003/49), explicitly reversing KG 2002/966. See also 
Berenschot 2003; Kouwenhoven 2005, p. 25. 
395  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 9-1 to 9.6. 
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In general, if the employer fails to substantiate (i) the existence of 
economic circumstances;396 (ii) the need to dismiss the employee in question; 
and/or (iii) the impossibility to replace the employee, the CWI rejects the 
request. Furthermore, it rejects a request based on economic circumstances when 
the position of the employee can be filled on short notice again.397 In general, 
the CWI is of the opinion that the responsibility of the employer to replace an 
employee increases with the years of service.398 Hence, the CWI considers 
seniority as a criterium to weigh the responsibility of the employer to replace the 
employee.399 Additionally, when it involves a so-called REA-employee – for 
whom the employer obtains subsidy based on the Act Reintegration of Disabled 
Employees (Wet op de Reintegratie Arbeidsgehandicapten or REA)400 – the CWI 
must ask the UWV for advice regarding the (im)possibilities to replace this 
employee.401
16.4.4 Conditional permit402
Under article 4:5 of the Dismissal Decree,403 the CWI may grant a so-called 
conditional permit (voorwaardelijke vergunning) if it assumes that the employer 
can still replace the employee.404 In this case, the CWI grants a permit on the 
condition that the employer within 26 weeks – after the CWI has granted the 
permit – does not hire another employee for the performance of duties of the 
same nature of the employee in question, without first having approached the 
former employee about whether he wishes to be rehired. If the CWI erroneously
grants a conditional permit on the condition that the employer does not hire 
another employee within 26 weeks after the employer has terminated the 
employment agreement, this invalid condition converts into a valid condition, 
i.e. prohibits the employer to hire another employee within 26 weeks after the 
396  Besides the exception of the new Art. 4:1 of the Dismissal Decree. See above under § 16.4.1. 
397  CWI Handbook on Dismissal  (2006), p. 21-1 to 21-10. 
398  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 21-1 to 21-10. 
399  Zondag 2005b, p. 466. 
400  For a brief discussion on the REA, see Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 441 and 442.  
401  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 27-5. 
402  A conditional permit must be distinguished from a permit ‘to the extent required by law’ (vergunning 
voor zover rechtens vereist) which can be asked for at the request of the employer or granted by the 
CWI on its own initiative (ambtshalve) when it is doubtful whether the BBA 1945 applies, e.g. the 
employer other than the employee is of the opinion that the employment agreement has been 
terminated by mutual consent. See CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 1-1. On the other hand, 
alterratively, the employer can choose to file a so-called conditional request (voorwaardelijk 
ontbindingsverzoek) instead under Art. 7:685 DCC based upon which the employer asks the Cantonal 
Court to conditionally dissolve the employment agreement. For the latter, see below under  § 18.4.2. 
403  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 23-5 and 23-6. 
404  For an in-depth discussion of the conditional permit, see CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 23-
1 to 23-8. Stcrt. 2006, 59, p. 23. See also Zwemmer 2006. 
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CWI has granted the permit.405 The reference to the duties of the same nature is 
to prevent the employer from renaming the position or changing it to avoid 
Article 4:5 of the Dismissal Decree.406 When an employer hires a new employee 
– including part-time or temporary workers – within 26 weeks for duties of the 
same nature, the condition is fulfilled, hence, the termination of the employment 
agreement of the employee in question is invalid.407 This means that the 
employee is still in the employer’s service. The employee cannot claim that he 
must be rehired based on the old terms.408 The Netherlands Supreme Court 
further held that when the CWI erroneously forgets to include the 26-weeks-
condition, this still can be done afterwards, on the condition that the employer 
has not yet notified the employee of termination of employment in furtherance 
of the permit.409
Article 2:7.2 of the Dismissal Decree explicitly determines that any 
other condition than the foregoing is invalid.410 So-called premises (premisse),
however, are still allowed. As from 1 October 2006 this is no longer allowed in 
case of long-term illness, however. Previously, employers asked for permission 
to partially terminate the employment agreement. The CWI tended to grant 
these requests on the premise that the employer offered a new part-time 
employment agreement to the employee to the extent the employee could still 
perform his duties (deeltijdontslag).411 On the other hand, the possibility existed 
that the employer could still replace the employee in another – adjusted – 
position for the other part under Article 5:2.1.b of the Dismissal Decree.412
Hence, as from 1 October 2006 this practice is no longer allowed.413 Still, this 
amendment leaves intact the possibility for an employer to ask for termination of 
employment on the premise that the employer offers the employee(s) in question 
a severance payment.414
16.5 Unsatisfactory performance 
The employer may also bring forward unsatisfactory performance as a reason 
for dismissal.415 The Dismissal Decree distinguishes between behavior for which 
405  HR 16 november 2001, NJ 2002, 44, JAR 2001/258 (Holtrop/Smith). CWI Handbook on Dismissal, 
p. 22-1 and 22.6. For an in-depth discussion of the decision of the Netherlands Supreme Court, see 
Van Minnen en Zondag 2002. 
406  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 23-4. 
407  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 23-2 and 23-7. For example, see Ktg. Emmen 23 oktober 
1996, JAR 1996/226; Ktg. Deventer 19 oktober 2004, JAR 2005/1. 
408  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 23-5.  
409  HR 14 maart 2003, JAR 2003/90 (Lypack). See also CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 22-4. 
410  See also CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 23-2 and 23-3, referring to W.A. Zondag ArA 
2002/3 (should be ArA 2003/3: VA.  See Zondag, 2003a, p. 95. 
411  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 22-1 to  22-6. 
412 For this provision, see below under § 16.7. 
413 Stcrt. 2006/169, p. 31.  
414  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 22-3 referring to Zondag 2003a, p. 94 and 95. 
415  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 9-1and 24-3. 
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the employee is not to blame, i.e. incapacity (onkunde) and behavior of which 
the employee is to blame, i.e. misconduct (onwil). In practice, incapacity and 
misconduct can overlap.416
Under Article 5:1.1 of the Dismissal Decree, the CWI gives permission to 
dismiss an employee in case of incapacity when the employer is able to 
substantiate 
(1) the employee’s incapacity;  
(2) the employees’ incapacity is not due to a disease or handicap;  
(3) the employer has made serious attempts to improve the employee’s 
incapacity; and  
(4) the employee’s incapacity is not due to a violation of the 
employer’s duty of care.417
If the CWI is of the opinion that incapacity is related to the employee’s illness or 
handicap, it will apply Article 5:2 of the Dismissal Decree that sees to ill
employees.418 This Article will be discussed more in-depth below in paragraph 
16.7. When the dismissal concerns a so-called REA-employee, the CWI must 
ask the CWI for advice to prevent that the incapacity is related to the employee’s 
illness.419
In case of misconduct, the CWI gives permission to dismiss an employee when 
the employer is able to substantiate 
(1) the employee’s misconduct;420
(2) that one reasonably cannot demand of the employer to continue the 
employment relationship, due to this misconduct;421 and 
(3) the employer seriously examined ways to improve the employee’s 
behavior, either or not through job training and/or occupational 
retraining (omscholing).422
In determining whether incapacity and/or misconduct exist, the CWI, too, takes 
case law of civil courts into consideration. In this respect, it examines whether 
performance interviews have taken place; whether the targets, which the 
employee have to meet are reasonable; whether the employer is able to 
416  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 30-2. See also Verhulp en Zondag 2003, p. 2. 
417 See also Nationale Ombudsman, 18 april 2006, JAR 2006/140. 
418  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 30-5. 
419  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 27-5 and 27-6. For the term REA-employee, see above under 
§ 16.4.3. 
420  See Art. 5:1.4 of the Dismissal Decree. 
421  See Art. 5:1.4 of the Dismissal Decree. See also CWI Handbook on Dismissal, p. 30-2. 
422  See Art. 5:1.1 under c of the Dismissal Decree. See also CWI Handbook on Dismissal, p. 30-7 and 
30-8.
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substantiate unsatisfactory performance, based on objective criteria; whether the 
employer has allowed the employee to react; whether the employer has allowed 
the employee to improve his conduct; whether the employee has made efforts to 
improve himself or has neglected reasonable instructions in this respect; and, 
whether the employer has taken into consideration the employees’ years of 
service, and his chances on the labour market.423
16.6 Breach of trust 
Article 5:1.5 of the Dismissal Decree applies to breach of trust. Under this 
Article, the CWI gives permission to dismiss an employee when the employer is 
able to substantiate why  
(1) the employment relationship cannot be continued; and  
(2) restoration of the relationship is not possible.424
The 2005 version of the Handbook on Dismissal did not yet provide detailed 
rules on a breach of trust. These rules were provided by the CWI in July 2006. 
Under these rules, permission will be granted when the employment relationship 
is severely and irreparably disrupted, making a replacement, in effect, 
impossible.425 In determining the latter, the CWI takes into consideration the 
employee’s age, years of service, his labour market position, the size of the 
company, and whether the employer considered mediation.426
The CWI Handbook on Dismissal determines that if the employer brings 
forward a conflict or romance between employees, this in principle does not 
justify a dismissal under Article 5:1.5, in that a conflict or romance between 
employees does not necessarily have to result in a conflict between the employer 
and the employee(s) in question. This applies all the more so, if the duties of 
these employees do not overlap.427 On the other hand, when these situations 
result in a conflict between the employer and the(se) employee(s), severely 
frustrating the operation of the company, making a replacement, in effect, 
impossible, a permit shall be granted under Article 3:1, thus, not under Article 
5:1.5 of the Dismissal Decree.428 This makes sense. When a conflict severely 
frustrates the operation of a company, the conflict, in effect, forces the employer 
to reorganize his operations. These ‘economic circumstances’, in itself, justify 
termination of employment.  
423  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 30-2 to 30-9. 
424  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 29-4. See also Van Drongelen en Van Rijs 2003, p. 145-151. 
425  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 33-6 and 33-8. 
426  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 33-2. See also p. 33-8 and p. 33.9. 
427  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 33-5 and 33-6. 
428  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 33-5. 
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The CWI Handbook on Dismissal further determines that if an 
employee states that the employment relationship is disrupted, this does not 
relieve the CWI from its duty to examine whether there is breach of trust. In this 
respect, the employer must substantiate that he behaved as befits a good 
employer by resorting to a dismissal as an ultimum remedium, hence, has 
seriously sought for possibilities to replace the employee.429 The fact that the 
employer has offered an alternative position is not sufficient. It is one of the 
circumstances only, in determining whether a permit will be granted.430
From the CWI Handbook on Dismissal derives that the CWI does not consider 
whether the employer or the employee is to blame for the breach of trust. This 
can be explained by the fact that the CWI cannot grant a severance payment by 
which it can take into account the degree for which one of the parties is to 
blame. However, suppose a just cause for dismissal is lacking, which may be the 
case when a non-existent reason underlies the breach of trust. From the CWI 
Handbook on Dismissal derives that based on Article 3:1 of the Dismissal 
Decree the CWI can give permission to dismiss an employee, based on  severe 
and irreparable breach of trust, frustrating the firm’s operations, in effect, 
making replacement impossible. Hence, it is irrelevant whether the employee is 
(not) to blame for the breach of trust. It, nonetheless, will strike most as unfair 
when the employee is not to blame. Hence, to the extent the employee is not to 
blame, the CWI Handbook on Dismissal explicitly allows the CWI to note down  
this in its decision to give employees a hand-out to claim damages based on 
manifestly unreasonable dismissal under Article 7:681 DCC.431
Herewith the answer is given to the question of the International Labour 
Office of the ILO to clarify the possibility for the CWI to allow dismissals based 
on breach of trust for which the employee is not to blame.432
16.7 Other reasons for dismissal 
Severe conscientious grounds 
Article 5:1.3 of the Dismissal Decree provides rules for employees who refuse 
to perform their duties, due to severe conscientious grounds (ernstige 
gewetensbezwaren). In these cases, the CWI grants a permit only when an 
employer substantiates that he is unable to replace the employee in question in 
another position.
429  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 33-8. See also above under § 16.4.3. 
430  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 33-8 and 33-9. 
431  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 33-9. 
432  ADO-Rapport 2000, p. 6. 
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Illness 
Article 5:2 of the Dismissal Decree aims to protect ill employees. In this respect, 
one may argue that the CWI discriminates under the Act on Equal Treatment 
Based on a Handicap or Chronic Illness (Wet gelijke behandeling op grond van 
handicap of chronische ziekte).433 Although the Act applies to the CWI,434
legislative history shows that the Act does not apply to protective rules for ill 
employees.435 Article 5:2 of the Dismissal Decree, thus, is exempted from the 
scope of the Act.436 Employees, however, can undertake action against the 
employer under the Act, when they are of the opinion that the employer is 
directly or indirectly discriminating against them due to their handicap or 
chronic illness by terminating them,437 on the condition that an employee timely, 
i.e. within two months after the termination invokes its invalidity.438
(i) During the two years of illness 
Article 5:2 of the Dismissal Decree applies to employees who are ill for more 
than two years.439 Employers, nonetheless, may file requests during the two 
years of illness. In handling these cases, the CWI will point at the prohibition on 
dismissal. It does not interfere, however. Hence, if there is just cause it will 
grant a permit. The result remains the same, in that the employer is not able to 
use the permit during the two years of illness, due to the prohibition on 
dismissal.440  An employer, on the other hand, may argue that the prohibition on 
dismissal does not apply – referring to the Articles 7:658a DCC and 7:660a 
DCC, which apply as from 1 April 2002 – stating that the employer made 
serious efforts to reintegrate the employee, but that the employee refused to 
cooperate.441 In these cases, the CWI will ask the UWV for advice regarding the 
(im)possibilities for parties to perform.442
 More specifically, Article 7:658a DCC requires of the employer to have 
examined whether an ill employee is able to perform (i) his duties in an adjusted 
position; (ii) suitable duties in another position, taking into consideration the 
433  For the Act, see above under § 14.4.5. 
434  See Art. 4 of the Act on Equal Treatment Based on a Handicap or Chronic Illness. See also TK 2001-
2002, 28 169, No. 3, p. 33 and 34. 
435  See Art. 3.1.b of the Act on Equal Treatment Based on a Handicap or Chronic Illness. 
436  TK 2001-2002, 28 169, No. 3, p. 31 and 32. See De Keizer 2004, p. 125. 
437  The Act does not apply to short-term illness. See HvJ EG 11 juli 2006, C-13/05, JAR 2006/191 
(Navas).  For an in-depth discussion of this case, see Waddington en Gijzen 2006. 
438  Diebels 2005, p. 177. 
439  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 29-4. 
440  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 1-6. 
441  See HR 29 april 2005, JAR 2005/136 (Wanders/Scholten). For a discussion of this case, see Bijkerk-
Verbruggen 2005, p. 87. For an in-depth discussion on the extent employers comply with Article 
7:660a DCC, see Willems 2006. 
442  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006),  p. 27-2. 
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employee’s abilities and capacities (krachten en bekwaamheden);443 (iii) duties 
on a lower level; or (iv) duties with another employer.444 The employer must 
seriously examine whether these possibilities exist.445 The employee, on the 
other hand, under Article 7:660a DCC must cooperate, and must make a specific 
offer with regard to suitable duties in another position.446 When the employee 
fails to meet his obligations, the prohibition on dismissal no longer applies,447
and the employer is entitled to stop paying salary.448
(ii) After two years of illness 
The prohibition regarding dismissal does no longer applies after two years of 
illness. Subsequently, the employer will address the CWI, stating that the 
employee is incapable to perform his duties, due to the employee’s disease or 
handicap. To decide whether the employer can dismiss the employee, the CWI 
applies Article 5:1.1.b in conjunction with Article 5:2.1 of the Dismissal Decree. 
Under these rules, the CWI gives permission to dismiss an employee when the 
employer is able to substantiate 
(1) the employee’s incapacity; 
(2) restoration within 26 weeks is not likely to take place; and 
(3) the employer seriously examined all options to replace the 
employee in an adjusted position or another position,449 either or 
not through job training and/or occupational retraining.450
Article 5:2.2 of the Dismissal Decree prescribes that the CWI must ask the 
UWV for advice on the aspects above, unless the employee reached consensus 
443  On the other hand, the employer may argue that reasons of physical, mental or social nature stand in 
the way to perform these duties. See Disselkoen 2003, p. 31; Asscher-Vonk 2003, p. 98 and 99. 
444  The duty to examine whether it is possible for the employee to perform duties with another employer 
applies as from 1 January 2003; as regards employees who have fallen ill before 1 January 2003: as 
from 1 January 2004. Moreover, a replacement in the same, adjusted or another position within the 
company of another employer can take place with the UWV’s consent only. For an in-depth 
discussion of these new Articles, see Boot 2002a. See also Asscher-Vonk 2003, p. 98 and 99, 153-
159, 164 and 165; Rutgers 2003, p. 132-135. 
445  See HR 29 april 2005, JAR 2005/136 (Wanders/Scholten). For a discussion of this case, see Bijkerk-
Verbruggen 2005, p. 87. 
446  See Conclusion of the Advocate General under 4.9-4.13 in HR 23 april 2004, JAR 2004/116 (De 
Vreede/SRK Rechtsbijstand), referring to HR 3 februari 1978, NJ 1978, 248 (Roovers/De Toekomst); 
HR 8 november 1985, NJ 1986, 309 (Van Haaren/Cehave); HR 13 december 1991, NJ 1992, 441 
(Goldsteen/Roeland); HR 26 oktober 2001, JAR 2001/238 (Bons/Ranzijn). See also HR 17 januari 
2003, RvdW 2003/16, JAR 2003/41 (Stal/UWV). For a discussion of these decisions, see Disselkoen 
2003, p. 30-33. See also Willems 2006, p. 11 referring to Ktg. Enschede 24 juni 2004, JAR 2004/147. 
447  See Art. 7:670b..3 DCC. 
448  See Art. 7:629.3 under c, d and e DCC. For example, Ktg. Zwolle 22 september 2004, JAR 2004/231. 
See also Bijkerk-Verbruggen 2005, p. 87; Willems 2006, p. 9 and 10. 
449  See also Van Drongelen en Van Rijs 2003, p. 151-154. 
450  The latter requirement applies as from 1 March 2006. See Stcrt. 2005, 242, p. 24 and 25. 
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with the employer that replacement, in effect, is impossible, or it concerns so-
called dead end cases, in which recovery, in effect, is impossible.451
In these cases, the employer, as from 1 March 2006, no longer needs prior 
authorization of the CWI to dismiss these  ill employees. Hence, parties may 
mutually agree on termination of employment without the employee losing his 
right to unemployment benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Benefits 
Act (Werkloosheidswet or WW) on the condition that  
x the employee is incapable of performing work due to illness;  
x efforts to reintegrate the employee has been without effect, 
whereby the CWI examines to what extent the employer has 
behaved as befits a good employer in making serious efforts to 
reintegrate the employee, and the employee has fully cooperated 
with the employer; and  
x reintegration on short notice – by means of adjusted duties and/or 
job training and/or occupational retraining  – is impossible.452
(iii) Because of – frequent – illness  
If the employer asks permission to terminate the employment agreement 
because of – frequent – illness, Article 5:2 of the Dismissal,453 and the former 
Appendix H of the Delegation Decree454 – which at present can be found in the 
CWI Handbook on Dismissal – apply.455 In brief, the CWI grants a request to 
terminate the employment agreement because of – frequent – illness only when  
(1) it is not likely that a regular pattern of illness is to be expected 
within 26 weeks;
(2) it is impossible for the employer to offer the employee an adjusted 
or new position;  
(3) deliberations on replacement between the employer and the 
employee have been without effect; 
(4) the absence of the employee severely frustrates the operation of the 
company;  
(5) the absence of the employee requires unreasonable efforts of 
colleagues; and 
451  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 27-2 to 27-3. Regardless of the advice of the UWV it has an 
own responsibility to examine if restoration within 26 weeks is likely and replacement in the same, 
another or adjusted position is possible. See Nationale Ombudsman 25 juli 2005, JAR 2005/206. 
452  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 34-13 and 34-14. 
453  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 29-4. 
454  For the Delegation Decree, see above under § 16.2. 
455  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 27-2. 
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(6) the employer cannot find a temporary solution, e.g. by hiring 
temporary employees to fulfill the position of the employee.456
The CWI is obliged to ask the UWV for advice regarding the aspects under (1) 
and (2).457
16.8  Studies on the CWI’s or its predecessors’ practices 
The BBA 1945, the Dismissal Decree, the CWI Handbook on Dismissal indicate 
that private-sector employees enjoy just cause protection. The studies below 
indicate that the CWI – and its predecessors – which apply these rules, seriously 
examine the grounds of dismissal, although according to researchers in the past, 
this differed from time to time, dependent on the ground of dismissal. 
 Ringeling was the first to examine whether – at the time – the 
Director(s) of the District Employment Office of Amsterdam (Directeur van het 
Gewestelijk Arbeidsbureau Amsterdam) consistently applied the rules according 
to the Circular Letter of 1946.458 He concluded that the Director, in general, 
gave permission to dismiss an employee, based on (a) economic circumstances; 
(b) unsatisfactory performance; or (c) breach of trust.459 He further concluded 
that in economic circumstances, personal interests more than often had to give 
way. He stressed that this did not mean that the permits were granted relatively 
easily, i.e. without investigation. In fact, Directors generally required 
considerable efforts on the part of employers to look for other ways. A more 
thorough investigation, however, appeared to take place in requests based on 
unsatisfactory performance. On the other hand, with regard to requests based on 
breach of trust, permits were granted relatively easily, although the Directors 
required serious efforts from the employer to replace the employee in another 
position.460 Other studies from 1976, 1981 and 1984 show that requests of 
employers were based on these same three grounds as well.461   
Overkleeft-Verburg and Roijakkers, in 1976, concluded that permits based on 
all grounds were granted relatively easily, in particular based on economic 
circumstances, and that the Directors rather looked at the consequences of the 
dismissal for employees, instead of thoroughly investigating the reason for 
456  For an in-depth discussion of the legislative history of these rules, see Hoogendijk 1999, p. 198-201. 
See also Diebels 2005, p. 175-177. 
457  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 27-2 to 27-3. 
458 As from 1 December 1948 new Directives applied. However, in practice, the Directive of 21 January  
1946 was applied until 1949. See Ringeling 1953, p. 42. Based on the 26,000 files that were filed 
between 1945 and 1949 in the region of Amsterdam, he selected 854 files. Ringeling 1953, p. 42. See 
also Havinga 1989, p. 22. 
459  Ringeling 1953, p. 35. 
460  Ringeling 1953, p. 298-301. See also Havinga 1989, p. 22. 
461  For the years of 1976, 1981 and 1984, respectively, see Overkleeft-Verburg en Roijakkers 1976, p. 3, 
who concentrate on three district employment offices: Tilburg, Utrecht en Winschoten; Naber 1981, 
p. 130-144, who concentrates on all district employment offices; Van der Heijden 1984, p. 66 and 67. 
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dismissal.462 Ter Hoeven, too, concluded the foregoing with regard to 
dockworkers, earlier, in 1973.463 In 1988, Knegt and Wilthagen more or less 
came to a same conclusion as Ringeling and Overkleeft-Verburg and 
Roijakkers, that with regard to requests based on economic circumstances, the 
employee’s personal interests more often than not had to give way. The need of 
the reorganization was seldom examined.464 On the other hand, they continued, 
the Directors of the four District Employment Offices465 thoroughly investigated 
the alleged unsatisfactory performance of the employee, or breach of trust. 
Moreover, in determining whether to grant permission to dismiss an employee, 
the Directors considered factors such as – the performance during – the years of 
service, the employee’s age, and the employee’s labour market position.466   
Subsequently, in 1998, Beltzer, Knegt and Van Rijs examined 
severance payments under the BBA 1945 and under the dissolution procedure of 
Article 7:685 DCC. They interviewed ten Regional Directors of Labor Services. 
Six out of ten Directors took the lack or the presence of a severance payment 
into consideration in their decision. However, they were unanimous that it could 
never be a decisive factor. In fact, all ten Directors stressed that they had never 
refused a permit because of the fact that the employer had not offered a 
severance payment.467
Subsequently, in 1999, the Ministry of Social Affairs assigned the Bureau for 
Policy Research (Research voor Beleid) to examine the effectiveness of the dual 
dismissal system. More specifically, it was asked to examine whether it (still) 
served the interests of employees, employers and the public. In its research, the 
Bureau based its findings particularly on the annual statistics on dismissal of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs (SZW ontslagstatistieken jaarrapportages) of 1998. 
Additionally, it interviewed 849 employers with 4-9 employees (165), 10-49 
employees (182), 50-99 employees (253), and with 100 or more employees 
(249). Besides, the Bureau interviewed 498 employees who had been dismissed 
in the previous two years. Of the number of interviewed employers, 38% had 
been involved in a dismissal procedure in the previous two years.  
As regards the BBA 1945-procedure, the Bureau concluded that 20% 
out of 39,064 requests had been withdrawn, and 6% had been rejected. 
Regarding the latter, 93% of the employees eventually had left the company. 
Hence, the Bureau concluded that the CWI-procedure was rather indirectly
462  Overkleeft-Verburg en Roijakkers 1976, p. 3, p. 195 and 196. See also Naber 1981, p. 135. 
463  Based on  187 files in Amsterdam and 557 files in Rotterdam of dockworkers in the period 1957 to 
1959. See Havinga 1989, p. 22 and 23, referring to P.J.A. ter Hoeven, Ontslagnormen en 
ongeschoolde arbeiders in Nederland, In: Annalen van de faculteit der Economische, sociale en 
politieke wetenschappen, Brussel, 1973, p. 167-191. 
464  Knegt en Wilthagen 1988, p. 316-318. See also Van der Heijden 2000, p. 228 and 229. Havinga 
concluded the same with regard to collective dismissals in 1989.Havinga 1989, p. 260. See also 
Hoekema 1985, p. 33. 
465  Knegt en Wilthagen 1988, p. 64. See also Havinga 1989, p. 21; Van der Heijden 2000, p. 229. 
466  Knegt en Wilthagen 1988, p. 319-322. See also Havinga 1989, p. 24. 
467  Beltzer, Knegt en Van Rijs 1998, p. 83-86. See also Even 2005, p. 94. 
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effective, than directly effective.468 Moreover, it concluded that between 
October 1997 and October 1999, Cantonal Courts had dissolved 90,000 
employment agreements –of which 60,000 involved pro forma cases –. 
Approximately 85,000 permits had been granted by the CWI. The number of pro 
forma requests under the BBA 1945-procedure was estimated on 20,000 
annually. Hence, the CWI appears to handle the majority of substantive cases. 
Overall, the majority of requests with the CWI were based on economic 
circumstances. The majority of requests with Cantonal Courts were based on 
breach of trust. Determinative for choosing between the RDA or the Cantonal 
Court were (i) costs: employers prefer the Cantonal Court in case of younger 
employees, and prefer the RDA in case of elderly employees (ii) success rate: 
employers believe that the dissolution procedure guarantees a higher success 
rate, in that Cantonal Courts rather dissolve an employment agreement with a 
severance payment, than that they reject the request. The 1998 statistics on 
dismissal, too, showed that Cantonal Courts rejected 3.5% ‘only’, compared to 
6% by the RDA; and (iii) fastness: employers experience the procedure with the 
Cantonal Court as faster than the BBA 1945-procedure.469
In 2002, the Work and Income Inspectorate (Inspectie Werk en Inkomen or IWI),
supervising the CWI, examined how the CWI applied the Dismissal Decree. 
This 2002 investigation was restricted to requests under Article 4:1 of the 
Dismissal Decree, and with regard to employees of 55 years and older only. One 
of the outcomes was that the CWI correctly required of larger companies, e.g. 
multinationals, stronger efforts to replace the older employee in another – 
adjusted – position. The IWI approved this ‘differentiating’ approach towards 
employers. The IWI held that these companies, indeed, are better suited, 
whether or not through job training and/or occupational retraining, to replace 
employees within the company.  
What was unsatisfactory to the IWI was that the sixteen regional 
offices, regarding other aspects, tended to apply the Dismissal Decree 
differently. Subsequently, the IWI asked the CWI to undertake measures in this 
respect.470 In 2004, a new examination took place by the IWI on the application 
of the Dismissal Decree in general. The results were to the satisfaction of the 
IWI, in that the CWI had issued the CWI Handbook on Dismissal (Beleidsregels
Ontslagtaak CWI) to achieve that all sixteen regional offices would uniformly 
apply the Dismissal Decree in granting permits.471 The IWI agreed with the CWI 
that a hundred percent uniformity on the application of the just cause standard 
could never be reached, because Article 3:1 of the Dismissal Decree leaves 
468  Research voor Beleid 2000, see particularly p. 49. 
469  Research voor Beleid 2000, p. 10, 22, 25-31, and 50 See also Grapperhaus 2006, p. 16. 
470  IWI 2002, p. 7. For this report, see Staphorst 2003. 
471  The handbook became known as ‘Beleidsregels Ontslagtaak CWI’ (in this thesis referred to as CWI
Handbook on Dismissal) and went into force on 1 October 2005. 
212
Directors with a discretionary power to balance the interests of the employer, the 
employee and the public.472
The most recent study on the effect of the dual dismissal system has been 
executed by Bureau Bartels. The latter, too, was assigned by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs to examine the effects of the dual dismissal system. The reporters 
interviewed 64 companies – with less than 50, between 50 and 250, and over 
250 employees – in five branches, i.e. industry, trade, building construction, 
transport and business. All companies had been involved in procedures on 
employment termination in the last three years.473 The Report distinguishes 
between individual and collective dismissals. For purposes of the Report, the 
latter involves one or more employees.474 In brief, the Report shows that with 
regard to individual dismissals employers prefer the Cantonal Court to the CWI, 
due to its speed and security on termination of employment. As minus points, 
employers point out that Cantonal Courts take the interests of employers into 
consideration to a certain extent only, resulting in unreasonably high severance 
payments. Hence, employers prefer the CWI to the Cantonal Court when they 
wish to terminate employment agreements with employees who are ill for more 
than two years. In general, small-sized companies prefer the CWI, due to the 
low costs.475 As regards collective dismissals, employers prefer the CWI to the 
Cantonal Court, due to its speed and the role the CWI plays in informing them 
on collective dismissals. As minus points of the BBA 1945, employers point out 
that it does not allow for dismissals based on quality, and that the CWI from 
time to time tends to take place on the chair of the entrepreneur.476
Overall, employers consider the dismissal system as too rigid in 
individual dismissals, in that employees who do no longer work at the 
satisfaction of employer can only be dismissed with high severance payments. 
Also, in collective dismissals, they remain ‘stuck’ with less qualified personnel, 
due to the principle of reflection. Consequently, employers invest in these 
insiders, and in this respect, recognize that the rigid system prevents employers 
from taking rash decisions.477 Important for this thesis is that employers, in 
general, subscribe to the just cause rule that protects employees against arbitrary 
dismissal in general, as a basic rule of the Dutch dismissal system. On the other 
hand, they oppose the dual just cause dismissal system, in that it overly protects 
the interests of employees compared to the interests of employers.478 Employers 
emphasize that a more flexible dismissal law is particularly needed with regard 
472  IWI 2004, p. 16 and 19. 
473  Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 2, 5 and 6. 
474  In contrast, collective dismissals under the statistics of the Ministry of Social Affairs involve 
dismissals, which include twenty or more employees according to the WMCO. See SZW 
Ontslagstatistiek 2005, p. 4. 
475  Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 3-6, 33-51. 
476  Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 6, 7 and 52-60. 
477  Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 7-9 and 61-74. 
478  Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 3, 4 and 35. 
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to collective dismissals, in that it will allow employers to dismiss employees, i.e. 
to make a selection based on quality. They advocate that unions should change 
their attitude in focusing on job security for employees only.479 Nevertheless, the 
majority of employers embrace the dual just cause dismissal system, in that it 
enables them to make a choice, dependent on the reason for dismissal to either 
choose for the CWI or the Cantonal Court.480 The Minister of Social Affairs, De 
Geus, meanwhile, sent the Report to the SER with the request to take it into 
consideration in its Advice on the Dutch Social-Economic Policy on the Mid-
Long Term (Advies over het Nederlandse Sociaal-Economische Beleid op de 
Middellange Termijn or MLT-Advies). The SER in the MLT-Advice, among 
others, will advise the government on whether the present dismissal system still 
meets the demands of time for the future five years.481
These studies show that the requirement of a just cause for dismissal still leaves 
room for employers to dismiss employees based on economic circumstances, 
unsatisfactory performance, and breach of trust. In fact, the annual statistics on 
dismissal of the Ministry of Social Affairs (SZW ontslagstatistieken 
jaarrapportages) show that the majority of requests are granted.482 In my 
opinion, this does not mean that the just cause standard under the Dismissal 
Decree is without effect, i.e. private-sector employees do not enjoy just cause 
protection under the BBA 1945 and the Dismissal Decree. Rather, that in 
consistently applying the rules, in the majority of cases there is good cause.483
Van der Heijden, for example, refers to the 1983 study on the effectiveness of 
the BBA 1945 by Knegt and Wilthagen, who concluded that six out of ten 
employees for whom a permit had been refused, still were in service the year 
after.484 In 2005, 7% of the 70,154 requests handled were rejected due to 
absence of good cause, and 8% withdrawn.485
In the BBA 1945-procedure, requests based on economic circumstances 
form the majority of requests filed. In 2005, 71% of 74,634 requests filed, were 
based on economic circumstances. These embraced 56% individual, and 16% 
collective dismissals.486 In his 1953 dissertation, Ringeling, too, showed that in 
the period between 1945 and 1951 the majority of requests of employers – at 
least regarding the district of Amsterdam – were based on economic 
479  Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 104. 
480  Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 9-11 and 75-91. 
481  Letter of the Minister of Social Affairs to the Chairman of the Lower House of 6 July 2006, 
AV/IR/2006/55988. For MLT-Advies, see more in-depth below under § 29.2.2. 
482  See also Research voor Beleid 2000, p. 49: none of the 849 employers had ever received a rejection. 
483  See also Research voor Beleid 2000, p. vi. For another opinion, see Grapperhaus 2006. 
484  Van der Heijden 2000, p. 288 and 229. See Knegt en Wilthagen 1988, p. 328. See also below under  
§ 28.2.2. See also Van den Heuvel 2000b, p. 366. 
485  SZW Ontslagstatistiek 2005, p. 6. See also Research voor Beleid 2000, p. 49. 
486  The term collective dismissals under the annual statistics refers to collective dismissals to which the 
WMCO apply only. Therefore, the term individual is somewhat misleading, in that collective 
dismissals which involve fewer than 20 employees are included in ‘individual’ dismissals. See SZW 
Ontslagstatistiek 2005, p. 4. 
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circumstances.487 With respect to requests based on economic circumstances,
however, one must borne in mind the following. First, (i) a significant number of 
cases – from 1 January 1999 until 1 January 2007  – involve(d) expedited 
(verkorte) procedures (2005: 15%; 2004: 22%). In these procedures, the CWI 
leaves out the employee’s defense and the hearing of parties, and applies when 
parties agreed upon the dismissal in light of economic circumstances, without 
the employee losing his right to unemployment benefits.488 These, in effect, 
concern pro forma requests. As the Bureau for Policy Research (Research voor 
Beleid) stressed, the majority of requests still involve substantive requests. 
Second, the CWI seriously considers the employee’s labour market position in 
its decision. That is, in years of economic growth the CWI and its predecessors 
tend to grant more permits based on economic circumstances than in less 
prosperous times, e.g. the average was 9.5% between the more prosperous years 
between 1950 and 1963, and 4.5% between the less prosperous years between 
1967 and 1980.489 In contrast, the number of rejections increased in times of 
economic recession, for example, at the beginning of the eighties: from 4,4% 
(1980) to 4,7% (1981) to 5,1% (1982).490 This percentage may seem low, but 
not when one considers that the number of requests almost doubled between 
1980 and 1982: from 89,987 to 140,000 to 173,651, respectively. The doubling 
in the years between 1980 and 1982, in turn, can be explained by the fact that in 
times of economic recession the number of requests based on economic 
circumstances tends to increase.491 Also, as regards the years between 1984 and 
1985 when unemployment was at its highest point, somewhere between 500,000 
and 600,000, the number of rejections was relatively high.492 In contrast, 
487  See Ringeling 1953, Tabel I, p. 46. 
488  Art. 2:6 (old) of the Dismissal Decree. For an in-depth discussion of the expedited procedure, see 
Van Drongelen en Van Rijs 2003, p. 127-131; CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 24.1-24.6. 
Meanwhile, as from 1 January 2007, this procedure has been abolished. The reason to introduce an 
expedited procedure was to establish a quick procedure for employment termination on which parties 
agreed, however, employees protested against to ensure that they were not qualified as ‘voluntary’ 
unemployed under the Unemployment Insurance Benefits Act (Werkloosheidwet or WW), i.e. 
consequently would lose their right to unemployment benefits. The reason  to, in turn, abolish this 
procedure has been that the WW has been amended as from 1 October 2006, in that an employee only 
loses his right on  unemployment benefits when he has been dismissed for an urgent cause for which 
he is to blame – in practice, in case of  summary dismissals – or the employment agreement has been 
terminated at his own request. See Stcrt. 2006, 243, p. 11. 
489  Naber 1981, p. 138 and 142. 
490  Van der Heijden 1984, p. 66. When we look at more recent numbers of rejections, in 2002 19% of the 
individual requests based on economic circumstances were rejected and 23% in case of collective 
dismissals. In 2003 and 2004, a period of slight economic recovery, fewer requests (roughly 17% of 
the individual requests and 19% of the collective dismissals) were rejected. See SZW 
Ontslagstatistiek 2002, 2003 and 2004. 
491  Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 306. For requests based on economic circumstances, handled in recessions, 
see SZW Ontslagstatistiek between 2000 to 2003: 2000 (44,159); 2001 (54,376); 2002 (61,743); 
2003 (85,881). 
492  Knegt en Wilthagen 1988, p. 239.  
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rejections were relatively low in 1999 when unemployment was at its lowest 
point, somewhere between 190,000 and 265,000.493
16.9 Conclusion 
The BBA 1945 determines that an employer needs prior authorization to 
unilaterally terminate an employment agreement. It does not require a just cause 
for dismissal. Article 3:1 of the Dismissal Decree does. Moreover, the Articles 4 
and 5 provide detailed rules on economic circumstances, unsatisfactory 
performance, and breach of trust. This Chapter shows that private-sector 
employees appear to enjoy just cause protection under the BBA 1945, the 
Dismissal Decree, the CWI Handbook on Dismissal, both in theory and practice. 
On the other hand, statistics of the Ministry of Social Affairs show that the CWI 
grants permission to dismiss employees in the majority of cases. This raises the 
question whether private-sector employees also feel that they are afforded just 
cause protection, all the more so because the CWI cannot grant severance 
payments and the BBA 1945 does not allow for appeal. An employee who is 
dismissed with prior authorization of the CWI, in effect, has no other possibility 
than to claim a severance payment under Article 7:681 DCC, based on a 
manifestly unreasonable dismissal. 
17 Article 681 of Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code:  
just cause protection? 
17.1   Article 7:681 DCC 
Article 1639s was introduced by the Act of 17 December 1953, after a 
discussion on the necessity of a just cause for dismissal.494 After its introduction, 
the reason for dismissal became significant under the Act. This Section 
examines whether it, too, entailed a iusta causa dimissionis.495 Article 1639s 
was changed into Article 681 of Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code in 
1997. Its contents virtually remained the same.496 In fact, the present text of 
Article 7:681 DCC still resembles the text of Article 1639s, with one 
exception.497 The example under Article 7:681 DCC of a dismissal based on an 
employee’s refusal to perform his work, due to serious grounds of conscience 
(ernstige gewetensbezwaren), was first introduced on 5 March 1994 at the 
advice of the Social-Economic Council (SER) in 1990.498
493  See Scholtens 2001b, p. 54 and 55. 
494  Ringeling 1953, p. 15-18; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 30 and 89; Van den Heuvel 2000a, p. 254; Kuip 
1993a, p. 169; Van der Grinten 2002, p. 341. See also above under § 17.2. 
495  Van den Heuvel 2000a, p. 255. 
496  Van Arkel 1997, p. 73 and 74. 
497  For the text of 1639s, see Stb. 1953, 619. See also Ringeling 1953, p. 23. 
498  Stb. 1994, 134. For an in-depth discussion of this amendment, see Van Cappelle 1994. 
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In brief, Article 7:681.1 DCC determines that when the court qualifies a 
termination as manifestly unreasonable, it must grant a severance payment.499
Article 7:681 DCC provides examples of when the court can – thus, not must 
qualify a termination as manifestly unreasonable. For example, a dismissal can 
be considered as manifestly unreasonable when the employer terminates the 
employment agreement without cause, based on a professed (voorgewende) or a 
false (valse, non-existente) reason, or the termination has far-reaching 
consequences for the employer in comparison with the interest of the employee 
to end the relationship.500 The termination on the part of the employer – the 
focus of this thesis  can be manifestly unreasonable when the employer 
terminates the employment agreement  
(a) without cause, based on a professed or a false reason;   
(b) the termination has far-reaching consequences for the employee, due to 
the minimum of provisions (voorzieningen) and the employee’s labour 
market situation in comparison with the interest of the employer to end 
the relationship;  
(c) on the ground that the employee is unable to perform his duty to work, 
due to military service;  
(d) the employer violates rules of seniority in terminating the employment 
agreement; or 
(e) on the ground that the employee refuses to perform his duty to work 
based on severe grounds of conscience.501
Hence, a court must not consider a dismissal as manifestly unreasonable per se
when an employer dismisses an employee without cause. Under Article 7:681 
DCC a court, in fact, has discretionary power to decide whether or not a 
dismissal is manifestly unreasonable based on the circumstances of the case at 
the moment of the dismissal.502 These being examples, the list is not 
exhaustive.503 For example, case law shows that a dismissal can also be 
considered as manifestly unreasonable when an employer knowingly hires 
foreigners who are not in possession of a work permit and subsequently 
dismisses – or is forced to dismiss  these employees, due to their illegal 
status.504
499  HR 4 juni 1976, NJ 1977, 98 (Derksen/Derksen BV). See also Levenbach 1954, p. 120; Kuip 1993a, 
p. 177; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 53;  Kuip 1993a, p. 173; Van den Heuvel 2000a, p. 265; Zondag 
2004b, p. 6 and 11; Zondag 2005a, p. 13 and 21. 
500  Art. 7:681.3 DCC. See also Tekst & Commentaar Arbeidsrecht (2006): Art. 7:681 BW. 
501  Art. 7:681.2 DCC. See also Zondag 2004b, p. 6 and 7; Zondag 2005a, p. 12. 
502  HR 3 maart 1995 NJ 1995, 451, JAR 1995/78 (Van Rossum/Van Erp). See also Hillen 1996. 
503  HR 29 januari 1999, NJ 1999, 323, JAR 1999/46 (Verkerk/Wifac). See also A.M. Luttmer-Kat, 
Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, Art. 7:681 BW (DCC) § 3; Van den Heuvel 
2000a, p. 261; Olde 2000; Zondag 2004b, p. 6. 
504  For case law on this subject, see De Blecourt-Wouterse 1995; Van Steenderen-Koornneef 1995. For a 
recent case, see Ktg. Alphen aan den Rijn, 23 augustus 2005, JAR 2005/222. Another example 
derives from HR 20 juni 1975, NJ 1975, 496 (Van Dam/KLM) affirmed by the Netherlands Supreme 
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Elaborating on these examples, Van den Heuvel distinguishes between 
a manifestly unreasonable dismissal related to (i) absence of (good) cause; (ii) 
the manner, in which the dismissal has taken place; and (iii) consequences for 
the employee as a result of the dismissal.505 This thesis primarily concentrates 
on the first, i.e. on the cases, in which an employer under Article 7:681.2.a DCC 
dismisses an employee without cause, or based on a professed or false reason. In 
this respect, it is important to stress that if the ground of dismissal – oral or 
written – is lacking, this does not automatically constitute a termination without
cause. Determinative is whether the employee is or could have been familiar 
with the reason for dismissal.506 With a professed reason is meant a reason 
invoked by an employer to cover the real (for example, discriminatory) reason. 
Thus, whereas the termination in principle is justified, the court can consider a 
dismissal as manifestly unreasonable based on bad intent. The dismissal will not 
be considered manifestly unreasonable, however, if an employer covers the real 
reason (for example, theft) to spare the employee. A false reason is a non-
existent reason.507
Article 7:681.1 DCC determines that the party in question must invoke his rights 
within six months after termination of the employment agreement.508 In general, 
parties ask for damages. The severance payment according to Article 7:681 
DCC primarily aims to cover specific damages.509 However, because in most 
employment termination cases it is difficult to estimate damages,510 courts in 
Article 7:681-procedures tend to grant a severance payment that is reasonable 
under the circumstances.511 From Article 7:682 DCC, it derives that instead of a 
Court in HR 1 juli 1983, NJ 1984, 150 (Van Dokkum/Mercedes Benz). The Netherlands Supreme 
Court held that an employer must stand his offer to pay a severance payment until the court has 
decided on the fairness of the offer, and a withdrawal can make the termination manifestly 
unreasonable. For both decisions, see Trap en Hes 1995. 
505  Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 109; Van den Heuvel 2003, p. 78. See also Kuip 1993a, p. 195. 
506  TK 1947-1948, 881, No. 3, p. 11. See also Kuip 1993a, p. 172. An important development in this 
respect has been the introduction of Art. 7:669 DCC under which an employer as from 1 January 
1999 is obliged – at the written request of the employee – to provide the employee the reason of the 
dismissal. See also A.M. Luttmer-Kat, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, Art. 
7:681 BW (DCC) § 4. For Art. 7:669 DCC, see above under § 17.3.2. 
507  TK 1947-1948, 881, No. 3, p. 11. See also Kuip 1993a, p. 172; Van den Heuvel 2000a, p. 262 and 
263; A.M. Luttmer-Kat, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, Art. 7:681 BW (DCC) 
§ 4. 
508  Art. 7:683 DCC. See also Kuip 1993a, 169 and 189; Van der Grinten 2002, p. 354. 
509  See Annotation Heerma van Voss HR 3 december 2004, NJ 2005, 119, JAR 2005/30 (Van 
Ree/Damco), referring to the amendment of Art. 7:681 DCC through ‘de Vaststellingswet van titel 
7.10 nieuw BW (Wet van 6 juni 1996, Stb. 1996, 406)’.
510  This explains the discussion in literature and contrasting decisions of courts as to a formula – more 
specifically: the Cantonal Formula – being applied to severance payments on the basis of Art. 7:681 
DCC as well. See Charbon 2002; Zondag 2004b, p. 11. See further HR 3 december 2004, NJ 2005, 
119 annotated by Heerma van Voss, JAR 2005/30 (Van Ree/Damco). See also Annotation Loonstra 
HR 3 december 2004, JIN 2005/89. 
511  See Vegter 2003, p. 69 referring to the Conclusion of the Advocate General under 10 in HR 11 
oktober 2002, JAR 2002/261 (Van Maarschalkerwaart/Dalle Vedove). In literature, some advocate 
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severance payment, the court can instruct the employer to restore the 
employment agreement.512 This can take place at the employee’s request only. A 
court, thus, cannot instruct restoration of the employment agreement on its own 
initiative.513 On the other hand, a court is not obliged to grant the employee’s 
request.514 Restoration of the employment agreement rarely takes place, 
however. Employees prefer to seek for a new job, and ask for severance 
payment because a procedure, in general, can take years.515 Also, the possibility 
of restoration, in practice, does not result in ‘reinstatement’, because the 
employer can ask to pay for a ransom (afkoopsom), which request must be 
granted by court. The court, too, can determine a ransom on its own initiative.516
Hence, the employer can buy his way out.  
 The burden of proof is on the party who claims that the termination is 
manifestly unreasonable. This is generally the employee, who files a request 
after he has been dismissed with prior authorization of the CWI.517 This rule on 
the burden of proof is in accordance with Article 150 of the Act on the New 
Civil Procedure (Wetboek van Nieuw Burgerlijk Rechtsvordering). Under this 
Article, the plaintiff-employee carries the burden of proof.518 The employee, 
thus, must prove that the dismissal is manifestly unreasonable, as well as the 
underlying circumstances of the case. The court, seriously must weigh the 
employer’s defense.519
17.2  Legislative history 
The legislative history of Article 7:681 DCC begins with the Report of the 
Labour Foundation of 29 July 1947. From this Report it can be derived that 
Article 1639s has been a compromise between employers and employees, and 
only partly met the wish of advocates for a just cause standard in the Act of the 
that a severance payment in employment termination cases need to cover specific damages. See Boot 
1999c; Luttmer-Kat 1999. Loonstra en Zondag are of another opinion. See Loonstra en Zondag 2000. 
512  Art. 7:682 DCC. This does not apply to an employment agreement with a managing director 
(statutair directeur). See Art. 2:134.3 DCC and 2:244.3 DCC. See further Zondag 2005a, p. 21-26 on 
examples of Art. 7:681 DCC. 
513  HR 4 juni 1976, NJ 1977, 98 (Derksen/Derksen BV). See also Levenbach 1954, p. 115, 116 and 120; 
Van der Grinten 2002, p. 353. 
514  HR 25 januari 1985, NJ 1985, 559 (Patelski/Gemeente Sittard); HR 10 april 1987, NJ 1988, 5 
(Meuleman/Hagemeyer). See also Levenbach 1954, p. 119.; Kuip 1993a, p. 181; Van der Grinten 
2002, p. 353. 
515  Kuip 1993a, p. 170; Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 308. 
516  Levenbach 1954, p. 119 and 120; A.M. Luttmer-Kat, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, 
Deventer, Art. 7:682 BW (DCC) § 3. 
517  HR 29 maart 1963, NJ 1963, 247 (Kooy/Verenigde Pharmaceutische Fabrieken); HR 2 januari 1970, 
NJ 1970, 155 (De Nederlandsche Bank/X); HR 2 juni 1978, NJ 1979, 520 (Van den Baard/Psychisch 
Centrum St. Anna); HR 17 december 1999, NJ 2000, 171, JAR 2000/29 (Stichting Thuiszorg Midden-
Limburg/P). See also the Conclusion of the Advocate General in HR 25 april 1986, NJ 1986, 624. 
See further Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 80 and 81; Kuip 1993a, p. 175; Van der Grinten 2002, p. 350. 
518  Van der Grinten 2002, p. 350 and 351; Bosse 2003, p. 234 and 235; Zondag 2004b, p. 8-10; A.M. 
Luttmer-Kat, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, Art. 7:681 BW (DCC) § 14. 
519  HR 17 december 1999, NJ 2000, 171, JAR 2000/29 (Stichting Thuiszorg Midden-Limburg/P.).
219
Employment Agreement of 1907. In brief, employers and employees in the 
Labour Foundation agreed that a dismissal, although in compliance with notice 
requirements and given with consent of the employment district office, 
nonetheless, could be unjustified, i.e. manifestly unreasonable under certain 
circumstances. However, it considered a just cause standard as too far-reaching. 
Consequently, it proposed a cause of action under law, based upon which the 
court could qualify a dismissal as manifestly unreasonable (kennelijk onredelijk)
or apparently in contradiction with reasonableness (kennelijk in strijd met de 
redelijkheid), taking the interests of the employer and the employee into 
consideration. 
It further held that the court in such a case should be able to instruct the 
employer to restore the employment agreement. When an employer had violated 
the principle of seniority or had dismissed an employee for absence due to 
military service, restoration of the employment agreement had to be possible as 
well. Only if restoration was impossible due to the circumstances, courts should 
be able to grant a severance payment instead. Furthermore, in determining the 
size of the severance payment, the court should be able to take into 
consideration whether the employee had received social security, the length of 
the notice period and the employee’s labour market position.520
The Minister of Justice, Mulderije, welcomed the consensus the social parties 
had reached on the delicate matter of a requirement of a just cause for dismissal 
under the Act. Consequently, he wished to respect the proposals of the Labour 
Foundation. In brief, he agreed with the Labour Foundation that the law needed 
to provide means to prevent rash dismissals. In time, one felt it as improper 
when an employer dismissed an employee without (just) cause. In the opinion of 
the Minister, the thought behind Article 1639o – introduced by the legislature in 
1907  that parties could legitimately terminate the employment agreement with 
prior notice, regardless of the reason, was no longer adhered to.521
Subsequently, the Minister proposed (i) the introduction of legal rule what later 
would become Article 1639s, under which a party could ask for a remedy when 
the other had terminated the employment agreement without just cause; and (ii) 
the introduction of restoration of the employment agreement as a new remedy 
under the Act.522
The Minister of Justice, Donker, who succeeded Mulderije, too, 
subscribed to the view of the Labour Foundation. However, he explicitly 
emphasized that with the introduction of Article 1639s he did not intend to 
introduce the requirement of a iusta causa dimissionis. For Reuter, a member of 
the Lower House this was not satisfactory. With reference to Levenbach, he 
stressed the importance of a just cause standard, all the more so if in the future 
520  STAR-Advies 1947, p. 19-23, 26 and 27. 
521  TK 1947-1948, 881, No. 3, p. 2 and 3. See also Oud, TK 1952-1953, 881, Handelingen II, 17 februari 
1953, p. 2322; Ringeling 1953, p. 25 and 26; Levenbach 1954, p. 115; Kuip 1993a, p. 178 and 179. 
522  TK 1947-1948, 881, No. 3, p. 2 and 3. See also Ringeling 1953, p. 25 and 26; Van den Heuvel 2000a, 
p. 256. 
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the BBA 1945 had to give way. Reuter, in brief, stated that under the BBA 1945, 
a public authority was authorized to give a preventive review on the 
reasonability of a dismissal, and under Article 1639s a court was authorized to 
give an eventual repressive review.523 Moreover, the BBA 1945 provided 
protection against arbitrary dismissal in general. In contrast, Article 1639s left 
room for termination of employment without just cause, because under Article 
1639s courts had discretionary power in this respect.524 In reply, Donker stated 
that the BBA 1945 could  and would  exist besides Article 1639s. Hence, 
there would be no problem in respect of just cause protection for employees.525
In Parliament, the term ‘manifestly’ came under debate. For most members the 
term remained unclear. The Standing Committee for Private and Penal Law 
(Vaste Commissie voor Privaat- en Strafrecht) stated that ‘manifestly’ meant 
that the unreasonability of the dismissal was crystal clear to experts on the one 
hand, and that the court was allowed to only marginally test the employer’s 
policy or the employee’s intentions on the other.526 Minister Mulderije, in turn, 
held that ‘manifestly’ meant that it was clear to every reasonable human being 
that the dismissal was unreasonable.527 Donker, contrary to Mulderije, answered 
that ‘manifestly’ meant that it was clear to every reasonable human being that 
the dismissal was unreasonable.528 A debate in the Upper House between 
Donker and Molenaar resulted in a statement of Donker that ‘manifestly’ meant 
that the court should only act when it was obvious to every human being that the 
dismissal was unreasonable.529 Levenbach  subscribing to the view of the 
Committee on Private and Penal Law530 and the Minister531  held that a precise 
definition of ‘manifestly’could not be given, in that the court had to balance the 
interests of the employer and the employee in determining whether a dismissal 
was manifestly unreasonable. Therefore, in his opinion the term would and 
needed to develop with the spirit of times under case law.532 Also, the Advocate 
523  Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 1954, p. 62 and 63; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 43; Hoffmans 
(1) 1991, p. 46. 
524  See TK 1952-1953, 881, Handelingen II, 18 februari 1953,  p. 2339; Handelingen II, 19 februari 
1953, p. 2359. See also Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 52; Van den Heuvel 2000a, p. 260 and 261. 
525  See TK 1952-1953, 881, Handelingen II, 19 februari 1953, p. 2352 and 2353. 
526  TK 1949-1950, 881, No. 4, Voorlopig Verslag , p. 18. See also Ringeling 1953, p. 26; Van den 
Heuvel 1983, p. 53. 
527  TK 1951-1952, 881, No. 6, p. 30. See also Gerbrandy 1954, p. 35; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 54; Kuip 
1993a, p. 170; Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 220. 
528  Reuter,  TK 1952-1953, 881, Handelingen II, 18 februari 1953,  p. 2339; Wttewaall van Stoetwegen, 
p. 2343. See also Gerbrandy 1954, p. 37; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 54 and 55. 
529  Handelingen I, 15 december 1953, p. 2063 en 2067. See also Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 55 and 56; 
Kuip 1993a, p. 170. For a discussion in literature on the term ‘manifestly’, see Van den Heuvel 1983, 
p. 62 and 63. For lower case law on this subject, see Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 64 and 65. 
530  TK 1949-1950, 881, No. 4, p. 18. 
531  TK 1951-1952, 881, No. 6, p. 30. 
532  TK 1947-1948, 881, No. 3, p. 5. See Levenbach 1953, p. 50; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 63 and 64; 
Hoffmans (1) 1991, p. 45. 
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General in Lampe/De Vries (1961) – which case will be discussed in-depth 
below – concluded that the term ‘manifestly’ concerned a standard of evaluation 
to be filled out by courts based on the circumstances of the case. In the case that 
was brought before him, the Advocate General rejected the proposition of the 
employer that ‘manifestly’ meant that facts are obvious, in that they need not be 
investigated. Hence, he rejected the proposition that the dismissal must be 
manifestly unreasonable at first sight, and that the claim must be rejected when 
this is not the case. In his opinion, manifestly unreasonable meant that it is clear 
to every reasonable human being that the dismissal is unreasonable, which view 
was shared by the Netherlands Supreme Court.533 This means that, in practice, 
there is no limited judicial review by courts.534
Second, a point of discussion was the new remedy of restoration. The 
Standing Committee on Private and Penal Law argued that employees, due to 
this new remedy, in effect, could be forced to stay in service against their will. 
That is, when an employee asks for restoration, an employer generally will 
request a ransom. In turn, when an employer asks for restoration, an employee 
generally lacks the financial means to ask the court to determine a ransom 
instead, hence, is forced to stay in service. Therefore, the Committee advised the 
Minister not to apply the principle of equality of parties under contract law to 
the employee in this respect.535 In reply, the Minister trusted the courts to take 
the financial means of the employee into consideration in determining a lump 
sum payment.536 Finally, in 1999, the government acknowledged that this 
remedy could effectually force an employee to stay in service. Consequently, 
through the Flexicurity Act that went into force on 1 January 1999, it was 
decided that employers could no longer ask for restoration of the employment 
agreement if an employee had terminated the employment agreement manifestly 
unreasonably.537
17.3 Case law in light of just cause protection  
The minority of cases filed under Article 7:681.2.a DCC are those, in which 
termination of employment has taken place without cause, or based on a 
professed or a false reason.538 This is partly due to the decision in 1953 of the 
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Social Affairs to maintain the BBA 1945 
533  See Conclusion of the Advocate General HR 1 december 1961, NJ 1962, 78 (Lampe/De Vries).  
534  Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 307; 2004b, p. 5 and 6. See also A.M. Luttmer-Kat, Losbladige 
Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, Art. 7:681 BW (DCC) § 3. See further Annotation 
Zonderland HR 11 februari 1977, NJ 1977, 246 (Polak/Technodiamant Amsterdam), and Conclusion 
of the Advocate General HR 11 november 1983, NJ 1984, 330 (De Vries/Rank Xerox). 
535  TK 1949-1950, 881, No.4,  p. 18 and 19. See also Ringeling 1953, p. 26 and 27; Levenbach 1954,  
p. 117 and 118. 
536  TK 1951-1952, 881, No. 6, p. 31; TK 1952-1953, 881, Handelingen II, 19 februari 1953, p. 2346. See 
also Ringeling 1953, p. 28. 
537  Zondag 2005a, p. 25; A.M. Luttmer-Kat, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer,  
Art. 7:682 BW (DCC) § 3. 
538  Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 307 and 308; Zondag 2004b, p. 7. 
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besides Article 1639s. Already, members of the Lower House, Oud and 
Wttewaall van Stoetwegen, at the time, stressed that if the BBA 1945 would be 
maintained, courts would be left only with cases in which district employment 
offices had judged wrongly. One expected these cases to be rare,539 besides the 
cases in which exempted workers from the BBA 1945 would rely on the 
Article.540 However, at the time one could not yet oversee the impact of the 
Netherlands Supreme Court in 1961 in Lampe/De Vries, in which it allowed 
employees to ask for a severance payment based on manifestly unreasonable 
dismissal because of the consequences for the employee as a result of the 
dismissal.541 After this case, employees increasingly started to file claims under 
Article 1639s, stressing the harsh consequences of the dismissal.542 By 2007, 
these cases form a majority of the cases filed under Article 7:681.2.b DCC.543
Still, however, the total number of – published – cases under Article 7:681 DCC 
is relatively low in comparison with those under Article 7:685 DCC.544
The possibility to claim damages in light of the consequences of the 
dismissal was not new. Already, the Labour Foundation in its advice of 1947 
held that a court, in determining whether a dismissal was manifestly 
unreasonable, should be able to take into consideration (i) social security; (ii) the 
length of the notice period; and (iii) the employee’s labour market position. In 
this respect, Article 1639s determined that the court could consider a dismissal 
as manifestly unreasonable if the dismissal has far-reaching consequences for 
the employee, due to a minimum of provisions (voorzieningen) and the 
employee’s labour market situation in comparison with the employer’s interest 
in ending the relationship.545 This now brings me to a discussion of case law 
under Article 7:681 DCC. In discussing case law, the focus will be on decisions 
of the Netherlands Supreme Court. These decisions provide guidelines and, in 
effect, must be followed by the lower courts.  
17.3.1  Correction of mistakes of the public authority in granting permits 
In 1953, Donker particularly focused on Article 1639s in respect of the effect it 
would have on the correction of mistakes of district employment offices in 
539  Oud, TK 1952-1953, 881, Handelingen II, 17 februari 1953, p. 2322; Wttewaal van Stoetwegen, TK 
1952-1953, 881, Handelingen II, 18 februari 1953, p. 2343. See also Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 60; 
Kuip 1993a, p. 174;  Zondag 2004b, p. 37-39. 
540  For the exempted workers under the BBA 1945, see above under § 16.1. 
541  For this case, see below under § 17.3.4. 
542  For an in-depth discussion of HR 1 december 1961, NJ 1962, 78 (Lampe/De Vries), see below under 
§ 17.3.4. 
543  A significant number of these cases apply to disabled employees who have been dismissed after two 
years of illness. For an overview of cases between 2001-June 2004, see Zondag 2004b, p. 18-33. 
544  Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 60;  Beltzer, Knegt en Van Rijs 1998, p. 48 and 49; Scholtens 2002; 
Zondag 2004b, p. 4. 
545  TK 1947-1948, 881, No. 3, p. 11. For the Advice of the Labour Foundation, see STAR-Advies 1947, 
p. 27. See further Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 70, 263 and 264; Kuip 1993a, p. 174. 
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granting permits.546 In this respect, the Netherlands Supreme Court took an 
important decision in HAL/Van Werkhoven (1979). In this case, the Director of 
the District Employment Office had not correctly applied the rules. The 
employer, nonetheless, terminated the employment agreement based on the 
permit. The lower court held that the employer herewith violated principles of 
good faith, and ordered restoration of the employment agreement. In contrast, 
the Netherlands Supreme Court held that the dismissal system did not allow 
restoration on the ground of good faith.547 Moreover, it held that an employer 
might rely on the permit granted. An employer, thus, does not have to 
investigate whether the Director has granted the permit according to the rules. 
The Netherlands Supreme Court, however, added that when the permit is 
granted, due to improper acts on the part of the employer – e.g. the employer 
provides the public authority with false information in furtherance of which this 
authority grants a permit – the dismissal could be considered as manifestly 
unreasonable.548 In Urenco/Baakman (1988), the Netherlands Supreme Court 
furthered its decision in HAL/Van Werkhoven (1979). Whereas it allowed the 
employer to rely on the decision of the public authority, it stressed that this does 
not mean that the court cannot undertake an independent investigation on the 
facts that led to the dismissal.549
In Pratt & Whitney/Franssen (1999), employees, in furtherance of these 
cases held that the dismissal was manifestly unfair, because their employer had 
willingly provided the public authority with false information on his financial 
situation in order to obtain a permit for the employees. With the exception of 
one employee, all claims had become time-barred (verjaard). Consequently, the 
court had denied the claims. However, the Netherlands Supreme Court held that 
employees, nonetheless, could claim damages based on a tort action, referring to 
the deceit of the employer, which, in itself, may be qualified as a tort.550 Hence, 
it held that to the extent courts cannot order restoration of the employment 
agreement based on grounds other than under the Articles 7:681 DCC and 7:682 
DCC, the possibility for courts remain to grant a severance payment based on 
tort (Article 6:162 DCC), when a claim under Article 7:681 DCC is time-barred.  
17.3.2  Dismissal without cause 
To my knowledge one of the first cases that was published, in which the 
employee held that the termination was given without cause, is Lampe/De Vries 
(1961). In this case, the employer dismissed the employee for reasons unclear to 
the employee, and without prior authorization as required under the BBA 1945. 
546  Van den Heuvel 2000a, p. 262 and 263. 
547  HR 11 mei 1979, NJ 1979, 441 (HAL/Van Werkhoven). See also Rood 1980, p. 293; Hoffmans (1) 
1991, p. 46 and 47; Rouwendal 2005. 
548  See in this context HR 3 december 1999, NJ 2000, 235, JAR 2000/18 (Pratt & Whitney/ Franssen).
549  HR 5 februari 1988, NJ 1988, 950 (Baakman/Urenco). Hoffmans (1) 1991, p. 46 and 47. 
550  HR 3 december 1999, NJ 2000, 235, JAR 2000/18 (Pratt & Whitney/ Franssen). See also Olde 2000; 
Staal 2002; Rouwendal 2005, p. 39. See also Boot 2006b, p. 164-167. 
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Subsequently, after the employee had protested, the employer asked for 
permission to dismiss the employee and dismissed the employee with prior
authorization of the public authority. The Netherlands Supreme Court held that 
because from that moment the reasons of dismissal were clear to the employee, 
the Court did no longer had to decide on whether the dismissal was given 
without cause.551 In this respect, more interesting is a 1987 decision of the 
Netherlands Supreme Court. An employer had sent the employee a resignation 
letter, but failed to state the reason for dismissal. Prior to the resignation letter, 
however, the employer had applied for a permit under the BBA 1945, in which 
he had stated that the employee did not perform well. Hereupon, the Director of 
the District Employment Office granted the permit based on economic
circumstances. A salient detail was that the employee as a possible reason for 
dismissal, the existence that he at the same time denied, brought this ground 
forward. When the employer dismissed the employee in furtherance of this 
permit, the employee held that the termination was manifestly unreasonable. He 
argued that the dismissal was given without cause, and/or based on a professed 
or a false reason, because it was not in accordance with the employer’s alleged 
reason of unsatisfactory performance. The Netherlands Supreme Court held that 
the employee could have known the reason from the employer’s application to 
the Director of the District Employment Office. In contrast, the Advocate 
General held that, although the Director was free to grant the permit on other 
grounds than the employer brought forward in his request, the employee in 
question could not have known the real reason, because the termination was 
based on the permit, which referred to a reason for the dismissal other than the 
employer had brought forward.552 I subscribe to the decision of the Netherlands 
Supreme Court. In my opinion, it is determinative whether the employee, in 
effect, is able to defend himself against the reason for dismissal. In this case, the 
employee held a defense both on unsatisfactory performance and economic 
circumstances.  
Also, a case worthwhile mentioning is the one of 1992. In this case, an 
employer had terminated the employment agreement with its managing director. 
The resignation letter did not refer to the reason for dismissal. However, prior to 
this letter the employee had been dismissed by the general meeting of 
shareholders, based on an auditor’s certificate, in which the accountant pointed 
at the unsatisfactory performance of the managing director for refusing to follow 
the company’s policy. The Netherlands Supreme Court held that the employee 
could have known the reason for dismissal based on the meeting of 
shareholders, at which the managing director was also present.553 A more recent 
case is that of Van der Werff/Elan (2006), which is almost similar to the case of 
551  HR 1 december 1961, NJ 1962, 78 (Lampe/De Vries). For its impact in respect of the consequences 
of a dismissal, see below under § 17.3.4. 
552  HR 10 april 1987, NJ 1988, 5 (Meuleman/Hagemeyer). 
553  HR 4 december 1992, NJ 1993, 271, JAR 1992/149 (Meijers/Mast Holding). 
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1992.554 Overall, the foregoing case law shows that the Netherlands Supreme 
Court does not easily assume that an employee is dismissed without cause, if he 
could have known the reason for dismissal. This is in accordance with 
legislative history. Therefore, in building up a strong case, employees, in 
general, subsidiary bring forward the argument that the dismissal is based on a 
professed or false reason. 
17.3.3  Dismissal based on a professed or false reason  
One of the most interesting cases dates back to 1986. In this case, a managing 
director was dismissed by the general meeting of shareholders for unsatisfactory 
performance. The employee stated he was dismissed for a false reason and 
brought forward facts, which undermined the employer’s statement. The lower 
court agreed with the employee, stating that it, too, was not convinced that the 
real reason of the dismissal had been unsatisfactory performance. Consequently, 
it granted a severance payment to the employee under Article 1639s. The Court 
of Appeal, however, held that the lower court had failed to investigate whether 
the undermining of statements could stand the employee’s burden of proof. The 
Netherlands Supreme Court affirmed this decision. It held that the burden 
ultimately rests with the employee to prove that the dismissal is manifestly 
unreasonable. The Netherlands Supreme Court referred to its earlier decisions in 
this respect.555 It made an exception, however. It held that when an employee 
claims that the alleged reason for dismissal is false, i.e. non-existent, the 
employer has to bring forward sufficient facts so that the employee can properly 
build his defense.556 Herewith, it aggravated the duty of motivation on the part 
of the employer (verzwaring van de motiveringsplicht) regarding the charge 
made against him. In this respect, the Netherlands Supreme Court argued that 
when the employee must prove a negative fact, i.e. a non-existent reason,557
which is virtually impossible, it is reasonable and fair to aggravate the 
employer’s duty in this respect.558 The Netherlands Supreme Court confirmed its 
decision in 1987.559
554  HR 23 juni 2006, JAR 2006/173 (Van der Werff/Elan). In this case, the Court of Appeal and the 
Advocate General of the Netherlands Supreme Court held that the managing director could have 
known the real reason from the minutes of the general meeting of shareholders. The Netherlands 
Supreme Court did not decide on the issue, i.e. rejected van der Werff’s case on formal grounds.  
555  HR 29 maart 1963, NJ 1963, 247 (Kooy/Verenigde Pharmaceutische Fabrieken); HR 2 januari 1970, 
NJ 1970, 155 (De Nederlandsche Bank/X); HR 2 juni 1978, NJ 1979, 520 (Van den Baard/Psychisch 
Centrum St. Anna); HR 17 december 1999, NJ 2000, 171, JAR 2000/29 (Stichting Thuiszorg Midden-
Limburg/P.). See also Conclusion of the Advocate General in HR 25 april 1986, NJ 1986, 624 
(Millenaar/Oerlemans); Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 80 and 81; Kuip 1993a, p. 175; Van der Grinten 
2002, p. 350. 
556  HR 25 april 1986, NJ 1986, 624 (Millenaar/Oerlemans). 
557  See also TK 1952-1953, 881, Handelingen II, 18 februari 1953, p. 2339; Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 80. 
558  HR 25 april 1986, NJ 1986, 624 (Millenaar/Oerlemans). See also Hoffmans (1) 1991, p. 45, 47 and 
48; Kuip 1993a, p. 176; Van der Grinten 2002, p. 350; A.M. Luttmer-Kat, Losbladige 
Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, Art. 7:681 BW (DCC) § 14. 
559  HR 10 april 1987, NJ 1988, 5 (Meuleman/Hagemeyer). 
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 The foregoing cases raise the question what the sanction is if the 
employer does not bring sufficient facts for the employee to properly build his 
defense. The Netherlands Supreme Court answered this question in 1989 and 
2001. In Dolmans BV/Wouters (1989), an employee in a 1639s-procedure held 
that the employer’s alleged reason about unsatisfactory performance was false. 
Based on statements of ex-colleagues, the Director of the District Employment 
Office had granted a permit. In the civil procedure, the employee undermined 
the statements of his ex-colleagues. The lower court agreed with the employee. 
It held that although, in general, the burden of proof rests with the employee to 
prove the false reason, this burden shifts to the employer when the employee has 
undermined the employer’s statements. The Netherlands Supreme Court rejected 
the decision of the lower court. It held that the fact alone that the employee has 
undermined the statement of the employer did not justify a shift of the burden of 
proof.560 The Netherlands Supreme Court held that the burden of proof 
ultimately rests with the employee, although the decision of 7 September 1986 
leaves space to decide otherwise.561 In Staat/Middel (2001), the Netherlands 
Supreme Court confirmed its decision in Dolmans BV/Wouters (1989). This 
decision, nonetheless, can be seen to be for the benefit of the employee. In this 
case, a dentist in service of the navy had been dismissed for unsatisfactory 
performance. The employer dismissed the employee based on a report of an 
internal committee, which included interviews with patients of which the 
employee was not given insight. The employee, who denied the alleged reason, 
asked his employer several times to give insight into the report so that he could 
defend himself properly with regard to the complaints of the patients. The 
employer refused, referring to internal rules of privacy, due to which he was not 
in the position to hand over the report. This in spite of the fact that the employee 
had stressed that these rules did not apply to him. The court in first instance 
disagreed with the employee that the termination was manifestly unreasonable, 
but the appellate court agreed with the employee. With reference to the decision 
of the Netherlands Supreme Court of 25 April 1986, it held that the employer 
had failed to bring forward sufficient facts for the employee to defend himself 
properly, and that courts hereupon may consider the dismissal as manifestly 
unreasonable. The Netherlands Supreme Court affirmed this decision.562
Last, a case worthwhile mentioning is M/Sociaal Kultureel Werk Rotterdam 
(1999). In this case, an employee could no longer perform his duties, due to a 
560  HR 12 mei 1989, NJ 1989, 596 (Dolmans BV/Wouters). In an earlier case, HR 21 april 1989, NJ 
1989, 573 (Ruyters BV/Vermeeren) the Netherlands Supreme Court held that in case an employer 
does not clearly states his defense this can work to his detriment, regardless of the fact that the 
burden of proof rests with the employee. The burden of proof, however, ultimately rests on the 
employee. See on both cases, Hoffmans (1) 1991, p. 48. In contrast, Van den Heuvel advocates the 
shift of the burden of proof with regard to Art. 1639s  (681). See Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 81. 
561  See Conclusion of the Advocate General under 2.5 in HR 10 april 1987, NJ 1988, 5 
(Meulemans/Hagemeyer). 
562  HR 7 september 2001, NJ 2001, 616, JAR 2001/188 (Staat/Middel).  See also Van der Grinten 2002, 
p. 350 and 351; Zondag 2004b, p. 9 and 10. 
227
conflict on the job. After two years of (situational) illness, the employer filed a 
request with the Regional Director of Labor Services in which he asked for 
permission to terminate the employment agreement. The employer brought 
forward that the employee was disabled and that he was not able to offer the 
employee an adjusted position. In this respect, the employer relied on the 
judgment of the Industrial Insurance Board (Bedrijfsvereniging), which had 
stated that the employee was incapable of performing his regular duties. The 
employee held the opposite, referring to a medical attest of his doctor and 
psychiatrist, hence, argued that he was capable of performing his regular duties. 
The employer terminated the employment agreement, after he had received the 
permit. After termination of employment, the Board informed the employee he 
was capable of performing his job again. Subsequently, the employee claimed 
that the termination of employment was manifestly unreasonable. The 
Netherlands Supreme Court held that the employer acted in good faith, hence, 
could trust on the judgment of the Board that the employee was (still) ill when 
he terminated the employment agreement.563
Subsequently, in Stichting Thuiszorg Midden-Brabant/Van Ierland 
(2000), the Industrial Insurance Board, too, stated that the employee in question 
was ill. The Netherlands Supreme Court, however, held that an employer had to 
pay wages over the periods that the employee was able and willing to perform 
her duties. A saillant detail was that the employee successfully had opposed the 
Board’s decision.564 This leads one to wonder what the outcome would have 
been if the employer had dismissed the ill employee based on the decision of the 
Board. The employee then would have been dismissed based on a decision of 
which the ground had fallen away with retrospective effect. In general, one 
cannot dismiss an employee for a false, i.e. non-existent reason.565
17.3.4  Dismissal in light of the consequences of the dismissal 
Lampe/De Vries (1961) meant a major break-through for employees in asking 
damages due to the harsh consequences of the dismissal. In this case, the head 
tailor’s cutter (cheffin coupeuse) was dismissed by her employer with prior 
authorization of the Director of the Employment District Office after eight and 
half years of service. The problems between the employee and the employer 
started after the latter had appointed a new employee as a tailor cutter, who was 
shortly after promoted as head of a new department. When problems arose 
between De Vries and this new employee, Lampe decided to dismiss De Vries, 
who at the time was 48 years old. She filed a claim under Article 1639s, which 
was rejected by the lower court. In contrast, the appellate court held that the 
563  HR 18 juni 1999, NJ 2000, 31, JAR 1999/148 (M./Sociaal Kultureel Werk Rotterdam). See also Olde 
2000; Van der Grinten 2002, p. 344.  
564  HR 23 juni 2000, NJ 2000, 585, JAR 2000/163 (Stichting Thuiszorg Midden-Brabant/Van Ierland). 
For an in-depth discussion on this decision in comparison with HR 18 juni 1999, NJ 2000, 31, JAR 
1999/148 (V./Sociaal Kultureel Werk), see Hoogendijk 2001. 
565  On the other hand, see the so-called conditional requests below under § 18.4.2. 
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dismissal was manifestly unreasonable, due to the fact that the employer had not 
taken into consideration the employee’s interests at the time of the dismissal.  
The Netherlands Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate 
court, stressing that it had not considered the decision to terminate De Vries as 
manifestly unreasonable, but the manner in which Lampe had dismissed De 
Vries. In sum, it held that the employer should have taken into consideration the 
employee’s interests when Lampe dismissed her, including her excellent state of 
service for at least six years; her age and her labour market position, which 
made it difficult for her to find a similar job; the fact that she would have joined 
the pension fund of the employer at the age of 60, and the absence of a financial 
provision in this respect; and the fact that although De Vries was partly to blame 
for the conflict, problems with her had started only after the employer decided to 
make changes in its business policy.566
Lampe/De Vries (1961) raised the question whether a dismissal also could be 
manifestly unreasonable if an employee was seriously to blame for the 
underlying conflict between parties.  
In Elmar/Felix (1978), the Netherlands Supreme Court held that when 
an employee was seriously to blame for the conflict – but this behavior did not 
constitute an urgent cause – the dismissal could still be manifestly unreasonable. 
It affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal, which held that although the 
employee was seriously to blame for the conflict, the dismissal was manifestly 
unreasonable, due to the fact that the employee had been working to the 
satisfaction of the employer for almost sixteen years; the employee’s labour 
market position; his medical situation; his age (44), which made if difficult to 
find a similar job; and, the fact that termination of employment had taken place 
without an extensive notice period or a severance payment.567
In Schrijver/Essen (1999),568 however, the Netherlands Supreme Court made 
clear that when the employee’s behavior justifies a summary dismissal, the 
employee does not have an action under Article 1639s. It held that in 
determining whether there is an urgent reason that justifies a summary dismissal, 
a court must already consider the employer’s and employee’s interests, i.e. the 
importance of the reason for dismissal; the nature of the employment 
relationship; the years of service; whether the performance had been to the 
satisfaction of the employer; and, the personal circumstances of the employee 
among which the employee’s age and the (financial) consequences for the 
employee as a result of the dismissal. Hence, when there is an urgent cause, 
566  HR 1 december 1961, NJ 1962, 78 (Lampe/De Vries). See also Van den Heuvel 2000a, p. 271; 
Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 307; Zondag 2004b, p. 5 and 6. 
567  HR 1 december 1978, NJ 1979, 185 (Felix/Aruba). See also Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 72; Kuip 
1993a, p. 174; Luttmer-Kat 1996; Van den Heuvel 2000a, p. 271; Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 307; 
Zondag 2004b, p. 6. For an overview of cases with regard to Art. 7:681.2 under b BW, see A.M. 
Luttmer-Kat, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, Art. 7:681 BW (DCC) § 5. 
568  For the names, see Peeters 1999, p. 135.  
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these interests cannot be considered again in deciding on whether the dismissal 
is manifestly unreasonable.  
The Netherlands Supreme Court held that to rule otherwise, this would 
not rhyme with the dismissal system. It referred to Article 1639o (7:677 DCC) 
and Article 1639w (7:685 DCC) according to which a court cannot grant 
severance payments in summary dismissals. Therefore, this should not be 
possible under Article 1639s (7:681) either.569 With Schrijver/Essen (1999), the 
Netherlands Supreme Court ended an ongoing discussion in literature whether a 
valid summary dismissal could still be manifestly unreasonable.570 Moreover, it 
made clear – although not exhaustively571   which circumstances must be 
considered in determining an urgent reason for dismissal. In contrast, the 
Netherlands Supreme Court still must give guidelines on precisely which 
circumstances need to be considered in determining a manifestly unreasonable 
dismissal,572 in that Article 7:681 DCC leaves space to give guidelines.573
In Van Ree/Damco (2004), the Netherlands Supreme Court ‘only’ emphasized 
that a court must consider all relevant circumstances on an equal basis. In this 
case, the lower court held that to obtain a higher severance payment, the 
employee must prove a higher pressure of work. The Netherlands Supreme 
Court, however, held that the pressure of work must be considered as one of the 
circumstances in the totality of circumstances, in determining the existence of a 
manifestly unreasonable dismissal.574 The Advocate General was of the opinion 
that the Netherlands Supreme Court could not decide on this subject, because it 
is not allowed to give a decision on factual circumstances.575 Although the 
Advocate General is correct on the latter,576 the Netherlands Supreme Court, in 
569  HR 12 februari 1999, NJ 1999, 643, JAR 1999/102 (Schrijver/Essen). Phaff earlier defended this 
theory, see Phaff 1986, p. 125. For an in-depth discussion of this case, see Sagel 1999. See also Van 
der Grinten 2002, p. 342; Zondag 2005a, p. 38-40. 
570  Van den Heuvel, on the other hand, is still of the opinion that a valid summary dismissal can be 
manifestly unreasonable. Van den Heuvel 2000a, p. 267-274 referring to Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 
109-114. In the past Kuip strongly defended this theory as well. Kuip 1993a, p. 194-212;  Kuip 1996. 
The Advocate General in HR 12 februari 1999, NJ 1999, 643, JAR 1999/102 (Schrijver/Essen) in my 
opinion correctly held that the foregoing authors did not take into consideration that all 
circumstances, including the consequences of the dismissal – thus, not solely the reason – should be 
considered on an equal basis in determining the existence of an urgent reason. See also Sagel 1999; 
Van der Grinten 2002, p. 342; Zondag 2005a, p. 38-40. 
571  Sagel 1999, p. 12. 
572  Hoffmans (1) 1991, p. 48. For an overview of the cases in which disabled employees claim damages  
under  Art. 7:681 DCC, see Zondag 2004b, p. 54-72. 
573  Zondag 2004b, p. 59-62; Duk 2006, p. 17 referring to his previous publication Duk 2004, p. 164-169. 
See further Annotation Zonderling HR 11 februari 1977, NJ 1977, 246 (Polak/Technodiamant 
Amsterdam); Van der Grinten 2002, 345-348. 
574  Rov. 3.4.5. HR 3 december 2004, NJ 2005, 119, JAR 2005/30 (Van Ree/Damco).  
575 HR 3 december 2004, NJ 2005, 119, JAR 2005/30 (Van Ree/Damco). See also Annotation Heerma 
van Voss with HR 3 december 2004, NJ 2005, 119, referring to rov. 2.24 and 2.25; Annotation 
Loonstra HR 3 december 2004, JIN 2005/89. 
576  See also Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 60 and 61.  
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effect, did nothing more than to provide a clear guideline that a court must 
consider all relevant circumstances on an equal basis.  
In an earlier case, the Netherlands Supreme Court already gave a clear 
guideline on the absence of a financial compensation, in that this in itself does 
not constitute a manifestly unreasonable dismissal.577 However, in a later 
decision, the Netherlands Supreme Court held that the fact that an employer had 
not offered compensation, this did not make the dismissal manifestly 
unreasonable, because the employee in question was entitled to social welfare. 
This decision seemed to imply that when an employee was not entitled to social 
welfare, the employer, thus, must offer compensation to avoid that the dismissal 
would be considered as manifestly unreasonable.578
One thing is clear, the court must consider all circumstances of the case in 
determining whether a dismissal can be considered as manifestly unreasonable. 
The latter, however, in turn, became unclear after a decision of the Netherlands 
Supreme Court in 1999. In Boulidam (1999),579 an employee who performed a 
physically heavy job had become ill after working to the satisfaction of his 
employer for almost 25 years. After two years of illness, he was dismissed by 
the employer with prior authorization of the Regional Director of Labor 
Services. The employee did not receive a severance payment, nor did the 
employee qualify for the Disability Insurance Act (Wet op de 
arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering or WAO).580 The Netherlands Supreme Court 
held that the dismissal was manifestly unreasonable, stating that it was improper 
to send off an employee after 25 years of work without severance payment. Not 
in question, according to the Netherlands Supreme Court was whether the 
employee had become ill due to, but after the hard work with the employer.581
Boulidam (1999) raised the question whether a termination of a disabled 
employee with a long state of service, in which an employer had not offered a 
severance payment, should be considered per se as manifestly unreasonable. 
Most authors, among whom Zondag and Verhulp, oppose the latter.582 Loonstra 
referred to the fact that courts must consider all circumstances in determining 
the existence of a manifestly unreasonable dismissal,583 however, this, in fact, is 
what happened in Boulidam (1999).584 Loonstra’s point of view was implicitly 
577  HR 20 december 1985, NJ 1986, 713 (Hotel Ibis/Elbouk). 
578  HR 5 februari 1988, NJ 1988, 950 (Baakman/Urenco). See also Hoffmans (1) 1991, p. 46. 
579  HR 25 juni 1999, NJ 1999, 601, JAR 1999/149 (Boulidam). 
580  The WAO has been amended and replaced by the WIA (Wet werk en inkomen naar 
arbeidsvermogen) as from 29 December 2005 and applies to employees who are ill for at least 104 
weeks as from 1 January 2004. Stb. 2005, 619. 
581  Van der Grinten 2002, p. 348; Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 308; Zondag 2004b, p. 27-33. For a 
discussion of this case see also Boot 1999b. 
582  Zondag 2004b, p. 28; E. Verhulp, JAR Verklaard 2001, p. 9. For case law, see Ktg. Bergen op Zoom 
6 februari 2002, JAR 2002/52; Ktg. Zaanstad 31 oktober 2002, JAR 2002/283. 
583  See Conclusion of the Advocate General in HR 10 juni 2005, NJ 2005, 395, JAR 2005/174 
(Grillroom Ramses II).
584  See Annotation Loonstra HR 3 december 2004, JIN 2005/89. 
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confirmed by the Netherlands Supreme Court in Stichting Thuiszorg Midden-
Limburg/S.585 Still, in practice, the emphasis in cases regarding ill employees 
often is on whether or not the employer has made serious efforts to regintegrate 
the employee,586 and/or on the relationship between the employee’s disability 
and the circumstances on the job.587 Hence, specific guidelines in this respect 
still lack under Article 7:681 DCC. 
17.4 Conclusion 
In 1954, Levenbach held that parties after the introduction of Article 1639s no 
longer have an unlimited right to arbitrarily terminate the employment 
agreement.588 Or as the Netherlands Supreme Court once strikingly held, the 
introduction of Article 1639s outmoded the rule of 1907 that an employer at all 
times could terminate the employment agreement with respect of a notice 
period, regardless of the reason.589 These statements are partly true, however. 
First, in 1953, the Minister of Justice explicitly stressed that with Article 1639s 
he did not wish to introduce a rule based on which an employer needed a just 
cause for dismissal. Second, under Article 1639s (7:681 DCC), a court 
dependent on the circumstances can, but does not have to consider a dismissal 
without cause as manifestly unreasonable. Third, from case law one cannot 
derive that employers need a just cause for dismissal either. The most far-
reaching decisions of the Netherlands Supreme Court in this respect have been 
with regard to a manifestly unreasonable dismissal based on a false, i.e. non-
existent reason. The Netherlands Supreme Court, however, explicitly refused to 
shift the burden of proof. In fact, suppose the Netherlands Supreme Court would 
require of the employer to prove the real reason, this reason does not need to 
constitute a just cause for dismissal. Courts can only take the alleged – good or 
bad – cause into consideration as one of the circumstances, based on which the 
dismissal can be considered as manifestly unreasonable. Fourth, the intent of the 
legislature behind Article 1639s was to provide the employee with a cause of 
action under law after being dismissed without cause. In this respect, Article 
7:681 DCC lost its meaning, because (i) the Netherlands Supreme Court 
relatively easily assumes that the employee based on the circumstances of the 
case could have known the reason; (ii) as from 1 January 1999, an employee 
under Article 7:669 DCC can require of the employer to provide him with the 
reason of the dismissal; and (iii) the emphasis of Article 1639s (Article 7:681 
585  HR 17 december 1999, NJ 2000, 171, JAR 2000/29 (Stichting Thuiszorg Midden-Limburg/P.). See 
also Ktg. Bergen op Zoom 6 februari 2002, JAR 2002/52; Ktg. Zaanstad 31 oktober 2002, JAR 
2002/283. 
586  For example, see Ktg. Utrecht 20 april 2005, JAR 2005/145.  
587  For example, see Ktg. Haarlem 11 november 2000 and 14 maart 2001, JAR 2001/88; Rb. Den Haag  
6 december 2000, JAR 2001/19; Ktg. Amsterdam 11 mei 2004, JAR 2004/152. See also Zondag 
2005a, p. 54-72; Vaandrager 2005, p. 33-36. 
588  Levenbach 1954, p. 69. 
589  HR 1 december 1989, NJ 1990, 451, rov. 3.5.3 and 3.5.4 (Deuss/Motelmaatschappij Holland). 
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DCC) on just cause protection, in practice, has shifted to cases which rather 
focus on the consequences for the employee as a result of the dismissal. Last,
one can doubt whether private-sector employees enjoy just cause protection 
under Article 7:681 DCC according to the legislature’s intent, when an 
employer, in effect, can buy his way out.  
18 Article 685 of Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code: 
 just cause protection? 
In the following paragraphs, I will examine to what extent private-sector 
employees enjoy just cause protection under Article 7:685 DCC. In fact, prior to 
1953, there was still doubt whether Article 1639w, its predecessor, required a 
iusta causa dimissionis.590 Article 1639w, in effect, was considered as a dead 
letter.591 However, it was amended significantly by the Act of 1953, primarily to 
make it possible for an employee to invoke 1639w when a permit was refused 
under the 1945 Special Decree.592 In time, however, Article 7:685 DCC became 
the alternative route of the BBA 1945-procedure, i.e. has been invoked by 
employers instead of the BBA 1945-procedure.593 In this Section, I will examine 
the latter, and whether the grounds for dismissal and review by the CWI and the 
Cantonal Court are the same.  
18.1 The rise of the dissolution procedure 
The predecessor of Article 7:685 DCC – Article 1639w – was introduced by the 
Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907. Under this Article, employers and 
employees could ask for dissolution of the employment agreement. Initially, the 
Article applied to rare situations only. In fact, between July 1907 and July 1954 
only 65 decisions in a dissolution procedure were published.594 To give an idea, 
in the year of 1953 only, about 40,000 requests were filed under the BBA 
1945.595
In 1953, the legislature broadened the scope of Article 1639w to include 
breach of trust as a ground of dismissal.596 Still, the number of requests based on 
Article 1639w remained low compared to the requests under the BBA 1945. For 
example, in 1977 the number of requests under Article 1639w was 480 
compared to 71,771 requests under the BBA 1945. In 1978 and 1979 the number 
590  See Oud, TK 1952-1953, 881, Handelingen II, 17 februari 1953, p. 2323. 
591  See Tendelo, TK 1952-1953, 881, Handelingen II, 18 februari 1953, p. 2334. See also the Minister, 
TK 1952-1953, 881, Handelingen II, 19 februari 1953, p. 2352. 
592  TK 1952-1953, 881, Handelingen II, 19 februari 1953, p. 2351 and 2352. 
593  See also Van der Heijden 2000, p. 235. 
594  Loonstra 1996, p. 148.  
595  For the number of permits between 1950 and 1982, see Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 306. For the number 
of decisions under Art. 1639w, Loonstra 1996, p. 148. 
596  See below under § 18.3. 
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of requests was still relatively low, i.e. 639 versus 67,918 and 765 versus 
71,007, respectively.597 In fact, nothing changed until the eighties. 
As from the 1980s, employers increasingly started to file requests under Article 
1639w (7:685 DCC). In 1981, 1982 and 1983 the number of requests under 
Article 1639w amounted to 1,898, 3,097, 5,035, respectively.598
One of the reasons behind the popularity of the dissolution procedure 
was the Second Oil Crisis. To cut costs, employers wished to dismiss 
employees. Generally, these employers preferred the BBA 1945-procedure, due 
to the low costs of this procedure. Because of the heavy workload on the part of 
the public authority it took months to obtain a permit, however. Not 
surprisingly, employers started to seek for an alternative. This was offered by 
Article 1639w.599 Another reason to invoke the dissolution procedure, was that 
Cantonal Courts tended to grant decisions in so-called pro forma requests easier 
than the public authority.600 As mentioned above, in these requests – generally 
based on economic circumstances – the employee (formally) protests against the 
dismissal to retain his right to unemployment benefits under the Unemployment 
Insurance Benefits Act (Werkloosheidswet or WW), although parties 
substantially agreed on the termination.  
The numbers below show that the BBA 1945-procedure and the dissolution 
procedure have grown towards one another. According to the data of the Central 
Bureau of Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek or CBS),601
and the data of the Ministry of Social Affairs of requests filed – which may 
differ with the cases the CWI and the Cantonal Court eventually handle602 – the 
BBA 1945 and Article 7:685 DCC (Article 1639 w old) relate to one another as 
follows603
597  For the statistics on dissolutions between 1977 and 1986, see Groen 1989, p. 63. For the statistics on 
permits between 1950 and 1982, see Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 306 and 307. 
598  For these statistics, see Groen 1989, p. 63.  
599  See also Scholtens 2001a, p. 6 and 7. 
600  Groen 1989, p. 64; Knegt en Wilthagen 1988, p. 265; Loonstra 1996, p. 155; Scholtens 2001a, p. 7. 
For an in-depth discussion of pro forma cases, see dissertations of Damsteegt 2003, Chapter. 5; and,           
Van Heusden 2006, Chapter 9.  
601  For the statistics on dissolutions between 1977 and 1986, see Groen 1989, p. 63. For the statistics on 
permits between 1950 and 1982, see Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 306 and 307. 
602  For example, see the year of 2004. In this year 89,494 requests were filed with the CWI, but after 
withdrawals ‘only’ 82,420 requests were handled. For the latter, see above under § 16.8. 
603 For the years of 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004, see also Scholtens 
statistiek ontbindingsvergoedingen regarding these years; for 2005, see Loonstra en Kruit 2006.  
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BBA 1945   7:685 DCC
1991 75,997     13,903 (89,900) 
1992 85,669     22,031 (107,700) 
1993 113,625    36,918 (150,543) 
1994  89 732     41,714  (131,446) 
1995  68,348     45,055 (113,403) 
1996  60,423     44,426 (104,849) 
1997  49,790     38,220 (88,010) 
1998  39,618     40,106 (79,724) 
1999  46,745     31,277 (78,033) 
2000  43,584     34,434 (78,018) 
2001  54,376     45,629 (100,005) 
2002  70,925     68,331 (139,256) 
2003  85,881     78,491 (164,372) 
2004  89,494     72,011 (161,505) 
2005  74,550     67,608 (142,158) 
In brief, the dissolution procedure and the BBA 1945-procedure relate to one 
another as 1:6 in 1991; as 1:3 in 1993; as 1:1 in 1998; and as 1:1.1 in 2005.604
The year of 1998 was exceptional, to the extent that for the first time in history 
the number of requests under Article 7:685 DCC was higher than under the 
BBA 1945 (40,106 versus 39,618).  
Earlier, in 1994, the Minister of Social Affairs, Melkert, suggested to make the 
BBA 1945-procedure the principal route again. He suggested that Article 1639w 
would apply only to (i) employment agreements for a definite period; (ii) 
situations in which the public authority refused permission to dismiss an 
employee under the BBA 1945; and (iii) situations, in which a prohibition on 
dismissal applied.605 The majority within the SER rejected the Minister’s 
proposal.606 Employers, too, opposed, in that they preferred to have a choice 
between the dissolution procedure and Article 6 BBA 1945.607 In 2000, the 
ADO-Committee, nonetheless, virtually proposed the same. It suggested to  
apply Article 7:685 DCC only to (i) employment agreements for a definite 
period with at least one year (left); and (ii) situations in which a prohibition on 
dismissal applied.608
More successful means  – but eventually without effect – to make the 
BBA 1945-procedure the main route again, were introduced by the Flexicurity 
604  See Scholtens 2001a, p. 7 and 8. See also Loonstra en Kruit 2006, p. 20. 
605  This to simplify the dismissal system, and to provide legal certainty and legal security under the 
‘new’ system. TK 1994-1995, 22 977, No. 3.   
606  SER-Advies 1995/8. See also Loonstra 1996, p. 156; Scholtens 2001a, p. 8. 
607  Scholtens 2001a, p. 10. See also Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 98. 
608  ADO-Rapport 2000, p. 148. 
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Act of 1998. This Act introduced the expedited procedure (verkorte procedure)
under the BBA 1945-procedure.609 Second, the Flexicurity Act of 1998 held that 
an employer who had obtained a permit, in terminating the employment 
agreement, could deduct one month of the notice period, with at least one month 
left.610 Third, it held that the prohibition on dismissal during the two years of 
illness did not apply when the employee had become ill after the CWI had 
received the employer’s request for a permit.611 Hereupon, in 1999, the BBA 
1945-procedure, so it seemed, gained popularity at the expense of the 
dissolution procedure, due to these measures. However, in 2002, the number of 
requests was equal again (about 70,000). Hence, the success of the foregoing 
measures turned out to be relatively short.612
18.2 Serious cause 
Under Article 7:685 DCC, an employer and an employee independently and at 
all times can address the Cantonal Court, asking to dissolve the employment 
agreement for serious cause. Serious cause embraces either (i) urgent cause; or 
(ii) a change of circumstances based upon which the employment agreement 
reasonably has to end immediately or on short notice. According to legislative 
history, the Cantonal Court must reject the request when serious cause is 
lacking. Hence, an employer cannot trade off just cause protection by a 
severance payment. Considering the foregoing, the decision of the Cantonal 
Court of Haarlem of 10 August 2006 is remarkable. In this case, the Supervisory 
Board, applying its own rules in this respect, after which the Cantonal Court was 
asked to dissolve the employment agreement, had sent off a managing director 
of a housing corporation.613 The Court granted the request. It held that because 
the employment agreement, in effect, was without meaning after the Board’s 
decision. The Court did not investigate whether there was serious cause. It 
simply concluded that, due to the rules of the Supervisory Board, the employee 
was without any protection against dismissal, upon which the Cantonal Court 
decided to take the absence of protection against dismissal into consideration in 
the severance payment, instead of rejecting the request.614
609  Art. 2:6  (old) of the Dismissal Decree. Meanwhile, the expedited procedure is abolished as from 1 
January 2007 (Stcrt. 2006, 243, p. 11). For the rationale behind its introduction and, in turn, its 
abolition , see above under § 16.8. See also below under § 29.2.2. 
610  This rule was laid down in Art. 7:672.4 DCC.  
611  This rule was laid down in Art. 7:670.1 under b DCC. 
612  Loonstra en Kruit 2006, p. 20. See also Scholtens statistiek ontbindingsvergoedingen 1999 and 2000. 
613  It concerned a decision of the Supervisory Board, in which members of the Housing Committee were 
involved, to be distinguished from a General Meeting of Shareholders. In case of the latter, Book 2 of 
the Dutch Civil Code and case law of the Netherlands Supreme Court apply based upon which the 
decision of the General Meeting of Shareholders, in principle, results in the termination of the 
employment agreement as well. For the dual character of the relationship managing director and 
employee, see above under § 16.2. 
614 Ktg. Haarlem 10 augustus 2006, LJN: AY6060. 
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 In practice, requests to dissolve the employment agreement are made by 
employees and employers, however, most frequently by employers.615 In this 
thesis, I will concentrate on the latter only. The requests based on urgent cause 
will be discussed in-depth in paragraph 18.4; the requests based on a change of 
circumstances will be discussed in-depth in paragraph 18.5.  
In brief, the term at all times means that parties can ask for dissolution so long 
as the employment agreement exists. This means that (i) parties can ask for 
dissolution after having agreed upon the employment agreement, regardless of 
whether the employee started working; and (ii) the employee can ask for 
dissolution, regardless of whether the employer notified the employee of 
termination of employment in furtherance of the CWI’s permission to dismiss 
the employee.616 The reason for an employee to address the Cantonal Court, 
although the employer already notified the employee, is that the CWI cannot 
grant a severance payment. The Cantonal Court can, when dissolving the 
employment agreement based on a change of circumstances.617 According to 
Article 7:685 DCC, this severance payment must be fair and reasonable under 
the circumstances, hence, need not cover specific damages.618 This leaves room 
to apply a standard formula.619
In fact, as from 1 January 1997 the so-called Cantonal Formula 
(Kantonrechtersformule) applies to severance payments in the dissolution 
procedure under Article 7:685 DCC. The Cantonal Formula = NxWxC (AxBxC).
In brief, N refers to the Number of years of service (Aantal dienstjaren), but, 
too, takes into consideration the employee’s age. In respect of the latter, N = 1 
for each year of service when the employee is younger than 40 years old at the 
time of the dissolution; N = 1.5 for each year of service when the employee is 
between ages 40 through 49; and N = 2 for each year of service when the 
employee is 50 and older. The W refers to Wages. More specifically, it refers to 
gross salary, including vacation bonuses (Beloning). The C refers to the 
correction factor (Correctiefactor). In determining the size of the severance 
payment, the starting point is a neutral dissolution. For example, termination of 
employment based on economic circumstances is considered as neutral, because 
no one generally is to blame for these circumstances. In these cases, the 
615  Knegt en Wilthagen 1988, p. 221. See also Scholtens statistiek ontbindingsvergoedingen 1998, 2000,  
2001 and 2003 (II). For an in-depth discussion of requests of employees, asking for a dissolution of 
the employment, see Burger 2000; Van Slooten 2001a, p. 41-49. 
616  Toelichting op Aanbevelingen voor procedures ex Art. 7:685 BW zoals vastgesteld in de plenaire 
vergadering van de Kring van Kantonrechters d.d. 8 november 1996, laatstelijk gewijzigd d.d. 5 
oktober 2001. Tekst & Commentaar Arbeidsrecht (2006): Bijlage 2. Circle of Cantonal Courts (Kring 
van Kantonrechters) was established in 1953. See Loonstra en Zondag 2006, p. 349 and 350. 
617  See below under § 18.3. 
618  See Annotation Heerma van Voss HR 3 december 2004, NJ 2005, 119 (Van Ree/Damco). 
619  However, see the discussion in literature – and contrasting decisions of courts – to have a formula, i.e 
the Cantonal Formula applied to severance payments under Art. 7:681 DCC. See Charbon 2002; 
Zondag 2004b, p. 11;  Annotation Heerma van Voss HR 3 december 2004, NJ 2005, 119 (Van 
Ree/Damco). 
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correction factor is 1. On the other hand, if the employee is responsible for 
termination of employment – i.e. the employee is at fault and/or termination of 
employment is at his risk – the Cantonal Court can set the correction factor at 
less than one, or even zero. In contrast, if the employer is responsible for 
termination of employment, the Cantonal Court can set the correction factor at 
greater than one.620 In general, a correction factor greater than two is 
exceptional.621 Although employers to a certain extent can calculate the 
severance payment under the Cantonal Formula, an employer may be confronted 
with an unpleasantly high severance payment, or an employee with an 
unpleasantly low severance payment. In this respect, there is a possibility to 
withdraw the request, however, this is possible only when the court allows the 
petitioner to. According to Article 7:685.9 DCC, Cantonal Courts, in principle, 
must point out to the petitioner the possibility to withdraw the request. In this 
respect, Cantonal Courts, generally, decide that they dissolve the employment 
agreement by a certain date under a severance payment, unless the petitioner has 
withdrawn the request before the date in question. On the other hand, when the 
Cantonal Court fails to point out this possibility, the petitioner cannot undertake 
any action against this ‘wrong’ decision, nor can he withdraw the request on his 
own initiative.622
Not surprisingly, employees will primarily base their requests on a change of 
circumstances with the aim to obtain a severance payment. The parties’ choice is 
not determinative, however. In Franssen/Safe Sun (1986), the Netherlands 
Supreme Court held that the court ultimately decides whether there is an urgent 
reason for dismissal, or a change of circumstances.623 Consequently, when an 
employer asks the Cantonal Court to dissolve the employment agreement based 
on urgent cause, but the circumstances, in effect, constitute a change of 
circumstances, the Cantonal Court may dissolve the employment agreement 
based on the latter.624 In Franssen/Safe Sun (1986), the employee asked to 
dissolve the employment agreement based on a change of circumstances which, 
in effect, constituted an urgent cause. Subsequently, the Cantonal Court 
dissolved the employment agreement based on urgent cause. Hence, the 
employee was not entitled to a severance payment. The unfairness was that the 
employer was to blame for this urgent reason for dismissal. The Netherlands 
Supreme Court outbanned this unfairness in Deuss/Motelmaatschappij Holland 
(1989), which decision was affirmed by the Netherlands Supreme Court in 
620  For an in-depth discussion of cases, see Aanbevelingen 3.1-3.7 Kantonrechtersformule in: Tekst & 
Commentaar Arbeidsrecht (2006): Bijlage 2. 
621 For example, see Scholtens statistiek ontbindingsvergoedingen 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000. See also  
Loonstra and Zondag 2006, p. 352. 
622  HR 27 maart 1998, NJ 1998, 553, JAR 1998/136 (FNV/Kuypers). 
623  HR 4 april 1986, NJ 1986, 549 (Franssen/Safe Sun).
624  HR 4 april 1986, NJ 1986, 549 (Franssen/Safe Sun). HR 22 november 1996, NJ 1997, 203, JAR 
1996/252 (Tele-Aruba/Lampkin). 
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2002.625 It held that when an employer is guilty of an urgent cause based on 
which the employee is forced to resign, or based on which the employer 
dissolves the employment agreement, the employer violates his duty to behave 
as befits a good employer under Article 1638z (7:611 DCC) and, subsequently, 
the employee can ask for damages under Article 7:677.3 DCC and 7:686 DCC. 
Under Article 7:677.3 DCC, an employee can ask for a fixed amount when he 
has substantiated that the employer is guilty of the urgent cause that led to the 
dissolution. Under Article 7:686 DCC, the employee can ask for additional 
damages, e.g. the loss of income based on breach of contract.626 A more efficient 
alternative for the employee would have been when the employee could have 
appealed from the decision in the dissolution procedure. However, Article 
7:685.11 DCC, in principle, does not allow parties to appeal from the decision of 
the Cantonal Court,627 although it has been more than once suggested that an 
appeal be allowed regarding the size of the severance payment.628 In fact, under 
case law, appeal is possible only
x when the Cantonal Court exceeded the scope of Article 7:685 DCC, 
e.g. it believed to have dissolved an employment agreement that did 
not exist;629
x when the Cantonal Court erroneously did not apply Article 7:685 
DCC, e.g. it believed that the agreement could not be qualified as 
an employment agreement;630 or
x when the employer has violated a fundamental principle of fair 
trial, in practice, restricted to the hearing of both sides (hoor en 
wederhoor).631
625 HR 1 december 1989, NJ 1990, 451 (Deuss/Motel Maatschappij Holland) affirmed by the 
Netherlands Supreme Court in HR 11 oktober 2002, JAR 2002/261 (Van Maarschalkerwaart/Dalle 
Vedove). For an in-depth discussion of the latter, see Vegter 2003, p. 62-77. 
626  HR 1 december 1989, NJ 1990, 451 (Deuss/Motel Maatschappij Holland). 
627  Art. 7:685.11 DCC. For its legislative history, see below under § 18.3. See also HR 24 oktober 1997, 
NJ 1998, 257, JAR 1997/248 (Baijings); HR 2 november 2001, NJ 2001, 667, JAR 2001/255 
(Elverding/Wienholts). See Van Marwijk Kooy 2002, p. 34. For case law, in which Baijings (1997)
was affirmed and/or decisions in which the Netherlands Supreme Court further explained Baijings 
(1997), see below under § 18.5. 
628  First, in 1988, the SER suggested to allow partial appeal against the size of the severance payment 
(SER-Advies 1988/12, p. 39 and 40). The government followed the SER (TK 1989-1990, 21 479, 
No. 2 under K), however, Bill 21 479 was withdrawn  in 1996. A year later, the Minister of Social 
Affairs sent the Bill on Flexibility and Security to the Lower House, in which it followed the 
suggestions of the Labour Foundation with one exception. It did not allow appeal against the award 
of a severance payment in an Article 685-procedure. See STAR-Advies 1996/2, p. 32 and 33. See 
also below under § 28.2.1. For a discussion between various authors, lawyers, judges and scientists 
on this issue, see Waarheen met artikel 1639w BW?, Verslag van de voorjaarsvergadering van 3 juni 
1988, Nederlandse vereniging voor procesrecht, Kluwer, Deventer, 1989. 
629  HR 6 maart 1992, NJ 1992, 707 (Campina). 
630  HR 12 maart 1982, NJ 1983, 181 (Sneep/Stichting Paedo). 
631  HR 4 maart 1988, NJ 1989, 4 (Hollandsche Beton Maatschappij/Wielenga); HR 24 april 1992, NJ 
1992, 672, JAR 1992/13 (Woesthoff/Intershow); HR 23 juni 1995, NJ 1995, 661, JAR 1995/15 
(V.A./R). 
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18.3 Legislative history 
1907 
Drucker submitted his – second – draft to the Minister of Justice in 1898. This 
would form the basis of the Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907. Article 
50 of this draft provided the possibility for parties to ask the court to dissolve the 
employment agreement based on a change of circumstances, with explicit 
examples on the part of the employer and the employee.632 The legislature of 
1907 followed the draft, but included a dissolution based on urgent cause as 
well. The latter was contrary to the legislature’s initial intent to create an 
extrajudicial procedure under Article 1639w. Initially, Article 1639w would 
apply to situations for which no one was to blame only. Consequently, Van den 
Heuvel speaks of a so-called weaving error (weeffout) on the part of the 
legislature, because dismissals based on urgent cause generally involve the 
question of who is to blame.633 Also, the legislature of 1907 crossed out the 
enumeration of examples as suggested by Drucker, considering Article 1639w 
clear enough in this respect.634
Consequently, when Article 1639w was introduced in the Act of the 
Employment Agreement of 1907, it provided that ‘an employer and an employee 
independently, before and after the employee started working, could ask the 
court to dissolve the employment agreement based on serious cause, either 
embracing  (i) an urgent cause according to Article 1639o; or (ii) a change of 
circumstances in one’s personal or financial position or in the job, based upon 
which the employment agreement reasonably has to end immediately or on short 
notice’.635
Urgent cause 
The possibility to ask for dissolution of the employment agreement based on 
urgent cause was suggested by  Van Idsinga, a member of the Lower House. 
During parliamentary discussions, he stressed that employers may have doubts 
on whether a reason constituted an urgent cause under the new Article 1639o. 
Hence, he suggested that employers would be offered an alternative through 
Article 1639w, to avoid liability under Article 1639o when – afterwards – an 
urgent cause was lacking.636 Therefore, Van Idsinga suggested that employers, 
632  Drucker 1898, p. 18 and 19. 
633  Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 116-118; Van den Heuvel 1989b, p. 2 and 3; Kuip 1993a, p. 118 and 119. 
634  Wet op de arbeidsovereenkomst van 13 juli 1907 (Stb. 193). See also Canes 1908, p. 310. 
635  Levenbach 1954, p. 81. 
636  Examples of an urgent cause based upon which the employer could ask the Cantonal Court to 
dissolve the employment agreement could be found in the new Art. 1639p, which included acts, 
characteristics or behavior of the employee based on which one reasonably could not expect of the 
employer to continue the employment agreement. Examples of an urgent cause based upon which the 
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who were doubtful whether a reason constituted an urgent cause under Article 
1639o, would be offered a possibility to ask for dissolution based on urgent 
cause under Article 1639w.  All the more so, in that the only other alternative 
was an action based on breach of contract. However, not all urgent reasons for 
dismissal constituted a breach of contract.  
Through Article 1639w, the legislature of 1907, hereupon, introduced 
the possibility of dissolution of the employment agreement based on urgent 
cause. Herewith, it explicitly authorized Cantonal Courts to decide on the 
existence of an urgent cause, covering situations, in which (i) employers were 
doubtful whether a summary dismissal under the new Article 1639o was 
successful; and/or (ii) an urgent cause did not constitute a breach of contract 
under the new Article 1639x.637 Article 1639w regarding an urgent cause, 
however, became a dead letter. The ‘new’ Article 1639w referred to ‘an urgent  
cause on the basis of Article 1639o’. This automatically meant that case law 
with regard to Article 1639o applied to the Article 1639w-procedure, among 
which the decision of 14 November 1913 – affirmed in 1914 – of the 
Netherlands Supreme Court. Under this case law, an employer was not allowed 
to keep an employee in service after the employee was dismissed based on an 
urgent reason.638 Under Article 1639w, however, the employee remained in 
service until the date of the dissolution.639
Change of circumstances 
A dissolution based on a change of circumstances was possible on limited 
grounds only, i.e. based on a change of circumstances in one’s personal or 
financial position, or in the job.640 Consequently, the legislature – and the 
founding father of the Act, Drucker – thought of rare cases only for which no 
one of the parties was to blame.641 For example, they thought of a wealthy 
person who had hired a secretary and lost all of its fortune, due to unforeseeable 
circumstances and, consequently, could no longer afford the secretary; or of an 
employee who had agreed on an employment agreement for a period of three 
years, but suddenly was given the opportunity to take over the family business 
through his father’s sudden death.642 Courts applied Article 1639w strictly 
employee could ask the Cantonal Court to dissolve the employment agreement could be found in Art. 
1639q. This Article included circumstances based on which one reasonably cannot ask of the 
employee to continue the employment agreement, among which the refusal to pay salary in time, 
battery and/or insult towards the employee. 
637  Canes 1908, p. 311; Bles IV, 1909, p. 264 and 265; Meijers 1924, p. 206. See also Polak 1939,  
p. 222; Kuip 1993a, p. 31. 
638  HR 14 november 1913, NJ 1913, 1268 (Verbruggen/Verhoef); HR 24 december 1914, NJ 1915, 268 
(Mulder/Van der Schoot). For a discussion of these cases, see  Kuip 1993a, p. 53, 57 and 58.  
639  Polak 1939, p. 221 and 222. 
640  Bles IV, 1909, p. 256 and 262; Levenbach 1954, p. 81; Loonstra 1997a, p. 10 and 11. 
641  Polak 1939, p. 222. 
642  Drucker 1898, p. 77 and 78; Bles IV, 1909, p. 260; Meijers 1924, p. 206; Levenbach 1954, p. 81 and 
82.
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according to the legislature’s intent.643 In 1921, its scope was broadened under 
case law. In this case, the Netherlands Supreme Court allowed the employee to 
ask for dissolution of the employment agreement when he was given the 
opportunity to obtain a far better job.644 The Netherlands Supreme Court did not 
follow its Advocate General, who held that a job offer did not constitute a 
change (yet), because it was an offer only.645 Still, employers and employees 
invoked Article 1639w rarely. Instead, parties preferred to terminate an 
employment agreement for an indefinite period with respect of the – short – 
notice period, rather than to ask for dissolution of the employment agreement 
under a 1639w-procedure.646 It is noteworthy to mention that at the time the 
dissolution procedure did not (yet) brought any extras, e.g. the possibility for 
employees to ask for a severance payment. As regards the latter, the legislature 
held that courts by setting the date of the dissolution could take the damages of 
parties into consideration.647
No appeal 
The legislature did not aim to provide courts a means with Article 1639w to 
settle a dispute between parties as is common in judicial procedures in 
contentious matters (judiciële procedure op tegenspraak). Consequently, the 
legislature left out the possibility of appeal in the dissolution procedure.648
Moreover, it left out the second defense (conclusie van repliek) and/or rejoinder 
(conclusie van dupliek), as is common in judicial procedures in contentious 
matters.649 In time, however, voices were raised against the absence of appeal, 
because of the fact that requests based on urgent cause – and as from 1953, 
requests based on breach of trust – in effect, concern contentious matters.650
Also, they referred to the 1981 decision of the Committee on the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which held that Article 6.1 ECHR651 applies to 
employment termination.652 In brief, this Article determines that everyone is 
643  Levenbach 1954, p. 81. 
644  Meijers 1924, p. 206, referring to HR 20 oktober 1921, NJ 1921, 1201 (De Vries/Arnhemsche 
Orchestvereeniging).
645  Loonstra 1996, p. 149 and 150, referring to HR 20 oktober 1921, NJ 1921, 1201 affirming the 
decision of Ktg. Enschede 22 oktober 1914, RBA (6) 1917, No. 13 and 14. See also Jansen en 
Loonstra 1990, p. 369 and 370. 
646  Meijers 1924, p. 206 and 207; Levenbach 1954, p. 81 and 82. 
647  Bles IV, 1909, p. 266 and 267; Levenbach 1954, p. 84. 
648  Bles IV, 1909, p. 85; Groen 1989, p. 172; Kuip 1993a, p. 30. See also Boot  2005b, p. 13-15. 
649  See Polak 1939, p. 234 and 235. 
650  For example, see Peereboom 1932, p. 35 and 36; Menalda 1957, p. 364 and 365;  Slagter 1957,  
p. 465-469; and, De Rijke 1957, p. 469 and 470. See also below under § 18.3. 
651  For this Treaty, see above under § 14.2.2.1. 
652  ECRM 8 oktober 1980, 8974/80, NJ 1981/149. The complaint on which the Committee had to decide 
was whether the BBA 1945 was in violation of Article 6 ECHR (EVRM), in that an administrative 
body – i.e. the government – decided on termination of employment without the possibility of appeal. 
The Committee held that the employee, eventually, could apply for an independent court under Art. 
1639s (Art. 7:681 DCC).  
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entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law.653 They argue that Article 6.1 ECHR 
applies to Article 7:685 DCC and the dissolution procedure does not constitute a 
fair hearing, because appeal is lacking, therefore, it is in violation of this 
Article.654 Opponents argue that, under prevailing case law, appeal is possible. 
They refer to case law that applies when the Cantonal Court has violated 
fundamental principles of fair trial.655 This case law, however, does not allow 
for appeal in all cases, e.g. when the Cantonal Court fails to motivate its 
decision.656
1953 
In 1946, Queen Wilhelmina announced a Bill on a revision of rules on 
employment termination with the aim to give workers with a long state of 
service more social security. This resulted in the Act of 17 December 1953.657
Under the Act, the notice periods were extended, dependent on the years of 
service. Subsequently, by means of trade-off, the legislature gave employers a 
means to have the employment agreement dissolved earlier under Article 
1639w.658 To achieve the latter, the legislature crossed out the limitative grounds 
with regard to a change of circumstances, and determined that dissolution of the 
employment agreement was possible based on ‘a change of circumstances of 
such a kind that the employment agreement has to end on short notice’.659
On the other hand, the legislature explicitly stated that with this change 
it did not intend to give courts discretion to dissolve the employment agreement 
based on any kind of change of circumstances. The legislature, in other words, 
still wished to cover rare situations as described above with one addition only: it, 
too, covered situations based on breach of trust for which no one was to blame, 
nonetheless, frustrating the execution of the employment agreement, hence, 
making it necessary to dissolve the employment agreement. Whereas parties 
prior to 1953 could already ask for a dissolution based on breach of trust, this 
was possible only when one of the parties was to blame for the breach of trust, 
i.e. the reason constituted an urgent cause.660
653  For the full text, see Viering 1994, p. 3. 
654  Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 115-120; Petri 1981. See also Loonstra 1985, p. 358. The latter emphasizes 
that the question of who is to blame particularly occurs in requests based on breach of trust; in other 
cases it still concerns so-called neutral cases in which no one is to blame. Moreover, Loonstra’s 
research does not include requests based on urgent cause, in which the question of who is to blame 
has a central role as well. See Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 116-118. Already, Loonstra had pointed at 
pro forma cases, which, too, cannot be considered judicial. Loonstra 1997a, p. 50 and 51.  
655  Groen 1989, p. 183. 
656  Kuijer en Sagel 2001. For the possibilities of appeal, see above under § 18.2. 
657  Stb. 1953, 619. See also above under § 15.3.2. 
658  Levenbach 1954, p. 82; Loonstra 1997a, p. 11. 
659  Levenbach 1954, p. 82-84. 
660  Levenbach 1954, p. 83.
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Also, by means of trade-off with respect to the extension of the notice periods, 
the legislature ‘liberalized’ Article 1639w regarding an urgent cause. The new
phrasing of Article 1639w became that a dissolution of the employment 
agreement based on urgent cause was possible ‘if the ground would have had 
constituted an urgent cause under Article 1639o based on which the employment 
agreement could have been terminated immediately’.661
 Hence, the legislature made it possible for employers to ask for 
dissolution based on urgent cause on the one hand, and to keep the employee in 
service until the date of the dissolution on the other. The legislature of 1953 did 
not abandon the rule that case law on summary dismissals (still) needed to be 
respected. Consequently, the decision of 14 November 1913, in effect, still 
applies.662 In brief, under this decision, an employer must file a request under 
Article 7:685 DCC shortly after he has knowledge of the urgent reason for 
dismissal.663 I agree with Kuip that the only case law on summary dismissals 
that does not apply to the dissolution procedure, is case law under which an 
employer must inform the employee of the urgent reason for dismissal 
immediately (onverwijld) after he knew of this cause.664 This requirement was to 
guarantee the employee a fair trial, i.e. to enable the employee to immediately 
investigate whether the reason was true and to have a court decided on this on 
short notice.665 However, in the dissolution procedure a court per definition will 
decide on the dismissal, which makes this requirement superfluous in 
dissolution procedures.  
Still, despite the liberalization of Article 1639w, the dissolution procedure was 
invoked rarely.666 After the legislature of 1953 had further ‘liberalized’ the 
Article, in that it had authorized courts to grant a severance payment in case of a 
change of circumstances, the number of requests, nonetheless, remained low.667
The legislature had introduced a severance payment, because practice showed 
that courts could not take into consideration the damages in all cases, by shifting 
the date of the dissolution. In fact, Article 1639w did not allow to have the date 
of the dissolution laid too far from the date of the Cantonal Court’s decision, 
because Article 1639w required termination of employment immediately or on 
short notice.668 With the introduction of severance payments, the legislature also 
realized that the difficulty for the petitioner would be to calculate the severance 
661  Levenbach 1954, p. 76-81. 
662  HR 14 november 1913, NJ 1913, 1268 (Verbruggen/Verhoef) ; HR 24 december 1914, NJ 1915, 268 
(Mulder/Van der Schoot). For an in-depth dicussion of these cases, see Kuip 1993a, p. 53, 57 and 58.  
663  Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 117; Phaff 1986, p. 106; Kuip 1993a, p. 82 and 83. 
664  I add that to the extent the employee wishes to be informed on the urgent reason for dismissal on 
short notice, the employee can file a claim on the basis of Art. 7:669 DCC. For an in-depth discussion 
of Art. 7:669 DCC, see above under § 15.3.3. 
665  Kuip 1993a, p. 82-84. 
666  Levenbach 1954, p. 84 referring to J. Mannoury, Sociale Zekerheidsgids Mei 1954, p. 321.
667  Levenbach 1954, p. 84 and 85. 
668  Levenbach 1954, p. 84. 
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payment in advance. Hence, the legislature decided that courts must give the 
petitioner the possibility to withdraw the request within a certain time frame.669
 Initially, the legislature thought of situations for which no one was to 
blame. Therefore, it allowed a severance payment in case of a change of 
circumstances only. In this respect, the one example mentioned in the 
Memorandum in Reply (Memorie van Antwoord) was that of the librarian, who 
had been left without work and without a future after the library had burnt down. 
In such a case, the librarian should be able to ask for dissolution of the 
employment agreement, and a severance payment.670 In case of an urgent cause,
usually one is to blame, hence, a severance payment should not be awarded. It, 
however, made one exception. When a party has given an urgent cause to the 
other party to ask for dissolution of the employment agreement, this party 
should be able to ask the other for a severance payment. Subsequently, the 
legislature of 1953 amended Article 1639o (Article 7:677.3 DCC), explicitly 
determining that a party in such a case can ask for a severance payment under 
this Article.671
1999 
Article 1639w – after it had been converted into Article 7:685 DCC672 – 
underwent a  (last) relevant change in light of just cause protection as from 1 
January 1999 through the Flexicurity Act.673 As from then, Article 7:685.1 DCC 
provides that the Cantonal Court can grant a request only after it has ascertained 
that the reason for dismissal is not related to a prohibition on dismissal.674 This 
requirement still exists.675 Second, the Flexicurity Act of 1998 determined that a 
request was inadmissible, if the employer had not handed over a so-called 
reintegration plan (reintegratieplan) for an employee who had reported himself 
ill before the Cantonal Court had received the request. A reintegration plan was 
already required under Article 71a (old) of the Disability Insurance Act (Wet op 
de arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering or WAO).676 As from 1 January 1999, the 
legislature applied this requirement to the dissolution procedure. In this 
reintegration plan, the employer needed to substantiate (i) to what extent the 
employee was still able to work; and (ii) the reason why the employer could not 
provide the employee with other – adjusted – work. With this new requirement, 
669  Levenbach 1954, p. 85. 
670  Levenbach 1954, p. 84, referring to ‘Memorie van Antwoord, p. 18’. 
671  Levenbach 1954, p. 84. 
672  Enforcement on 1 April 1997. See Stb. 1996, 406 and 562. 
673  Stb. 1998, 300. 
674  For its legislative history, see below under § 18.5.2.2 under (ii). 
675  For whether and to what extent Cantonal Courts apply the prohibition on dismissal as regards illness, 
see below under § 18.5.2.2. 
676  The WAO has been amended and replaced by the WIA (Wet werk en inkomen naar 
arbeidsvermogen) as from 29 December 2005 and applies to employees who are ill for at least 104 
weeks as from 1 January 2004. Stb. 2005, 619. 
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the legislature aimed to provide Cantonal Courts a means to decide on the 
possibility of reintegration,677 and, consequently, to protect disabled employees 
against rash dismissals.678 However, in practice, the new requirement frustrated 
the operation of Article 7:685 DCC. A reintegration plan first needed to be 
reviewed by the National Institute for Social Security (Landelijk Instituut voor 
Sociale Verzekeringen or LISV),679 which took a considerable amount of time. 
This conflicted with the nature of the dissolution procedure, which required an 
immediate dissolution, or dissolution on short notice. Second, a request was 
inadmissible per se when the employee was ill, regardless of whether the 
change of circumstances was related to illness. For example, when the employer 
asked for dissolution of the employment agreement based on unsatisfactory 
performance, apart from the employee’s illness, the request, nonetheless, was 
inadmissible, simply due to the fact that the employee was ill.  
 Courts became divided on this matter.680 In its decision of 29 September 
2000, the Netherlands Supreme Court gave clarity. It held that when an 
employee was ill, this did not automatically imply that the request was 
inadmissible when a reintegration plan was lacking. In this case, the employee 
had made it impossible for the employer to determine whether he was ill. 
Consequently, the employer was not able to submit a reintegration plan.681
Subsequently, in 2001, the Netherlands Supreme Court held that also in 
situations, in which reintegration, in effect, is impossible – e.g. in case of  
breach of trust – a request is admissible, although a reintegration plan is 
lacking.682 The foregoing decisions of the Netherlands Supreme Court – and 
criticism in literature683 – eventually urged the legislature to abandon the 
requirement of a reintegration plan, as from 1 April 2002. Still, under case law,
employers must substantiate the impossibility to replace the employee in another 
– adjusted – position.684
677  Verburg 1998. 
678  See Scholtens 2001a, p. 8 and 9. See further Verburg 1998; Boot 1999a, p. 149; Van Arkel en 
Loonstra 2004, p. 12.29. 
679  The Lisv has been replaced by the Social Security Agency (Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemers 
Verzekeringen or UWV) as from 1 January 2002 under the Act on the Implementation Structure for 
Work and Income (Wet Structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen or SUWI). 
680  For example, see Ktg. Gorinchem, 24 november 1999, JAR 2000/2; Ktg. Groningen 1 september 
2000, JAR 2000/213. 
681  HR 29 september 2000, NJ 2001, 302, JAR 2000/224 (Kuijper/ING). For a discussion of this 
decision, see Pieters 2000, p. 201-206; Verhulp 2000; Verhulp 2001. 
682  HR 22 juni 2001, NJ 2001, 475, JAR 2001/130 (Van der Kooy/Autoservice Van der Velden). For this 
decision, see Verhulp 2001; Buijs 2001. 
683  See in particular Marcelissen, Knegt, Van de Pas en Beltzer 2000. 
684 Wet verbetering poortwachter, Stb. 2001,685 (in furtherance of TK 27 678, No. 3, p. 29). See Boot 
2002a; Verhulp 2000, footnote 32, referring to ‘Brief van 22 september 2000 aan de Voorzitter van 
de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, kenmerk AV/RV/2000/43758’, in which the Minister of 
Social Affairs already announced to reconsider the requirement of a reintegration plan in a 
dissolution procedure. 
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18.4 Urgent cause 
It never has been an issue that an urgent cause constitutes a just cause for 
dismissal.685 This Section, nonetheless, examines case law in this respect under 
Article 7:685 DCC. The reason is to examine whether courts qualify a reason as 
urgent relatively easily. The reason to examine the foregoing in the context of 
Article 7:685 DCC, and not in the context of Article 7:677 DCC (summary 
dismissals), is that Article 7:685 DCC, in particular, is controversial in the 
debates on just cause protection. In brief, under Article 7:678 DCC, an urgent 
cause, i.e. urgent reason for dismissal on the part of the employer may consist of 
acts, characteristics or behavior of the employee, e.g. theft, battery and/or insult 
based upon which a reasonable person cannot expect the employer to continue 
the employment agreement.686 Also, behavior for which the employee is not to 
blame, e.g. alcoholism, can constitute an urgent cause.687 The examples given by 
the legislature may alter in time. For example, in 1920 courts held that a strike 
constituted a severe breach of contract. Consequently, an employer was allowed 
to dismiss an employee who had joined a strike instantly,688 because a strike was 
considered as illegitimate.689 Meanwhile, in 1986, the Netherlands Supreme 
Court has held that a strike is legitimate under Article 6.4 of the European Social 
Charter of 1961.690 Under Article 31 ESH a strike can become illegitimate, 
albeit in exceptional situations when it is in serious violation of interests of third 
parties, e.g. unions have abused their right to collective bargaining.691
685  Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 107-109. For summary dismissals  in historical perspective, see Kuip 
1993a, p. 15-31. 
686  Examples of an urgent cause based upon which the employee can ask the Cantonal Court to dissolve 
the employment agreement can be found in Art. 7:679 DCC. This Article includes circumstances 
based on which one reasonably cannot expect the employee to continue the employment agreement, 
among which the refusal to pay salary in time, battery and/or insult towards the employee. For an in-
depth discussion of requests based on urgent cause, see below under § 18.4. For a recent case on 
whether theft constitutes an summary dismissal, see HR 24 maart 2006, JAR 2006/99 
(Staal/Middelkoop).
687  HR 3 maart 1989, NJ 1989, 549 (Choaibi/NS) affirmed by the Netherlands Supreme Court in HR 29 
september 2000, NJ 2001, 560, JAR 2000/223 (D./Nutricia). See also HR 21 januari 2000, NJ 2000, 
190, JAR 2000/45 (Hema I).
688  Jansen en Loonstra 1990, p. 368, footnote 75, referring to Ktg. Enschede 4 maart 1920, RBA (9) 
1921, No. 13 and 14.  
689  With regard to a discussion on whether a strike was (il)legitimate, see Jansen en Loonstra 1990,
p. 368, 370 and 37,  referring to E.M. Meijers, Staking als dringende reden, in: RBA 4 (1913), p. 73 
and 74; and, M.G. Levenbach, Onrechtmatige daad en werkstaking, Haarlem 1935. 
690  HR 30 mei 1986, NJ 1986, 688 (NS).
691  For a discussion of the right to strike and relevant case law in this respect, see Bakels 2005, p. 248-
263; Loonstra en Zondag 2006, p. 273-281. 
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18.4.1  Studies on case law 
The following studies on case law show that requests based on urgent cause 
form a minority of the cases under Article 7:685 DCC on the one hand, and are 
rejected in the majority of cases on the other. More recent cases, too, show that 
Cantonal Courts are reluctant to grant requests based on urgent cause.692 First, in 
1939, Polak presented results in this respect. He examined decisions regarding 
Article 1639w, delivered between 1909 and 1939. He concluded that in case of 
an urgent cause, employers gave preference to Article 1639o.693 Loonstra and 
Jansen, too, concluded the same regarding decisions, delivered between 1909 
and 1942. The central question generally was whether an employee could be 
dismissed before he started working, or if the employment agreement had come 
to an end because of an employee’s statement.694 Overall, the few cases based 
on urgent cause under Article 1639w were due to its strict formulation.695 In 
fact, the liberalization of Article 1639w in 1953 resulted in a slight increase of 
the requests based on urgent cause only, and remained relatively low ever since.  
As demonstrated by Groen in his 1988 dissertation, between 1 January 
1953 and 1 January 1987, only 13% of the requests under Article 1639w were 
based on urgent cause. Groen had examined published 227 decisions, delivered 
between 1953 and 1978 (50), and between 1979 and 1986 (177).696 Groen 
concluded that the majority of cases based on urgent cause were rejected, hence, 
only a quarter of the requests based on urgent cause were granted (31%).697 A 
brief study of Scholtens indicates that the(se) numbers did not actually change 
between 1987 and June 1993.698 A brief overview of Luttmer-Kat of requests 
based on urgent cause under Article 7:685 DCC shows the same percentage. 
From this overview derives that Cantonal Courts between 1987 and 2003 
granted requests in 30 of 105 cases (about 30 %).699
Luttmer-Kat’s overview further shows that 37 of 75 requests (about 50%), 
which were rejected based on urgent cause, eventually were dissolved based on 
a change of circumstances. Groen, too, concluded that a request based on urgent 
692  For example, see Ktg. Eindhoven 24 november 2003, JAR 2004/6; Ktg. Amsterdam 28 november 
2003, JAR 2004/74; Ktg. Vzngr. Lelystad 25 februari 2004 en 31 maart 2004, JAR 2004/106; Ktg. 
Amsterdam 1 juni 2004, JAR 2004/208; Ktg. Eindhoven 3 juni 2005, JAR 2005/223; Ktg. 
Amsterdam 17 juni 2005, JAR 2005/177.  
693  Polak 1939, p. 221, 222 and 232. 
694  Jansen en Loonstra 1990, p. 367 and 368. 
695  See also above under § 18.3. 
696  See Scholtens 1993a, p. 439. 
697  Groen 1989, p. 65. 
698  Scholtens 1993a,a p. 439; Scholtens statistiek ontbindingsvergoedingen 1993. 
699  See A.M. Luttmer-Kat, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, Art. 7:685 BW (DCC) 
§ 23 (2006). 
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cause eventually led to dissolutions based on a change of circumstances.700 This 
induced him to plea for abolishing dissolutions of employment agreements 
based on urgent cause under Article 1639w (7:685 DCC). All the more so, 
because the procedures under Article 1639o and Article 1639w led to different 
results in similar cases, which in his opinion is totally unjustified. Groen referred 
to (i) the absence of severance payments under Article 1639w contrary to Article 
1639o; and (ii) the absence of appeal under Article 1639w contrary to Article 
1639o.701 In 1983, Van den Heuvel, too, held that the urgent cause should be 
eliminated from Article 1639w, in that it primarily intends to be an extrajudicial 
procedure, hence, termination of employment based on urgent cause does not 
belong in this procedure.702
In contrast, Loonstra advocates eliminating the possibility of a summary 
dismissal under Article 7:677 DCC (1639o old), and instead to have all cases 
decided under Article 7:685 DCC. He argues that in summary dismissals under 
Article 7:677 DCC, the employer is the sole judge to decide whether urgent 
cause exists, whereby the employee is left without salary payment instantly. 
Because of these aspects, the intervention of a court is not only desirable, but 
also needed.703 Earlier, Van Spaendonck, in 1979, advocated eliminating the 
possibility of a summary dismissal under Article 7:677 DCC (1639o old). He 
proposed that, instead, employers would be allowed by law to suspend an 
employee based on urgent cause, without an employee’s right on continuation of 
salary payment. Subsequently, the employer could have the urgent cause 
decided on by the Cantonal Court under Article 1639w (7:685 DCC), on the 
condition that the employer would file this request within fourteen days after the 
suspension, and subsequently, would ask for dissolution based on urgent 
cause.704
Personally, I agree with Loonstra, in that it seems justified to first have a court 
examine the case.705 In this respect, one must bear in mind that between 1907 
and 1953, Article 1639o (Article 7:677 DCC), in effect, was the only basis to 
terminate employment instantly, without legal recourse.  As mentioned above, 
due to its strict formulation parties could not invoke Article 1639w. However, 
since 1953 the legislature liberalized this Article, making it possible to file a 
request based on urgent cause under Article 1639w.  
This alternative is more efficient for an employer (a decision on short 
notice, and no appeal), and less harmful for an employee (payment of salary 
700  Groen 1989, p. 66. For a discussion on the change of circumstances, see below under § 18.5. For 
recent case law, see Ktg. Eindhoven 29 november 2004, JAR 2005/2; Ktg. Lelystad 17 november 
2004, JAR 2005/19. 
701  Groen 1989, p. 66 and 69. 
702  Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 115-118. 
703  Loonstra 2005a, p. 295 and 296. 
704  Van Spaendonck 1979. For reactions, see Rood 1980, p. 293-295; Van der Sloot en Jacobs 1980; De 
Jonge 1980, p. 300 and 301; Van Seggelen 1980a; Van Seggelen 1980b. 
705  See also Verburg 1984, p. 114. 
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until the dissolution, and a possible rejection of the request or a dissolution with 
a severance payment). In fact, it has become the best alternative for employers 
after Schrijver/Essen (1999)706 and Vixia/Gerrits (2004),707 which decisions will 
be discussed in-depth in the paragraph below. In brief, these cases make it 
extremely difficult for employers to dismiss an employee based on urgent cause, 
hence, make it extremely risky for employers to dismiss an employee on the 
basis of Article 7:677 DCC. In my opinion, Van Spaendonck’s proposal is 
outdated, in that an employer, under present case law, must – continue to – pay 
salary during suspension.708 Therefore, my proposal would be to abolish the 
possibility of a summary dismissal under Article 7:677 DCC. Subsequently, 
under case law, the employer can suspend the employee with continuation of 
payment of salary, after having notified the employee on the urgent reason for 
dismissal. Based on case law,709 the employer shortly after can – or better said, 
must – file a request on the basis of Article 7:685 DCC, in which he asks the 
Cantonal Court to dissolve the employment agreement. In effect, this proposal is 
in accordance with the legislature’s initial intent.710
18.4.2 Criteria in determining an urgent cause 
The previous studies do not distinguish between unconditional and conditional 
requests. A significant number of requests based on urgent cause constitute 
conditional requests, however.711 In practice, these requests seem to be granted 
easier than unconditional requests.712 This raises the question whether it is 
justified for courts to apply different criteria to conditional and unconditional 
requests. I will first discuss case law to examine which criteria Cantonal Courts 
apply in determining an urgent reason for dismissal in conditional and 
unconditional requests. 
Unconditional requests 
In unconditional requests, employers ask Cantonal Courts to dissolve the 
employment agreement based on urgent cause when they doubt whether the 
706  HR 12 februari 1999, NJ 1999, 643, JAR 1999/102 (Schrijver/Essen).
707  HR 8 oktober 2004, JAR 2004/259 (Vixia/Gerrits). 
708  For the right on salary, see HR 1 juli 1993, NJ 1993, 666, JAR 1993/177 (Chicopee/Van Gerwen) and 
HR 21 maart 2003, JAR 2003/91 (Van der Gulik/Vissers & Partners). For an in-depth discussion of 
these decisions, see Sagel 2003a and Sagel 2003b. 
709  See above under § 18.3. 
710  See Advocate General in HR 21 maart 2003, JAR 2003/91 (Van der Gulik/Vissers & Partners) under 
‘D. Pogingen om de schorsing bij de wet te regelen’, rov. 3.15-3.19, referring to, amongst others, 
‘Levenbach’s ontwerp (1972), Art. 7.10.1.7 and 7.10.5.13’. For the latter, see Van der Heijden 1991: 
enclosure.  
711  At least 17 of the 30 cases involved conditional dissolutions (voorwaardelijke ontbindingen). Groen 
does not state which requests based on urgent cause concerned conditional request. However, he  
states that this often is the case. See Groen 1989, p. 65. 
712  Knegt en Wilthagen 1988, p. 262; Roeloff 1988, p. 205; Verhulp 2003d, p. 39. 
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dismissal justifies a summary dismissal under Article 7:677 DCC (1639o old). 
This was exactly the situation the legislature had in mind when it introduced the 
possibility to dissolve an employment agreement based on urgent cause under 
Article 1639w (7:685 DCC).713 In determining an urgent cause for dismissal in 
unconditional requests, case law shows that Cantonal Courts explicitly714or 
implicitly715 refer to case law on summary dismissals under Article 7:677 DCC 
(Article 1639o old). These courts, in brief, take into consideration what the court 
with jurisdiction as to the merits of the case (bodemrechter) would have 
decided. This is in accordance with legislative history, based on which Cantonal 
Courts must respect the case law on summary dismissals under Article 1639o 
(7:677 DCC). 
Criteria in determining an urgent cause for dismissal in unconditional requests 
Kuip – elaborating on Levenbach – stated that under case law, objectively, the 
reason, in itself, must be considered serious enough to justify a summary 
dismissal and, subjectively, that the employer, consequently, has no other 
alternative than to instantly dismiss the employee after he has learnt the reason. 
As regards the latter, if the employer had not dismissed the employee instantly, 
the idea was that an urgent reason for dismissal was lacking.716 Most recently, 
the Netherlands Supreme Court furthered the objective aspect in Schrijver/Essen 
(1999),717 and Vixia/Gerrits (2004).718 In Schrijver/Essen (1999), it held that the 
reason, in itself, was not sufficient. Instead, courts must balance the interests of 
the employer and the employee in determining whether a reason constitutes 
urgent cause. A summary dismissal, thus, depends on all circumstances of the 
case. Hence, the reason, in itself, for example, theft, is no longer sufficient to 
justify a summary dismissal.719 Elaborating on this case, Loonstra was of the 
opinion that courts also had to take into consideration non-job-related
circumstances in determining urgent cause.720 His view was affirmed by the 
713  See above under § 18.3. 
714  For example, see Ktg. Vzngr. Lelystad 25 februari 2004 en 31 maart 2004, JAR 2004/106; Ktg. 
Arnhem 16 februari 1995, Prg. 1995, 4259. 
715  For example, see – in accordance with case law on summary dismissals after HR 12 februari 1999, 
NJ 1999, 643, JAR 1999/102 (Schrijver/Essen) – Ktg. Sittard 21 december 2001, JAR 2002/28; Ktg. 
Haarlem 15 februari 2002, JAR 2002/55; Ktg. Alkmaar 1 juli 2002, JAR 2002/157.  For 
Schrijver/Essen (1999), see also above under § 17.3.4. 
716 Kuip 1993a, p. 53 and 54. 
717  HR 12 februari 1999, NJ 1999, 643, JAR 1999/102 (Schrijver/Essen).
718  HR 8 oktober 2004, JAR 2004/259 (Vixia/Gerrits). Recently, the Netherlands Supreme Court had a 
chance to affirm this decision in HR 3 november 2006, JAR 2006/305 (De Paulo/Private Banking 
Curaçao), but because the complainant, in effect, asked a decision on facts, it rejected the case based 
on Article 81 of the Judiciary Act (Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie). 
719  For an in-depth discussion of this case, see above under § 17.3.4. 
720  Loonstra referred to HR 12 februari 1999, NJ 1999, 643, JAR 1999/102 (Schrijver/Essen); HR 21 
januari 2000, NJ 2000, 190, JAR 2000/45 (Hema I); HR 27 april 2001, NJ 2001, 401, JAR 2001/95 
(Wennekes Lederwaren) en HR 20 juni 2003, NJ 2003, 523, JAR 2003/179 (Wickel/Klene). See 
Loonstra 2004, p. 34 and 35. 
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Netherlands Supreme Court in Vixia/Gerrits (2004). The Netherlands Supreme 
Court held that courts in determining an urgent cause for dismissal must take all 
circumstances of the case into consideration, including personal non-job-related 
circumstances.721 Sagel and Verhulp hereupon held that when an employer 
explicitly had asked an employee about his personal circumstances, courts 
should not be allowed to consider other than these circumstances in determining 
an urgent cause for dismissal.722 However, suppose, an employee – due to the 
pressure of the situation  is psychologically unable to express his or her 
thoughts. It then seems unfair to ‘punish’ the employee by neglecting the 
personal circumstances, which the employee failed to mention. Furthermore, the 
Netherlands Supreme Court furthered the subjective aspect in its recent decision 
of 16 June 2006. In brief, it held that when an employer points at different facts 
to justify a summary dismissal, he must prove all (these) facts.723 This is 
different only when the employer states that (i) the facts, separately, urged him 
to dismiss the employee instantly;724 (ii) the employee could have known that 
the facts were merely examples;725 or (iii) the employee could have known that 
it concerned minor facts.726
 Overall, Schrijver/Essen (1999), Vixia/Gerrits (2004), and the decision 
of 16 June 2006, make it extremely difficult for employers to dismiss an 
employee based on urgent cause under Article 7:677 DCC.727 I subscribe to 
these decisions, however. First, the reason why an employee acts in a certain 
way can only be assessed on the basis of all circumstances of the case. One may 
argue, that these decisions imply that an employee cannot be dismissed for theft 
because he has worked with the employer for 35 years. However, the 
Netherlands Supreme Court is clear, in that all circumstances must be taken into 
consideration. Also, these decisions do not imply that the employer must prove 
all (ir)relevant facts, rather must state which facts induced him to dismiss the 
employee instantly, and must prove these facts. Second, from legislative history 
it can be derived that a dismissal must be considered as an ultimum 
remedium.728 In this respect, the decision of the Netherlands Supreme Court of 
1983 is understandable, in which it approved a summary dismissal to be effected 
721 HR 8 oktober 2004, JAR 2004/259 (Vixia/Gerrits) rov. 3.5.2. For a discussion, see Sagel 2004; 
Beltzer 2005b; Vegter 2005b De Laat 2005. See also the Conclusion of the Advocate General under 
3.17-3.20 in HR 24 december 2004, JAR 2005/50 (Ouled L’Kadi/Albert Heijn). 
722  Sagel en Verhulp 2005, p. 96 and 97. 
723  HR 16 juni 2006, NJ 2006, 340, JAR 2006/171 (X/Willemsen)
724  HR 7 oktober 1988, NJ 1989, 258 (Stoof/Gemeente Koudekerk aan den Rijn). 
725  HR 10 maart 1989, NJ 1990, 185 (Otten/Stichting RBS). 
726  HR 12 november 1999, LJN: AG2328. 
727  For a discussion of decisions of the Netherlands Supreme Court until 1993, see Kuip 1993a. For the 
recent decision of 16 June 2006, NJ 2006, 340, JAR 2006/171 (X/Willemsen), see Tan, Financieel 
Dagblad of 13 July 2006; Vermeulen 2006; Ruizeveld 2006. 
728  Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 311; Sagel 2004, p. 434 and 435; Buijs 2005b, p. 26; Boot 2005a,  
p. 167. 
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after the employee was given a week to terminate the employment agreement on 
his own initiative.729
Conditional requests 
When an employer dismisses an employee under Article 7:677 DCC, one may 
assume that the employer has no doubts whatsoever that the reason constitutes 
an urgent cause. Nevertheless, employees will deny an urgent reason for 
dismissal and ask for continuation of salary payment in summary proceedings 
(kort geding), followed by a procedure with the court with jurisdiction as to the 
merits of the case (bodemrechter). Consequently, almost as a rule, an employer 
files a conditional request under Article 7:685 DCC after having dismissed the 
employee.730 In brief, the employer asks the Cantonal Court to conditionally
dissolve the employment agreement in case the employment agreement still 
exists, for example, the court in the proceedings on the merits decides that an 
urgent cause for dismissal is lacking. The aim of the request is – because the 
proceedings on the merits can take years – to achieve that the employment 
agreement at least will have been dissolved on a date relatively close to the date 
of the summary dismissal. This prevents the employer from having to pay salary 
with retrospective force after years of litigation.731
The Netherlands Supreme Court approved this practice in 1983. It held 
that under Article 7:685 DCC (1639w old), Cantonal Courts are allowed to give 
a solution on short notice on the existence of an employment agreement. In this 
respect, it held that an employer after a summary dismissal has an interest in 
obtaining this security on short notice.732 Literally, the Netherlands Supreme 
Court is correct. However, Kuip in my opinion has a strong point, in that a 
Cantonal Court should not be allowed to decide on a conditional request that is 
based on the same urgent reason for dismissal, and facts, as brought before the 
court that must still decide on the merits of the case. In fact, according to 
legislative history, Article 1639w aimed to offer an alternative for employers 
who were uncertain about the existence of an urgent cause. Therefore, it is in 
violation of legislative history to offer this possibility to employers who 
obviously are certain in this respect, and, nonetheless, to allow them to follow 
this procedure for damage control only.733
729  HR 4 november 1983, NJ 1984, 187 (Keller/Van Kimmenade). For a discussion of this case, see Kuip 
1993a, p. 60, 70 and 71. 
730  Knegt en Wilthagen 1988, p. 262; Groen 1989, p. 101 and 102. 
731  Groen 1989, p. 101-107; Kuip 1993a, p. 143-150; Van Slooten 2000; Sagel 2002; Fruytier 2004. 
732  HR 21 oktober 1983, NJ 1984, 296 (Nijman/X) affirmed by the Netherlands Supreme Court in HR 27 
maart 1987, NJ 1987, 882 (Seceurop/Koning). For an in-depth discussion of these decisions see Kuip 
1993a, p. 148 and 149. See also Roeloff 1988, p. 201; Sagel 2002, p. 25; Verhulp 2003d, p. 38;  
Bouwens 2004, p. 179 and 180; Fruytier 2004, p. 9 and 10. 
733  Kuip 1993a, p. 148-153. 
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The latter, in particular, strikes most as unfair. In fact, in 1995 the Cantonal 
Court of Harderwijk rejected a conditional request based on the fact that the 
urgent reason for dismissal, and facts, were the same as submitted to the court 
that had jurisdiction on the merits of the case. In this case, the Cantonal Court 
considered it as unfair that the employment agreement would be conditionally 
dissolved, when the court in a later stadium would decide that the reason did not
constitute an urgent cause under Article 7:677 DCC.734 The decision of the 
Cantonal Court of Harderwijk is an exception to the rule, however. In general, 
Cantonal Courts act in accordance with the decision of the Netherlands Supreme 
Court.735
Nevertheless, the decision of the Cantonal Court of Harderwijk is 
understandable. When the court with jurisdiction as to the merits of the case 
determines that an urgent reason for dismissal is lacking, the Cantonal Court by 
granting the conditional request based on urgent cause, in effect, endorses that 
the employer dismisses an employee without – an urgent – cause. Moreover, 
Cantonal Courts reward employers, in that they only have to pay salary as from 
the date of the dismissal to the date of the conditional solution.736
Understandably, Cantonal Courts search for practical solutions to meet this 
hybrid situation. For example, this takes place when a same Cantonal Court 
decides on the conditional request and the injunction in which the employee 
asks for continuation of salary payment, after a summary dismissal. In these 
cases, Cantonal Courts may try to persuade the employer to withdraw the 
summary dismissal, stating that the reason is not as urgent as the employer 
assumes, after which the Cantonal Court eventually dissolves the employment 
agreement through an unconditional request based on a change of 
circumstances.737 However, an employer may want to persist with the summary 
dismissal, which leaves the Cantonal Court no other option than to decide on the 
conditional request based on urgent cause. 
Criteria in determining an urgent cause for dismissal in conditional requests 
In conditional requests, employers ask Cantonal Courts to dissolve the 
employment agreement in case the employment agreement still exists. Cantonal 
Courts do not have to examine whether the employment agreement still exists.738
This leaves intact that Cantonal Court must still examine whether the 
employment agreement can be dissolved on the alleged urgent cause. Cantonal 
Courts must apply the same stringent criteria they apply to unconditional 
requests, in determining an urgent reason for dismissal to conditional requests. 
This can be derived from legislative history, and the foregoing decision of the 
734  Ktg. Harderwijk 11 oktober 1995, Prg. 1996, 4492. See also A.M. Luttmer-Kat, Losbladige 
Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, Art. 7:685 BW (DCC) § 12. 
735  See also Groen 1989, p. 102. 
736  Kuip 1993a, p. 144, referring to Offermans en Poelmen 1975, p. 3-5. See also Sagel 2002, p. 24. 
737  See Buijs 2005a, p. 37. 
738  A.M. Luttmer-Kat, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, Art. 7:685 BW (DCC) § 12. 
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Netherlands Supreme Court in 1983, in which it ‘only’ allowed employers to file 
a conditional request after a summary dismissal to obtain security on the 
existence of the employment agreement. It did not allow for Cantonal Courts to 
apply less stringent criteria than in unconditional requests in determining an 
urgent reason for dismissal.739
Consequently, Loonstra argues that Cantonal Courts should grant a 
conditional request only when the urgent reason for dismissal is evident.740
What is evident, though? From case law it can be derived that Cantonal Courts 
have considered a reason as urgent in situations, in which the employee had used 
drugs while working in a drug rehabilitation centre,741 the employee had misled 
the employer by showing a false degree certificate,742 or the employee had been 
guilty of battery743 or theft.744 Although these reasons at first sight seem evident 
to justify a summary dismissal, Schrijver/Essen (1999) and Vixia/Gerrits (2004),
meanwhile, may point out otherwise. Therefore, Loontra is correct to the extent 
‘evident’ means that there is an urgent cause under case law on summary 
dismissals.745 In practice, Cantonal Courts, however, do not act accordingly, and 
apply less stringent criteria in determining an urgent reason for dismissal in 
conditional requests based on urgent cause.746 They may not be aware that in 
doing so they reinforce an abuse of the system of conditional requests by 
employers. To understand the latter one must first explain the possibility for 
employees to make a so-called ‘switch’ after being dismissed under Article 
7:677 DCC.  
As mentioned above, employees generally will deny the existence of an urgent 
reason for dismissal, and consequently, state that the employment agreement 
still exists. On the other hand, when they have found a job they no longer wish 
to continue the employment agreement. Subsequently, in Dibbets/Pinckers 
(1994), the Netherlands Supreme Court approved the ‘switch’ on the part of the 
employee. In brief, after the employee primarily had objected to the summary 
dismissal, asking for continuation of salary payment, the Netherlands Supreme 
Court allowed the employee, instead, to consent to termination of employment 
739  Whereas the Netherlands Supreme Court in its decision of 27 March 1987, NJ 1987, 882 
(Seceurop/Koning) stressed that the dissolution procedure differed from the procedure with the court 
with jurisdiction as to the merits of the case, this in my opinion did not imply that the Cantonal Court 
could apply less stringent criteria in determining an urgent cause.  
740  See Loonstra 1997a, p. 28. 
741  Ktg. Rotterdam 22 februari 1993, JAR 1993/103. 
742  Ktg. Amsterdam 12 oktober 1993, JAR 1993/265. 
743  Ktg. Utrecht 26 februari 1996, Prg. 1996, 4499. 
744  Ktg. Utrecht 20 augustus 1997, JAR 1997/204. See also Ktg. Rotterdam 13 september 2002,  
JAR 2002/239. 
745  See also Bouwens 2004, p. 180. 
746  See also Verhulp 2003c, p. 81. 
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and to ask for a severance payment based on irregular termination of the 
employment agreement, i.e. termination of employment without prior notice.747
Subsequently, the question arose whether an employee could, too, make 
this switch after the Cantonal Court had granted a conditional request based on 
urgent cause, or a change of circumstances for which the employee is to 
blame.748 One can imagine, the Cantonal Court’s decision immediately raises 
doubts on whether the employee’s claim still will be successful with the court 
with jurisdiction as to the merits of the case. The best alternative for the 
employee in such a case is to make a switch, i.e. to consent to termination of 
employment and to ask for a severance payment based on irregular termination 
of employment instead of salary. In Greeven/Connexxion (2002), the 
Netherlands Supreme Court approved the employee’s switch after a conditional 
solution.749 In doing so, the Netherlands Supreme Court again balanced the 
relationship between the employer and the employee after its decision of 1983, 
in which it allowed employers to file a conditional request after a summary 
dismissal.750
However, in practice, employers prior to this switch tend to withdraw the 
summary dismissal when the Cantonal Court has dissolved the employment 
agreement without severance payment, leaving an employee, in effect, empty-
handed. In brief, employers claim that by withdrawing the summary dismissal, 
the condition of the conditional dissolution is fulfilled. Hence, the employment 
agreement is dissolved as from the date of the conditional dissolution. As a 
consequence, the employer only has to pay salary as from the date of the 
dismissal to the date of the conditional dissolution. This practice undermines the 
protection that is offered to the employee in Greeven/Connexxion (2002). The 
question arises whether one can speak of an abuse of the conditional dissolution 
on the part of the employer, in that the employer is led by reasons of damage 
control only. The answer seems negative. The Netherlands Supreme Court 
allowed employers to file a conditional request for this reason in 1983. 
Nevertheless, in my opinion one can speak of an abuse of the system of 
conditional requests when employers, knowing that Cantonal Courts use less 
stringent criteria, dismiss the employee based on urgent cause and immediately 
file a conditional request, in effect, to use the conditional dissolution to get rid of 
the employee in an easy and cheap way. A summary dismissal in my opinion 
must remain an ultimum remedium.751 Employers, on the other hand, may have 
747  HR 7 oktober 1994, JAR 1994/234 (Dibbets/Pinckers). Under Art. 7:677 DCC, the severance 
payment is equal to the period that lies between the date of the summary dismissal and the date on 
which the employment agreement would have terminated, provided the employer would have 
respected the notice period. 
748  HR 7 juni 2002, NJ 2003, 125, JAR 2002/155 (Greeven/Connexxion). 
749  For an in-depth discussion of these decisions, see  Boot 2002b, p. 14-18. See also Verhulp 2003d,  
p. 40 and 41; Verhulp 2003c, p. 82-84; Bouwens 2004/ p. 180 and 181;  Zondag 2004b, p.  12-16. 
750  Duk 1986, p. 158; Boot 2005a, p. 167. 
751  Roeloff  1988, p. 205. 
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a point that Cantonal Courts who apply less stringent criteria, in effect, reinforce 
this practice.  
 Surprisingly, the practice of employers to withdraw the summary 
dismissal after a conditional dissolution is hardly disputed. In fact, the District 
Court of The Hague in its decision of 1 March 2000 affirmed that the 
employment agreement had come to an end after the employer had withdrawn 
the summary dismissal prior to the switch.752 In my opinion, an employment 
agreement does not per se come to an end through a conditional request, after a 
withdrawal of a summary dismissal. Put differently, I doubt whether the 
condition of a conditional dissolution is fulfilled in all cases. First, if an 
employer asks for a conditional dissolution ‘in case a court determines that the 
employment agreement still exists’, the employee in my opinion can object 
when the employer determines that the employment agreement still exists. 
Second, in its decision of 1998 the Netherlands Supreme Court explained the 
nature of a conditional request, in that it is inextricably bound up with the 
invalidity of the dismissal.753 However, if the employer withdraws a dismissal, 
this does not necessarily imply that the employer consents to the invalidity of 
the dismissal. Third, one may argue whether the Netherlands Supreme Court in 
1983 meant to allow employers to withdraw the summary dismissal after a 
conditional dissolution, or instead, legislative history requires that when an 
employer withdraws a summary dismissal, he must file an unconditional 
request, because the employment agreement still exists when the employer 
withdraws a summary dismissal. 
Boot, too, doubts whether an employment agreement comes to an end through a 
conditional request after a withdrawal of the summary dismissal by the 
employer. In this respect, he brings forward that an employer is unable to 
unilaterally withdraw the summary dismissal. He refers to a decision of the 
Netherlands Supreme Court of 1995.754 In this case, the Netherlands Supreme 
Court stated that when an urgent reason for dismissal is lacking and the 
employer terminates the employment agreement without prior notice, the 
employee can object to the termination of the employment agreement and ask 
for salary, or can consent to the termination of the employment agreement and 
ask for a severance payment based on irregular termination of employment 
instead. It held that when the employee consents to the termination of the 
employment after he first objected to the termination of the employment 
agreement – i.e. the employee has made a switch – the employer cannot convert 
the irregular termination into a regular termination by afterwards terminating the 
752  Rb. Den Haag 1 maart 2000, JAR 2000/98, which on the other hand held that the employer was liable 
under Art. 7:611 DCC. 
753  HR 5 september 1997, NJ 1998/421 (De Bode/DHIJ). For an in-depth discussion of this decision, see  
Van Slooten 2000. 
754  Boot 2005a, p. 171; HR 30 juni 1995, NJ 1996, 52, JAR 1995/152 (De Waal/Van Rijn).
257
employment agreement with respect of the notice period.755 Does this decision 
of the Netherlands Supreme Court, as Boot states, mean that an employer cannot 
withdraw a summary dismissal after a conditional dissolution? I seriously doubt 
this. In my opinion, the decision of the Netherlands Supreme Court of 1995 
applies to situations only, in which an employee makes a switch. This differs 
from the situation we have before us, in which the employee has objected to 
termination of employment, and the employer invokes the conditional 
dissolution before the employee can make a switch. Verhulp seems to share this 
opinion. He wonders whether there are special circumstances based upon which 
the employee, nonetheless, can seek for a severance payment based on irregular 
termination in these cases.756 Verhulp is of the opinion that when an employer 
abuses the system of conditional requests, i.e. withdraws the summary dismissal 
to terminate the employment agreement to get rid of the employee in an easy 
and cheap way, this constitutes a special circumstance, allowing the employee to 
make a switch after the employer has invoked the summary dismissal.757
Verhulp refers to Dibbets/Pinckers (1994) and Greeven/Connexxion (2002).
From these cases it can be derived that when the Cantonal Court has granted a 
conditional dissolution, this does not prevent the employee from making a 
switch. The problem, however, is that it will be difficult, if not impossible, for 
an employee to prove bad intent of the employer. Therefore, so long as the 
Netherlands Supreme Court, or the legislature do not hold otherwise, this 
practice will continue. On the other hand, this practice can be restricted when 
Cantonal Courts strictly apply case law on summary dismissals to conditional 
requests.  
 Overall, it can be derived from legislative history that Cantonal Courts 
are allowed to decide on an urgent cause for dismissal. Therefore, the statement 
of Cantonal Courts that they cannot decide on ‘summary dismissals’, because 
the dissolution procedure is not the appropriate procedure, is incorrect.758
Second, according to legislative history, and the 1983 decision of the 
Netherlands Supreme Court, Cantonal Courts must apply case law on summary 
dismissals to unconditional and conditional requests that are based on urgent 
cause, and consistently must reject or grant requests. To the extent Cantonal 
Courts apply case law on summary dismissals in determining urgent cause, one 
can speak of just cause protection. To the extent Cantonal Courts apply less
stringent criteria in – mainly conditional – requests, Cantonal Courts undermine 
this protection. This applies all the more so, when Cantonal Courts herewith, in 
effect, reinforce an abuse of the system of conditional requests on the part of 
employers. When the case is – too – complex, there are, in fact, two options. 
First, Cantonal Courts may not defer any further decision until the court’s 
755  The decision is important in light of Art. 7: 653 DCC. Under this Article, an employer cannot invoke 
a covenant not to compete in case of an irregular termination. 
756  See also Rb. Den Haag 1 maart 2000, JAR 2000/98. 
757  Verhulp 2003d, p. 42. 
758  See also the Conclusion of the Advocate General under 3.53 in HR 27 april 2001, NJ 2001, 421, JAR 
2001/95 (Wennekes Lederwaren); Kuip 2002, p. 41; Visser 2004. 
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decision in the proceedings on the merits, because the Netherlands Supreme 
Court does not allow this.759 On the other hand, Cantonal Courts may exclude a 
certain issue under Baijings (1997). Its exception, however, can be applied in 
exceptional cases only.760 Second, Cantonal Courts are allowed – or better said 
must – examine whether the facts and circumstances constitute an urgent cause 
or a change of circumstances. Hence, Cantonal Courts primarily can examine 
whether there is a change of circumstances.761 A significant number of cases, in 
effect, eventually are dissolved based on breach of trust.762 Whether a breach of 
trust at all times constitutes a just cause for dismissal will be examined below.  
18.5 A change of circumstances 
18.5.1 Studies on case law 
(i) Studies on case law prior to 1954 
The legislature of 1907 allowed for dissolution of the employment agreement 
based on a change of circumstances only in case of (i) a change in the 
employer’s or employee’s personal situation; (ii) a change in the employer’s or 
employee’s financial position; and/or (iii) a change of circumstances in the job, 
based upon which the employment agreement reasonably had to end 
immediately or on short notice.763
The studies on case law by  Polak and Loonstra demonstrate that courts 
strictly applied Article 1639w, according to the legislature’s intent. Polak was 
one of the first to examine court decisions under Article 1639w. Of the twenty-
two published cases between 1909 and 1939, he categorized eight under 
category (i), seven under category (ii), and seven under category (iii). Almost 
half of the twenty-two cases were rejected: more than half on the part of 
employers, and less than a quarter on the part of employees. Whereas the 
legislature had only contemplated rare situations, it was striking, therefore, that 
Cantonal Courts granted requests based on economic circumstances in a 
majority of cases. In five out of six cases, Cantonal Courts dissolved the 
employment agreement.764 Jansen and Loonstra stressed that the First World 
War, in fact, made the situation a rare one, but that the latter did not at all times 
759  HR 3 december 1982, NJ 1983, 182 (Bravenboer/Van Rhee). See also Groen 1989, p. 103. 
760  This derives from HR 24 oktober 1997, JAR 1997/248 (Baijings). For an in-depth discussion of this 
decision and more case law on this issue, see below under § 18.6. 
761  For example, Ktg. Zwolle 19 april 2006, RAR 2006/96. See also Buijs 2005a, p. 38. Another 
possibility of course is to examine urgent cause based on case law that applies to urgent dismissals, 
and when urgent cause is lacking, to examine whether there is breach of trust. See Ktg. Haarlem 13 
november 2006, LJN AZ3130 in accordance with the proceedings on the merits, Ktg. Haarlem 16 
juni 2006, JAR 2006/162. 
762  Roeloff 1988, p. 205; Fruytier 2004, p. 180. 
763  See also Polak 1939, p. 222. 
764  Polak1939, p. 225-229. 
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made dissolution of the employment necessary.765 Also, illness, in principle, did 
not justify dissolution of the employment agreement. In fact, courts seemed to 
be willing to dissolve the employment agreement in case of long-term illness
only.766
In general, Cantonal Courts, too, were of the opinion that dissolution of the 
employment agreement based on breach of trust could not lead to dissolution.767
The Cantonal Court of Rotterdam even explicitly held that a breach of trust was 
excluded by Article 1639w.768 In contrast, in 1914, the Cantonal Court of 
Onderdendam dissolved the employment agreement based on breach of trust, 
although it admitted that it was doubtful whether this was according to the 
legislature’s intent.769
Hence, even more striking was the decision of the Cantonal Court of 
Amsterdam of 28 November 1931, which dissolved the employment agreement 
based on breach of trust, without making any reservation in this respect. In this 
case, the employer asked the Cantonal Court to dissolve the employment 
agreement with one of its key executives. The employer alleged that the 
executive had conspired with a colleague, as a result of which the executive had 
damaged the company’s interests. However, based on testimonies of witnesses 
the alleged reason appeared to be non-existent. Nevertheless, the Cantonal Court 
held that it was not in the company’s interest to continue the employment 
relationship with the executive. The Cantonal Court dissolved the employment 
agreement based on the fact that the employment relationship, in effect, had 
resulted in a breach of trust.770 Neither of the parties had brought forward this 
reason, however. Consequently, this decision led to heavy criticism. 
Peerenboom held that the trial was unfair, because the employment agreement 
had been dissolved on a ground of which the employee could not have been 
aware of, and against which he could not have defended himself. Moreover, the 
dismissal was unjustified because the Cantonal Court, in effect, allowed the 
employer to dismiss an employee for a non-existent reason, hence, without 
cause and without legal recourse as appeal was excluded by Article 1639w.771
765  Jansen en Loonstra 1990, p. 369, referring to Ktg. Rotterdam 23 september 1914, RBA (6) 1917, No. 
21 and 22. 
766  Ktg. Amsterdam 1 juni 1920, NJ 1920,  976; Ktg. Assen 24 augustus 1922, RBA (11) 1923, No. 5 
and 6. See Polak 1939, p. 225; Jansen en Loonstra 1990, p. 369. 
767  Ktg. Amsterdam, 28 november 1931, NJ 1932, 95. See also Polak 1939, p. 224. Loonstra in this 
respect also refers to Ktg. Onderdendam 21 november 1914, RBA (6) 1914, No. 7 in: Loonstra 1996, 
p. 151. 
768  Polak 1939, p. 230, referring to Ktg. Zutphen 10 maart 1922, NJ 1922, 454 and Ktg. Rotterdam 2 mei 
1936, NJ 1936, 681.
769  Ktg. Onderdendam 21 november 1914, RBA (6) 1914, No. 7. See also Loonstra 1996, p. 151. 
770  Ktg. Amsterdam 28 november 1931, NJ 1932,  95. See also Polak 1939, p. 224. 
771  Peereboom 1932, p. 35 and 36.See further Van Creveld 1934. 
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Also Loonstra’s 1996 research shows that prior to 1954 courts strictly applied 
Article 1639w.772 Like Polak, Loonstra concluded that the majority of 
employers’ requests – of the thirty-one cases, published between July 1907 and 
July 1954 – were rejected. The employers’ requests based on economic 
circumstances, on the other hand, were granted in a majority of cases (seven out 
of twelve), which could be explained by the First World War.773 The employees’
requests were granted in a majority of cases. Most of these requests were based 
on a change of their personal or financial situation, e.g. business 
opportunities.774
(ii) Studies on case law between 1954 and 1999 
The legislature of 1953 broadened the scope of Article 1639w, making it 
possible to dissolve an employment agreement based on breach of trust. 
Loonstra’s research of 1985 – in which he had examined sixty-eight cases 
between 1970 and 1983 – showed that the second largest category consisted of 
requests based on breach of trust (20.6%). The Cantonal Court granted these 
requests in a significant majority (64.4%). Loonstra concluded that although 
Cantonal Courts generally required that the employment relationship had 
become permanently and irreparably disrupted, this appeared to be assumed 
relatively easily. Also, he concluded that it was not a decisive factor for the 
Cantonal Court, in rejecting the request, that the employee was not to blame for 
the breach of trust. This played a role in determining the size of the severance 
payment only. In this respect, the Cantonal Court, too, considered factors as the 
employee’s salary, the years of service, the employee’s performance, the 
employee’s age, the labour market situation, and the employee’s right on social 
security.775
The largest category consisted of requests based on economic 
circumstances (26.5% of the 68 cases), in which the employment agreement had 
been dissolved either with (44.4%) or without severance payment (5.6%).  
In his 1988 dissertation, Groen affirmed the increasing popularity of requests 
based on breach of trust. In total, he examined 227 published decisions, 
delivered between 1 January 1953 and 1 January 1987. Like Loonstra, he more 
or less distinguished between requests based on a change of circumstances 
consisting of (i) economic circumstances (ii) unsatisfactory performance, either 
or not due to illness; and (iii) breach of trust. This time, the majority of requests 
were based on unsatisfactory performance, either or not due to illness (23.8%), 
followed by requests based on economic circumstances (22.5%), and breach of 
772  Loonstra 1996, p. 148, referring to Ktg. Onderdendam 21 november 1914, RBA (6), No. 7; Ktg. 
Breda 11 april 1934, NJ 1935 ,207; Ktg. Rotterdam 2 mei 1936, NJ 1936, 681; Ktg. Rotterdam 9 
augustus 1949, NJ 1950, 278. 
773  Loonstra 1996, p. 148 and 149. 
774  Polak 1939, p. 225-229; Loonstra 1996, p. 148. 
775  Loonstra 1985, p. 349-353. 
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trust (18.5%). To explain the differences with Loonstra’s research, Groen 
stressed that Loonstra’s research did not include the year of economic recovery 
of 1986. In this year, fewer requests were filed. In fact, the relatively short 
period between 1970 and 1983 on which Loonstra had focused included years of 
economic recession. This in Groen’s opinion could explain the large number of 
requests filed, based on economic circumstances between 1970 and 1983. 
What was striking, was that in Groen’s research the requests based on 
breach of trust formed a minority, which was contrary to the general assumption 
at the time that most cases were dissolved based on breach of trust. Like 
Loonstra, Groen, on the other hand, concluded that the requests based on breach 
of trust were granted in an overwhelming majority of the cases (73.8%), 
compared to the average of 50% in other cases, which in his opinion explained 
this general assumption, and the popularity of requests based on breach of 
trust.776 Subsequently, in the same year Groen published his thesis, Loonstra 
presented new results on the dissolution procedure. Overall, Loonstra examined 
eighty-two decisions, published between 1984 until 1986. The largest categories 
consisted of requests based on breach of trust (44%) economic circumstances 
(23.3%), and unsatisfactory performance, whether or not due to illness (15.4%). 
Again, Loonstra concluded that Cantonal Courts had dissolved requests based 
on breach of trust in a significant majority of cases (72.1%) – compared to the 
average of 50% in the other categories – either with (64.7%) or without 
severance payment (8.1%). Unlike in the past, in two-third of the cases based on 
breach of trust, Cantonal Courts rejected the request, because the employee was 
not to blame, i.e. a serious cause was lacking.777 In 2001, Scholtens, again, 
stressed the success of requests based on breach of trust, which were granted in 
the majority of cases. Only in 5% of the cases the requests had been rejected, 
when it was still possible to replace the employee in another position.778
(iii) Studies on case law between 1999 and 2007 
As from 1 January 1999, Cantonal Courts must ascertain that the reason for 
dismissal is not related to a prohibition on dismissal.779 Consequently, the Circle 
of Cantonal Courts adjusted the Cantonal Formula as from 8 October 1999, 
determining that a Cantonal Court must examine on its own initiative 
(ambtshalve) whether there is a prohibition on dismissal, particularly in pro 
forma cases.780 Only when employers and employees have explicitly stated that 
a prohibition on dismissal does not apply, the Cantonal Court may assume its 
776  Groen 1989, p. 58-60, 63 and 65. 
777  Loonstra 1988a, p. 99 and 100. 
778  Scholtens 2001b, p. 64 and 65. Scholtens had examined 918 cases between 1992 and 2000, in which 
Cantonal Courts had dissolved the employment agreement. 
779  For an in-depth discussion of the prohibitions on dismissal, see above under § 14.4.5. 
780  For the term pro forma cases, see above under § 18.1. 
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absence.781 Case law shows that Cantonal Courts, in general, strictly apply 
prohibitions on dismissal.782 The introduction of a prohibition on dismissal 
during illness, in fact, was in accordance with a long-standing practice,783 as a 
2001 study by Scholtens shows. Scholtens’s examination covered the period 
between 1992 and 2000. He concluded that the number of rejections was the 
highest with regard to requests based on unsatisfactory performance, either or 
not due to illness (60 out of 219: 27%),784 and that twenty-one cases were 
rejected, due to the prohibition on dismissal regarding illness; eighteen of these 
cases were rejected before 1 January 1999.785
In 2000, the Bureau for Policy Research (Research voor Beleid)
concluded that the majority of requests with the Cantonal Court are based on 
breach of trust, and the majority of requests with the RDA based on economic 
circumstances, both granted in the majority of cases. For the year of 2005, 
Loonstra and Kruit came to a same conclusion with regard to requests filed with 
the Cantonal Court and the CWI.786
Another significant development after 1999, was that the legislature started to 
take measures to diminish pro forma cases,787 which formed, and until 2007, 
still forms, one of the largest categories.788 A study by Knegt and Wilthagen 
from 1988 shows that about 40% of all cases were pro forma cases.789 They 
examined 315 cases, covering the period between July 1984 and June 1985 in 
five cantonal districts.790 Subsequently, in 1999, Beltzer, Knegt and Van Rijs 
examined 258 decisions, covering the years of 1995 and 1997, of the Cantonal 
Courts of ‘s-Hertogenbosch, Hoorn, Meppel, Nijmegen and Rotterdam. They 
781 Toelichting Aanbeveling 4 Kantonrechtersformule in Tekst & Commentaar Arbeidsrecht (2006): 
Bijlage 2. See also Olde 1999. 
782  Rutgers 2003, p. 119. For  example Ktg. Tiel 25 oktober 2000 JAR 2001/6; Rb. Arnhem 29 oktober 
2001, JAR 2001/252; Ktg. Emmen 20 december 2002, JAR 2003/24; Ktg. Rotterdam 12 september 
2003, JAR 2003/253; Ktg. Amsterdam 16 april 2004, JAR 2004/121. 
783  Boertien en Schaink 1996; A.M. Luttmer-Kat, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, 
Art. 7:685 BW (DCC) § 7. 
784  Scholtens 2001b, p. 55 and 56. 
785  Knegt en Wilthagen 1988, p. 239; Beltzer, Knegt en Van Rijs 1998, p. 111 and 116.
786  For an in-depth discussion of the report of Research voor Beleid 2000, see above under § 16.8. See 
also Loonstra en Kruit 2006, p. 21. 
787  Council for the Judiciary (Raad voor Rechtspraak) estimates that it concerns about 80% of all cases; 
Verburg about 85%; Scholtens about 90%.; Boot between 80 and 90%. See Scholtens statistiek 
ontbindingsvergoedingen 2005 (I), p. 33.; Raad voor de Rechtspraak, Advies Wetsvoorstel normering 
ontslagvergoeding, 8 juli 2004, 2004/28; Verburg 2005a, p. 149; Boot 2006a, p. 1103. In the period 
between October 1997 and October 1999, one spoke of approximately 60,000 pro forma cases – on a 
total of 90,000 – yearly. Research voor Beleid 2000, p. 10. More recently, the government speaks of 
approximately 45,000 pro forma cases – on a total of 70,000 – yearly. TK 2005-2006, 30 370, No. 8, 
p. 60. See also Grapperhaus 2006, p. 16. 
788  In the past, the legislature already has tried to take measures to diminish pro forma procedures. See 
Scholtens 2001a, p. 7.; Van Heusden 2002; Damsteegt 2003, Chapter 5; Van Heusden 2006, Chapter 
9.
789  Knegt en Wilthagen 1988, p. 239. See also Scholtens 2001b, p. 53 and 54. 
790  Knegt en Wilthagen 1988, p. 217-219. 
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came to an even higher number of pro forma cases (65%). They, too, concluded 
that virtually all cases were granted.791 In an unpublished research, L.W.J. van 
den Heuvel, who examined 648 decisions, covering the year of 1999 of the 
Cantonal Court of Tilburg, too, concludes that the majority of cases were pro
forma cases (about 69%: 446 cases).792
The most recent measure to diminish pro forma procedures is an 
amendment of Article 24 of the Unemployment Insurance Benefits Act 
(Werkloosheidswet or WW). After this amendment, an employee only loses his 
right on unemployment benefits when he has been dismissed based on a valid 
urgent reason, or termination of employment takes place on the employee’s own 
initiative. The amendment went into force on 1 October 2006.793
In conclusion, Groen correctly states in his 1988 dissertation that studies on case 
law cannot be seen as statistical evidence, because researches, in general, show 
only a fraction of the total of requests, which are filed. However, they can give 
an indication.794 The studies above under (i), (ii) and (iii) in my opinion indicate 
that (1) employment agreements generally are requested based on (i) economic 
circumstances; (ii) unsatisfactory performance, either or not due to illness; and 
(iii) breach of trust.795 In literature, the foregoing reasons for dismissal are also 
to which generally is referred.796 Hence, in the following paragraphs, I will 
concentrate on these reasons of dismissal, in examining to what extent private-
sector employees enjoy just cause protection under Article 7:685 DCC, and to 
what extent Cantonal Courts apply the same criteria as the CWI; (2) Cantonal 
Courts grant requests which are based on a change of circumstances in the 
majority of cases. This raises the question whether Cantonal Courts seriously 
examine whether there is a serious cause to dissolve the employment agreement. 
At first sight, one must assume that Cantonal Courts seriously examine the 
cases, in that Cantonal Courts still reject requests for absence of serious cause.797
Scholtens’ research of 2001 shows that in at least ninety-seven of the cases the 
Cantonal Court rejected the request for absence of serious cause, generally 
pertaining to requests based on unsatisfactory performance, either or not due to 
illness.798
791  Beltzer, Knegt en Van Rijs 1998, p. 111 and 116. See also Scholtens 2001b, p. 54. 
792  Knegt en Wilthagen 1988, p. 239. See also Scholtens 2001b, p. 54. 
793  Stb. 2006, 303 and 304.  See also below under § 29.2.2. For a discussion of this proposal, see Beltzer 
2005a. For scepticism on whether it will diminish the number of pro forma requests, see Boot 2006a, 
p. 1103-1107; Fluit 2006. For a less sceptic view, see Van de Poel 2006. For a discussion of the 
amendment in light of a ‘healty’ and an ill employee in this respect, see Koolhoven 2006. 
794  Groen 1989, p. 60. See also Loonstra 1988a, p. 98; Scholtens statistiek ontbindingsvergoedingen 
1999, p. 6; Loonstra en Kruit 2006, p. 23. 
795  See also Groen 1989, p. 64. 
796  For an extensive overview of literature in this respect, see Groen 1989, p. 55-57. 
797  See Buijs 2005a, p. 30. 
798  Scholtens 2001b, p. 59-64. His annual statistics on the year of 2003 show that in at least eleven cases 
the requests were rejected for absence of serious cause. See Scholtens statistiek 
ontbindingsvergoedingen 2003 (II), p. 12. See also Research voor Beleid 2000, p. 49. 
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18.5.2 Criteria in determining a change of circumstances 
18.5.2.1  Economic circumstances  
Requests based on economic circumstances involve either individual or 
collective requests. In general, a collective dismissal refers to a dismissal 
according to the WMCO, involving at least twenty employees within a CWI’s 
district.799 However, literally, collective requests involve more than one 
employee. These, in turn, may take the form of collective or separate requests.800
In this thesis, I primarily concentrate on individual dismissals. However, in 
discussing dismissals based on economic circumstances, a discussion of 
collective dismissals in light of economic circumstances is indispensable, due to 
the fact that individual dismissals are often part of collective dismissals. From 
case law it can be derived that courts are divided on whether they have exclusive 
jurisdiction in collective dismissals. The Cantonal Courts of Utrecht and 
Amsterdam present a striking example. They were asked to decide on a 
collective request, involving nine employees, filed by what was basically the 
same employer. The Cantonal Court of Utrecht, in its decision of 16 December 
1993, referred the employer to the RDA, the predecessor of the CWI, stating that 
the Cantonal Court was not the appropriate authority to decide on collective 
dismissals. It added that the RDA was better equipped to decide on the 
employer’s request to dissolve the employment agreements with the nine 
employees, i.e. to answer the questions (i) whether the reorganization was 
necessary; (ii) whether the employer had correctly applied the principle of 
seniority; and (iii) whether it was possible to replace the employee in another 
position.801 In contrast, the Cantonal Court of Amsterdam in its decision of 29 
December 1993, explicitly held that it was authorized to decide on the nine 
requests, arguing that ‘it was not a collective dismissal according to the 
WMCO’.802 For this Court, therefore, it was determinative whether the 
collective dismissal involved fewer than twenty employees within a CWI’s 
district.803
(i) Authority of Cantonal Courts in dismissals based on economic 
circumstances 
The Cantonal Court of Utrecht, in its decision of 16 December 1993, referred 
the employer to the RDA. This is understandable, in that Article 4:1 of the 
799  For the WMCO, see above under § 16.4.1. See also Heinsius 2004, p. 170-192; Zondag 2001,  
p. 230-232; CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006),  p. 25-1 to 25-12. 
800  Knegt en Wilthagen 1988, p. 42; Lousberg 1997, p. 77.  
801  Ktg. Utrecht 16 december 1993, JAR 1994/23. 
802  Ktg. Amsterdam 29 december 1993, JAR 1994/23. See also Ktg. Haarlem 11 maart 1994,  
JAR 1994/71. 
803  See above under footnote 799. 
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Dismissal Decree – and in the past the Directives – determines that the CWI is 
authorized to decide on collective dismissals, in which one or more positions
become(s) redundant due to economic circumstances.804 On the other hand, the 
legislative history of Article 1639w does not imply that Cantonal Courts are not
authorized to decide on collective dismissals, or are authorized to decide on 
individual dismissals only.  
Moreover, in the 1990s the Minister of Social Affairs implicitly 
underlined the Cantonal Court’s authority in this respect when he discussed the 
rule – which went into force on 1 January 1994 – to include five or more 
requests under Article 7:685 DCC in the number of twenty under the WMCO. 
The Minister held that if an employer files four requests with the Cantonal Court 
and sixteen requests with the RDA (CWI), this does not constitute a collective 
dismissal under the WMCO. On the other hand, if the employer files six 
requests with the Cantonal Court and fourteen requests with the RDA (CWI), it 
does.805 The Minister herewith implicitly held that the Cantonal Court is 
authorized to decide on requests, which involves fewer than twenty employees 
in the CWI’s district. The Cantonal Court of Amsterdam, with its decision of 29 
December 1993, thus, correctly held that he was authorized to decide on a 
collective dismissal, in which fewer than twenty employees were involved.806 In 
contrast, the Cantonal Court of Utrecht held that the employer’s claim was 
inadmissible.807
The foregoing case law leaves the question unanswered whether Cantonal 
Courts are authorized to decide on requests based on economic circumstances, 
which involve twenty or more employees. Loonstra and Zondag are of the 
opinion that to allow Cantonal Courts to decide on collective dismissals to 
which the WMCO applies, this would traverse the legislature’s intent.808 In 
brief, the rationale behind the WMCO is to prevent unemployment. Loonstra 
and Zondag are of the opinion that the CWI is better equipped to prevent 
unemployment. For example, it is able to advise the employer in general, and on 
short-time permits (ontheffingsverlening van verbod werktijdverkorting) and 
financial aid in particular.809 Therefore, in their opinion Cantonal Courts should 
not be authorized to decide on collective dismissals to which the WMCO apply. 
However, the WMCO does not exclude Cantonal Courts from deciding on 
804  See above under § 16.4.1. 
805  TK 1992-1993, 22 970, No. 5, p. 2. See also Friedberg 1994; Heinsius 2004, p. 111 and 112.  
806  See also Loonstra 1997a, p. 47; Friedberg 1994. 
807  For other cases, see Loonstra 1997a, p. 44, referring to Ktg. Groningen 29 januari 1986, Prg. 1986, 
2507; Ktg. Utrecht 8 december 1986, Prg. 1987, 2619; Ktg. Oostburg 2 december 1993, Prg. 1994, 
4055. 
808  Loonstra en Zondag 2004, p. 366; Loonstra 1997a, p. 44, 46 and 47, referring to Ktg. Breda
6 november 1984, Prg. 1984, 2232. 
809  Heinsus 2004, p. 173, referring to TK 1974-1975, 13 324, No. 3, p. 8. See also CWI Handbook on 
Dismissal (2006), p. 25-6; Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 6 and 7. 
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collective dismissals which involve twenty or more employees, as Heinsius 
correctly states.810
Hence, a number of Cantonal Courts handle these cases, although with 
restraint. The general opinion among courts is that the CWI must remain the 
main route in collective dismissals to which the WMCO applies, and Cantonal 
Courts can decide on these dismissals in case of an urgent situation only.811
Consequently, courts apply the rules of the WMCO. In this respect, the Cantonal 
Court of Groenlo held that ‘(…) the Directives and the WMCO, in principle, 
must form the lead on which Cantonal Courts must decide in collective 
dismissals which involve twenty or more employees’.812 Consequently, Cantonal 
Courts consistently require that employers deliberate with unions and/or the 
Works Councils.813 If not, Cantonal Courts tend to reject the requests.814
To the extent Cantonal Courts handle collective dismissals under the WMCO in 
urgent situations, Loonstra points out that the WMCO, too, covers urgent 
situations.815 At the time, he referred to Article 6 of the WMCO.816 He, however, 
did not point out that a request had to be made in this respect, and that it took 
about three weeks to obtain a decision.817 Moreover, he did not consider that, in 
practice, employers and unions themselves might explicitly prefer a dissolution 
procedure to the BBA 1945-procedure, due to the urgency of the case. In this 
respect, unions, apparently, too, are of the opinion that Article 6 of the WMCO 
is less efficient than the dissolution procedure.818 In fact, for the employer the 
dissolution procedure has an important advantage. Employees, in principle, 
cannot ask for a severance payment after the dissolution procedure. After a BBA 
1945-procedure, based on Article 7:681 DCC, they can.819
 A fact remains that so long as the WMCO is not exclusive, the Act 
leaves room for Cantonal Courts to decide on collective dismissals under the 
WMCO. I agree with Loonstra and Zondag that the WMCO should be(come) 
the main route. Employers should not be able to traverse the legislature’s intent 
to prevent unemployment. Cantonal Courts, in fact, agree that the CWI, a public 
authority, is the appropriate authority to safeguard this public interest. 
Therefore, my suggestion would be that either the legislature makes the WMCO 
810  Heinsius 2004, p. 112-121.  
811  For example, see Ktg. Groenlo 5 oktober 1994, JAR 1994/238; Ktg. Gorinchem 28 februari 1995, 
JAR 1995/71; Ktg. Groenlo 10 april 1995, JAR 1995/103 en 116;  Ktg. Leeuwarden 28 september 
2005, JAR 2005/259. 
812  Ktg. Groenlo 10 april 1995, JAR 1995/103 en 116. 
813  For example, see Ktg. Zevenbergen 2 januari 1986, Prg. 1986, 2537; Ktg. Groenlo 10 april 1995, 
JAR 1995/103 en 116; Ktg. Leiden 4 december 2002, JAR 2003/5; Ktg. Leeuwarden 28 september 
2005, JAR 2005/259; Ktg. Leeuwarden 4 januari 2006, JAR 2006/24. 
814  For example, see Ktg. Leeuwarden 4 januari 2006, JAR 2006/24. 
815  Loonstra 1997a, p. 46 and 47. 
816  Loonstra 1997a, p. 46 and 47. 
817  Heinsius 2004, p. 187. 
818  For example, see Ktg. Groenlo 5 oktober 1994, JAR 1994/238. 
819  See below under § 18.6. 
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exclusive, or Cantonal Courts only will handle these cases when the employer 
and unions have substantiated that Article 6 and/or the new Article 6a of the 
WMCO must be passed. A procedure pending with the Works Council, for 
example, may stand in the way to make an effective use of Article 6a. As from 1 
January 1999, the new Article 6a of the WMCO determines that when the 
unions state that they have been informed by the employer, and have agreed on 
the expedited procedure under the WMCO, the CWI must immediately handle 
the request.820
 (ii)  The criteria in determining economic circumstances 
This brings me to an examination of criteria that Cantonal Courts apply to 
requests based on economic circumstances. The first question that arises is 
whether Cantonal Courts must apply the Articles 4:1 to 4:6 of the Dismissal 
Decree, in determining serious cause.821 As Heinsius correctly states, Cantonal 
Courts, in principle, do not have to apply the same criteria as the CWI, because 
these derive from the Dismissal Decree and apply to the CWI only.822
Nevertheless, Cantonal Courts generally apply the same criteria as the CWI.  
For example, the Cantonal Court of Amsterdam of 29 December 1993 
held it was authorized to decide on a collective dismissal of nine employees, 
because the WMCO did not apply. However, because more than one employee 
was involved, it held that ‘the RDA, in principle, was the appropriate authority 
and, therefore, the Cantonal Court must apply the same criteria as the RDA in 
answering the questions (i) whether the reorganization was necessary; (ii) 
whether the employer had correctly applied the principle of seniority; and (iii) 
whether it was possible to replace the employee in another – adjusted – 
position’.823 In a nutshell, these at the time indeed were the criteria based upon 
which the CWI – the RDA’s successor –examined whether a dismissal was 
justified,824 and based upon which Cantonal Courts, in general, determined 
whether there was serious cause.825 Subsequently, the Cantonal Court of 
Amsterdam rejected the requests, because the employer (a) had not substantiated 
the financial need; (b) had not substantiated which positions became redundant 
820  Heinsius 2004, p. 187 and 190; Heinsius 2005, p. 85 and 86. 
821  For example, see Ktg. Zutphen 15 juli 1996, JAR 1996/177, which asked for advice of the RDA and 
consistently applied the Articles in question of the Delegation Decree, the predecessor of the 
Dismissal Decree; Ktg. Utrecht 2 juli 2004, JAR 2004/201, which explicitly referred to Art. 4:2 of 
the Dismissal Decree; Ktg. Deventer 30 november 2005, JAR 2005/23, which, in effect, applied Art. 
4:2.6 of the Dismissal Decree. 
822  Heinsius 2004, p. 111 and 112. 
823  Ktg. Amsterdam 29 december 1993, JAR 1994/28. See also Ktg. Lelystad 18 juni 2003,  
JAR 2003/174;  Ktg. Zwolle 4 september 2003, Prg. 2004, 6165; Ktg. Leiden 5 oktober 2005, JAR 
2006/5. 
824  See above under § 16.4. 
825  For example, see Ktg. Lelystad 18 juni 2003, JAR 2003/174; Ktg. Zwolle 4 september 2003,  
Prg. 2004, 6165; Ktg. Utrecht 2 juli 2004, JAR 2004/201; Ktg. Bergen op Zoom 9 december 2004, 
Prg. 2005, 56. 
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due to economic circumstances; and (c) had not correctly applied the principle 
of seniority to the employees in question.826
The principle of reflection 
Until 1 March 2006, the principle of seniority applied to collective dismissals. 
As from 1 March 2006, the principle of reflection applies in collective 
dismissals, regardless of the number of employees involved. As this thesis 
reached its completion, there were only few cases published after 1 March 2006. 
In its decision of 9 June 2006, LJN AX8998, the Cantonal Court of Haarlem 
dissolved the employment agreement of the employee, due to economic 
circumstances, after having examined that the employer correctly applied the 
principle of reflection. In contrast, in its decision of 27 June 2006, LJN AX9570, 
the Cantonal Court of Leeuwarden rejected fourteen requests, although the 
employer and unions agreed upon the necessity to dismiss these employees due 
to economic circumstances. The Court stated that the employer had not 
substantiated why these circumstances made it necessary to dismiss the 
employees in question. Moreover, the employer did not substantiate which
positions became redundant. Hence, it was unclear whether the employer had 
applied the principle of reflection correctly.827 Although the foregoing cases 
make it impossible to conclude whether Cantonal Courts in the future continue 
to follow the Dismissal Decree in this respect, it is likely due to the fact that in 
the past Cantonal Courts consistently applied the principle of seniority in 
collective dismissals, as described below. 
The principle of seniority 
Case law until 1 March 2006 shows that Cantonal Courts applied the principle 
of seniority in dismissals based on economic circumstances. Like the CWI, if the 
employee in question was not the last in service, Cantonal Courts rejected the 
request,828 or unlike the CWI granted the request, compensating the absence of 
serious cause by a severance payment.829 Cantonal Courts allowed employers to 
deviate from the principle of seniority if the employer and unions830 – or the 
826  See also Ktg. Amsterdam 29 december 1993, JAR 1994/28. 
827  For a discussion of these decisions, see Margadant 2006, p. 16 and 17. 
828  For example, see Ktg. Zwolle 24 juni 1994, JAR 1994/189; Ktg. Arnhem 28 september 1994,  
JAR 1994/237; Ktg. Rotterdam 11 oktober 1994, JAR 1994/239; Ktg. Alphen aan den Rijn 23 
december 1994, JAR 1995/56; Ktg. Utrecht 2 juli 2004, JAR 2004/201; Ktg. Gorinchem 26 augustus 
2004, Prg. 2004, 6299; Ktg. Haarlem 9 februari 2006, RAR 2006/56. 
829  For example, see Ktg. Utrecht 11 mei 1998, JAR 1998/156 See also Boot 2005c, p. 268-272; 
Loonstra en Kruit 2006, p. 26. 
830  For example, see Ktg. Roermond 31 maart 2003, JAR 2003/109; Ktg. Den Haag 22 december 2004, 
JAR 2005/55. 
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employer and the Works Council831 – had consented to a Redundancy Plan 
(Sociaal Plan), in which they agreed to deviate from the principle of seniority. 
In this respect, the Cantonal Court of Haarlem in its decision of 5 November 
2004 held that the employer’s interest in running his business efficiently is as 
important as job security, hence, the employer must be free to run his business 
as he likes. Consistently, he held that the employer must be free to apply the 
criteria for dismissal, which best suited the employer’s business.832 The 
Cantonal Courts of Leeuwarden and Utrecht,833 and the Cantonal Court of 
Enschede held the same.834 In this respect, Cantonal Courts, too, allowed a 
selection of employees based on quality on the condition that  
x the employer substantiates which positions have become redundant, 
and for which objective reasons the employees in question need to 
be dismissed, i.e. the application of the criteria is verifiable, hence, 
the dismissal of employees is not arbitrary; and 
x quality as a criterium of dismissal is fair and reasonable, in that it 
must be considered as the best alternative to meet the financial 
problems of the company.835
Cantonal Courts, too, allow for other criteria for dismissal in dismissals to which 
the WMCO applies, on these same conditions.836
Personally, I do not object to quality as a criterium to select employees on the 
conditions above. Legislative history of Article 7:685 DCC shows that when an 
employee does not perform to the satisfaction of the employer this, in itself, 
constitutes a – just – cause for dismissal. So long as the legislature has not 
amended the Dismissal Decree in this respect, I, however, am in favor of 
Cantonal Courts applying the same criteria as the CWI.837 To the extent the 
831  Ktg. Utrecht 4 december 2003, JAR 2004/23.Also when there was no Works Council involved, the 
Cantonal Court sometimes allowed deviation. For example, see Ktg. Sittard-Geleen 17 mei 2005, 
JAR 2005/143; Ktg. Nijmegen 3 mei 2005, JAR 2005/163. 
832  Ktg. Haarlem 5 november 2004, JAR 2005/56. In contrast, the Cantonal Court of Nijmegen, too, 
allowed deviation based on quality, without consent between the employer and unions and/or a 
Works Council, in Ktg. Nijmegen 3 mei 2005, JAR 2005/163. For  these cases, see also Grapperhaus 
2006, p. 41. 
833  Ktg. Leeuwarden 24 oktober 2003, Prg. 2004, 6181. 
834  Margadant refers to Ktr. Enschede 31 mei 2006, zaaknr. 219797, in which the Cantonal Court did not 
apply the principle of reflection under the Dismsissal Decree, but, instead, approved and applied the 
criteria for dismissal as agreed upon by the employer and unions. See Margadant 2006, p. 17. 
835  For example, see Ktg. Amsterdam 2 juli 2002, JAR 2002/212; Ktg. Amsterdam 14 juni 2004,  
JAR 2004/262; Ktg. Haarlem 5 november 2004, JAR 2005/56; Ktg. Den Haag 22 december 2004, 
JAR 2005/55. From these cases derive that the Cantonal Court applies a marginal test with regard to 
the question what the best alternative is to meet financial needs. For an in-depth disussion of the 
marginal test, see below under § 18.6. 
836  For example, see Ktg. Leeuwarden 24 oktober 2003, Prg. 2004, 6181; Ktg. Roermond 25 januari 
2003, JAR 2003/109. 
837  See also Margadant 2006, p. 17. 
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BBA 1945-procedure and the dissolution procedure have become alternative 
routes for terminating an employment agreement, private-sector employees, in 
my opinion, deserve a same treat with regard to just cause protection, regardless 
of which route the employer chooses to terminate the employment agreement. 
This, in turn, raises the question whether the Dismissal Decree should be 
amended in this respect.
Requirement of replacement
Like the CWI, Cantonal Courts must examine whether employers are able to 
replace the employee in another – adjusted – position. The way the majority of 
courts think is best reflected through the decision of the Cantonal Court of 
Zwolle. The latter held that ‘(…) whereas an employer has the right to run his 
business as he likes and to reorganize the company as needed on the one hand, 
the employer has an obligation to do his utmost to replace the employee in 
another position within the company on the other’.838 This applies all the more 
so, when this obligation to replace the employee is manifest in the Redundancy 
Plan.839 Also, the employer must examine whether he is able to replace the 
employees, when the unions and the Works Council have acknowledged the 
need to reorganize. Therefore, when the employer had not seriously examined 
the possibility to replace the employees, the Cantonal Court of Bergen op Zoom 
rejected the requests, although the unions and the Works Council had agreed 
upon the need to reorganize, and on the dismissals in question.840
On the other hand, a request will be granted if the employer 
substantiates that he seriously examined whether the employees in question 
could be replaced in another position.841 Therefore, I find the decision of the 
Cantonal Court of Utrecht of 4 December 2003 remarkable. In this case, the 
employer had to reorganize the company due to economic circumstances. The 
Court held that the employer could not be reasonably expected to examine 
whether he could replace the employee within the company, in that the 
employee was already offered a new position in light of the reorganization. The 
employee did not meet the requirements of this new position. A salient detail in 
the Utrecht case was that the company employed about 2500 employees.842 This 
is more an exception than the rule, however. 
In conclusion, Cantonal Courts tend to apply the same criteria as the CWI in 
requests based on economic circumstances. Additionally, Cantonal Courts 
838  Ktg. Zwolle 10 juni 1994, JAR 1994/141. See also Ktg. Sneek 13 april en 18 juni 1994,
JAR 1994/140;  Ktg. Zuidbroek 8 februari 1996, Prg. 1996, 4485; Ktg. Apeldoorn 20 maart 1996, 
Prg. 1996, 4531; Ktg. Rotterdam 9 april en 11 juni 1997, Prg. 1997, 4863; Ktg. Harderwijk  
15 februari 1999, JAR 1999/105. 
839  For example, see Ktg. Harderwijk 15 februari 1999, JAR 1999/105. 
840  Ktg. Bergen op Zoom 9 december 2004, Prg. 2005, 56. 
841  Ktg. Groenlo 5 oktober 1994, JAR 1994/238; Ktg. Gorinchem 28 februari 1995, JAR 1995/71. 
842  Ktg. Utrecht 4 december 2003, JAR 2004/23. 
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accept quality as a criterium for dismissal, however, on certain conditions only. 
This is possible, because the Dismissal Decree does not bind Cantonal Courts. 
Heinsius’ statement that the rules of the Dismissal Decree were written to serve 
in the BBA 1945-procecure is correct. In practice, Cantonal Courts, nonetheless, 
apply these rules. This is possible, in that there is no legal obstacle for Cantonal 
Courts to apply the same principles as the CWI.843
First, Article 7:611 DCC requires that an employer must behave as 
befits a good employer. In furtherance of this Article, and according to 
legislative history, Cantonal Courts consider a dismissal as an ultimum 
remedium, hence, require of employers to examine whether it is possible to 
replace the employee in another position.844 Also, one can argue that Article 
7:611 DCC imposes on an employer a heavier duty of care to look for 
alternatives, the longer the employment relationship endures.845 The fact that the 
Cantonal Formula does not include the principle of reflection, nor the 
requirement of replacement, is not determinative, and insufficient for this 
matter. The Cantonal Formula mainly sees to the size of the severance payment, 
and does not constitute law, but directives.846 Second, from Article 7:685 DCC it 
can be derived that Cantonal Courts must examine whether there is serious cause 
to dissolve the employment agreement for the employee in question. In effect, 
the principle of reflection, and requirement of replacement, sees to the latter. 
Last, a reason that might explain why Cantonal Courts apply the same criteria as 
the CWI, is that courts may have become aware of the fact that the BBA 1945-
procedure and the dissolution procedure have grown towards one another, i.e. 
requests under both procedures are based on the same reasons for dismissal. 
Consequently, Cantonal Courts may be of the opinion that employees deserve 
the same treatment, regardless of the route the employer chooses. In this respect, 
the Cantonal Court of Gorinchem held that ‘(…) the choice to adhere the 
Cantonal Court should not serve an employer to avoid the protective rules of the 
Dismissal Decree’.847 Also, Cantonal Courts may wish for clear criteria in 
determining serious cause. Article 7:685 DCC and/or the Cantonal Formula lack 
criteria on determining serious cause. The CWI Handbook on Dismissal, on the 
other hand, entails clear rules on a just cause for dismissal.  
In my opinion, Hansma oversees these aspects when he states that it is illogical 
for Cantonal Courts to apply the same criteria to the dissolution procedure like 
the CWI in the BBA 1945-procedure.848 He is correct that the dissolution 
procedure was meant for other situations than the BBA 1945. However, in my 
opinion this argument is no longer valid, in that the dissolution procedure in 
843  See also Loonstra 1997a, p. 48. 
844  See above under § 16.4.1 and § 18.4.2. 
845  For example, see Ktg. Zwolle 10 juni 1994, JAR 1994/141; Ktg. Utrecht 2 juli 2004, JAR 2004/201. 
846  Tjong Tjin Tai en Veling 2005, p. 159, referring to Teuben 2005, p. 20, 102, 318 and 320. 
847  Ktg. Gorinchem 26 augustus 2004, Prg. 2004, 6299. See also Ktg. Heerlen 9 maart 2005,  
JAR 2005/125, rov. 7.3.1. See also Van Minnen 2003, p. 380. 
848  Hansma 2005, p. 46 and 47. 
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time has become the alternative route for the BBA 1945-procedure. This applies 
all the more so after several attempts of the legislature to make the BBA 1945 
the main route have failed.849 In my opinion, to the extent the BBA 1945-
procedure and the dissolution procedure are alternative routes, and the intent 
behind both procedures is to provide employees just cause protection, without 
the possibility for employers to trade off this protection, employees in 
dissolution procedures deserve the same treatment.850
Heinsius’ argument, that if Cantonal Courts will apply the rules of the 
Dismissal Decree to the dissolution procedure, this will lead to insecurity for 
employees,851 in my opinion, is unfounded. Rather, when Cantonal Courts apply 
different criteria in determining serious cause – which, in practice, appears to be 
the case – this will lead to insecurity for employers and employees. Instead, 
when the Cantonal Court applies the same criteria as the CWI, this will give 
insight on which criteria Cantonal Courts – uniformly – apply to requests based 
on economic circumstances. On the other hand, the legislature cannot ignore that 
employers apparently are in need of other criteria for dismissal, and that 
Cantonal Courts respond to this need. In effect, this cry for more flexible law 
already induced the legislature to reconsider the principle of seniority as a 
criterium for dismissal.852 This raises the question whether courts or the 
legislature must respond to the cry of employers for – more – flexible law. 
18.5.2.2 Unsatisfactory performance  
After 1954, a large category embraced requests based on unsatisfactory 
performance. The rejections were also the highest in this category. Courts, in 
other words, do not easily assume this ground.853 As mentioned above, the CWI 
roughly distinguishes between behavior for which an employee is not to blame 
(incapacity), and behavior for which he is to blame (misconduct).854 Cantonal 
Courts tend to make a similar distinction between incapacity – whether or not 
due to illness – and misconduct. In general, misconduct is brought forward as an 
urgent cause in dissolution procedures, which is discussed in-depth in paragraph 
18.4 above.855 In discussing a change of circumstances the focus in this 
paragraph, therefore, will be on the employee’s incapacity, distinguishing 
between (i) incapacity in general; and (ii) incapacity, due to illness.  
(i) Incapacity in general 
849  Scholtens statistiek ontbindingsvergoedingen 2003 (I), p. 3.  
850  See also Van Minnen 2003, p. 388; Van Beek 2004, p. 32. 
851  Heinsius 2004, p. 112. 
852  Zondag 2005b, p. 465-467. 
853  See also above under § 18.5.1 under iii. 
854  See above under § 16.5. 
855  See also Verhulp en Zondag 2003, p. 1-4 making a same distinction. For misconduct, i.e. behaviour 
outside the job for which an employee is convicted under penal law, see Koevoets 2006. See also 
Loonstra, Koevoets en Zondag 2003, p. 213; Van Luyn en Van Poelgeest 2005, p. 28-34. For an in-
depth discussion on dissolutions based on urgent cause, see above under § 18.4. 
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Cantonal Courts, in general, agree that an employment agreement constitutes an 
obligation on the part of the employee to perform to the best of one’s ability 
(inspanningsverbintenis). The fact that the employee had not reached his target, 
thus, does not automatically constitute a just cause for dismissal,856 because an 
employment agreement does not entail an obligation to produce a certain result 
(resultaatsverbintenis).
In this respect, Cantonal Courts consider factors in granting requests as whether 
x the employer is able to provide objective criteria for unsatisfactory 
performance;857
x the employee has been warned;858
x performance interviews have taken place;859
x the employer shortly after the alleged unsatisfactory performance, 
notified the employee of the unsatisfactory performance;860
x the employer notified the employee in clear wordings and in a 
proper way, in which respect the employee performed 
unsatisfactorily;861
x the employer allowed the employee to react;862
x the employer allowed the employee to improve himself;863
x the employer and the employee made a realistic plan in improving 
the employee’s performance, and the employer offered guidance, 
including job training and/or occupational retraining;864
856  For example, see Rb. Zwolle 7 oktober 1992, JAR 1993/7; Ktg. Amersfoort 5 februari 1997, JAR 
1997/123. See also Buijs 2003, p. 102. 
857  For example, see Rb. Zwolle 7 oktober 1992, JAR 1993/7; Ktg. Utrecht 27 november 1992, JAR 
1993/22;  Ktg. Gouda, 22 juni 1993, JAR 1993/168; Ktg. Amsterdam 12 mei 1995, JAR 1995/120;  
Ktg. Amersfoort 5 november 1997, JAR 1998/57; Ktg. Alkmaar 13 maart 1998, Prg. 1998, 4981; 
Ktg. Rotterdam 14 april 2003, JAR 2003/121; Ktg. Amsterdam 22 januari 2004, JAR 2004/54. 
858  For example, see Ktg. Amsterdam 21 juli 1993, JAR 1993/201; Ktg. Nijmegen 10 december 1993, 
JAR 1994/21; Ktg. Zwolle 12 juli 1995, JAR 1995/171; Ktg. Alkmaar 4 juli 1997, JAR 1997/169; 
Ktg. Deventer 6 november 2001, JAR 2001/246; Ktg. Emmen 29 augustus 2001, JAR 2001/178; Ktg. 
Rotterdam 4 januari 2005, JAR 2005/40. 
859  For example, see Ktg. Zevenbergen 22 november 1995, Prg. 1996, 4487; Ktg. Alkmaar 4 juli 1997, 
JAR 1997/169; Ktg. Breda 26 februari 2002, JAR 2002/86. 
860  For example, see Ktg. Eindhoven 2 oktober 2000, Prg. 2000, 5562; Ktg. Rotterdam 31 mei 2001, 
JAR 2001/165; Ktg. Haarlem 31 juli 2002, JAR 2002/191; Ktg. Alkmaar 9 augustus 2002, JAR 
2002/210. 
861  For example, see Ktg. Gouda 22 juni 1993, JAR 1993/168; Ktg. Rotterdam 11 oktober 1994, JAR 
1994/239; Ktg. Utrecht 16 maart 1995, JAR 1995/128; Ktg. Zwolle 12 juli 1995, JAR 1995/171; Ktg. 
Zevenbergen 22 november 1995, Prg. 1996, 4487; Ktg. Eindhoven 8 april 1998, Prg. 1998, 4980; 
Ktg. Amsterdam 12 februari 1997, JAR 1997/124; Ktg. Delft 25 januari 2001, JAR 2001/70. 
862  For example, see Ktg. Amsterdam 12 februari 1997, JAR 1997/124. 
863  For example, see Ktg. Eindhoven 26 juni 2001, Prg. 2001, 5712; Ktg. Rotterdam 4 januari 2005, JAR 
2005/40. 
864  For example, see Ktg. Groningen 30 september 1996, JAR 1996/222; Ktg. Hilversum 15 juli 1998, 
JAR 1998/187; Ktg. Utrecht 15 februari 1999, JAR 1999/54; Ktg. Delft 25 januari 2001, JAR 
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x the employee made efforts in improving himself or, in contrast, 
neglected reasonable instructions in this respect;865
x the employee fulfilled a role model within the company;866 and 
x the dismissal must be considered as disproportionate based on the 
employee’s age, years of service and chances on the labour 
market.867
Additionally, Cantonal Courts consider factors as whether the request has been 
filed shortly after the probationary period expired,868 the employer recently has 
extended the employment agreement,869 the employer has been given several 
raises,870 or, the employee has been promoted shortly before the alleged 
unsatisfactory performance.871 In two aspects, the foregoing practice resembles 
the practice of the CWI. Like the CWI, Cantonal Courts (i) require of employers 
to have given employees the opportunity to improve themselves, and to make 
realistic plans in this respect;872 and (ii) require of employers to search for 
possibilities to replace the employee in another position.873
(ii)  Incapacity due to illness 
As from 1 January 1999, Cantonal Courts must ascertain that the reason for 
dismissal is not related to a prohibition on dismissal.874 This new rule under 
Article 7:685 DCC was to prevent employers from avoiding prohibitions on 
dismissal through the dissolution procedure. Prohibitions of dismissal, being 
notice requirements, in principle, apply to a unilateral termination of 
employment only. Article 7:685 DCC concerns a dissolution of the employment 
agreement to which prohibitions on dismissal, in principle, do not apply. As 
from 1 January 1999, this has changed. It is noteworthy to mention that the 
prohibition on dismissal in dissolution procedures is only one of the 
2001/70; Ktg. Haarlem 3 april 2003, JAR 2003/117; Ktg. Lelystad 1 maart 2004, JAR 2004/91; Ktg. 
Rotterdam 3 april 2006, RAR 2006/93. 
865  For example, see Ktg. Rotterdam 8 september 1997, JAR 1997/252; Ktg. Utrecht 19 februari 1997, 
JAR 1997/75. 
866  For example, see Ktg. Middelburg 13 december 2001, JAR 2002/25. 
867  For example, see Ktg. Utrecht 27 november 1992, JAR 1993/22; Ktg. Groenlo 15 november 1995, 
JAR 1996/3; Ktg. Amsterdam 17 juni 2005, JAR 2005/177; Ktg. Bergen op Zoom 25 oktober 2006, 
Prg. 2006, 185. 
868  For example, see Rb. Zwolle 17 juni 1992, JAR 1992/61. 
869  For example, see Ktg. Gouda 22 juni 1993, JAR 1993/168. 
870  For example, see Ktg. Utrecht 16 maart 1995, JAR 1995/128; Ktg. Alphen aan den Rijn 26 augustus 
1997, JAR 1997/197; Ktg. Rotterdam 13 augustus 1998, JAR 1998/180.  
871  For example, see Ktg. Amsterdam 2 april 1999 JAR 1999/95; Ktg. Deventer 20 februari 1998, JAR 
1998/62; Ktg. Zaandam 16 april 1993, JAR 1993/212. 
872  See Art. 5:1.1.c of the Dismissal Decree. See also Blom 2002, p. 23; Buijs 2003, p. 100 and 101. 
873  For example, see Ktg. Amsterdam 12 mei 1995, JAR 1995/120; Ktg. Amsterdam 12 februari 1997, 
JAR 1997/124; Ktg. Apeldoorn 30 maart 1998, Prg. 1998, 4973; Ktg. Deventer 20 februari 1998, 
JAR 1998/62. 
874  For a discussion of the prohibitions on dismissal in general, see above under § 14.4.5. 
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circumstances in determining serious cause.875 Legislative history shows that 
Cantonal Courts, in principle, need to reject the request in case of a prohibition 
on dismissal, however, they must grant the request if the totality of 
circumstances constitute serious cause, which necessitates to dissolve the 
employment agreement on short notice.876
This Section focuses on the prohibition on dismissal of Article 7:670.1 
DCC, prohibiting employers to dismiss an employee during the first two years 
of illness. Literally, it, thus, does not protect an employee because of illness. 
However, in effect, it protects an employee against dismissal based on any
ground during this period, therefore, the employee is protected against dismissal 
because of illness during this period as well.877 After the two years of illness, 
Article 7:670.1 DCC, in principle, no longer applies. Article 7:685.1 DCC, on 
the other hand, requires of Cantonal Courts to examine whether the request is 
related to a prohibition on dismissal, therefore, broadens the scope of Article 
7:670.1 DCC. Hence, the duty to examine whether a dismissal is related to a 
prohibition on dismissal, in effect, sees to dismissals during and because of 
illness.878 Consequently, I will make a distinction in discussing case law 
between (a) requests during the period of two years of illness; (b) requests after 
the period of two years of illness; and (c) requests, in which the employer asks 
the Cantonal Court to dissolve the employment agreement because of illness. 
(a)  Dissolution during the first two years of illness 
Cantonal Courts, in general, strictly apply the prohibition on dismissal during 
the two years of illness.879 On the other hand, Cantonal Courts are free to grant a 
request when the totality of circumstances constitute a serious cause that 
necessitates to dissolve the employment agreement on short notice. This 
explains the decisions of the Cantonal Courts of Deventer and Alphen aan den 
Rijn, which dissolved the employment agreement with an ill employee – 
although Article 7:670.1 DCC applied – because of the fact that their positions 
had become redundant due to economic circumstances.880 The aforementioned 
courts held that Article 7:670.1 DCC applied to situations only (i) in which an 
875  TK 25 263, 1996-1997, No. 3, p. 32. See also Van Kempen en Ridderbroek 2006, p. 3-5. 
876  EK 1997-1998, 25 263, No. 132d, p. 15. Hoogendijk 1999, p. 208-212; Bijkerk-Verbruggen 2005,  
p. 89; Diebels 2005, p. 178.
877  Hoogendijk 1999, p. 177 and 178,  referring to the legislative history of Art. 7:670.1 DCC.  
878  Diebels 2005, p. 178. 
879  For case law, see A.M. Luttmer-Kat, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, Art. 7:685 
BW (DCC) § 8.3. See also Van Kempen en Ridderbroek 2006, p. 6. 
880  For example, see Ktg. Heerlen 30 mei 2001, JAR 2001/134; Ktg. Deventer 19 februari 2004, JAR 
2004/57; Alphen aan den Rijn 6 april 2004, JAR 2004/102. See also Bijkerk-Verbruggen 2005, p. 89 
and 90; Van Kempen en Ridderbroek 2006, p. 7. In contrast, the Cantonal Court rejected the request, 
regardless of economic circumstances, arguing (i) that the employee could be replaced in another – 
adjusted – position (Ktg. Brielle 29 april 2005, JAR 2005/140); and (ii) that the employer, in effect, 
asked for a dissolution of the employment agreement due to illness (Ktg. Den Bosch 5 juli 2006, JAR 
2006/179). 
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employer asked for dissolution of the employment agreement because of illness; 
(ii) the employee was not capable to defend himself, due to this illness in the 
dissolution procedure; and (iii) the illness was caused during the performance of 
the employee’s duties. This does not derive from legislative history, however.881
From case law further derives, that in determining whether the totality of 
circumstances justifies a dismissal of the ill employee during the first two years 
of illness, a Cantonal Court, in general, rejects the request when it is of the 
opinion that the employer has not seriously examined whether he is able to 
replace the employee in another – adjusted – position.882 Only incidentally, 
Cantonal Courts grant requests, although serious cause, in effect, is lacking.883
In these cases, the Cantonal Court compensates the absence of serious cause by 
a severance payment. The legislature, however, requires serious cause without 
the possibility for the employer to trade off serious cause. The legislature, as a 
matter of fact, codified the requirement to replace an ill employee in another – 
adjusted – position under the new Article 7:658a DCC. Hence, under this 
Article, the employer must make serious efforts to reintegrate the ill 
employee.884
 Also, the prohibition on dismissal of Article 7:670.1 DCC applies to 
situational illness. The latter, in general, refers to illness as a direct consequence 
of a conflict between colleagues, which makes the employee incapable of 
performing work with the employer in question.885 Hence, it is incorrect to state 
that a dissolution is justified per se in case of situational illness, due to the fact 
that Article 7:670.1 DCC, in principle, applies.886 Consequently, employers 
generally state that the situational illness has resulted in a permanent and 
irreparable breach of trust. The latter, in itself, constitutes serious cause which, 
in turn, makes the decision in accordance with legislative history.887 This 
explains that Cantonal Courts dissolve employment agreements during the first 
881  EK 25 263, 1997-1998, No. 132d, p. 15. See also Verburg 1998; Bijkerk-Verbruggen 2005, p. 89. 
882  Scholtens 2001b, p. 64-66, referring to Ktg. Utrecht 28 augustus 1992, JAR 1992/91; Ktg. Utrecht 29 
april 1999, JAR 1999/111; Ktg. Amsterdam 13 oktober 1999, JAR 1999/258.  In addition, see Ktg. 
Eindhoven 23 oktober 2002, JAR 2002/284. See also Buijs 2005a, p. 32-33. 
883  For example, see Ktg. Apeldoorn 18 december 2003, JAR 2004/4. See also above under § 18.3 under 
1999. 
884  For an in-depth discussion of this Article, see above under § 16.7. 
885  Hoogendijk 1999, p. 175; De Groot 1995, p. 5. See also GH Arnhem 11 november 2003, JAR 
2003/292, disapproved by Verspagen. See Verspagen 2004. For a reaction on Verspagen, see Heida 
2005. 
886  Incorrect, therefore, is the decision of the Cantonal Court of Zwolle (Ktr. Zwolle 7 oktober 2005, 
LJN AU4462). In contrast, see Ktr. Maastricht 17 november 2005, JAR 2006/110, recognizing the 
employee’s situational illness on the one hand, but rejecting the employer’s request to dissolve the 
employment agreement on the other due to its failure to deliberate with the employee on how to 
improve the employee’s attitude, either or not through a mediator. See also Ktg. Tiel 27 januari 2006, 
JAR 2006/78. 
887  For example, requests were granted by Ktg. Boxmeer 6 juli 1993, Prg. 1994, 4115; Ktg. Alkmaar 15 
april 1992, Prg. 1992, 3725; Ktg. Arnhem 6 februari 1997, JAR 1997/60; Ktg. Delft 4 maart 2004, 
JAR 2004/88. For an in-depth discussion of requests/dissolutions based on breach of trust, see below 
under § 18.5.2.3. 
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two years of illness, when the illness is situational.888 When the employee is not 
to blame for the breach of trust – or the employer has not behaved as befits a 
good employer – Cantonal Courts tend to compensate this by a severance 
payment.889 Consequently, one raises the question whether a breach of trust, 
which has led to the employee’s incapacity – e.g. the situational illness of the 
employee – for which the employee is not to blame, at the same time, can 
constitute a serious cause.890
The prohibition on dismissal during illness does not apply, if the employee 
structurally refuses to cooperate with the efforts of the employer to reintegrate 
the employee.891 Also, the prohibition on dismissal during illness does not apply 
in case of an urgent reason for dismissal.892 In fact, employers generally ask for 
a (conditional) dissolution based on urgent cause if an ill employee structurally 
refuses to comply with reasonable instructions of the employer, in effect, 
making it impossible for the public body, i.e. the Social Security Agency 
(Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemers Verzekeringen or UWV) to determine whether 
the employee is ill. In general, this takes place during the two years of illness. In 
principle, these employees enjoy just cause protection, to the extent Cantonal 
Courts consistently apply case law on summary dismissals regarding ill 
employees, as discussed below.893
 In Vixia/Gerrits (2004),894 the Netherlands Supreme Court held that 
absent other circumstances a frequent violation of reasonable instructions to 
determine the existence of the illness of the employee alone does not constitute 
an urgent cause for dismissal. Primarily, the employer must suspend salary until 
the employee meets the employer’s instructions.895 However, in Ouled
L’Kadi/Albert Heijn (2004),896 the Netherlands Supreme Court held that when 
other circumstances occur, a frequent violation of reasonable instructions can 
constitute an urgent cause for dismissal, without the obligation for the employer 
to first suspend the employee’s salary. These other circumstances derive from 
decisions of the Netherlands Supreme Court,897 i.e. (i) a summary dismissal 
must remain an ultimum remedium; and (ii) the court must take into 
888  Rutgers 2003, p. 119. For case law, see Hoogendijk 1999, p. 218 and 219; Holtzer 1998; Boertien  en 
Schaink 1996, p. 7; Boertien en Schaink 1999, p. 10. 
889  For example, see Ktg. Alkmaar 15 april 1992, Prg. 1992, 3725; Ktg. Boxmeer 6 juli 1993, Prg. 1994, 
4115; Ktg. Arnhem 28 mei 1999, JAR 1999/136; Ktg. Amersfoort 25 februari 2003, JAR 2003/74. 
890  For case law, I refer to Ktg. Amersfoort 29 juni 1988, Prg. 1989, 3094; Ktg. Amersfoort 2 september 
1992  en 17 februari 1993, Prg. 1993, 3830; Ktg. Amsterdam 10 november 1992, Prg. 1992, 3773. 
For the answer to the question, I refer  to § 18.5.2.3. 
891 Art. 7:670b.3 DCC. For an in-depth discussion of this Article, see above under § 16.7. 
892  See Art. 7:670.1 DCC. 
893  See above under § 18.4. 
894  HR 8 oktober 2004, JAR 2004/259 (Vixia/Gerrits). 
895  Kronenburg-Willems 1996, p. 1519. 
896  HR 24 december 2004, JAR 2005/50 (Ouled L’Kadi/Albert Heijn). 
897  See also Bijkerk-Verbruggen 2005, p. 88. 
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consideration all circumstances of the case in determining an urgent cause.898 In 
the case of Ouled L’Kadi, the employer already had suspended the employee’s 
salary and had warned the employee for a last time that when the employee 
persisted in ignoring instructions without any reasonable ground, a summary 
dismissal would follow.899 Finally, when an employer and employee differ on 
whether the employee is (not) ill, the decisions of the Netherlands Supreme 
Court of 1974, 1982 and 1991 apply. Based on these decisions, it is 
determinative whether the employee actually – thus, apart from the UWV’s 
judgment – is capable of performing work. When afterwards it turns out that the 
employee is capable of performing work, it is determinative whether the 
employee reasonably might have believed that he was not able to work. The 
Netherlands Supreme Court affirmed these decisions in 1991.900 In conclusion,
so long as Cantonal Courts act in accordance with these cases, private-sector 
employees – who are ill – enjoy just cause protection under Article 7:685 
DCC.901 To the extent Cantonal Courts compensate the absence of serious cause 
by a severance payment, i.e.  grant requests in these cases, although serious 
cause, in effect, is lacking, private-sector employees lack just cause protection.  
(b)  Dissolution after two years of illness 
Article 7:670.1 DCC raises the question whether an employee automatically can 
be dismissed after the period of two years of illness. The general opinion is that 
Cantonal Courts are free to dissolve the employment agreement.902 Case law 
prior to 1953 already showed that courts dissolved the employment agreement in 
case of long-term illness.903 Loonstra’s 1985 study shows that Cantonal Courts 
dissolved employment agreements in 80% of cases of long-term illness. 
Loonstra found it striking that Cantonal Courts in determining serious cause did 
not require other circumstances than long-term illness alone.904 In this respect, it 
is interesting to look at the practice of the CWI. Under Article 5:2 of the 
Dismissal Decree, the CWI rejects the request when recovery is possible within 
26 weeks and it is possible for the employer to offer the employee an adjusted 
position or other suitable duties in another position.905 In contrast, Cantonal 
Courts examine whether the employee can be replaced in another – adjusted – 
898  For an in-depth discussion of case law on summary dismissals, see above under § 18.4. 
899  For an in-depth discussion of these cases, see Vegter 2005b; Beltzer 2005b;  Sagel 2005. 
900  HR 6 juni 1975, NJ 1975, 484 (Motel Maatschappij Holland/Sijstermans); HR 13 januari 1978, NJ 
1978, 433 (Loullichki/Hoechst Holland NV); HR 22 januari 1982, NJ 1982, 470 
(Chemlal/Jaarbeurs); HR 20 september 1991, NJ 1991, 768 (Van Dam/SVB en RvA). For a 
discussion of these cases, see Hoffmans (2) 1991, p. 207-209. 
901  For an in-depth discussion of requests/dissolutions based on urgent cause, see above under § 18.4.2. 
902  See Rutgers 2003, p. 151; Bijkerk-Verbruggen 2005, p. 90 and 91. See also De Volkskrant 10  
January 2006, p. 9, referring to a research in assignment of the STAR. 
903  See above under § 18.5.1 under (i). 
904  Loonstra 1985, p. 354. 
905  See above under § 16.7. 
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position after two years of illness in a minority of cases only.906 In the majority 
of cases, Cantonal Courts compensate the absence of serious cause by severance 
payments. This is contrary to the Cantonal Formula. The latter determines that 
before granting a severance payment in case of long-term illness, the Cantonal 
Court must first determine whether replacement is impossible.907
 When this is impossible, only then Cantonal Courts must focus on the 
questions ‘at whose risk the illness is’ and ‘who is to blame’. In this respect, 
Cantonal Courts, in general, examine whether the illness is due to circumstances 
on the job and/or whether the employer has made serious efforts to reintegrate 
the employee.908 Because the latter has already been discussed in-depth above 
under (a), I will focus on the circumstances on the job only. As regards the 
latter, it can be derived from case law that when the illness is – partly – caused 
by bad working conditions on the job, this will be compensated by a severance 
payment.909 The illness is considered to be at the risk of the employer when the 
employee falls ill, due to circumstances related to the job, e.g. an employee is 
injured during a personnel event organized by the employer, in which the 
employee must participate.910 The Cantonal Formula, however, determines that 
when the employee is to blame, e.g. the employee joins a sport event against the 
employer’s will, Cantonal Courts do not compensate the aspect of illness by the 
severance payment.911 This may seem strange, because the employee under the 
same circumstances, in general, remains entitled to his salary under Article 
7:629.3.a DCC.912 On the other hand, under Article 7:611 DCC an employee 
must at all times behave as befits a good employee, in that his behavior will not 
result in illness or that he avoids the risk to become ill to the least possible, 
which aspect may be considered in determining the size of the severance 
payment.913 Besides a severance payment under Article 7:685 DCC, the 
employee can, too, ask for a severance payment on the basis of the Articles 
7:658 DDC and 7:611 DCC in a separate procedure. Under Article 7:658 DCC a 
906  For example, see Ktg. Zutphen 20 april 2000, JAR 2000/158, which dissolved the employment 
agreement with a severance payment after it had examined that reintegration was not realistic.  
907  Toelichting Aanbeveling 3.4 Kantonrechtersformule in Tekst & Commentaar Arbeidsrecht (2006):  
       Bijlage 2. 
908  Van Slooten 2001a, p. 43 and 44; Vegter 2002; Asscher-Vonk 2003, p. 216; Heerma van Voss 2005a, 
p. 72. For case law, see Ktg. Utrecht 17 januari 1992, Prg. 1992, 3772; Ktg. Utrecht 11 mei 1999, 
JAR 1999/269; Ktg. Gouda 10 april 2003, JAR 2003/116; Ktg. Apeldoorn 18 december 2003, JAR 
2004/4.  
909  For example, see Ktg. Rotterdam 29 mei 1998, JAR 1998/173; Ktg. Rotterdam 11 december 2002, 
JAR 2003/61.  
910  See Sap 2000, referring to Rb. Utrecht 3 september 1997, JAR 2000/13; Rb. Breda 15 november 
1999, JAR 2000/31. 
911  Asscher-Vonk 2003, p. 215 and 216. 
912  See also TK 1995-1996, 24 439, No. 5, p. 61 and No. 6, p. 74; EK 1995-1996, 24 439, No. 134a, p. 
30 and No. 134b, p. 48. For an in-depth discussion of Art. 7:629.3.a. DCC, see Willems 2005; 
Hoogendijk 1996, p. 227-233. 
913  Hoogendijk 1996, p. 231-233. See also Ktg. Amersfoort 12 december 2001, JAR 2002/34, which 
held that the employee was not entitled to salary during his illness after getting in a car with a 
colleague who was drunk and without a driver’s license. 
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formal or a substantive employer is responsible for damages, which an employee 
suffers, due to circumstances on the job, unless the employer can prove that the 
employer met his obligations to behave as befits a good employer in this respect 
or the damages are a result of the employee’s malice (opzet) or willful 
recklessness (bewuste roekeloosheid).914 Under Article 7:611 DCC, the 
employee can claim damages he suffered due to circumstances related to the 
job.915 In general, a procedure under Article 7:611 DCC is excluded after a 
dissolution procedure. However, claims in which the employee asks for damages 
due to circumstances on the job or related to the job, generally, are considered as 
so-called independent claims.916 In conclusion, Cantonal Courts must reject a 
request when serious cause is lacking, which is the case when it is still possible 
to reintegrate the employee, i.e. to replace the employee in an adjusted or 
another position. From case law it can be derived that Cantonal Courts often 
compensate the absence of serious cause by a severance payment. These 
employees do not obtain just cause protection according to the legislature’s 
intent. 
(c)  Dissolution because of illness 
Literally, the prohibition on dismissal does not apply when the employer files a 
request between periods of illness. Employers file these requests when the 
employee is frequently ill. As mentioned above, Article 7:685.1 DCC broadened 
the scope of Article 7:670.1 DCC, in that Cantonal Courts must ascertain that 
the request is not related to a prohibition on dismissal. This implies that an 
employee cannot be dismissed during and because of illness. Consequently, 
Cantonal Courts are reluctant to dissolve an employment agreement because of 
illness.917 From case law it can be derived that Cantonal Courts, in fact, only 
seem willing to dissolve the employment agreement because of illness when the 
employer substantiates that the frequent absence severely frustrates the operation 
of the company and/or the frequent absence requires unreasonable efforts by 
914 Under HR 20 september 1996, NJ 1997, 198, JAR 1996/203 (Pollemans/Hoondert) and HR 11 
september 1998, NJ 1998, 870 (Van der Wiel/Philips) these exceptions, in effect, are a dead letter. 
For an in-depth discussion of these cases, see Loonstra en Zondag 2003, p. 49-55. For a discussion of 
this term in private law in general, see Haak en Koot 2004. 
915  HR 22 januari 1999, NJ 1999, 534, JAR 1999/44 (S/Stichting Reclassering); HR 12 januari 2001, 
JAR 2001/24 (Vonk/Van der Hoeven); HR 9 augustus 2002, NJ 2002, 235, JAR 2002/205 (De 
Bont/Oudenallen).  For a discussion of these cases, see Loonstra 2002, p. 15-21; Loonstra en Zondag 
2004, p. 248-254, referring to other authors in this respect as well. For compensation for mental 
injury on the basis of Art. 7:658 and/or 7:611 DCC or otherwise, see Vegter 2005a, p. 83-171. 
916  For case law on this subject and the term independent claims, see below under § 18.6. See also Van 
Slooten 2001a. 
917  Hoogendijk 1999, p. 214, footnote 131, referring to relevant case law. See also Ktg. Den Bosch 28 
september 1994, JAR 1994/227; Ktg. Rotterdam 10 november 1995, JAR 1996/21; Ktg. Amsterdam 
14 juni 1996, JAR 1996/159; Ktg. Utrecht 18 maart 1997, JAR 1997/80; Ktg. Den Haag 25 juni 
1997, JAR 1997/188; Ktg. Haarlem 17 april 2002, JAR 2002/8. See further Boertien en Schaink 
1999, p. 6. Most recently, see Ktg. Den Bosch 5 juli 2006, JAR 2006/179. For the latter, see Van 
Kempen en Ridderbroek 2006, p. 7. 
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colleagues to establish a smooth operation.918 This practice of Cantonal Courts – 
and the CWI919 – is in accordance with Bons/Ranzijn (2001), in which the 
Netherlands Supreme Court implicitly held that the termination of employment 
is justified when the absence of the ill employee severely frustrates the operation 
of the company and/or his colleagues will be overburdened by performing duties 
of the colleague in question.920 Therefore, the idea that under the Act on Equal 
Treatment Based on a Handicap or Chronic Illness (Wet gelijke behandeling op 
grond van handicap of chronische ziekte) an employer can never ask for 
dissolution of the employment agreement with an employee who is ill, is 
misplaced.921
Overall, I conclude that, in general, employees who are ill for more than two 
years are lacking just cause protection, to the extent that absence of serious 
cause is compensated by a severance payment. In all other cases, Cantonal 
Courts, in general, are reluctant when they are asked to dissolve the employment 
agreement. Hence, employees during the two years of illness, and those 
frequently ill, generally enjoy just cause protection according to the legislature’s 
intent. 
18.5.2.3  Breach of trust 
When the legislature of 1953 allowed dissolutions based on breach of trust, it 
thought of dissolutions for which no one was to blame. For situations, in which a 
party was to blame the legislature offered a possibility to file a request based on 
urgent cause. The latter changed over time. However, what did not change was 
that the legislature required serious cause.922 It bears mentioning that the 1953 
legislature, too, held that a change of circumstances did not include any kind of 
change of circumstances. Consequently, this implies that not any breach of trust 
constitutes a serious cause.923 Logically, there was loud protest when Scholtens 
in 1988 implied that Cantonal Courts as a rule should dissolve the employment 
agreement when there was breach of trust.924 Apparently, it was felt by all that a
just cause for dismissal, as the basic principle under Dutch dismissal law must at 
all times be respected.925 Also the VNO-NCW, the Netherlands’ largest 
employers’ association, stressed the importance of this principle.926 Buijs, a 
918  Hoogendijk 1999, p. 217, footnote 138, referring to relevant case law. See also Ktg. Enschede 19 
november 2003, Prg. 2004, 6159; Ktg. Amsterdam 18 september 2006, JAR 2006/249. 
919  For a discussion of the rules the CWI applies in case of illness, see above under § 16.7. 
920  HR 26 oktober 2001, JAR 2001/238 (Bons/Ranzijn). See also Rutgers 2003, p. 132. 
921  For the Act, see above under § 14.4.5 and § 16.7. 
922  See above under § 18.3. See also Roeloff 1988, p. 203. 
923  See above under § 18.3. 
924  Scholtens 1989, p. 22-24. For protest, see Ingelse 1989, p. 32-35. See also Roeloff 1988, p. 36-38. 
925  See also Buijs  2005a, p. 23-27. 
926  VNO-NCW 1995. 
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Cantonal Judge, too, held that based on legislative history,927 not any breach of 
trust, as Scholtens seemed to imply, automatically constitutes a just cause for 
dismissal.928 Scholtens later nuanced his statement, in that ‘as a rule’, in effect, 
meant that the employment agreement must be dissolved when based on a 
change of circumstances it is reasonable and justified to dissolve the 
employment agreement.929
 On the other hand, one can only agree with Scholtens that Cantonal 
Courts almost as a rule grant requests based on breach of trust. When an 
employee is to blame for breach of trust this is understandable, because in these 
cases the breach of trust, in general, is caused by misconduct on the part of the 
employee, which, in itself, constitutes serious cause.930 However, one can raise 
the question whether a breach of trust for which the employee is not to blame 
constitutes serious cause. I particularly refer to cases, in which a non-existent
reason underlies the breach of trust.931 For example, in its decision of 28 
November 1931, the Cantonal Court of Amsterdam dissolved the employment 
agreement, although the alleged reason of the employer of unsatisfactory 
performance was non-existent. The Cantonal Court dissolved the employment 
agreement based on the fact that continuation of the employment relationship 
was not in the interest of the company. This approaches Scholtens’s view, 
because ‘why continuing an employment relationship if both parties are in 
conflict with one another?’ Peerenboom at the time, however, considered this 
decision ‘unfair and in violation of Dutch dismissal law that required serious 
cause’.932 Why? The answer is simple: an employment agreement can be 
dissolved when there is serious cause only. Peerenboom held that there was no 
serious cause. When we look back at the decision of 28 November 1931, the 
Cantonal Court dissolved the employment agreement based on the fact that to 
replace the employee in question in the same or another position would severely 
frustrate the operation of the company. This, in itself, constitutes serious cause. 
Peerenboom still has a point, however, in that breach of trust was not considered 
as a serious cause at the time, therefore, the employee could not properly defend 
himself against the dismissal. In this respect, I refer to the decision of the Court 
of Appeal of Amsterdam of 13 March 2003 and 5 June 2003, in which the Court 
held that an appeal of the Cantonal Court’s decision was possible, because the 
927  Scholtens 1989, p. 46-48. See also Scholten 2001a, p. 10. 
928  See also Buijs 2005a, p. 38, referring to Ktg. Harderwijk 13 november 1984, Prg. 1985, 2247;  
Ktg. Harderwijk 11 oktober 1995, Prg. 1996, 4492. 
929  See also Buijs 2003, p. 104. 
930  For example, see Ktg. Wageningen 16 april 1997, Prg. 1997, 4781; Ktg. Haarlem 10 februari 1998, 
Prg. 1998, 4971; Ktg. Rotterdam 14 februari 2002, JAR 2002/78; Ktg. Hilversum 16 mei 2002,  
JAR 2002/177; Ktg. Hilversum 16 oktober 2002, JAR 2002/283. 
931  This must be distinguished from an existent reason for which the employee is not to blame. See  
HR 29 september 2000, NJ 2001, 560, JAR 2000/223 (D./Nutricia). See also above under § 18.4. 
932  For the decision of the Cantonal Court of Amsterdam of 28 November 1931, see above under
§ 18.5.1. 
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Cantonal Court had violated the fundamental principle of hearing both sides.933
More specifically, the Cantonal Court dissolved the employment agreement 
based on breach of trust although none of the parties had referred to this ground 
of dismissal, i.e. both had not brought forward facts and arguments in this 
respect.934 In effect, this also happened in the case before the Cantonal Court of 
Amsterdam of 28 November 1931, to be distinguished from Franssen/Safe Sun 
(1986), in which the Netherlands Supreme Court held that the Cantonal Court 
based on the facts that parties had brought forward ultimately decides whether 
there is an urgent reason for dismissal or a change of circumstances.935
Cantonal Courts, in general, do not examine whether the employment 
relationship is permanently and irreparably disrupted.936 A minory only require 
that the employment relationship be permanently and irreparably disrupted, 
according to legislative history,937 in that it makes replacement, in effect, 
impossible. Under case law, replacement is still possible when the employer is 
able to restore the employment relationship by making (new) serious efforts 
either or not through (external) coaching.938 The majority of Cantonal Courts, 
however, dissolve the employment agreement although serious cause is lacking, 
compensating its absence by a severance payment, rather than that they reject 
the request.939 Scholtens would argue that to replace the employee in the same or 
another position is without effect when the employment relationship is 
permanently and irreparably disrupted. Case law, however, shows that the latter 
is assumed relatively easy. Few courts seriously examine whether it would be an 
option to replace the employee in the same, adjusted or another position, i.e. 
whether the employment relationship still could be continued in the same or 
another setting. In this respect, it bears mentioning, that an employer under 
Article 7:658a DCC has an obligation to examine whether it is possible to 
replace the – ill – employee in the same, or another – adjusted – position within 
933  For the eventual possibilities to appeal from the decision of the Cantonal Court under Art. 7:685 
DCC, see above under § 18.2. 
934  GH Amsterdam 13 maart 2003 en 5 juni 2003, JAR 2003/98. 
935  HR 4 april 1986, NJ 1986, 549 (Franssen/Safe Sun). For this case, see also above under § 18.2. 
936  For example, see Ktg. Eindhoven 26 februari 2002, JAR 2002/110; Ktg. Rotterdam 14 april 2003, 
JAR 2003/121; Ktg. Nijmegen 6 oktober 2004, JAR 2005/90; Ktg. 21 april 2006, JAR 2006/142; 
Ktg. Haarlem 13 november 2006, LJN AZ 3130. 
937  See above under § 16.6. 
938  For example, see Ktg. Den Haag 14 mei 1997, JAR 1997/129; Ktg. Rotterdam 9 juni 1997, Prg. 
1997, 4813; Ktg. Den Bosch 26 februari 2002, JAR 2002/110; Ktg. Rotterdam 20 juni 2003, JAR 
2003/175; Ktg. Roermond 28 november 2003, JAR 2004/9; Ktg. Delft 4 maart 2004, JAR 2004/88; 
Ktg. Zwolle 14 maart 2005, JAR 2005/94; Ktg. Tiel 27 januari 2006, JAR 2006/78; Ktg. Haarlem 17 
mei 2006, JAR 2006/147; Ktg. Leeuwarden 19 oktober 2006, Prg. 2006, 179; Ktg. Utrecht 31 
oktober 2006, JAR 2006/295. One could also argue, that reference should be made to Ktg. 
Amsterdam 18 september 2006, JAR 2006/249 and Ktg. Maastricht 17 november 2006, JAR 
2006/110. However, these cases, in my opinion, rather see to rejections due to the prohibition on 
dismissal regarding illness, than on rejections due to a failure to reintegrate the ill employee, leading 
to breach of trust. 
939  See Roeloff 1988, p. 204. 
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one’s own company and the company of another employer.940 Apparently, the 
fact alone, that parties appear in court as conflicting parties and/or an 
employer’s general statement to have lost faith in the employee is a decisive 
factor for Cantonal Courts to assume that parties are not able to work together in 
the future.941
In conclusion, Article 7:685 DCC requires serious cause for dismissal. 
Cantonal Courts, however, act differently when it concerns breach of trust for 
which an employee is to blame, i.e. a non-existent reason underlies the breach of 
trust. I am of the opinion that Cantonal Courts must make a distinction between 
(i) breach of trust for which the employee is to blame; and (ii) breach of trust for 
which the employee is not to blame, i.e. a non-existent reason underlies the 
breach of trust. In case of the latter, a serious cause is present only when the 
breach of trust is permanent and irreparable, in that replacement, in 
effect,severely frustrates the operation of the company. In determining the latter, 
Cantonal Courts must examine whether it is possible for employers to replace 
the employee, and consistently must reject the request when replacement is 
possible. This applies to unconditional and conditional requests. As mentioned 
above, when the Netherlands Supreme Court allowed employers to file a 
conditional request it did not allow for Cantonal Courts to apply less stringent 
criteria in conditional requests in determining serious cause.942 By applying less 
stringent criteria in determining serious cause with regard to breach of trust, 
Cantonal Courts, in effect, may reinforce a practice, through which the employer 
automatically will base his request on breach of trust to ensure that the 
employment agreement will be dissolved.943 Subsequently, an employer can 
make up a non-existent reason resulting in breach of trust based on which the 
employment agreement will be dissolved. In my opinion, this cannot be 
qualified as a justified dismissal. As Roeloff correctly stated, it is not hard for an 
employer to force breach of trust, and to consequently call upon this ground to 
establish dissolution.944 Although it seems fair that Cantonal Courts reflect the 
absence of serious cause through severance payments, this is not in accordance 
with the legislature’s intent. With the introduction of Article 1639w, and the 
severance payment in 1953, the legislature did not intend to offer employers the 
possibility to trade off the requirement of serious cause by severance 
payments.945 Therefore, I conclude that Cantonal Courts which dissolve an 
employment agreement based on breach of trust for which the employee is not 
940  See above under § 16.7. A statement of the employer that the employee is allowed to sollicitate with 
related companies is not sufficient. See Ktg. Amsterdam 11 november 2005, JAR 2006/52. 
941  For example, see Ktg. Gorinchem 4 augustus 2003, JAR 2003/233; Ktg. Haarlem 15 april 2004, JAR 
2004/125; Ktg. Enschede 17 januari 2006, JAR 2006/55. 
942  See above under § 18.4.2. 
943  Moreover, an employer can add that he is not able to pay a severance payment due to his bad 
financial position. See Ktg. Apeldoorn 11 december 1996, JAR 1997/41. For an in-depth discussion 
of this decision, see De Blecourt 1997. 
944  Roeloff 1988, p. 202. 
945  See above under § 18.3. 
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to blame, i.e. a non-existent reason underlies this breach of trust, without
examining replacement, undermine the system of just cause protection.946
18.6 Serious cause, a marginal test or conclusive test? 
Before drawing final conclusions whether or not private-sector employees enjoy 
just cause protection under Article 7:685 DCC, the question that needs 
answering first is to what extent Cantonal Courts may apply a marginal test in 
determining serious cause. The CWI applies a marginal test with regard to 
requests based on economic circumstances, in that it does not interfere with the 
employer’s policy in respect of the employer’s choice of operational 
requirements. In this respect, it examines whether the employer’s choice is fair 
and reasonable.947 From case law it derives that Cantonal Courts apply a same 
marginal test in case of requests based on economic circumstances. A striking 
example is the decision of the Cantonal Court of Amsterdam of 17 February 
2004. The Cantonal Court explicitly stated that ‘reorganization, in itself, is 
justified because an employer, in principle, may run his business as he likes’. 
This Cantonal Court went one step further than the CWI, because prior to this 
statement it explicitly held that the employer had not substantiated the financial 
need to reorganize, nor the fact that the position of the employee had become 
redundant due economic circumstances. The CWI in such a case rejects the 
request. The CWI makes one exception only, as from 1 March 2006 with regard 
to collective dismissals under the WMCO.948 In all other cases, the CWI requires 
of the employer to substantiate the economic reasons, the need to reorganize, the 
number of positions which becomes redundant due to these circumstances, and  
the necessity of the dismissal of the employee in question. Herewith it does not 
tread on the employer’s freedom of policy. In effect, it simply examines whether 
the reason is (non) existent. This is consistent with legislative history on just 
cause protection.949 Contrary to legislative history, the Cantonal Court of 
Amsterdam in the aforementioned decision of 17 February 2004 granted a 
severance payment, compensating the absence of serious cause, and the 
employer’s bad behavior.950 Personally, I have problems with this decision. The 
alleged reason did not exist, nor was it clear why the position of the employee 
needed to end. Nevertheless, the Cantonal Court of Amsterdam granted the 
request, stating that reorganization, in itself, justifies a dismissal. In this respect, 
I refer to the CWI Handbook on Dismissal which, in my opinion, correctly states 
‘that a simple statement of the economic circumstances does not suffice to 
justify a dismissal’.951 By no means do I wish to imply that Cantonal Courts 
946  Roeloff 1988, p. 203. 
947  See above under § 16.4.1. 
948  See above under § 15.1.1. and § 17.2. 
949  See above under § 16.4.1. 
950  Ktg. Amsterdam 17 februari 2004, JAR 2004/56. 
951  CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 9-5. See also Ktg. Lelystad 3 mei 2006, Prg. 2006, 107. 
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must apply a conclusive test (volle toets) with regard to economic 
circumstances, as Zondag advocated in the past. The latter advocated that 
Cantonal Courts would interfere with the employer’s choice for operational 
requirements to meet the employer’s financial need.952 Contrary to Zondag, I 
subscribe to the CWI’s practice to apply a marginal test in respect of operational 
requirements (only). In my opinion, Cantonal Courts, like the CWI, too, must 
examine the existence of the alleged reason.  
First, legislative history requires such. Second, Baijings (1997) requires 
of Cantonal Courts to examine the existence of the alleged reason. In brief, the 
Netherlands Supreme Court requires of Cantonal Courts in a dissolution 
procedure that the severance payment reflect all relevant circumstances of the 
case, herewith, in effect, instructing Cantonal Courts to consider all relevant 
circumstances in determining serious cause.953 This applies all the more so, in 
that Baijings (1997) makes it virtually impossible to initiate an action under 
Article 7:681 DCC based on manifestly unreasonable dismissal after the 
dissolution procedure, when being dismissed without cause.954 To understand 
the foregoing I will discuss Baijings (1997), and in its progeny, the case law 
insofar as relevant for this thesis.955
In Baijings (1997), the Cantonal Court had dissolved the employment agreement 
between Sara Lee/Douwe Egberts N.V. and one of its key executives, Baijings. 
The Cantonal Court did not include the loss of stock options in the severance 
payment. The Cantonal Court held that the employee was free to initiate a 
separate procedure for this issue. The employee filed a new claim with the 
appropriate court in first instance that rejected the claim. When the attorney-at-
law failed to appeal against this decision, Baijings sued his attorney before the 
District Court. He sued for damages, including the loss of the stock options 
which, Baijings claimed, would successfully be awarded in appeal based on the 
principles of fairness and reasonableness. The District Court held that with 
regard to the loss of stock options the employer indeed had not behaved as befits 
a good employer. Moreover, the District Court held that the employer had 
terminated the employment agreement in a manifestly unreasonable manner 
under Article 1639s (7:681 DCC). The Court of Appeal did not agree with the 
District Court. It held that the employment agreement was dissolved and that it 
was, thus, impossible to initiate a claim based on manifestly unreasonable 
dismissal under Article 1639s, which sees to a unilateral termination of the 
952  In brief, Zondag proposed that Cantonal Courts would refer the employer to the Labour Inspectorate
to ask for a short-time permit (werktijdverkorting) when the financial need was temporary. Zondag 
2003b, p. 163. In contrast, I subscribe to the CWI’s practice to reject the request, and to point out the 
possibility of a short-time permit. See CWI Handbook on Dismissal (2006), p. 10-1 to 10-5. 
953  Loonstra 2002, p. 21-23; Van Marwijk Kooy 2002, p. 33; De Laat 2002, p. 162; Bodewes 2004,  
p. 14. 
954  See above under § 17.3.2. 
955  For an in-depth discussion of HR 24 oktober 1997, NJ 1998, 257, JAR 1997/248 (Baijings) and in its 
progeny the cases that followed hereafter, see the numerous publications referred to in the following 
footnotes. 
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employment agreement only. In addition, it held that there is no room for a test 
based on these principles outside Article 1639s.  
The Netherlands Supreme Court overruled the decision of the Court of 
Appeal. Although it agreed that it was not possible to initiate a claim based on 
manifestly unreasonable dismissal after a dissolution procedure, this did not per 
se mean that an employee could never initiate a claim based on the principles of 
fairness and reasonableness after the dissolution procedure. Subsequently, the 
Netherlands Supreme Court held that the main rule is that the special 
relationship of the employment agreement and the protective rules surrounding 
this relationship, in principle, do not allow a second test against the principles of 
fairness and reasonableness than in exceptional cases only. According to the 
Netherlands Supreme Court, this means that a Cantonal Court, in principle, must 
test all relevant circumstances against the principles of fairness and reasonability 
in the dissolution procedure. Subsequently, it held that the severance payment 
should fully reflect the result of this test and, therefore, in principle excludes a 
second test based on the principles of fairness and reasonability. Baijings, 
nevertheless, was allowed to initiate a new procedure based on the principles of 
fairness and reasonability, because the Cantonal Court had explicitly stated in 
the dissolution procedure that he had not considered the loss of stock options in 
the severance payment, and that Baijings in this respect was free to initiate a 
separate procedure.956 In literature, the general opinion on Baijings (1997) was 
that for the Netherlands Supreme Court to rule otherwise, in effect, would mean 
that the Netherlands Supreme Court implicitly would allow an appeal of the 
Cantonal Court’s decision in the dissolution procedure, which is excluded by 
Article 7:685.11 DCC.957
In Elverding/Wienholts (2001), the Netherlands Supreme Court affirmed Baijngs 
(1997). In this case, Wienholt filed a claim after the dissolution procedure based 
on exactly the same facts and the same legal cause of action – i.e. the principles 
of fairness and reasonableness – but on the basis of Article 7:611 DCC this time. 
The Netherlands Supreme Court rejected the claim with reference to Baijings
(1997).958 Subsequently, the Netherlands Supreme Court partly had rejected a 
claim of an employee in Tulkens/FNV(1999)959 for the same reason.960 New in 
Tulkens/FNV(1999) was that the Netherlands Supreme Court, implicitly, left a 
possibility for the employee to initiate a 611-procedure based on a ‘new’ fact, 
which had not been taken into consideration by the Cantonal Court in the 
dissolution procedure.961 The Netherlands Supreme Court, implicitly, confirmed 
956  HR 24 oktober 1997, NJ 1998, 257, JAR 1997/248 (Baijings), rov. 5.1. See also Grouls 2004, p. 119. 
957  See Van Marwijk Kooy 2002, p. 35; Grouls 2004, p. 120;  Loonstra en Verburg 2005, p. 53. 
958  HR 2 november 2001, NJ 2001, 667, JAR 2001/255 (Elverding/Wienholts). See also Van Slooten 
2001b; Loonstra 2002, p. 26 and 27; Bodewes 2004, p. 15. 
959  HR 5 maart 1999, NJ 1999, 644, JAR 1999/73 (Tulkens/FNV). 
960  For an in-depth discussion on these cases, see Tjong Tjin Tai en Veling 2005, p. 161-164. 
961  See also Loonstra 2002, p. 22 and 23; Bodewes 2004,  p. 14. 
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the latter in Van Ravenswade/ING (2003).962 Consequently, in Tjemkes/ABN 
AMRO (2004), the Advocate General held that a claim based on a ‘new’ fact 
was admissible only when it was not related to the ground(s) of the dismissal.963
The Netherlands Supreme Court, however, did not decide on the issue. It 
rejected Tjemkes’ case on formal grounds. Nevertheless, based on these 
decisions one argued that an employee could initiate a 611-procedure when a 
court is asked to decide on (new) facts that occurred after the decision in the 
dissolution procedure.964
The Netherlands Supreme Court brought more clarity to the question 
whether and when an employee can initiate a second test based on fairness and 
reasonability in TNO/Ter Meulen (2002),965 Guerand/PTT (2002)966 and 
Vermeulen/Douwe Egberts (2004).967 In brief, the Netherlands Supreme Court 
held that it is possible to initiate a second fairness and reasonability-test after the 
dissolution procedure for so-called independent claims.968 According to the 
Netherlands Supreme Court, these claims – in the aforementioned cases: an 
invention award, a backpay wage claim and an award based on a redundancy 
plan, respectively –  
(i) have found their basis of existence during the employment 
agreement;  
(ii) are related to the period prior to the termination of 
employment;  
(iii) are not related to the – reason for dismissal and the – manner 
the employment agreement has come to an end; and  
(iv) in principle need not be tested against the principles of fairness 
and reasonability.969
A salient detail in Guerand/PTT (2002) was that the Cantonal Court to a certain 
extent had taken the independent claim into consideration in the severance 
payment, i.e. the Cantonal Court had taken into consideration that the employer 
had not behaved as befits a good employer, because he had not paid salary in 
time. As Baris correctly states, based on Baijings (1997), the latter must be 
considered in determining the size of the severance payment in a dissolution 
procedure.970 Because it strikes as unfair to consider the same facts twice in 
determining a severance payment, the Netherlands Supreme Court held that the 
962  See Loonstra en Verburg 2005, p. 56. 
963  HR 2 april 2004, JAR 2004/114, rov. 12 (Tjemkes/ABN AMRO). 
964  See also Bodewes 2004, p. 17-19. 
965  HR 1 maart 2002, NJ 2003, 210, JAR 2002/66 (TNO/Ter Meulen). 
966  HR 1 maart 2002, NJ 2003, 211, JAR 2002/67 (Guerand/PTT).
967  HR 10 december 2004, NJ 2006, 214, JAR 2005/12 (Vermeulen/Douwe Egberts). 
968  See also the conclusion of the Advocate General under 11 in HR 2 april 2004, JAR 2004/114 
(Tjemkes/ABN AMRO). 
969  See also De Laat 2002; Verburg 2004, p. 61; Grouls 2004, p. 120 and 121; Baris 2005, p. 133-136. 
970  See also Baris 2005, p. 135. 
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court in a new procedure must take the size of the severance payment in the 
dissolution procedure into consideration.971
In Visser/Van Lee (2003),972 the Netherlands Supreme Court, with 
reference to Guerand/PTT (2002) and TNO/Ter Meulen (2002), held that a same 
fact can lead to different claims. By means of example, the Netherlands 
Supreme Court referred to a backpay wage claim. To the extent the employer by 
not paying wages has not behaved as befits a good employer, this must be taken 
into consideration in determining the size of the severance payment. However, 
this same fact constitutes a so-called independent claim, based on which the 
employee retains a right to his wage for which he can file a separate claim under 
Article 7:611 DCC, or any other legal cause of action he prefers.973
Subsequently, the Netherlands Supreme Court held admissible the employee’s 
claim in Drankencentrale Waterland/Blakborn (2004)974 and De
Zonnehof/Swart (2004).975 In the first case, the employee asked the employer to 
comply with a contractual obligation to pay a severance payment, and in the 
second, the employee asked the employer to comply with an obligation to pay a 
redundancy payment (wachtgeld) under the collective bargaining 
agreement.976Also, in Vermeulen/Douwe Egberts B.V. (2004) the claim – related 
to an agreement based on the Redundancy Plan – was held admissible. The 
claim was denied for being without interest, however.977
The main rule, thus, is that a Cantonal Court, in principle, must test all relevant 
circumstances against the principles of fairness and reasonability in the 
dissolution procedure. When we examine the exceptions to this rule, the 
Netherlands Supreme Court made a first exception in Baijings (1997), i.e. in 
which the Cantonal Court explicitly excluded the issue of stock options. Such 
exclusion, however, was possible in exceptional cases only.978 Apparently, the 
latter was the reason for the Netherlands Supreme Court to approve the decision 
of the Cantonal Court in Intramco (2000) to include ‘the right on stock options’ 
in the severance payment.979
971 HR 2 april 2004, NJ 2006, 212, JAR 2004/112 (Drankencentrale/Blakborn). See De Laat 2002,  
p. 165; Bodewes 2004, p. 18 and 19; R.M. Beltzer, JAR Verklaard 2004, p. 11; Verburg 2004, p. 61; 
Tjong Tjin Tai en Veling 2005, p. 164 and 165. 
972  HR 7 november 2003, NJ 2004, 174, JAR 2003/295 (Visser/Van Lee). 
973  HR 7 november 2003, NJ 2004, 174, JAR 2003/295 (Visser/Van Lee). See also Baris 2005, p. 136 
and 137; Grouls 2005, p. 121; Tjong Tjin Tai en Veling 2005, p. 166. 
974  HR 2 april 2004, NJ 2006, 212, JAR 2004/112 (Drankencentrale/Blakborn). For an in-depth 
discussion, see Loonstra en Verburg 2005, p. 48-51. 
975  HR 25 juni 2004, NJ 2006, 213, JAR 2004/169 (De Zonnehof/Swart).  
976  See also Bodewes 2004, p. 19 and 20; R.M. Beltzer, JAR Verklaard 2004, p. 11; Grouls 2004, p. 121 
and 122; Tjong Tjin Tai en Veling 2005, p. 167. 
977  See Loonstra en Verburg 2005, p. 51 and 52; Bodewes 2005. 
978  See also the conclusion of the Advocate General under 1 in HR 2 april 2004, JAR 2004/114 
(Tjemkes/ABN AMRO). 
979  HR 15 december 2000, NJ 2001, 251, JAR 2001/14 (Intramco). 
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The Netherlands Supreme Court again seemed to have broadened the 
exception of Baijings (1997) in Van Ravenswade/ING (2003).980 In the latter, the 
employee wished to have the employer’s accusations on his unsatisfactory 
performance rectified in the dissolution procedure. Article 7:685 DCC, in 
principle, is not the appropriate legal cause of action to ask for rectification.981
Nevertheless, the Cantonal Court had instructed the employer to rectify its 
accusations in a report. When the employer had not sufficiently met this 
instruction, the Cantonal Court increased the severance payment to the extent 
the accusations had damaged the employee’s career. In a separate procedure 
with regard to the rectification, the Netherlands Supreme Court held that the 
Cantonal Court should have given the employee the opportunity to agree with 
the increase or, in contrast, the employee should have been given the 
opportunity to ask for a rectification in a separate procedure. At first sight, it 
appeared that the Netherlands Supreme Court by doing so, in effect, instructed 
the Cantonal Court in a dissolution procedure to comply with the employee’s 
wish to exclude a certain issue. This, however, is contrary to the decision of the 
Netherlands Supreme Court in Baijings (1997). As derives from Baijings (1997),
an exclusion can be made by court and is exceptional. From TNO/Ter Meulen 
(2002) and Guerand/PTT (2002), it can be derived that employees, in fact, can 
only ask courts to apply the exception in Baijings (1997) with regard to 
independent claims.982 I, therefore, find it difficult to agree with De Laat that the 
‘instruction’ of the Netherlands Supreme Court in Van Ravenswade/ING (2003)
refers to claims in general.983 In my opinion, Van Ravenswade’s claim was an 
independent claim,984 which explains the ‘instruction’ of the Netherlands 
Supreme Court. Hence, Van Ravenswade/ING (2003) in my view leaves the rule 
of Baijings (1997) intact.
In conclusion, legislative history and the foregoing case law do not allow a 
marginal test in determining serious cause. Cantonal Courts must examine 
whether the alleged reason by the employer exists, and whether the alleged 
reason necessarily leads to the dismissal of the employee in question. Only with 
regard to requests based on economic circumstances Cantonal Courts may apply 
a marginal test, to the extent it respects the employer’s choice for operational 
requirements. Therefore, when an employer cannot substantiate the reason 
and/or the necessity of the dismissal, serious cause is lacking, and, subsequently, 
the request must be rejected. 
980  HR 10 januari 2003, NJ 2003, 231, JAR 2003/39 (Van Ravenswade/ING). 
981  See conclusion of the Advocate General  under 20 in HR 10 januari 2003, NJ 2003, 231, JAR 
2003/39 (Van Ravenswade/ING). See also Bodewes 2003, p. 6 and 7;  De Laat 2003a; Bodewes 
2004, p. 17 and 18; Verburg 2004, p. 60-63; Baris 2005, p. 133; Tjong Tjin Tai en Veling 2005,  
p. 165 and 166. 
982  See also Baris 2005, p. 135. 
983  De Laat 2003a, p. 90. 
984  HR 10 januari 2003, NJ 2003, 231, JAR 2003/39 under 20 (Van Ravenswade/ING). See also 
Bodewes 2003, p. 6 and 7;  De Laat 2003a, p. 88-90; Bodewes 2004, p. 17 and 18.Verburg 2004,  
p. 60-63; Baris 2005, p. 133; Tjong Tjin Tai and Veling 2005, p. 165 and 166. 
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18.7 Conclusion 
Article 7:685 DCC (1639w old) was introduced in the Act of the Employment 
Agreement of 1907. The legislature’s intent was to provide a means to obtain a 
reasonable solution in case of a conflict of interests between an employer and an 
employee. Under this Article, a Cantonal Court is allowed to dissolve an 
employment agreement based on serious cause. Initially, the legislature of 1907 
required an urgent cause or a change of circumstances, to be applied strictly. 
The legislature of 1953 broadened its scope by allowing dissolutions based on 
breach of trust. Moreover, the legislature introduced the possibility for Cantonal 
Courts to grant a severance payment in case of a change of circumstances. 
Studies on case law, and case law, show that Cantonal Courts, contrary to the 
legislature’s intent, tend to compensate the absence of serious cause by 
severance payments, instead of rejecting requests, when serious cause, in effect, 
is lacking. This regularly takes place with requests based on breach of trust, for 
which the employee is not to blame. Also, Cantonal Courts grant so-called 
conditional requests, applying less stringent criteria than in unconditional 
requests, herewith, reinforcing a practice, in which employers abuse Article 
7:685 DCC to dismiss an employee without – an urgent – cause. Third, 
occasionally, Cantonal Courts grant requests based on economic circumstances, 
although the employer has not substantiated its existence. Last, Cantonal Courts 
grant requests for employees who are ill for more than two years without 
seriously examining the possibility whether it is still possible for employers to 
replace the employee in the same, an adjusted or another position. It should be 
noted that the number of these cases is unknown, because published cases only 
show a fraction of the cases Cantonal Courts handle. However, to the extent 
Cantonal Courts do not consistently apply Article 7:685 DCC according to the 
legislature’s intent, one can state that they undermine the system of just cause 
protection. The fact that Cantonal Courts in these cases grant a severance 
payment does not justify the dismissal. That is that with the introduction of – the 
severance payment – under Article 1639w, the legislature did not intend to offer 
employers a possibility to trade off the requirement of serious cause with a 
severance payment. On the other hand, one can argue that these Cantonal Courts 
meet the wish of employers for a more flexible dismissal law. This raises the 
question whether it is up to courts, or the legislature, to find a balance between 
flexible dismissal law for employers, and just cause protection for employees.  
19  Dutch dismissal law 
 just cause protection for private-sector employees? 
The Dutch dismissal system, initially, did not differ from the American 
dismissal system. Private-sector employees with an employment agreement for 
an indefinite period, too, could be dismissed at will. However, contrary to the 
American dismissal system, the introduction of the BBA 1945 converted the 
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Dutch at-will dismissal system into a just cause dismissal system. In general, 
one assumes that private-sector employees in the Netherlands enjoy just cause 
protection under the BBA 1945 and the Articles 681 and 685 of Book 7 Title 10 
of the Dutch Civil Code. This Chapter shows that only the BBA 1945 – together 
with the Dismissal Decree and the CWI Handbook on Dismissal – provide(s) 
just cause protection to private-sector employees, according to the legislature’s 
intent. This is to provide just cause protection without the possibility for 
employers to trade off just cause protection with a severance payment. Article 
7:681 DCC on a manifestly unreasonable dismissal makes it possible for 
employers to trade off restoration of the employment agreement with a 
severance payment. Moreover, under this Article, a court can – but does not 
have to – consider a dismissal as manifestly unreasonable when an employee is 
dismissed without cause. Hence, Article 7:681 DCC does not hold a iusta causa 
dimissionis. Article 7:685 DCC, on the other hand, in theory, requires serious 
cause based upon which an employer can ask the Cantonal Court to dissolve the 
employment agreement. To the extent Cantonal Courts apply the same criteria as 
the CWI to determine whether a dismissal is justified, private-sector employees 
enjoy just cause protection. To the extent Cantonal Courts compensate the 
absence of serious cause by severance payments, courts undermine the system of 
just cause protection. This more often than not takes place with requests based 
on breach of trust. The general assumption that private-sector employees, too, 
enjoy just cause protection under the Articles 681 and 685 of Book 7 Title 10 of 
the Dutch Civil Code, therefore, is unjustified.  
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V AMERICAN AND DUTCH DISMISSAL LAW 
 IN LIGHT OF ARTICLE 4 OF ILO CONVENTION 158 
‘The employment of a worker shall not be 
terminated unless there is a valid reason 
for such termination connected with the 
capacity or conduct of the worker or 
based on the operational requirements of 
the undertaking, establishment or 
service.’ Article 4 of ILO Convention 158 
20    The International Labour Organization (ILO)
20.1  Introduction 
In this Chapter, the American and the Dutch just cause standards will be gauged 
against the international just cause standard of Article 4 of Convention 158 of 
the International Labour Organization (ILO).1 The aim of this Chapter is to gain 
an impression whether – and to what extent – the American at-will dismissal 
system and the Dutch dual just cause dismissal system are growing towards this 
international just cause standard. This brings me to the importance of Article 4, 
which is partly determined by the (legal) status of the Convention.  
 To understand its status, I will describe why the ILO was established 
and what its goals are (20.2), its characteristics (20.3), and its core work (20.4). 
Also, I will pay attention to the process of economic globalization. As 
demonstrated in the first Chapter, just cause protection is still needed in this 
ongoing process, which justifies that I will pay attention to ILO’s role in this 
process (20.5). Subsequently, I will pay attention to ILO Convention 158. In the 
paragraphs 21 and 22, respectively, I will describe the legislative history of ILO 
Convention 158 to show the intent behind the Convention in general, and behind 
its just cause standard in particular. In paragraph 23, I will examine the 
importance of ILO Convention 158 of 1982 in light of the ILO Declaration of 
1998, which provides fundamental workers’ rights. In paragraph 24, I will 
conclude to what extent the just cause standards under American and Dutch 
dismissal law meet Article 4 of ILO Convention 158. Finally, in paragraph 25, I 
will examine why the Dutch government wishes to ratify ILO Convention 158, 
and the need and the chances of ratification of ILO Convention 158 in general. 
The question whether the Dutch government, in fact, should ratify the 
Convention will be answered in the last Chapter. 
1  For these treaties and sources, see above under § 1.3.2. 
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20.2  The ILO and its establishment 
20.2.1 Constitution 
After the First World War, the Allies signed a Treaty of Peace at the (Peace) 
Conference in Versailles on 28 June 1919 (hereafter Treaty of Versailles of 
1919) to have Germany paid for the damages it caused during the war in 
particular, and to prevent another war in general. To ensure the latter, the 
League of Nations (Volkenbond) and the International Labour Organization 
were created by the Treaty. The task of the League of Nations was to keep world 
peace in general, ILO’s task was to promote social peace. The latter was 
considered a prerequisite for universal peace and was based on the belief that 
social peace abolishes the danger of military adventures, being used as a 
diversion from domestic difficulties.2 Part XIII of the Treaty of Peace of 
Versailles held the Constitution of the ILO (Articles 387-426). It was prepared 
by the tripartite Commission on International Social Legislation, which was set 
up by the Allied countries in the Peace Conference for the purpose of drafting 
the provision of an ‘organization of work’. The Peace Conference adopted the 
Constitution in two stages, on 11 and 28 April 1919.3 This Conference, too, was 
composed of representatives of workers’ and employers’ organizations, hence, 
not only of government representatives. In brief, ILO’s task under the 
Constitution was to institute a system of international labour legislation through 
the creation of uniform and universal minimum labour standards for workers 
that would amount to fair competition between countries.4
 The wish for international labour legislation dates back to the 
nineteenth century. The International Association for the Legal Protection of 
Workers5 already prepared the Berne Conventions in 1906, the world’s first two 
multilateral labour conventions, prohibiting the use of white phosphorus and 
night work of women in industry, respectively. In fact, this Association, a 
private organization, is seen as the predecessor of the ILO, but had been 
dependent on diplomatic channels for the adoption of proposals. The ILO, 
instead, became an international public organization that was able to commit 
their governments on the subjects agreed upon.6 The ILO gained support of the 
international community, as reflected through the Nobel Peace Prize it was 
awarded in 1969.7 The first time the existence of the ILO was at stake was with 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, when the Communist world began to 
2  Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 395; Raetsen 1979, p. 11; Boonstra 1996, p. 11. 
3  The principle of tripartism is the most distinguishing characteristic of the ILO. For a discussion of 
this principle, see below under § 20.3.2. 
4  Thomas 1921 (1996), p. 261; Feis 1927 (1996), p. 305; Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 395-396; Raetsen 
1979, p. 11; Ghebali 1989, p. 8-10 and 62; Swepston 1994, p. 1; Boonstra 1996, p. 11; Devlin 2001, 
p. 366. See also www.ilo.org 
5  See also above under § 1.3.1. 
6  Thomas 1921 (1996), p. 264; Ghebali 1989, p. 4; Swepston 2001, p. 135. 
7  Van der Ven (2) 1979, p.38; Valticos 1996, p. 476. 
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crumble. The harmonization of a bipolar world, in effect, was the main raison 
d’être for the ILO, and some even said that ILO’s days had passed.8 In 
pursuance hereof, the ILO Director-General, Michel Hansenne, in 1994, when 
observing the 75th anniversary of the ILO called for a new approach in his 
Report Defending Values, Promoting Change – Social Justice in a Global 
Economy: An ILO Agenda. Hansenne stressed the need for refocusing ILO’s 
standard setting activity, and for the future to focus on fundamental principles 
related to human rights to combat the negative effects of the process of 
economic globalization on workers.9 Eventually, this initiative resulted in the 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up of 
1998 (ILO Declaration of 1998).10 With this Declaration, as Sybesma-Knol 
states, the ILO began its third life,11 adjusted to the challenge of the 21st century, 
that of globalization,12 whereby its main goal remained standard setting, to 
create social peace and to regulate international competition through 
international labour standards.13 In fact, through the ILO Declaration of 1998 the 
ILO re-established its role as world leader in the social field.14 Already, in 1921, 
the first Director-General of the ILO –  Albert Thomas – wondered what the 
ILO intended to become  
‘(…) the International Labour Organization might (…) be nothing but a 
bureaucratic institution without real authority. (…).’ [on the other hand, he 
continued]: ‘(…) it may (…) command the attention of governments; its advice 
and intervention may be sought; its operations may furnish the workers whom 
it protects (…). A common spirit may be created, which will animate if room 
within. It may be the centre of a real and intense international life.’15
In 2007, we look back at what the ILO has become, an international 
organization with 178 member states, and acknowledged as the international 
keeper of social norms.16
20.2.2   Goals 
The ILO has instituted a system of international labour legislation. According to 
the main principles of the Constitution, these serve to amount to fair competition 
between countries, and to establish social peace through working conditions. 
Hence, the International Labour Conference (hereafter also Conference), 
8  Swepston 1994, p. 17.  
9  Smyth 1994, p. 49; Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 57; Cloutier 2001, p. 8. 
10  Kellerson 1998, p. 223-224. Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 58. 
11  First life after World War I; Second life after World War II. 
12  Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 58. 
13  Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 58.  
14  Gould 2001, p. 11. 
15  Thomas 1921 (1996), p. 263 and 270 and 271.
16  See also below under § 20.5.2. 
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primarily focused on minimum labour standards for workers. This changed 
through the Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944, in which the Conference 
reaffirmed the fundamental principles of the Constitution, however, influenced 
by the Second World War, paid attention to human rights as well.17 In line with 
this broadened objective, the thought was that peace is not possible in a world 
where one cannot speak freely, and where one is subject to discrimination.18
Additionally, in 1998, the Conference adopted the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up. The latter, too, 
was a reaffirmation by the ILO’s government, employer and worker constituents 
of central beliefs on fundamental principles as set out in the organization’s 
Constitution, but this time in light of the process of economic globalization.19
ILO’s primer goals remain(ed) to regulate international competition and to 
establish social peace.20
20.2.3  Structure 
From the moment of its establishment, member states of the ILO – inspired by 
fear for another war and unfair competition – were willing to accept 
international labour standards for workers worldwide. From the start, the intent 
was to have international labour standards adopted by a Conference, consisting 
of delegates from all member states,21 designed to be the legislative assembly of 
the new organization, responsible for the drafting, adoption and supervision of 
international labour standards.22 Consequently, Article 2 of the ILO Constitution 
provides for an International Labour Conference consisting of representatives of 
state governments, employers’ and workers’ organizations to decide on the 
adoption of proposals,23 by means of Conventions and Recommendations.24
Through this tripartite representation it, in effect, aims to build a ‘reality check’ 
into its standards.25 As Swepston states
‘[it] increases the likelihood that ILS [International Labour Standards: VA] (…) 
will take into account the problems workers face, the capacity of employers to 
comply, and the possibilities that governments will adopt the regulatory and 
17  For an in-depth discussion of the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944), see Boonstra 1996, p. 14-19. 
Ghebali 1989, p. 61 and 62; Sietaram 2001, p. 22. See also below under § 20.4.4. 
18  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, p.138. See also Ghebali 1989, p. 7 and 61-66; 
Swepston 2001, p. 135; Rogovsky and Sims 2002, p. v and 1. 
19  For an in-depth discussion of the ILO Declaration of 1998, see below under § 20.5.3. 
20  Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 55; Swepston 2001, p. 136. 
21  Thomas 1921 (1996), p. 261-263. 
22  Article 19 of ILO Constitution. See also Ghebali 1989, p. 150; Betten 1993, p. 17; Boonstra 1996,  
p. 24. Since the Second World War, the Conference has authority in respect of admission of new 
members and constitutional amendments as well. See Ghebali 1989, p. 150 and 151. 
23  See also Article 19 of the ILO Constitution. Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 65 and 66. 
24  Raetsen 1979, p. 19 and 20; Boonstra 1996, p. 24 and 25. 
25  Rogovsky and Sims 2002, p. 6. 
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supervisory systems necessary to implement the standards on the national 
level.’26
The International Labour Conference primarily is considered as the legislative
body of the ILO. In fulfilling its task, it annually meets in June.27 Besides, it 
discusses the Annual Report of the Director-General,28 and devotes an essential 
part of its debates to a general discussion on global social policy, based on the 
Annual Report of the Director-General. In fact, in the course of time, the 
Conference has become considered as a ‘world parliament of labour’, in which 
social and labour questions of importance to the entire world are discussed.29
The Governing Body is considered to be the executive organ of the ILO, 
coordinating the activities of the ILO, and convening three times a year. More 
specifically, under Article 2 of the Constitution, it controls the expenditure of 
the organization, has overall responsibility for managing ILO programmes, and 
supervises the work of the International Labour Office.30 Also, it has primary 
responsibility to determine the Annual Agenda of the Conference. In 
determining the Agenda, it needs to take into consideration suggestions of the 
Conference, member states, the representative organizations of employers and 
workers, and/or public international organizations.31 When the Conference 
decides by two-thirds of the votes cast by the delegates present that any subject 
shall be considered by the Conference, that subject shall be included in the 
Agenda for the following meeting as well.32 The Governing Body, finally, 
appoints the Director-General.33
 The Director-General is responsible for the efficient conduct of the 
secretariat of the ILO, the International Labour Office, and for such other duties 
as may be assigned to him. He is responsible to the Governing Body only.34 The 
Director-General, contrary to what the Constitution suggests, is far more than 
just the manager of a bureau, however. Together with the Officers of the 
Governing Body he draws up the Agenda for the Conference.35 Moreover, the 
Director-General enjoys the prerogative of expressing in his Annual Report to 
26  Swepston 1994, p. 17. 
27  Betten 1993, p. 18; Boonstra 1996, p. 24. The ILC , however, can hold an extra session of its general 
Conference of June. The 94th (Maritime) Session, for example, devoted to the maritime sector, to 
address specific problems in that sector, was held from 7 to 23 February 2006. 
28  For the Director-General, see hereafter in this same paragraph. 
29  Ghebali 1989, p. 151. 
30  Ghebali 1989, p. 141and 142 and 147; Betten 1993, p. 28; Boonstra 1996, p. 34; Sybesma-Knol 
1999, p. 71-73. 
31  Boonstra 1996, p. 24 and 35. 
32  Article 16(3) of the ILO Constitution. See also Ghebali 1989, p. 141 and 142. 
33  Since 1975, the appointment of the Director-General has been submitted to the Conference for 
approval. Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 77. 
34  Article 8 of ILO Constitution. See also Ghebali 1989, p. 142 and 159 footnote 2; Boonstra 1996,  
p. 35. As from the ILO’s establishment, a man has been appointed as Director-General. Under the 
ILO Constitution, it, too, could be a woman. 
35  Ghebali 1989, p. 159. 
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the Conference his own views on world economic and social developments and 
the work of the ILO.36 The International Labour Office is ILO’s headquarter. It 
has branch offices all over the world.37 Its functions, enumerated in Article 10 of 
the Constitution, include collecting and distributing information on international 
labour affairs, examining subjects, which it is proposed to bring before the 
Conference, preparing documents on the various items of the agenda for the 
meetings of the Conference, and editing publications dealing with problems of 
employment of international interest. Popularly spoken, the International Labour 
Office, fulfills the functions of secretariat, information centre and publisher.38
20.3  The ILO and its characteristics 
20.3.1  Membership 
When the ILO was created by the Treaty of Versailles,39 it consisted of 29 states, 
which originally signed the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. The Netherlands was 
invited to access to the Treaty and to become an Original Member of the League 
of Nations. It was the firm conviction of the ILO that it would be more effective 
if its membership could be made universal. With 178 members in 2007, 
practically covering all countries of the world, it has reached this goal. As 
regards its membership, as with other international organizations, e.g. the United 
Nations,40 or the European Union,41 a state becomes a member by the formal 
acceptance of the obligations and principles of the organization. Under Article 
1(3) of the ILO Constitution, a member state of the United Nations 
automatically becomes a member of the ILO by communicating to the Director-
General the acceptance of the obligations of the Constitution.42 The consequence 
of being a member of the ILO seems to reach further than a membership with 
36  Ghebali 1989, p. 160 and 163; Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 75. As from 1919 respectively Alfred Thomas 
(France), Harold Butler (UK), John G. Winant (US), Edouard Phelan (France), David A. Morse (US), 
Wilfred Jenks (UK), Francis Blanchard (France), Michel Hansenne (Belgium), and Juan Somavia 
(Chile) were Director-General of the International Labour Office. Betten 1993, p. 30-31; Boonstra 
1996, p. 35; Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 74. 
37  Betten 1993, p. 30 and 31; Boonstra 1996, p. 35; Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 74. 
38  Ghebali 1989, p. 161; Boonstra 1996, p. 35-36; Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 75. 
39  See above under § 20.2.1. 
40  Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 67 referring to the UN Charter. 
41  For example, candidate countries are expected to enter into nominal convergence or sustained non-
inflationary growth conforming with the criteria laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, enabling them 
eventually to join the European Monetary Union (EMU). See Egger 2003, p. 5. 
42  In most cases Article 1(3) is applied. More rarely Article 1(4) is applied based on which a formal 
Conference decision must be taken by a two-thirds of the government delegates present and voting. 
According to Article 1(5) a member may withdraw. In the event of a withdrawal, the readmission of a 
state – according to Article 1(6) – shall be governed by the aforementioned paragraphs 3 and 4 again. 
See Ghebali 1989, p. 103 in footnote 2 referring to C. Wilfred Jenks, Universality and ideology in the 
ILO, in Annals of international studies, Vol. I, 1970, p. 45; Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 66-67; 
Kuczkiewicz 2001, p. 29. 
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other international organizations, however. The ILO Declaration of 1998 
explicitly states 
‘(…) that in freely joining the ILO (…) all Members, even if they have not 
ratified the Conventions in question [italics: VA] have an obligation arising 
from the very fact of membership in the Organization to respect, to promote 
and to realize [italics: VA], in good faith and in accordance with the 
Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the 
subject of those Conventions (…).’43
Put differently, it is a unique feature that the ILO based on membership alone is 
able to require of its members to respect, to promote and to realize international 
labour standards, regardless of ratification of the conventions that guarantee 
them.44 On the other hand, one can argue that to realize is not judicially the 
same as being legally bound to realize, but rather a serious intent to realize to 
the extent the ILO Declaration of 1998, in principle, intends to be a promotional 
instrument only.45 In fact, it concerns eight fundamental Conventions underlying 
the ILO Declaration of 1998 ‘only’. One cannot deny, however, that the phrase 
is not commonly used by other international organizations, therefore, important 
in that it wishes to stress that membership of the ILO requires for more than to 
respect and to promote its standards.   
As regards its members, worthwhile mentioning for their major political 
implications are the memberships – and withdrawals – of the former USSR, the 
United States, and the Republic of South-Africa. As regards the USSR, from the 
start it was hostile to the ILO, considering it as a tool of capitalism. By virtue of 
its admission to the League of Nations, in 1934, it joined the ILO. Subsequently, 
it lost its membership in 1940, but was readmitted again after Stalin’s death in 
1954.46 Hereupon, other communist countries decided to resume full co-
operation with the ILO,47 or to apply for membership.48
The ‘American crisis’ started in 1970, with the threat of President 
Nixon that the United States would withdraw from the ILO if it became a forum 
43  Javillier 2001, p. 5; Brett 2001, p. 1; Cloutier 2001, p. 8-9; Delhomenie 2001, p. 13; Sietaram 2001, 
p. 22; Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 72. For the eight fundamental Conventions in question, see below 
under § 20.5.3. 
44  Kuczkiewisz 2001, p. 29. See also Boonstra 1996, p. 32 and 33. 
45  See below under § 20.5.3. 
46  Ghebali 1989, p. 106 and 107. 
47  The communist countries in question were Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 
who had ceased to honour their financial commitments, to the point where some of them had lost 
their voting rights at the Conference. See Ghebali 1989, p. 107 hereby  in footnote 3 refers to Harold 
K. Jacobson: ‘The USSR and ILO’, in International Organization, Vol. XIV, No. 3, Summer 1960,
p. 406. 
48  For example, Romania had waited, but became a member of the ILO in 1956 after it had become a 
member of the United Nations. See Ghebali 1989, p. 107 in footnote 4 referring to Record of 
Proceedings, ILC, 1954, p. 575. 
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for political, rather than social issues.49 The withdrawal of the United States 
announced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Henry Kissinger, became a reality 
on 6 November 1977. The reasons, in brief, were the undermining of the 
principle of tripartism mainly by Communist countries; the condemnation in 
1974 of Israel on grounds of racial discrimination and violation of trade union 
freedoms in the occupied territories on the one hand, and the lack of objectivity 
as regards violations of these rights of other member states on the other; the 
admission in a highly emotional atmosphere of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) as an observer at the Conference in 1974; and, the decision 
of the Governing Body to initially refuse to grant a PLO observer status at the 
World Employment Conference in 1976, which made the ILO a forum of 
political, rather than social issues.50 However, the United States – which had 
been a member from 1934 – returned to the ILO on 10 February 1980 in the 
realization that the best way to counter international political affairs would be 
through an active presence, rather than absence.51 Meanwhile, during its 
absence, the Republic of South-Africa had withdrawn from the ILO in March 
1966, due to the resistance of other member states against its regime of 
Apartheid. In 1994, after the first democratic elections were held and won by 
Mandela – who would become South Africa’s first black President – the United 
Nations recognized the Republic of South-Africa as an independent state, hence, 
in May 1994, it was readmitted to the United Nations, and to the ILO, again.52
20.3.2  Tripartite system 
The tripartite system is the most distinguishing characteristic of the ILO. 
Primarily, this system refers to decision-making by representatives of state 
governments, employers’ and workers’ organizations.53 The founders of the ILO 
Constitution felt that the aim of social justice would more likely be attained if 
social partners, besides governments, were given a role and responsibility. In 
effect, this was a reaction against the Communist revolutionary system. 
Consequently, considered to be one of the most important Articles of the Peace 
of Treaty of Versailles of 1919, was the provision that required employers’ and 
workers’ delegates besides governments’ delegates to the Annual Conference.54
This was revolutionary, considering the fact that employers’ and workers’ 
organizations were not fully recognized in most countries at the time. In fact, it 
49  Raetsen 1979, p. 33; Ghebali 1989, p. 114. 
50  Raetsen 1979, p. 34; Ghebali 1989, p. 114. 
51  Ghebali 1989, p. 115; Gould 2001, p. 3. 
52  See Ghebali 1989, p. 111; Smyth 1994, p. 51. 
53  Delhomenie 2001, p. 13 in footnote 1 referring to Provisional Record of Proceedings, Nos. 20 and 22, 
International Labour Conference, 86th Session, Geneva, 1998. 
54  Oudegeest 1921 (1996), p. 278. 
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still is a novelty under international law.55 It is noteworthy to mention that the 
principle of tripartism applies to all internal organs of the ILO.56 Hence, the 
Conference consists of two government delegates, and two delegates 
representing employers and workers, supplemented with advisors.57 Also, the 
Governing Body consists of a tripartite body. It includes the Chairman and two 
Vice-Chairmen, selected of each of the three groups; the Chairman, in general, 
being a government representative.58 Generally, also Committees of the 
Conference and the Governing Body are tripartite organs.59 Last but not least, 
Conventions and Recommendations are shaped and fostered by tripartism. 
Hence, only the co-operation of government, employers and workers opens up 
any door to standard setting.60
 In the past, questions on tripartism, nonetheless, have been raised. For 
example, in 1971, the discussion was whether or not the principle of tripartism 
should prevail over the principle of universality. More specifically, the question 
was whether the ILO should admit fewer member states, in which all parties 
actually were represented, or more member states of which parties, in effect,
were not all represented. In its Resolution of 1971, the Conference took the 
middle course by stressing the importance of tripartism.61 More recently, in 
2002, the Conference adopted another Resolution concerning tripartism and 
social dialogue, in the light of the process of economic globalization. It invites 
governments to ensure that the necessary preconditions exist for social dialogue, 
including respect for the fundamental principles and the right to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining. In this respect, the Resolution stresses that 
the Governing Body must continue to promote the ILO Declaration of 1998. The 
Resolution further stresses the importance of independent and democratic 
organizations of workers and employers, engaged in social dialogue.62   
20.3.3 Supervisory standards system 
The system of supervision built up by the ILO in 1919 is one of the most 
advanced of its kind at the international level, particularly for ‘keeping close 
track of national developments, for carrying out objective and impartial 
supervision, and for advancing constructive proposals on how states can meet 
55  See also Thomas 1921 (1996), p. 270 stating that (also) the first successes were mainly due to this co-
operation between three interested groups; Boonstra 1996, p. 19; Valticos 1996, p. 475; Tapiola 
2001, p. 61. 
56  Boonstra 1996, p. 19 referring to a speech by Blanchard addressed the Faculty of Law of the Leyden 
University in 1989. 
57  Boonstra 1996, p. 24. 
58  Ghebali 1989, p. 147 and 148. 
59  Ghebali 1989, p. 147 and 148; Boonstra 1996, p. 26. 
60  Javillier 2001, p. 6. 
61  Ghebali 1989, p. 133 and 134; Betten 1993, p. 13-17; Boonstra 1996, p. 23. See also Thomas 1921 
(1996), p. 272. 
62  For this Resolution and an in-depth discussion hereof, see GB.285/7/1, 285th Session, Geneva, 
November 2002. 
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the standards voluntarily ratified with concrete help of the ILO’.63 Experience 
over the years has shown that this standard supervisory system of the ILO 
provides for a highly effective form of supervision of Conventions, although 
supervision alone does not at all times ensure full compliance with its 
instruments.64
 Historically, under Article 22 of the ILO Constitution, member states 
only needed to supply annual reports on the application and the law and practice 
of ratified Conventions.65 However, the Conference realized that solely when the 
reports submitted by governments were subjected to scrutiny, was it possible to 
talk of supervision.66 Consequently, to promote and control the actual 
implementation of the provisions of Conventions, the Conference adopted a 
Resolution in 1926, authorizing the Governing Body to appoint experts to make 
a preliminary study of these annual reports submitted by the various 
governments, and for the Conference to set up a committee, to consider these 
annual reports.  
Hereupon, in 1927, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendation (hereafter, the Committee of Experts) was set up by the 
Governing Body. Also, the Conference set up a permanent committee, the 
Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendation.  
In first instance, the Committee of Experts examines whether the law 
and/or practice are/is in conformity with Conventions and Recommendations.67
Subsequently, the Committee on Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations, to whom the Committee of Experts submits its Report,68
may call on governments to give account of the situation in their country and to 
appear before it to explain discrepancies with Conventions. The Conference, 
thus, is the organ of the ILO, in which non-compliance of member states with 
ILO standards are publicly exposed and discussed.69 Clearly, a member state 
does not wish to be mentioned in the ‘special paragraphs’ of the Report of the 
Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, and to be 
followed with close interest. As Cloutier states 
63  Leary 1982, p. 17; Swepston 1994, p. 20. See also Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 409; Boonstra 1996,  
p. 32; Valticos 1998, p. 143. 
64  Jenks 1960, p. 21; Van der Heijden 1999b, p. 27-30. 
65  See Article 22 of the ILO Constitution. Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 409; Boonstra 1996, p. 27; Cloutier 
2001, p. 10.  
66  Boonstra 1996, p. 26 and 27, 39, 40 and 44; referring in footnote 36 to E. Osieke, Constitutional law 
and practice in the International Labour Organisation, Dordrecht 1985, p. 173. 
67  Under Article 31 of the ILO Constitution the International Court of Justice formally has the final say. 
The findings of the Committee of Experts on the law and the practice of a state, in practice, however, 
are ‘final’. Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 409 and 410; Ghebali 1989, p. 147 and 148; Valticos 1998,  
p. 143; Boonstra 1996, p. 24-27 and 29; Swepston 1998, p. 174.  
68  Under Article 23 of the ILO Constitution, when the Committee of Experts draws up a report, the 
Director-General is responsible for its submission to the Conference. See also Boonstra 1996, p. 27. 
69  Boonstra 1996, p. 24; Cloutier 2001, p. 10. 
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‘(…) governments generally do not very much relish having to appear before 
the Committee on Application of Conventions or Recommendations or, worse 
yet, being cited in the famous “special paragraphs” of its report dealing with 
cases in which “problems” (read infringements) have arisen (…) publicity of 
this kind is often enough to rectify the situation.’70
This form of exposure is described as the mobilization of shame, for although no 
economic sanction can be imposed, the conclusions are experienced as political 
or moral sanctions carried by an international forum, in which governments, 
employers and workers may speak freely. The positive side of this form of 
exposure is that it usually inspires the government of the specific state to 
implement the provisions of the Convention voluntarily, or to ask for assistance 
to make compliance possible.71
Furthermore, the Committee on Freedom and Association plays an important 
role in the supervisory standard system.72 This tripartite Committee was set up 
in 1951 by the Governing Body, originally to make a preliminary examination 
of complaints, submitted either by governments or by employers’ or workers’ 
organizations with the Governing Body, in cases involving freedom of 
association.73 It, however, gradually went on to independently examine the 
substance of complaints and gained considerable importance, in that it made all 
states accountable for their actions in this particularly sphere. As today, it calls 
on countries, even if states have not ratified the relevant Conventions. For its 
authority it relies on the ILO Constitution, the Declaration of Philadelphia in 
1944 and ILO Declaration of 1998, which all hold the principle of freedom of 
association and must be respected based on mere membership alone.74
In 1946, the supervisory system became more advanced through an amendment 
of the ILO Constitution to monitor unratified Conventions. In this respect, 
Article 19(5) of the Constitution requires of member states 
‘(…) to report to the Director-General of the International Labour Office, at 
appropriate intervals as requested by the Governing Body, the position of its 
law and practice in regard to the matters dealt with in the Convention, showing 
the extent to which effect has been given, or is proposed to be given, to any of 
the provision of the Convention by legislation, administrative action, collective 
70  Cloutier 2001, p. 10. 
71  Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 410; Boonstra 1996, p. 26 and 30; Van der Heijden 1999b, p. 29 and 30. 
72  Valticos 1998, p. 139; Gernigon 2001, p. 17.  
73  The Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association was originally set up by 
the Governing Body in 1950 for exercising the final examination. However, contrary to the 
Committee on Freedom of Association, it needed the consent of the government in question to do an 
examination. Boonstra 1996, p. 33 and 34;  Swepston 1998, p. 175. 
74  Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 411; Valticos 1998, p. 143; Swepston 1998, p. 175; Gernigon 2001, p. 17 
and 18; Cloutier 2001, p. 12. 
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agreement or otherwise and stating the difficulties which prevent or delay the 
ratification of such Convention.’  
A similar reporting obligation with regard to Recommendations is laid down in 
Article 19(6)(d). In furtherance of Article 19 of the Constitution, the Governing 
Body yearly selects a number of unratified Conventions and Recommendations 
with the purpose of calling governments’ attention to these instruments. The 
Committee of Experts hereupon writes a General Survey on the national law 
and/or practice of the countries involved, either leading to ratification, or at least 
action to give effect to some of their provisions.75
 In 1959, the system of supervision was simplified.76 Governments were 
no longer obliged to supply reports on ratified Conventions annually, but, 
instead, every four years, unless reports were requested at shorter intervals.77 In 
November 2001 and March 2002, the Governing Body approved a new 
reporting system, which entered into force for a period of five years. As from 
then, reports on ratified Conventions are either due (i) every two years for 
fundamental Conventions;78 and (ii) every five years for all other Conventions, 
unless they are specifically requested at shorter intervals.79
Part of the supervisory standards system further is the procedure under the 
Articles 24 to 33 of the ILO Constitution that, in practice, is rarely invoked.80 In 
brief, Article 24 determines that social partners have the right to file a complaint 
with the International Labour Office to report any member state’s failure to 
secure the effective observance of any Convention to which it is a party. 
Subsequently, the Governing Body may communicate this representation to the 
government against which it is made, and may invite that government to make 
such statement on the subject as it may think fit. Under Article 25, if no 
statement is received within a reasonable time from the government in question, 
or if the statement when received is not deemed to be satisfactory by the 
Governing Body, the latter shall have the right to publish the representation and 
the statement – if any – made in reply to it.  
75  Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 410; Ghebali 1989, p. 147 and 148; Boonstra 1996, p. 27 and 28; Swepston 
1998, p. 176; Cloutier 2001, p. 10. 
76  Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 412. For an overview of – also other -  amendments, see Valticos 1969 
(1996), p. 412-414.  
77  As from 1959 until 2003, a member state has to report the year it ratifies the Convention, and further 
every four years. Van der Heijden 1999b, p. 26. 
78  The two-year reporting cyclus also applies to so-called priority Conventions. The Priority 
Conventions are the four following instruments: 
Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 122), 
Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81), 
Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention, 1969 (No. 129), 
Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 144). 
79  See Handbook of procedures relating to international labour Conventions and Recommendations, 
International Labour Standards Department, International Labour Office, Geneva, rev. 2006, p. 20. 
80  Swepston 1994, p. 17. For the exceptional cases of Columbia (violation of freedom of association) 
and Myanmar (Burma) (violation of forced labour), see Cloutier 2001, p. 11. 
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Article 26 determines that any of the member states shall have the right 
to file a complaint with the International Labour Office if it is not satisfied that 
any other member state is securing the effective observance of any Convention, 
which both have ratified. The Governing Body may, if it thinks fit before 
referring such a complaint to a Commission of Inquiry, communicate with the 
government in question, or directly appoint a Commission of Inquiry. Under 
Article 28, when the Commission of Inquiry has fully considered the complaint, 
it shall prepare a report embodying the findings containing such 
recommendations as it may think proper as the steps, which should be taken to 
meet the complaint. Subsequently, the Director-General of the International 
Labour Office shall communicate this report to the Governing Body and to each 
of the governments concerned in the complaint that can either accept the 
recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry, or have the complaint referred 
to the International Court of Justice. Under the Articles 32 and 33, the decision 
of the latter in which the Court affirms, vary or reverses the findings or 
recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry, is final. Under Article 33, in 
the event of any member state failing to carry out the recommendations of the 
Commission of Inquiry or the International Court of Justice, the Governing 
Body may recommend to the Conference such action as it may deem wise and 
expedient to secure compliance herewith.  
20.4  The ILO and its core work 
20.4.1  International labour standards  
The Conference initially established working conditions only. As mentioned 
above, its mandate was broadened through the Declaration of Philadelphia of 
1944 to also include general social policy, human and civil rights matters.81 Due 
to the Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944, the international labour standards of 
the ILO, thus, do no longer represent mere standards to improve the level of 
working conditions of workers in the world.82 In effect, this Declaration  
‘(…) broadened the Organization’s competence and constitutional basis in two 
ways: rationae materiae, it was to emphasise that this competence was not 
confined to conditions of work alone, and rationae personea, it was to extend 
this competence from workers in the strict sense of the word to all human 
beings.’ 83
This setting of universal and uniform minimum labour standards through 
Conventions and Recommendations has become ILO’s most important task.84
Also, the Conference and the Governing Body may agree upon documents such 
81  Ghebali 1989, p. 61; Swepston 1994, p. 16; Valticos 1996, p. 394. See also above under § 20.2.2. 
82  Swepston 1994, p. 1; Gernigon 2001, p. 17. 
83  Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 398. 
84  Ghebali 1989, p. 204; Valticos 1996, p. 393-396; Rogovski and Sims 2002, p. 6. 
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as codes of conduct,85 resolutions and declarations, but these generally are not 
referred to as part of ILO’s system of international labour standards.86 The other 
functions of the ILO – which are in service of its standard setting – are (i) to 
offer technical assistance to help governments implement standards; (ii) to offer 
education and to initiate promotional activities; and (iii) to raise awareness and 
understanding of standards.87 Particularly, providing technical assistance gained 
importance.88 In fact, the Follow-up of the ILO Declaration of 1998 explicitly 
entails an obligation for the ILO in respect of these standards.89 More 
specifically, it contains an obligation to assist its members to attain the 
objectives set out in the Declaration,90 therefore, pertaining to the 
implementation of specific international labour standards.91
20.4.2  Conventions and Recommendations  
After the Conference has adopted Conventions and/or Recommendations, all 
member states have the obligation to bring the newly adopted ILO labour 
standards before the competent authority within 12, or in exceptional cases 
within 18 months of adoption,92 and to inform the ILO of the outcomes of this 
process.93 In general, the competent authority is the authority, which according 
to national law has the power to legislate, or to take other action in order to 
implement Conventions and Recommendations.94
 For federal states there is a special procedure with regard to the 
submission of Conventions and Recommendations. Article 19(7) of the 
Constitution prescribes that the federal government must submit Conventions 
and Recommendations, which it considers appropriate for federal action to the 
competent authorities within 12, or in exceptional cases within 18 months of 
adoption. The latter is applicable only in respect of Conventions and 
Recommendations, which the federal government considers to be appropriate 
under its constitutional system for action by the constituent states, provinces or 
85  Otherwise: Ghebali 1989, p. 204 footnote 3.  
86  For example, there are codes of conduct on occupational health and safety, which are rather technical  
      and subject to scientific changes. See also Rogovski and Sims 2002, p. 6. 
87  Valticos 1996, p. 394. 
88  See Validire 2001, p. 53 quoting Hansenne. 
89  Cloutier 2001, p, 11-12; Tapiola 2001, p. 63-64. 
90  Van der Heijden 1999b, p. 12; Cloutier 2001, p. 9.  
91  See Delhomenie 2001, p. 13, as well as p. 14, referromg to the Malagasy Government that has 
      requested the help of the International Labour Office in dealing with the comments addressed to it by  
      the Committee of Experts concerning the implementation of Convention 29 and the ratification of  
      Convention 105 both on the (Abolition of) Forced Labour. 
92  More specifically, after the closing of the Session in which the adoption took place. 
93  See the Articles 19(5) and (19)6 of the ILO Constitution. 
94  Memorandum concerning the obligation to submit Conventions and Recommendations to the 
competent authorities, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2005, under II. 
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cantons, rather than for federal action.95 In this case, the federal government 
must periodically consult with the constituent states, provinces or cantons on 
ratification of the Conventions.96 In practice, this procedure leads to only little 
ratification by federal states.97
The moment of submission, state and federal governments, too, must indicate 
what measures they wish to take to give effect to these instruments, or propose 
that no action should be taken or that a decision should be postponed. For 
example, when the government is of the opinion that the Convention is fully 
applied in national law it may recommend ratification.98 It, too, must state that 
there will be an opportunity to take up the matter for debate.99 Overall, the aim 
of submission is to bring the contents of international labour standards to the 
knowledge of the public, to stimulate public debate at the national level on these 
matters, to stimulate tripartite dialogue, and eventually to promote measures at 
the domestic level for the ratification of Conventions, and the implementation of 
Conventions and Recommendations.100 The obligation to submit does not imply 
any obligation to propose the ratification of Conventions or to accept the 
Recommendations.101
 In total, from 1919 to 2007, the International Labour Conference 
adopted more than 180 Conventions, and more than 190 Recommendations, 
covering a broad range of subjects from working conditions to human rights 
matters, collectively called the International Labour Code.102 Before the Treaty 
of Peace at Versailles had been signed on 28 June 1919, the Conference had 
already adopted six Conventions and six Recommendations in its first session in 
1919.103 These instruments dealt with immediate problems of working 
conditions such as the longstanding demand of workers for an eight-hour day 
95  Memorandum concerning the obligation to submit Conventions and Recommendations to the 
competent authorities, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2005, under V(b). 
96  Under Article 19(2) of the ILO Constitution ‘only’ a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast by the 
delegated present is necessary for the adoption of a Convention or Recommendation. See also Jenks 
1960, p. 17. 
97  Raynauld en Vidal 1998, p. 53. 
98  Burger 1998, p. 202; Van der Heijden 1999b, p. 25 and 26. The Dutch government, in principle, does 
not ratify a Convention, unless already converted into national law. See TK 1994-1995, 23 900 XV, 
No. 44, p. 8. 
99  Memorandum concerning the obligation to submit Conventions and Recommendations to the 
competent authorities, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2005,  under IV. 
100  Burger 1998, p. 202-203; Van der Heijden 1999b, p. 26. See also Memorandum concerning the 
obligation to submit Conventions and Recommendations to the competent authorities, International 
Labour Office, Geneva, 2005, under I. 
101 Memorandum concerning the obligation to submit Conventions and Recommendations to the 
competent authorities, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2005, under III(b). 
102  Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 398. 
103  The six Conventions adopted were respectively Hours of Work (Industry); Unemployment; Maternity 
Protection; Night Work (Women); Minimum Age (Industry); Night Work of Young Persons 
(Industry).  See also Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 398; Ghebali 1989, p. 9 and 10; Devlin 2001, p. 366 
footnote 1. 
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and forty-eight-hour week in industry.104 An interruption by the Second World 
War, the adoption of international labour standards was resumed and has gone 
on steadily ever since.105 The number of 180 includes revised Conventions. A 
revised Convention generally includes a clause, stating that the adoption of the 
revised instrument will not entail the cancellation of the original, but that the 
original will no longer be open to ratification after the entry into force of the 
revised Convention, and that ratification of the latter by a state will entail 
denunciation by it of the original.106
The difference between Conventions and Recommendations is significant, in 
that Conventions are legally binding when ratified. under Article 22 of the ILO 
Constitution, member states have a legal obligation to implement its provisions 
once they ratify the Convention. Recommendations, which typically deal with 
the same subjects as Conventions, are not open to ratification. They set out 
guidelines for national policy only.107 Nevertheless, Recommendations may 
fulfill useful functions, because in many ways they help to pave the way for the 
ratification of a Convention.108 It is noteworthy to mention that adoption without 
ratifying a Convention also entails obligations for member states. As former 
Director-General of the ILO, Wilfred Jenks, put it 
‘No member is bound by the provisions of a convention by reason of the 
adoption of the convention by the Conference. But adoption, nevertheless, has 
important legal consequences.’109
One of these consequences derives from Article 19(5) of the ILO Constitution. 
Under this Article, non-ratifying states have an obligation to regularly report on 
the law of the state, and to state the reason why it has not (yet) ratified the 
convention. Thus, without any legal obligation, a non-ratifying member state has 
an enduring obligation to examine the possibility of ratification of 
Conventions.110
20.4.3  Universality and uniformity  
From the beginning, ILO’s approach to standard setting has been a universal 
one. The ILO wished to include all states of the world as its member states.111
104  Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 398. 
105  Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 399. 
106  In general, when a member state wishes to denounce a Convention a period of notice of ten years 
applies. Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 404; Swepston 1994, p. 20; Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 98. 
107  Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 404; Boonstra 1996, p. 39; Burger 1998, p. 202; Rogovski and Sims 2002,  
p. 6. 
108  Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 404-405. 
109  Jenks 1960, p. 17 and 18. 
110  See below under § 20.4.2. 
111  Mahaim 1921 (1996), p. 289.  
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The difficulty, however, has been to set a standard that could be accepted by the 
greatest possible number of countries. It had to be practicable for all states on 
the one hand, but not too low to bring about progress on the other. The problem 
is that universal standards, in effect, imply that these standards equally apply to 
all member states, regardless of different levels of development, climates, and 
social and/or cultural structures.112 Due to the latter, universal standards can 
become impracticable for states, however. Hence, the difficulty from the start 
has been to strike a balance between ideals and practice.113
Consequently, Article 19(3) of the Constitution determines that the 
Conference with regard to countries, in which climatic conditions, the imperfect 
development of industrial organization, or other special circumstances that make 
the industrial conditions substantially different, may suggest to exempt these 
countries from implementation of standards. This rarely takes place, however. 
As said, ILO’s goal remain to set universal standards.114
The foregoing raises the question whether the differences in economic and 
social conditions between various parts of the world should rather call for 
regional than universal standards. The fundamental reason why the ILO adheres 
to the general principle of universal standards is that in a world becoming 
increasingly interdependent, it is of the opinion that regional standards rather 
sharpen than reduce the differences between various parts of the world.115
The Conference, therefore, aims to create universal and uniform 
minimum labour standards, which are flexible enough to be applied to a variety 
of countries and situations to bring about a real improvement in working 
conditions.116 This explains that almost all Conventions, adopted since 1946, 
hold flexible formulas of one kind or another, except for standards related to 
human rights,117 to prevent standards from becoming meaningless.118 As Van 
der Heijden and Devlin correctly point out, state governments are not allowed to 
make reservations in ratifying Conventions. The rationale behind this is that 
allowing state governments to make reservations would undermine the tripartite 
system.119
112  Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 70 referring to Van Liemt 1989, p. 437. 
113  Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 402. 
114  Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 73 referring to Servais 1989, p. 425. 
115  Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 403. 
116  Valticos 1996, p. 477; Swepston 2001, p. 138. The EC Directives rather include minimum (labour) 
standards, than that they aim to establish unification of national rules. See De Ly 1993, p. 25-30. 
117  Thomas 1921 (1996), p. 261; Ghebali 1989, p. 206; Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 73 referring to Servais 
1989, p. 425. 
118  Valticos 1969 (1996), p. 402 and 403. See also Jenks 1960, p. x; Valticos 1998, p. 140; Van 
Roozendaal 2001, p. 73. 
119  Van der Heijden 1999b, p. 25 and 26; Devlin 2001, p. 367. 
310
20.4.4  Human rights 
As stressed by the former Director-General David Morse in 1967, the 
importance of international protection for human rights does not only relate to 
social justice, but should be considered as a theme that must pervade all ILO 
activities, rather than that they should be considered as a distinct field of 
action.120 The ILO Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944 was the first in the 
international area to explicitly proclaim the principle of international protection 
for human rights.121 After the Second World War, member states had become 
more aware of the link between international peace and social justice, and the 
importance of international labour standards.122 The Declaration held that 
‘(…) all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to 
pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in 
conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal 
opportunity.’123
The thought was that without human rights, such as the freedom of expression 
and of association, social justice would be a fraud.124 In fact, since the adoption 
of the Declaration, the relationship between international labour standards and 
human rights has been of ongoing concern to the ILO. In light hereof the 
Conference adopted ILO Conventions 87 and 98 in 1948 and 1949, respectively. 
These Conventions provide the right to the freedom of association and the right 
to collective bargaining.125 The first Convention protects workers against 
interference by the state, the second protects workers against interference of 
employers.126
 The importance of human rights was furthered in ILO Convention 100 
on Equal Remuneration for Men and Women adopted in 1951, and Convention 
111 on Discrimination in Employment and Occupation adopted in 1958.127 In 
addition, the Conference adopted ILO Convention 105 on the Abolition of 
Forced Labour – broadening the goals of ILO Convention 29 on Forced Labour 
in 1930 to eradicate slave work – in 1957,128 the Minimum Age Convention 138 
in 1973, and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 182 in 1999.129 The 
latter was partly in furtherance of the ILO Declaration of 1998, in which the 
120  Ghebali 1989, p. 74 in footnote 2 referring to Record of Proceedings 1967, p. 421. 
121  Ghebali 1989, p. 62 and 63; Valticos 1998, p. 135. 
122  Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 55; Ghebali 1989, p. 61. 
123  Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 56; Sietaram 2001, p. 22. 
124  Ghebali 1989, p. 62 and 63. 
125  Gernigon 2001, p. 17. 
126  Jenks 1960, p. 51 and 55. 
127  Valticos 1998, p. 139 and 140; Sietaram 2001, p. 22 and 23. 
128  Swepston 1994, p. 1; Valticos 1998, p. 138; Fenwick 2001, p. 40 and 41. 
129  Valticos 1998, p. 136-138; Grumiau 2001, p. 46. 
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Conference emphasized the importance of working conditions related to human 
rights, this time in light of the process of economic globalization.130
20.5     The ILO and its role in combating the negative effects of economic 
globalization on workers 
20.5.1 The debate on a social clause 
In the twentieth century, the ILO and other international organizations became 
forums through which economic globalization and its effects were regulated.131
A discussion on its social effects started with a campaign in 1986 by the world’s 
largest international trade union organization, the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The latter was impelled by the increasing number 
of infringements on labour standards related to human rights worldwide. Also, 
the governments (mainly) of developed countries became aware of the violation 
of these labour standards, not in the least by the emergence of the success of the 
exporting developing countries, which violated these standards.132 In its 
campaign, the ICFTU held that without a so-called social clause in trade 
agreements the global competition would result in a worldwide lowering of 
standards, i.e. ‘a race to the bottom’.133 Subsequently, the ICFTU asked the 
WTO that deals with international trade and is concerned with tariff reductions 
in light of fair international competition, to insert a social clause in trade 
agreements that required compliance with minimum labour standards. 
Governments that failed to observe this clause would be subject to inquiry, and 
would be urged to rectify the situation and would face retaliatory measures as a 
last resort.134 This request of the ICFTU to the WTO led to an international 
debate on a social clause in trade agreements, in which the ILO, the UN, the 
WTO and the OECD became involved, the WTO serving as the main forum for 
the discussion.135   
 The ICFTU, in the debate on a social clause, initially emphasized 
standards related to the freedom of association, collective bargaining, minimum 
age for employment, occupational health and safety, labour inspection, non-
discrimination and the abolition of forced labour. Around 1993, the ICFTU 
130  Valticos 1998, p. 136. See also Summers 2001, p. 3. 
131  See also Hey 2002, p. 220. 
132  The argument was that when a country allows its workers to work under deplorable working 
conditions, it could export its products at lower prices through which it acquires an unfair advantage 
over its competitors. Van Liemt 1989, p. 434 and 438; Servais 1989, p. 423; Van Roozendaal 2001, 
p. 33. 
133  Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 17, 20 and 38; Cloutier 2001, p. 9; Van Liemt 1989, p. 435. The fear of the 
shift of industrial activities from so-called high standards countries to low standards countries, 
however, generally is not only related to the question of labour costs, but also with that of labour 
productivity. Servais 1989, p. 427-428; Raynauld and Vidal 1998, p. 42; Gould 2001, p. 7 hereby 
also referring to an OECD Report of 2000. 
134  Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 16; Validire 2001, p. 51. 
135  Kellerson 1998, p. 224; Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 32. 
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dropped labour inspection and occupational health and safety to increase the 
chances of its proposal being accepted.136 Subsequently, proponents came up 
with different suggestions.137 In March 1995, at the UN World Summit for 
Social Development, in Copenhagen, the Heads of State and Government of 
developed and developing countries, eventually, committed themselves to 
safeguard the basic rights and interests of workers, and to promote respect for 
relevant ILO Conventions. These rights included the freedom of association, 
elimination of forced labour, abolition of child labour, and the elimination of 
discrimination, considered as universal standards, and corresponding with 
provisions in the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights.138
Nevertheless, a group of developing countries, in which Malaysia played a 
significant role, opposed a social clause in trade agreements. Already, from the 
early start, in 1986, these countries had taken a common stand against such an 
inclusion.139 In brief, the developing countries considered trade as a two-way 
relationship. In general, both parties expect to gain from it. Hence, it is not a 
privilege given to someone.140 A social clause asked for reciprocity in social 
obligations in return for trade concessions.141 Hence, they considered the social 
clause to be disguised protectionism, obstructing their industrial development 
and depriving them of their key comparative advantage: the ability to use low-
cost labour productivity.142 Therefore, developing countries perceived a social 
clause as the further underpinning of protectionism in another guise, in that the 
countries most dependent on international trade would be hardest hit by these 
trade measures.143
 In general, one will not deny that the added value of developing 
countries is cheap labour.144 The latter is also the reason why these countries145
generally oppose a worldwide minimum wage, due to the fact that all other 
comparative advantages such as technology, capital, marketing networks are 
already with the developed countries, leaving the developing countries, in effect, 
empty-handed.146 Also, advocates of unbridled economic liberalism take the 
view that the ‘North’ should not forbid the ‘South’ from using the working 
136  Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 38. 
137  Van Liemt 1989, p. 436. 
138  Kellerson 1998, p. 224; Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 34 and 71 referring to the OECD Report of 1996. 
139  Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 33. For examples of agreements in which the US incorporated social 
clauses with trading partners in the past, see Servais 1989, p. 427; Van Liemt 1989, p. 440. 
140  Van Liemt 1989, p. 443. 
141  Van Liemt 1989, p. 435. 
142  Raynauld and Vidal 1998, p. 9; Summers 2001, p. 4. 
143  Brett 2001, p. 1; Munck 2002, p. 133 and 134. 
144  Servais 1989, p. 428. 
145  It is the question whether developed countries are in favor of a worldwide minimum wage. 
146  Raynauld and Vidal 1998, p. 5-6; Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 115. 
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methods that enabled the industrialized countries to accumulate their capital.147
In fact, there is no good reason for objecting to competitive developing countries 
based on favorable working conditions. This is quite different, however, if the 
low standard of working conditions can be attributed to practices resulting in the 
exploitation of workers. As the former Director-General of the ILO in 1976 
stated
‘The competitiveness of new imports from developing countries should not be 
achieved to the detriment of fair labour standards.’ 148
Put differently, a social clause in trade agreements is justified when it wishes to 
correct abusive practices. However, the question is whether a social clause in 
trade agreements is the appropriate way of achieving the desired social 
changes.149
20.5.2 The Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 1996 
In  1996, it became clear that no consensus could be reached on a social clause 
in trade agreements, due to the ongoing resistance of Asian developing 
countries. The developed and developing countries, nonetheless, were able to 
reach a compromise through the Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 1996, in 
which the Ministerial Conference,150 on behalf of the WTO, stated that 
‘We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized 
core labour standards. The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the 
competent body to set and deal with these standards, and we affirm our support 
for its work in promoting them. We believe that economic growth and 
development fostered by increased trade and further trade liberalization 
contribute to the promotion of these standards. We reject the use of labour 
standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage 
of countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put 
into question. In this regard, we note that the WTO and ILO Secretariats will 
continue their existing collaboration.’151
The compromise could be reached, because the United States was prepared to 
drop the social clause issue in exchange for an agreement on the liberalization of 
the information technology market. In return, Malaysia gave up its resistance to 
any reference to labour standards in the Singapore Declaration, however, on the 
147  Servais 1989, p. 425; Raynauld and Vidal 1998, p. 10-11; Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 35; Validire 
2001, p. 53 and 54. 
148  See Servais 1989, p. 423 and 428 and 429. 
149  Van Liemt 1989, p. 434 and 447. 
150  In this First WTO Ministerial Conference which was held in Singapore between 9 and 13 December 
1996 trade, foreign, finance and agriculture Ministers from more than 120 World Trade Organization 
Member governments participated. See www.wto.org 
151  Kellerson 1998, p. 224; Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 15. 
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condition that the Declaration would not have any consequences as regards 
trade. This resulted in several developing countries to follow the Malaysian 
lead.152 What was important for the ILO, was that all member states of the WTO 
– more than 140153 – pointed at the ILO as the competent body to deal with core 
labour standards. 
20.5.3  ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of 1998
The ILO Declaration of 1998 was a result of the Singapore Ministerial 
Declaration of 1996. It holds fundamental rights, to be respected by all member 
states, to guarantee that workers in developing and developed countries will 
equally benefit from the process of globalization.154 In 1994, the ILO Director-
General, Hansenne, had already called for a new approach of the fundamental 
rights of workers in light of the process of economic globalization and 
technological changes.155 Hereupon, a number of member states tabled 
resolutions asking the Director-General to develop the ideas in his report, and to 
take into account the different needs of both developed and developing 
countries.156 Consequently, in 1997, after years of internal debate, the ILO 
Director-General, Hansenne, in his Report on The ILO, standard setting and 
globalization suggested the adoption by the ILO International Labour 
Conference of a declaration of fundamental rights, directly linked to ILO 
standards, on which the World Summit for Social Development157 had reached a 
consensus in March 1995 in Copenhagen.158 Subsequently, the Governing Body 
of the International Labour Office, in the course of its 270th session of 1997, 
decided to place on the agenda of the next International Labour Conference a 
proposal concerning the possible consideration and adoption of a declaration on 
fundamental rights, including a follow-up mechanism.  
In June 1998, the ILO International Labour Conference hereupon 
adopted the ILO Declaration of 1998.159 There were no votes against. 
Apparently, the international society had realized that globalization was the 
problem and that global solutions had to be sought.160 As mentioned above, the 
152  Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 35 and 36. 
153  149 member states on 11 December 2005. See www.wto.org 
154  Raynauld and Vidal 1998, p. 65; Velasco 2001, p. VI. 
155  Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 57; Cloutier 2001, p. 8.  
156  C. Raghavan, Labour: social standards issue will be prominent at ILC, Geneva, 7 June 1994. See 
ilo.sunsonline.org  
157  At the World Summmit for Social Development, held in March 1995 in Copenhagen, governments 
reached a new consensus on the need to put people at the centre of development. The Social Summit 
was the largest gathering ever of world leaders at the time. It pledged to make the conquest of 
poverty, the goal of full employment and the fostering of social integration overriding objectives of 
development. See www.un.org 
158  Kellerson 1998, p. 224; Tapiola 2001, p. 63. 
159  Kellerson 1998, p. 223 and 224; Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 58; Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 71; Cloutier 
2001, p. 9; Boonstra 2003, p. 8. 
160  Van der Heijden 1999b, p. 10; Howard 2001, p. 55. 
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ILO Declaration of 1998 aims to guarantee that employers and workers can 
freely demand, individually and collectively and without any discrimination, a 
just share of the fruits of progress.161 In this respect, the Declaration provides 
that 
‘Whereas, in seeking to maintain the link between social progress and 
economic growth, the guarantee of fundamental principles and rights at work is 
of particular significance in that it enables the persons concerned to claim freely 
and on the basis of equality of opportunity their fair share of the wealth which 
they have helped to generate, and to achieve fully their human potential.’ 
In brief, the Declaration acknowledges that economic growth is essential to 
ensure social progress. However, it emphasizes that economic growth is not 
sufficient to guarantee fundamental principles and rights at work. This is of 
significance because fundamental rights enable workers to claim freely, and on 
the basis of equality of opportunity, their fair share of the wealth that they have 
helped to generate, which, in turn, helps to achieve fully the human potential of 
workers.162 The Declaration enumerates core labour standards to be promoted, 
respected and realized by all member states, regardless of ratification, in the 
hope to establish the social progress needed in the process of economic 
globalization.163 More specifically, the ILO Declaration of 1998 determines that 
‘(…) all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in question, 
have an obligation, arising from the very fact of membership in the 
Organization, to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in 
accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental 
rights which are the subject of those Conventions, namely: 
(a)  freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to      
collective bargaining;  
(b)  the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;  
(c)  the effective abolition of child labour; and  
(d)  the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation.’164
These principles are not new. They can be found as specific rights in 
fundamental and widely ratified Conventions, i.e. the Convention on the 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention of 
1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 
of 1949 (No. 98);165 the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) and the 
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention of 1957 (No. 105); the Minimum Age 
161  Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 72-73. 
162  Ghebali 1989, p. 63; Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 72 and 73. 
163  Tinoco and Vado 1999, p. 41. 
164  See § 2 of the ILO Declaration of 1998. 
165  Gernigon, Odero and Guido 2003, Freedom of Association, p. 5; Collective Bargaining, p. 21. 
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Convention of 1973 (No. 138) and the Worst Form of Child Labour Convention 
of 1999 (No. 182); the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention of 1958 (No. 111), and the Equal Renumeration Convention of 1951 
(No. 100).166
The adoption of the ILO Declaration of 1998 raises the question whether other
rights than enumerated in the Declaration are still of importance. In this respect, 
Javillier correctly states that the Declaration and its Follow-up cannot and never 
will be able to weaken the other standards,167 because these instruments 
primarily were meant to be promotional only, i.e. did not aim to replace existing 
instruments.168 Van der Heijden, therefore, correctly points at the continuing 
importance of, for example, ILO Convention 102 on Social Security of 1952. 
Although the underlying principle of this Convention is not included in the ILO 
Declaration of 1998, he states that the Preamble to the ILO Constitution of 1919, 
in which all member states have committed themselves to improving working 
conditions with regard to ‘the prevention of unemployment, the provision of an 
adequate living wage, the protection of the worker against sickness, disease and 
injury arising out of his employment’.169 Van der Heijden further refers to the 
debate on a social clause, in which the ICFTU initially included the standards 
related to occupational health and safety as fundamental.170 Hence, ILO 
Convention 158, too, did not lose its importance, as will be discussed below. 
21  ILO Convention 158 
21.1 International labour standards on termination of employment 
In a Resolution adopted in 1950, the International Labour Conference noted the 
absence of international standards on termination of employment. Consequently, 
it requested a report on national law and practice on the matter for consideration. 
After a number of studies carried out on the subject, the Conference, in 1963, 
adopted the Termination of Employment Recommendation 119, the first 
international labour instrument to specifically deal with this issue. ILO 
Recommendation 119 held fundamental standards with regard to justification for 
termination, notice, the right to appeal, compensation and income protection. It 
also included provisions with regard to reduction of the workforce. Overall, it 
marked the recognition at the international level of the idea that workers should 
be protected against arbitrary termination of their employment relationship, and 
166 Van der Heijden 1999b, p. 11 and 12 and 14-23; Javillier 2001, p. 5; Cloutier 2001, p. 8 footnote 1; 
Sietaram 2001, p. 22; Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 72. 
167  Javillier 2001, p. 6. 
168  Sietaram 2001, p. 26. See also Delhomenie 2001, p. 13. 
169  Van der Heijden 1999b, p. 14 and 23 and 24. 
170  See above under § 20.5.1. 
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against the economic and social hardship inherent in their loss of 
employment.171
 In 1974, the Committee on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations concluded that the issue should be put before the Conference 
again, in order to draw up another suitable instrument, taking into consideration 
new developments since the adoption of Recommendation 119, including the 
process of economic globalization.  
At its 211th Session in 1979, the Governing Body decided to place the issue on 
the agenda. Subsequently, the Committee on Termination of Employment was 
set up by the Conference at its third sitting on 4 June 1981. The Committee held 
fourteen sessions before it presented its report to the Conference for 
discussion.172 At the end of its 67th Session in 1981, the Conference adopted the 
report and included the item on the 68th Session in 1982 for a second discussion 
with a view to the adoption of a Convention and a Recommendation.173 A new 
Committee on Termination of Employment was set up on 3 June 1982. This 
Committee, too, acknowledged the importance of the subject. It held that the just 
cause standard did not only affect the right of workers to security of 
employment, but also the right of employment to manage the undertaking and 
the harmony of labour-management relations.  
Hereupon, the Committee agreed the time was ripe, almost 20 years 
after the adoption of ILO Recommendation 119 of 1963, to consider the 
updating of the international standards on the subject, taking into account the 
developments in national law and practice since that date.174  Subsequently, on 
22 June 1982, the Conference adopted the Termination of Employment 
Convention 158 and Recommendation 166, replacing the Termination of 
Employment Recommendation 119 of 1963.175
ILO Convention 158 went into force after ratification by two member states, to 
be exact on 24 November 1985,176 regulating the termination of individual 
employment and – partly – collective dismissals.177 Overall, it holds provisions, 
which together constitute a series of procedural and substantive controls on the 
employer’s ability to dismiss an employee.178 Its twofold objective is 
171  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 3. See on ILO Recommendation 119 Van den 
Heuvel 1983, p. 151 and 152. 
172  ILC, Record of Proceedings, 67th Session, 1981, p. 33/1. 
173  ILC, Record of Proceedings, 67th Session, 1981, p. 33/30. 
174  ILC, Record of Proceedings, 68th Session, 1982, p. 30/1. 
175  ILC, Record of Proceedings, 68th Session, 1982, p. 36/17. 
176  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 1. In fact, ILO Conventions in general do not 
come into force until at least two ratifications have been registered. Leary 1982, p. 9. 
177  Governing Body, Paper 2001, Appendix I (short survey), par. 2, 6 and 52. 
178  Governing Body, Paper 2001, Appendix I (short survey), par. 52. 
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1. to protect workers in their professional life against arbitrary 
termination of employment by requiring a valid reason for 
dismissal, and prohibitions of dismissal; and  
2. to preserve the right of employers to terminate the employment of 
workers for reasons which are recognized as being valid.179
ILO Recommendation 166 serves as a guideline to fill out the minimum 
standards of ILO Convention 158.180
21.2   Procedural safeguards: defense, burden of proof, and appeal 
To obtain a complete overview of ILO Convention 158, I will pay attention to 
its substantive safeguards, procedural safeguards, and its remedies. In brief, the 
procedural safeguards are  
x the right of a worker to defend himself against the allegations made;  
x the right of a worker not to have to bear alone the burden of proving 
that the termination was unjustified;  
x the right of appeal to an impartial body;181 and 
x the right that a worker shall be entitled to a reasonable period of 
notice, or compensation in lieu thereof.182
The opportunity to defend oneself is laid down in Article 7 of the Convention. It 
entails the right to assistance in preparing a defense, to access to information, 
and to be heard.183 The Committee of Experts, which examined the laws of the 
member states, concluded that the employee’s right to defend himself is 
considered by many of these states as one of the most important procedural 
requirements that employers must fulfill before they may take a decision to 
terminate the employment of a worker.184 Article 8 entails the procedural right 
of appeal to an impartial and independent body.185 Article 9 of the Convention, 
provides the procedural right that the worker does not have to bear alone the 
burden of proving that the termination was unjustified. In this respect, the 
Convention allows member states to make a choice, in that (a) the burden of 
proof shall rest on the employer; or (b) a court shall be empowered to reach a 
conclusion on the reason for the termination based on the evidence provided by 
179  Governing Body, Paper 1998, par. 49. 
180  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, p. 4; Sybesma-Knol 1999, p. 84. 
181  Sims 1995, p. 675.  
182  See Article 11 of ILO Convention 158. Governing Body, Paper 2001, Appendix I (short survey),  
par. 7 and 39. 
183  Sims 1995, p. 696. 
184  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 149-151. See also Heerma van Voss 1992,  
p. 290 and 291. 
185  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 175-178. See also Heerma van Voss 1992,  
p. 317 and 318; Sims 1995, p. 698-700. 
319
parties. Subsequently, the Committee of Experts is of the opinion that when 
sufficient evidence lacks, the burden of proof shifts to the employer.186 Last, 
Article 11 provides that a worker shall be entitled to a reasonable period of 
notice, or compensation in lieu thereof. More specifically, Article 11 of ILO 
Convention 158 determines that 
‘A worker whose employment is to be terminated shall be entitled to a 
reasonable period of notice or compensation in lieu thereof, unless he is guilty 
of serious misconduct, that is, misconduct of such a nature that it would be 
unreasonable to require the employer to continue his employment during the 
notice period.’187
The notice period, thus, can be replaced by compensation.188 Therefore, the 
amendment of the Workers’ members was rejected at the 67th Session of the 
Committee in 1981, determining that the worker should per se be entitled to a 
period of notice. This now brings me to an important aspect of the substantive
safeguards: these cannot be traded off by the employer. 
21.3 Substantive safeguards: valid and invalid reasons 
In brief, the substantive safeguards on the employer’s ability to arbitrarily 
dismiss an employee are  
x the requirement of a valid reason – a just cause – to dismiss an 
employee; and  
x the enumeration of invalid reasons – bad causes – based on which 
an employer is prohibited to dismiss an employee.  
Before discussing these safeguards more in-depth, it should be stressed that 
protection against arbitrary dismissal must be distinguished from the idea of 
employees’ ownership of jobs.189 Employment termination legislation falls short 
of providing such protection, in that it implies some kind of veto over dismissal 
or an automatic right to compensation for loss of employment.190 As Jenks 
correctly states, a right to work is in the nature of a moral challenge to the 
economic system, rather than of a right susceptible of legal definition and 
enforcement.191 Consequently, whereas Article 4 of ILO Convention 158 for the 
benefit of the employee requires a valid reason for dismissal, either through 
186  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 211. See also Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 322. 
187  For a discussion of urgent dismissals in light of Article 11 of ILO Convention 158, see Kuip 1993a, 
p. 283. 
188  ILC, Record of Proceedings, 67th Session, 1981, p. 33/13. 
189  See also above under § 15.1.2. 
190  Governing Body, Paper 2001, Appendix I (short survey), par. 53. 
191  Jenks 1960, p. 120.  
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preventive or repressive review, on the one hand,192 it allows an employer to 
dismiss an employee connected to the conduct or capacity of the worker, or 
operational requirements of the undertaking on the other. Hence, it does not
deny the employer’s authority to carry out dismissals.193
Additionally, the Articles 5 and 6 provide invalid reasons, i.e. bad 
causes for dismissal.194 More specifically, these Articles prohibit discriminatory 
and retaliatory discharges,195 and determine that 
‘The following, inter alia, shall not constitute valid reasons for termination: (a) 
union membership or participation in union activities outside working hours or, 
with the consent of the employer, within working hours; (b) seeking office as, 
or acting or having acted in the capacity of, a workers’ representative; (c) the 
filing of a complaint or the participation in proceedings against an employer 
involving alleged violation of laws or regulations or recourse to competent 
administrative authorities; (d) race, colour, sex, marital status, family 
responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction or 
social origin; and (e) absence from work during maternity leave. 196 [Article 5] 
Temporary absence from work because of duly certified illness or injury shall 
not constitute a valid reason for termination, unless the operational 
requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service make it necessary to 
replace the worker concerned on a permanent basis. [Article 6].’ 
The list is not exhaustive. The national legislature can add other invalid reasons 
of dismissal. This follows from the term ‘inter alia’ in Article 5.197 ILO 
Recommendation 166, by means of example, sets forth the following invalid 
reasons for dismissal (1) age – subject to national law and practice regarding 
retirement –; and (2) absence from work, due to compulsory military service or 
other civil obligations.198
One may argue that Article 4, in effect, may become superfluous, considering 
the extensive list of invalid reasons for dismissal under the Articles 5 and 6, in 
practice, supplemented by the national legislature with other invalid reasons. 
192  See also Nyfer 2000, p. 164; Grapperhaus 2006, p. 6. 
193  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 86; Governing Body, Paper 2001, Appendix I 
(short survey), par. 54. See also Sims 1995, p. 684. 
194  Sims 1995, p. 675.  
195  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 75, 118 and 126-128; Governing Body, Paper 
2001, Appendix I (short survey), par. 41. For a discussion of the  Articles 5 and 6, see also Heerma 
van Voss 1992, p. 238 and 284; Kuip 1993a, p. 281; Sims 1995, p. 689-691. 
196  For the underlying principles and Conventions and Recommendations of this Article, see Protection 
against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 102; Governing Body, Paper 2001, Appendix I (short 
survey), par. 9. 
197  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 101; see also footnote 31; Sims 1995, p. 693 
and 694. 
198  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 10. See also Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 245-
247 and 277. For a discussion of all provisions, see also Kuip 1993a, p. 285-287. 
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One has a point, in that it is realistic to assume that combating discrimination is 
a continuous process, resulting in an even more extensive list of invalid 
reasons.199 The difference between Article 4, and the Articles 5 and 6, however, 
is significant and best felt in an at-will dismissal system. Under this system, the 
existence of prohibitions on dismissal in it itself does not change that an 
employee can still be dismissed without cause, i.e. arbitrarily. Or as the 
Committee of Experts put it 
‘(…) these specific types of protection [Articles 5 and 6: VA] are indeed very 
important, nevertheless they should be considered complementary measures to 
the more general guarantees against unjustified termination of employment 
contained in Article 4 of the Convention, which establishes the general 
principle that any [italics: VA] termination of employment has to be based on a 
valid reason.’ 200
Also, when a national legislature literally implements the Articles 5 and 6, an 
employee, for example, is not protected against a dismissal based on age.201 The 
employee in such a case can invoke Article 4, which prescribes that the ground 
of dismissal must be connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or 
based on the operational requirements of the undertaking.202 Article 4, thus, is of 
importance besides the Articles 5 and 6.  
21.4 Remedies for an invalid dismissal 
Article 10 of ILO Convention 158 provides that in case of unjustified 
termination of employment, the competent bodies shall be able to order 
reinstatement. If this is not workable, the competent body – usually the court – 
shall be empowered to order adequate compensation. Reinstatement is not 
considered as workable, for example (i) when the period between the 
termination of employment and the decision on reinstatement is too long; or (ii) 
when employers concern small enterprises where personal ties are closer 
between employers and workers, which makes reinstatement less favorable.203
Article 10, thus, provides alternative remedies.204 The rationale for 
preferring reinstatement is that the Convention primarily aims to offer job 
security and the possibility to retain the rights the worker has acquired during 
his years of service.205 The latter is achieved by the Articles 4, 5 and 6. In its 
General Survey, the Committee of Experts of 1995 subscribes to the general 
199  Sietaram 2001, p. 25. 
200  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 374. 
201  See also Sims 1995, p. 693 and 694. 
202  For Article 4, see below under § 22. 
203  Governing Body, Paper 2001, Appendix I (short survey), par. 38. 
204  ILC, Record of Proceedings, 68th Session, 1982, p. 30/10. 
205  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 218-221, 226 and 229. See also Sims 1995,  
p. 700-702. 
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practice of most countries that when national courts award financial 
compensation, the amount in most countries commonly is determined by the 
length of service, age, acquired rights, the circumstances of the particular case, 
the personal circumstances of the worker, and the possibility of finding a job.206
22  Article 4 
22.1 A valid reason for dismissal  
As may be clear by now, Article 4 protects employees against arbitrary dismissal 
on the one hand, and allows employers to terminate the employment of workers 
for reasons connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the 
operational requirements of the undertaking on the other.207 At first sight, 
Article 4 holds exhaustive reasons. Hence, the employer’s freedom to dismiss 
employees is restricted. Subsequently, the Government of the United States 
submitted an amendment seeking to delete Article 4, strongly disapproving a 
system of national regulation, which listed the reasons for which an employer 
might terminate a worker’s employment. The amendment was withdrawn when 
Workers’ members and Employers’ members opposed.208 Hereupon, the 
Government of the Netherlands submitted an amendment for virtually the same 
reason, proposing to replace point 8 – which would later become Article 4 – 
with a provision that would determine that 
‘The employment of a worker should not be terminated unless there is a valid 
reason for such termination and an adequate protection against unjustified 
termination.’
This amendment, in effect, proposed a general requirement of a valid reason for 
termination, without stipulating the kind of reasons that were valid, which in the 
opinion of the Government of the Netherlands could be diverse. For example, a 
dismissal based on breach of trust, which is often brought forward in the 
Netherlands.209 The Workers’ members supported the amendment. However, the 
Employers’ members and several Governments opposed the amendment, hence, 
it was rejected.210
Does this mean that a breach of trust is excluded from Article 4? From the 
discussion on Article 4 during the 67th Session of the Conference of 1981, and 
the General Survey of the Committee of Experts in 1995, it can be derived that 
although Article 4 contains listed reasons, it, in effect, is open-ended as regards 
its interpretation. In fact, the General Survey of the Committee of Experts in 
206  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 218-221, 226 and 229.  
207  See also Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 233; Kuip 1993a, p. 280 and 281; Sims 1995, p. 675. 
208  ILC, Record of Proceedings, 67th Session, 1981, p. 33/6 and 33/7. 
209  See above under § 16.6 and § 18.5.2.3. 
210  ILC, Record of Proceedings, 67th Session, 1981, p. 33/7. 
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1995 showed that the terms of Article 4 are interpreted almost in a similar way 
by courts, tribunals or arbitrators worldwide.211 Hence, the listed reasons, in 
practice, do not constitute significant difficulties.  
To stick with our example, at first sight, breach of trust is excluded 
from Article 4. However, in practice, it can be categorized under either 
misconduct (breach of trust for which the employee is to blame) or economic 
circumstances (breach of trust for which the employee is not to blame, but has 
resulted in a severe frustration of the operation of the company). In all other 
cases – when an employee is not to blame for the breach of trust and/or still can 
be replaced in the same, an adjusted or another position, it is assumed that a 
valid reason is lacking. Correctly, the International Labour Office, in this 
respect, has asked the Dutch government to clarify the practices of the CWI and 
Cantonal Courts.212
22.2   Capacity of worker 
The termination of employment connected with the capacity of the worker 
relates to a lack of the skills or qualities necessary to perform certain tasks, 
eventually resulting in loss of confidence.213 This is largely consistent with the 
definition used in a number of countries.214 However, it appears that countries 
may differ as regards the employer’s freedom to judge on the employee’s 
(in)capacity.  
For example, the highest court in Gabon decided that the employer 
remains the sole judge of the professional abilities of an employee, i.e. the 
opinion of the employer is determinative. In contrast, the highest court in France 
held that the alleged loss of confidence must be based on objective 
considerations.215 The Committee of Experts seems to take the middle course. It 
states that whether a dismissal is justified based on an employee’s incapacity 
should be determined by substantive and procedural safeguards such as careful 
assessment of his work, warning him about the possible consequences if the 
quality of his work does not improve, and allowing him to demonstrate his skills 
and to improve his work performance.216 The freedom to dismiss employees for 
a valid reason, thus, does not imply that a judgment on the existence of this 
reason can be left totally at the free discretion of employers.217
211  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO, 1995, par. 88; Governing Body, Paper 2001, Appendix 
I (short survey), par. 56. 
212  See ADO-Rapport 2000, p. 6., and above under § 16.6. For dissolutions based on breach of trust, see 
above under § 18.5.2.3. 
213  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 94. 
214  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 78. 
215  Sims 1995, p. 687. 
216  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 95. See also Sims 1995, p. 695 and 696. 
217  ILC, Record of Proceedings, 68th Session, 1982, p. 30/1. 
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22.3  Conduct of worker 
Article 4 further refers to the worker’s conduct as a valid reason for dismissal.218
In practice, it implies misconduct, which in various countries is referred to as a 
‘breach of discipline’. 219  In general, misconduct refers to a worker’s  
x improper behavior, for example, the use of insulting language, 
violence, disrupting the peace and order of the workplace, or 
turning up for work in a state of intoxication; or  
x professional misconduct, for example, a violation of work rules, 
disobedience of legitimate orders, or tardiness or absence without 
good cause.220
In furtherance of Article 11, most countries in this respect make a distinction 
between serious misconduct, which gives rise to summary dismissal, i.e. 
termination of the contract without notice, and misconduct of a less serious 
nature, which requires a termination of employment with prior notice.221
22.4  Operational requirements of the undertaking 
Last, an employer can dismiss an employee based on a reason for dismissal 
connected with operational requirements of the enterprise. According to the 
Committee of Experts, this includes reasons of an economic, technological, 
structural or similar nature,222 which according to this Committee, is largely 
consistent with the definition used in most countries.223
Besides Article 4, the Articles 13 and 14, too, see to dismissals based on 
economic reasons. In theory, Article 4 must be read in conjunction with the 
supplementary provisions of the Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention. In 
practice, however, the Articles 13 and 14 in most countries generally apply to 
collective dismissals only, i.e. ‘redundancy’ or ‘retrenchment’.224 More 
specifically, the Articles 13 and 14 include the right to information and 
consultation of workers’ representatives, and the notification of the competent 
authority, respectively.225
218  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO, 1995, par. 89. 
219  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO, 1995, par. 78. 
220  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 90; Simps 1995, p. 684 and 685. 
221  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 91. 
222  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO, 1995, par. 96. See also Sims 1995, p. 676. 
223  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO, 1995, par. 78; Sims 1995, p. 677. 
224  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO, 1995, par. 276-278. See also Sims 1995, p. 677 and 
679.
225  Governing Body, Paper 2001, Appendix I (short survey), par. 8. 
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23  ILO Convention 158 in light of the ILO Declaration of 1998 
23.1   Prevention of unemployment 
The just cause standard is not included in the ILO Declaration of 1998 as a 
fundamental right. Like ILO Convention 102, however, the just cause standard 
of ILO Convention 158 can be seen as rooted in the ILO Constitution.226 In the 
Preamble of the ILO Constitution, member states have committed themselves to 
improve working conditions with regard to prevention of unemployment. 
Therefore, to the extent the just cause standard protects workers against – 
arbitrary – dismissal, it can be said to prevent unemployment under the 
Constitution, as also stressed by the Committee of Experts in its General Survey 
on ILO Convention 158.227
In fact, the predecessor of ILO Convention 158 – ILO Recommendation 
119 of 1963 – in 1981 was reconsidered in light of massive job losses in many 
countries, due to economic and technological developments.228 Moreover, in its 
General Survey on ILO Convention 158,229 the Committee of Experts concluded 
that ILO Convention 158 had lost none of its relevance in light of the very large-
scale job losses, through restructuring of enterprises, made necessary by the 
globalization of the economy.230 Primarily, however, as the Workers’ members, 
as well as several Government members, stressed during the 68th Session of the 
Conference in 1982 on ILO Convention 158, Article 4 sets forth a fundamental 
principle231 to guarantee minimum protection against arbitrary dismissal for 
workers everywhere.232
Opponents of just cause protection state that the just cause standard protects the 
working class only,233 and that deregulation of dismissal law is the panacea for 
unemployment. On the other hand, when the Dutch legislature made the 
dismissal laws more flexible the rate of unemployment did not fall. In fact, 
legislative reform in Europe elsewhere focusing on deregulating the labour 
market and enhancing flexibility did not result in a reduction of unemployment 
226  For ILO Convention 102 in light of the ILO Declaration of 1998, see above under § 20.5.3. 
227  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 371. 
228  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, § 376. See also International Labour Conference, 
68th Session, 1982,  Report V(1), Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer, 
International Labour Office, Geneva, p. 3 and 4; ILC, Record of Proceedings, 67th Session, 1981,  
p. 33/1. 
229  For this General Survey, see also below under  25. 
230  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 379 and 380; Governing Body, Paper 2001, 
par. 9-11. 
231  ILC, Record of Proceedings, 68th session, 1982, p. 30/4 and 30/5. 
232  ILC, Record of Proceedings, 68th session, 1982, p. 30/1. 
233  Feis 1996, p. 308-309; Ichino 1998, p. 306 and 310; HSI 1999/03, p. 10; Gould 2001, p. 4; 
Governing Body, Paper 2001, Appendix I (short survey), par. 62. 
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either.234 This might explain why French students protested in March 2006 
against new dismissal laws of the French government, which intended to enable 
employers to dismiss employees until the age of twenty-six more easily to create 
jobs for newcomers, hence, to combat youth employment.235
To the extent nearly one-third of the global work force is 
unemployed,236 it would be interesting to explore the causal relationship 
between employment protection and the overall level of (un)employment. As 
today, the causal relationship between employment security protection and the 
overall level of (un)employment has not yet been empirically proven.237
However, it would go beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the trade-off 
between dismissal regulation and (un)employment. In fact, this would force me 
to look at the termination of an employment agreement from an economic point 
of view. As may be clear, I wish to look at dismissal law primarily from a social 
point of view.238 From a social point of view, the Committee of Experts is 
correct in stating that the Conference’s intent behind Article 4 of ILO 
Convention 158 is to protect workers against arbitrary dismissal in general, 
hence, from becoming unemployed.  
23.2    Protection of fundamental principles and rights at work 
Besides the fact that Article 4 of ILO Convention 158 prevents employees in 
question from being dismissed, in my opinion, the just cause standard, can 
further the rights of the ILO Declaration of 1998. The latter stressed the 
importance of the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, 
elimination of child labour and forced labour, and non-discrimination. Brett, in 
this respect, correctly states that  
‘(…) the very notion of fundamental workers’ rights should not be read as 
giving secondary status to other equally important international labour 
standards. They are fundamental in the sense that without respect for core 
labour standards, other standards will either be inaccessible or under threat
(Italics: VA). In fact, fundamental workers’ rights are enabling rights without 
which other objectives stand in jeopardy. What are the chances for respect for 
234  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 11 and 12, footnote 25, referring to OECD, 
Employment outlook (Paris), June 1999, Chapter 2. 
235  NRC Next 28 maart 2006, p. 4 and 5. See also Loonstra 2006a; Grapperhaus 2006, p. 3. In the 
Netherlands, the Koninklijke Metaalunie, proposed the same for youngsters till the age of 23. Its 
proposal did not make it, due to heavy criticism of unions. See www.metaalunie.nl and 
www.fnvbondgenoten.nl. 
236  Smyth 1994, p. 46. 
237  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 378; Governing Body, Paper 2001, Appendix 
I (short survey), par. 57-60. See also Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 11; 
Nagelkerke 2006. 
238  For an economic view on dismissal law, see Vandenberghe 2004, p. 165-185; CPB Document 135 
(2006). 
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ILO standards on social protections (…) if workers are denied the right to form 
unions or to bargain collectively.’239
Elaborating on Brett’s statement, one can also state that without the just cause 
standard the core labour standards of the ILO Declaration of 1998 may be 
inaccessible or under threat. Hence, in my opinion, the just cause standard may 
further the rights of the ILO Declaration of 1998, notably (i) the right to freedom 
of association and the right to collective bargaining; and (ii) the right to non-
discrimination. Put differently, the at-will rule, in effect, may threat the 
principles of freedom of association and collective bargaining and non-
discrimination, in that an employee under this system can be dismissed without 
cause, hence, arbitrarily.240
For example, Hepple refers to the BJ&B factory in the Dominican 
Republic, owned by a Korean parent company producing Nike, Reebok and 
Adidas products. Although the Dominican Republic ratified the ILO 
Conventions 87 and 98, all workers that filed a petition under Dominican law for 
the recognition of their union were dismissed or retaliated against in another 
way. Although the Dominican Republic had to respect these fundamental rights 
on the one hand, the Labour Code of the Dominican Republic left considerable 
discretion to management with respect to dismissal without cause on the 
other.241 This example illustrates that the value of the freedom of association, in 
effect, may be null when workers can be dismissed without cause, i.e. may 
become less effective under an at-will dismissal system. Consequently, the 
Committee of Experts in their General Survey on ILO Convention 158 held that  
‘Protection against acts of anti-union discrimination, and in particular 
termination of employment for such activities, is particularly necessary for 
trade union leaders and representatives, since in order to be able to fulfill their 
duties freely and independently they must have the guarantee that they will not 
suffer any prejudice as a result of holding trade union office or taking up trade 
union activities.’242
In this respect, I refer to the fundamental rights of ILO Convention 98 that sees 
to the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining. More specifically, this Convention provides protection 
against acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of employment, including 
protection against dismissal by reason of union membership, or of participation 
in union activities. 243 To the extent the international just cause standard of 
Article 4 of ILO Convention 158 – by requiring a just cause for dismissal in 
general – is able to further the(se) fundamental rights of ILO Declaration 1998, 
239  Brett 2001, p. 3. 
240  Gernigon, Odero and Guido, 2003, Freedom of Association, p. 17. 
241  Hepple 2003, p. 20 and 21. 
242  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 110. 
243  Jenks 1960, p. 55; Gernigon, Odero and Guido, 2003, Freedom of Association, p. 7. 
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the just cause standard is as fundamental as these rights. Hence, Article 4 of ILO 
Convention 158, too, is important in light of the process of economic 
globalization. This now brings me to the question to what extent the American 
and Dutch just cause standards meet this international just cause standard. 
24  American and Dutch dismissal law:  
in accordance with Article 4 of ILO Convention 158? 
24.1   Introduction 
Before examining to what extent the American and Dutch just cause standards 
meet Article 4 of ILO Convention 158, it is important to realize that Article 1 of 
ILO Convention 158 determines that a ratifying state may choose between 
different methods to give effect to the Convention. Hence, the implementation of 
standards can take place by laws or regulations, by means of collective 
bargaining agreements, arbitration awards or court decisions, or in such other 
matter consistent with national practice.244 The ILO Convention 158, therefore, 
is flexible with regard to the methods of implementation of its standards,245
which includes Article 4.246 This means that the legislature does not need to 
explicitly require a valid reason for a dismissal, rather that the legislature, courts 
or arbitrators, in effect, apply this rule. The Committee on Termination of 
Employment in the 67th Session of the Conference in 1981, in this respect, 
stressed that 
‘Both the proposed Convention and the Recommendation leave it entirely up to 
each nation to concretise implementation within its own tradition and practice, 
but subject to only two provisions: first, that there be institutions in one form or 
another, such as courts, government departments, tribunals, arbitrators, and so 
forth, to see to it that the universal principles relative to termination are given a 
concrete expression within the framework of its sovereign people; and secondly 
that such institutions be impartial in character.’247
24.2 American dismissal law 
24.2.1  Federal statutory law 
In Chapter 2, I concluded that private-sector employees in the United States may 
enjoy protection against arbitrary dismissal under the Sections 7 and 8 of the 
National Labour Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA). However, these Sections 
244  Protection against an unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 371-373; Governing Body, Paper 2001, 
Appendix I (short survey), par. 3. 
245  Protection against an unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 371-373; Governing Body, Paper 1998, 
par. 49. 
246  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995, par. 79. See also Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 234. 
247  ILC, Record of Proceedings, 67th Session, 1981, p. 39/22. 
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provide protection in case of specified – concerted – activities only. Hence, the 
Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA do not provide protection against arbitrary 
dismissal in general according to Article 4 of ILO Convention 158, nor do they 
afford this protection under any other provision in the NLRA. Apart from the 
NLRA, private-sector employees can enjoy protection against dismissal under 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 amended in 1991 (Title VII); the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (the ADEA); the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1974 (the PDA); and, the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990 (the ADA). Under these Acts, employers are prohibited to discharge 
private-sector employees based on race, color, sex, religion and national origin, 
age, pregnancy, and disability, respectively. This protection against 
discriminatory dismissal can be obtained under the disparate treatment doctrine, 
which focuses on discriminatory intent, or the adverse impact doctrine, which 
focuses on discriminatory results. These federal anti-discrimination statutes do 
not provide protection against arbitrary dismissal in general. All federal – and 
state – anti-discrimination statutes prohibit a discharge for specified – 
discriminatory – reasons only. The McDonnell Douglas test, which the US 
Supreme Court has introduced under federal anti-discrimination law to relieve 
the burden of proof for employees in disparate treatment cases did not create 
protection against arbitrary dismissal in general either. Under this test, an 
employer can rebut the inference of discrimination by bringing forward a 
legitimate, i.e. a non-discriminatory reason. However, the latter need not 
constitute just cause; it merely needs to be a reason that does not fall within the 
statute’s definition of discrimination.  
 Only private-sector employees, who are subject to a collective 
bargaining agreement, can enjoy just cause protection according to Article 4 of 
ILO Convention 158. They can enjoy this protection through collective 
bargaining agreements and labor arbitration. These so-called bargaining unit 
employees, a minority of the private-sector employees – about ten percent of the 
private workforce – cannot be dismissed but for just cause only. 
24.2.2 State statutory law 
The good cause standard under the Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act 
of 1987 (WDFEA) is an equivalent of a just cause standard as is common in 
collective bargaining agreements. In brief, good cause under the WDFEA is 
defined as reasonable job-related ground of dismissal based on a failure to 
satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the employer’s operation, or other 
legitimate business reason. This protection appears meaningless for the majority 
of workers. First, under statutory case law the ‘other legitimate business reason’, 
referred to in the WDFEA, holds a reason that is neither false, whimsical, 
arbitrary nor capricious, and must have some logical relationship to the needs of 
the business. Montana law, however, still protects a good-faith employer. That 
is, so long as the employer acts in good faith, he is the sole judge in decisions 
concerning employment. This seems in contrast with the vision of the 
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Committee of Experts’ on just cause protection according to ILO Convention 
158. Second, a violation of the good cause standard results in contract damages 
only, hence, the good cause protection of the Montana statute appears to be 
illusory for blue-collar workers. In brief, the WDFEA primarily provides for 
arbitration, but when an employee makes an offer to arbitrate and the employer 
consequently refuses to arbitrate, which is likely for strategic reasons, the 
employee has no other option than to address the judiciary. Considering the facts 
that attorneys-at-law generally do not accept contract claims on a contingency 
fee basis – unless it concerns contract claims of white-collar workers – on the 
one hand, and blue-collar workers generally lack the financial capability to hire 
counsel on an hourly basis on the other, blue-collar workers, in practice, will 
lack just cause protection. Put differently, the good cause standard under the 
WDFEA meets the standard of Article 4 of ILO Convention 158 in theory, but 
not in practice, to the extent it protects good-faith employers on the one hand, 
and protects white-collar workers only on the other. 
24.2.3  Common law 
The common law at-will rule is the basic premise in the United States 
undergirding the employment relationship. In its classic form, an employer can 
discharge an employee for any cause, no cause, or even a cause morally wrong, 
without being liable. The development of judicial exceptions to the at-will rule 
in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, presented the prospect that the at-will 
doctrine would be ‘swept away’. In brief, courts created three exceptions to the 
at-will rule (1) the public policy exception; (2) the breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) the breach of the contract to 
discharge for good cause only, which includes the handbook exception and the 
implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception. In brief, the public policy 
exception constitutes what is a bad cause for dismissal. Hence, it does not offer 
protection against arbitrary dismissal in general. The same applies to the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing as applied in the employment context. 
Initially, the latter held a promise of giving just cause protection. However, 
meanwhile, the majority of the few states that accepted the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing are of the opinion that this exception to the at-will rule 
does not provide protection against arbitrary dismissal in general. 
 Only the handbook exception and the implied-in-fact (good cause) 
contract exception – first accepted by the Michigan Supreme Court in Toussaint 
(1980) and the California Court of Appeal in Pugh (1981), respectively – appear 
to provide protection against arbitrary dismissal in general. The bottleneck as 
regards the handbook exception, however, is that in reaction to this exception, 
employers started to insert at-will disclaimers to negate job security under this 
exception. Because courts generally consider these disclaimers as valid, this, in 
practice, leaves the employee with less just cause protection than primarily 
assumed under the handbook exception. The implied-in-fact (good cause) 
contract offers a more solid cause of action. Based on the totality of 
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circumstances, an employer under this exception needs good cause to terminate 
the employment The majority of states, however, still protect the good-faith 
employer, although the reason given by the employer is subject to scrutiny. 
Hence, the employer does not have an unfettered right to exercise discretion in 
the guise of business judgment. However, like the handbook exception, 
employers started to insert at-will disclaimers. Although – unlike the handbook 
exception – an at-will disclaimer generally is considered merely as one of the 
factors in the totality of circumstances test it, nonetheless, can be a factor to 
negate good cause protection, which leaves the employee under the implied-in-
fact (good cause) contract, too, with less just cause protection than primarily 
assumed. Overall, the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception under 
state common law most closely approaches the just cause standard of Article 4 
of ILO Convention 158. It bears mentioning, however, that the implied-in-fact 
(good cause) contract exception results in contract damages only, and that 
attorneys-at-law generally are not willing to accept – these – cases on a 
contingency fee basis. Hence, like under Montana statutory law, blue-collar 
workers, in effect, generally lack just cause protection. Also, a minority of the 
states only accepted the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception. 
24.3 Dutch dismissal law 
24.3.1 The dual just cause dismissal system 
In the early nineties, the Minister of Social Affairs, De Vries, stated that the 
Dutch dismissal system met the standards of ILO Convention 158. These 
standards included the just cause standard.248 In 2000, the Committee Rood that 
was asked by the Minister of Social Affairs to write a proposal on a new 
dismissal system and to involve ILO Convention 158 into its review, too, 
concluded that Dutch dismissal law was in accordance with the just cause 
standard of ILO Convention 158. It referred to Article 3:1 of the Dismissal 
Decree which, in effect, requires a just cause for dismissal. However, it was of 
the opinion that this just cause standard needed to be codified in Book 7 Title 10 
of the Dutch Civil Code, before the Netherlands could ratify ILO Convention 
158. In brief, the Committee Rood advised the government to abolish the BBA 
1945 and the provision on a manifestly unreasonable dismissal, and 
subsequently, to replace the dismissal system by a system that would require a 
valid reason for a dismissal according to Article 4 of ILO Convention 158. It 
stressed that the latter was necessary, because the action of a manifestly 
unreasonable dismissal did not meet the standard of Article 4 of ILO Convention 
158. The new requirement, in turn, made the BBA 1945 obsolete.249
248  TK 1990-1991, 21 479, No. 6, p. 20. See also Kuip 1993a, p. 287 footnote 50. 
249  ADO-Rapport 2000, p. 76 and 77. For an in-depth discussion of this Report, see further below under 
§ 29.2.2. 
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In contrast, the Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid or STAR),
in reply to the Committee’s proposal advised negatively, stressing that there was 
no need to introduce an explicit just cause rule according to Article 4. More 
specifically, it held that Article 3:1 of the Dismissal Decree was in accordance 
with Article 4 of ILO Convention 158, and Article 7:685 DCC (1639w old) 
required a – serious – cause for dismissal as well.250 The International Labour 
Office of the ILO, on the other hand, expressed doubt whether Dutch dismissal 
law was in accordance with Article 4 of ILO Convention 158. First, it held that 
Article 7:681 DCC (1639s old) did not meet Article 4 to the extent it determines 
that a dismissal without cause is not automatically – manifestly – 
unreasonable.251 Second, the International Labour Office opposed the practice 
under Dutch dismissal law which makes it possible for employers to dismiss an 
employee based on breach of trust for which the employee is not to blame.252
24.3.2 BBA 1945 
In the literature, too, one has doubts whether Dutch dismissal law is in 
accordance with Article 4 of ILO Convention 158. More specifically, in 1991, 
the Working Committee on Revision of Dismissal Law (Werkgroep Herziening 
Ontslagrecht)253 held that the BBA 1945 was not in accordance with Article 4. 
Although the Directives at the time determined that the public authority shall 
grant a permit to terminate the employment agreement in case of a just cause 
only, authors held that it did not explicitly require a just cause connected with 
the capacity or conduct of the employee, or operational requirements of the 
undertaking. Instead, the Directives only required that the public authority in its 
decision had to balance the interests of the employer, the employee and the 
public.254 Kuip, too, held that the BBA 1945 and/or the Directives did not 
explicitly require a just cause for dismissal connected to the capacity or conduct 
of the employee, or operational requirements of the undertaking.255 Van Dooren 
brought forward the same argument as Kuip.256
 Still, the BBA 1945 does not explicitly require a just cause standard. 
The Dismissal Decree that replaced the Directives and applies to the BBA 1945, 
however, does. Article 3:1 of the Dismissal Decree determines that an employer 
can only dismiss an employee when justified, i.e. for just cause only.257
250  STAR-Advies 2003/7, p. 7, 11 and 12. 
251  ADO-Rapport 2000, p. 6. 
252  ADO-Rapport 2000, p. 6 and 76. 
253  The Working Committee is part of the ‘Vereniging voor Arbeidsrecht’ (Dutch Association of 
Employment Law). It focuses on dismissal law in particular and looks at necessary changes on which 
the members of the Working Committee –  judges, lawyers, scientists – advise. See Werkgroep 
Ontslagrecht VvA 1991, p. 214. 
254  Werkgroep Ontslagrecht VvA 1991, p. 218. 
255  Kuip 1993a, p. 280 and 281. 
256  Van Dooren 1999, p. 890. 
257  For an in-depth discussion of this Article, see above under § 16.3. 
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Moreover, in practice, under this Article, the CWI grants permission for 
dismissal connected to the capacity or conduct of the employee, or operational 
requirements of the undertaking. Additionally, in case of breach of trust, it 
grants permission when the breach of trust either results in misconduct or 
operational requirements of the operation. It, thus, is in accordance with Article 
4 of ILO Convention 158. As mentioned above, under Article 1 of ILO 
Convention 158, the implementation of Article 4, in effect, can take place 
through different methods, hence, it does not require that the legislature 
explicitly requires a valid reason for a dismissal according to Article 4 through 
legislation, rather that the legislature or courts or arbitrators, in effect, apply this 
rule.258 I, therefore, agree with the Committee Rood and the Labour Foundation 
that Article 3:1 of the Dismissal Decree is in accordance with Article 4 of ILO 
Convention 158.  
24.3.3  Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code 
In the literature, one states that Article 7:681 DCC does not meet Article 4 of 
ILO Convention 158. In 1991, the Working Committee on Revision of 
Dismissal Law held that when the legislature introduced Article 1639s (a) it did 
not explicitly require a just cause for dismissal in general; and (b) when an 
employer dismisses an employee without – just – cause, the dismissal is not per 
se manifestly unreasonable. Furthermore, it held that the Articles 1639g and 
1639o were not in accordance with Article 4. The Working Committee did not 
explain why these Articles were not in accordance. It only emphasized that 
according to Article 1639g an employer in terminating an employment 
agreement must respect a notice period, and according to Article 1639o, an 
employer is allowed to terminate an employment agreement without prior 
notice, provided the employer pays a severance payment. Apparently, the 
Working Committee on Revision of Dismissal Law wished to indicate that in 
both cases termination of employment could take place, regardless of the reason. 
However, as Heerma van Voss correctly states, the Articles 1639g and 1639o 
are covered by Article 11 of ILO Convention 158, which contains a right on a 
notice period or a severance payment in lieu hereof.259 In 1993, Kuip used the 
same arguments as the Working Committee. He, too, held that the Articles 
1639g, 1639o and 1639s were not in accordance with Article 4.260
 In Chapter 3, I have demonstrated that the Minister of Justice stressed 
that with Article 1639s he did not wish to introduce a just cause rule that would 
provide protection against arbitrary dismissal in general. Moreover, under 
Article 1639s, courts based on the circumstances of the case can  – thus, do not 
have to – determine that a dismissal is manifestly unreasonable, after the 
employer has terminated the employment agreement without – just – cause. 
258  See also above under § 24.1. 
259  See also Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 331 and 332. 
260  Kuip 1993a, p. 280 and 281. 
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Therefore, a termination that is given without cause is not per se – manifestly – 
unreasonable under this Article.261 Courts did not introduce a just cause rule 
either. Although the Netherlands Supreme Court has relieved the burden of 
proof when the reason stated by the employer is false, i.e. non-existent, case law 
does not require a just cause for dismissal. To the extent an employer must bring 
forward sufficient facts so that the employee can properly build his defense, the 
court can ‘only’ take a bad reason in consideration as one of the circumstances 
in determining whether a dismissal is manifestly unreasonable. I, therefore, 
conclude that Article 7:681 DCC – as also brought forward in literature262 – 
does not meet the standard of Article 4 of ILO Convention 158.263   
In contrast, Article 7:685 DCC, in my opinion, in theory, does meet Article 4 of 
ILO Convention 158. This Article requires serious cause for dismissal. Article 
7:685 DCC (1639w old), in brief, determines that an employer and an employee 
independently and at all times can ask the Cantonal Court to dissolve the 
employment agreement based on serious cause. Serious cause embraces either 
an urgent reason for dismissal, or a change of circumstances based upon which 
the employment agreement reasonably has to end immediately or on short 
notice. Legislative history shows that when serious cause is lacking, the 
Cantonal Court must reject the request.  
An examination of case law, however, shows that Cantonal Courts, in 
practice, allow employers to trade off the existence of serious cause. First, 
Cantonal Courts grant a severance payment although the stated reason by the 
employer, in effect, is non-existent. This takes place with regard to requests 
based on breach of trust of which the employee is not to blame, i.e. a non-
existent reason underlies the breach of trust without the existence of another 
valid reason. In such a case, the Cantonal Court must reject the request, with one 
exception only. That is if replacement in the same, an adjusted or another 
position would severely frustrate the operation of the firm. The latter constitutes 
good – serious – cause as these circumstances, in effect, can be considered as 
‘economic circumstances’ based upon which the employment agreement must 
end immediately or on short notice. Therefore, the International Labour Office 
correctly opposes Dutch dismissal law, to the extent it allows employers to 
dismiss an employee based on breach of trust for which the employee is not to 
blame.264 Second, Cantonal Courts grant conditional requests based on urgent 
cause according to less stringent criteria than the Netherlands Supreme Court, 
which, too, undermines the system of just cause protection according to the 
legislature’s intent. These courts, in effect, reinforce a practice, in which the 
employer may and will abuse the alternative route of Article 7:685 DCC to 
dismiss an employee without – an urgent – cause. Both practices are not 
261  See also Gerbrandy 1954, p. 37 and 38. 
262  See above under § 23.3.1. 
263  See also above under § 17.4. 
264 For remarks on a manifestly unreasonable dismissal, see above under § 17.4; for remarks on a 
dissolution based on breach of trust, see above under § 18.5.2.3. 
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consistent with Article 4 of ILO Convention 158. Hence, the Labour 
Foundation, in my opinion, is incorrect to the extent it implies that Article 7:685 
DCC meets Article 4 per se. Article 7:685 DCC meets the just cause standard of 
Article 158 in theory, but not in practice, at least not in the foregoing cases.265
25   The need and chances on ratification of ILO Convention 158 
One may argue that ratification of ILO Convention 158 may be superfluous 
when the provisions of ILO Convention 158 are already applied in practice.266
Advocates of ratification, including the Dutch government, however, argue that 
– although ratification of Conventions is not a purpose in itself, rather the 
improvement of conditions of labour – it may be an important step towards 
implementation, and consequently in the fulfillment of ILO’s goals.267 Second, 
they argue that ratification of ILO Conventions is an expression of solidarity 
with other member states in agreeing that international coordination of workers’ 
rights and working conditions is appropriate.268 Furthermore, they argue that 
ratification is a direct consequence of the adoption of a Convention. Adoption 
means that standards are accepted by the majority of member states, and that 
based on its membership every ILO member state has an obligation to improve 
working conditions for all workers in the world.269 In this respect, De Pooter 
states that the ratification of a Convention does not serve to stimulate national
working conditions, but rather global working conditions and, therefore, 
national laws that provide for better conditions should not stand in the way of 
ratifying a Convention.270 Additionally, Van der Heijden states that ratification 
is important for ensuring that minimum fundamental principles will continue to 
be respected.271 In my opinion this, in fact, happened with the ILO Declaration 
of 1998. This Declaration could be adopted relatively easily, i.e. without any 
votes against, due to the fact that the underlying – eight – Conventions of the 
ILO Declaration of 1998, holding minimum fundamental principles, had already 
been ratified by a significant majority of member states.272 A high number of 
ratifications of a Convention, in general, is an indication that the underlying 
principles are acceptable for the majority of member states and workable under 
national law, i.e. are generally accepted values worldwide. The latter is not (yet) 
the case with regard to all standards of ILO Convention 158. As this thesis 
reached its completion, ILO Convention has been ratified by thirty-two 
265  See also above under § 24.3.1. 
266  For example, see Ghana who brought forward this argument. See Governing Body, Paper 1998,  
par. 54. 
267  Boonstra 1996, p. 44; TK 1994-1995, 23 900 XV, No. 44, p. 2. 
268  Valticos 1998, p. 140; TK 1994-1995, 23 900 XV, No. 44, p. 4. 
269  De Pooter 1994, p. 475; Boonstra 1996, p. 44. 
270  De Pooter 1994, p. 475 and 476; TK 1994-1995, 23 900 XV, No. 44, p. 7. 
271  Van der Heijden 1999b, p. 11; TK 1994-1995, 23 900 XV, No. 44, p. 7. 
272  For the ILO Declaration of 1998, see above under § 20.5.3. 
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countries ‘only’. Nevertheless, the Dutch government expressed an interest in 
ratifying the Convention.273
This brings me to the chances on ratification of ILO Convention 158. In 
general, it may be clear that the step from a dual just cause dismissal system 
towards a just cause dismissal system according to Article 4 is easier to take 
than from an at-will dismissal system. As regards the latter, to achieve 
ratifications among states with at-will dismissal systems, in my opinion, it is 
important to first promote the basic principle of the Convention, i.e. the just 
cause standard – e.g., in light of the process of economic globalization274 – 
rather than to promote the ratification of ILO Convention 158 as a whole. Most 
countries experience the Convention as too detailed with its procedural controls 
on the employer’s ability to dismiss an employee.275 In this respect, I agree with 
Boonstra that the influence of standards is affected not so much along linear 
paths, but more through persuasion, for example, because they were based on 
generally accepted shared values, protected by a supervisory machinery, rather 
than through force.276 De Ly further points at the possibility of unification of law 
through initiatives of other international organizations in which they subscribe to 
these standards.277 Last, a possibility is to have the just cause standard 
transferred – back again – to a Recommendation, as suggested during the 68th
Session of the Conference of 1982 by the Government member(s) of the United 
States.278 Overall, it is not realistic to think that within the near future a 
significant majority of member states or all member states will ratify ILO 
Convention 158. In fact, in 1998, a significant number of member states stated 
that they were examining or would be examining in the near future the 
possibility of ratifying ILO Convention 158. As this thesis reached its 
completion, none of these countries had ratified the Convention.279 Only five 
other member states had ratified ILO Convention 158 after the examination of 
1998. By 2007, the United States has no intention to ratify the Convention.280
ILO Convention 158 encounters persistent difficulties in gaining a significant 
number of ratifications.281 Already, the Governing Body, in accordance with 
Article 19 of the ILO Constitution, decided at its 251st Session (November 1991) 
273  See also above under § 1.3.3. 
274  See above under § 23. 
275  See also TK 1994-1995, 23 900 XV, No. 44, p. 7, in which the Dutch government stresses that too 
many details may form an obstacle in ratifying a Convention. 
276  Boonstra 1996, p. 45. 
277  De Ly 1993, p. 57.  This, in fact, happened with regard the just cause standard of Article 4 of ILO  
       Convention 158 , being a source of inspiration to Article 24 of the revised European Social Charter      
       of 1996 of the Council of Europe, and Article II-90 of the European Constitution of the  
       European Union. For these treaties, see above under § 1.3.2. 
278  ILC, Record of Proceedings, 68th Session, 1982, p. 30/4 and 30/5. 
279  Governing Body, Paper 1998, par. 52, footnote 34. 
280  Governing Body, Paper 2001, par. 5, footnote 7. See www.ilo.org for an update of ratifications. 
281  Governing Body, Paper 1997, par. 53. 
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to invite the governments of those member states that had not yet ratified ILO 
Convention 158 to submit a report on this instrument. The reports, together with 
those submitted by the member states that ratified the Convention, enabled the 
Committee of Experts in 1995 to carry out a General Survey on the effect given 
to ILO Convention 158, called Protection against unjustified dismissal.282
Subsequently, the Working Party of the Governing Body undertook its 
first examination on ratification of ILO Convention 1958 in March 1997.283
Consequently, it requested information from member states on the obstacles and 
difficulties encountered that might prevent or delay ratification of the 
Convention or that might point to the need for its revision. In March 1998, the 
Working Party re-examined ILO Convention 158 in the light of these results,284
and decided that a short survey be carried out. Pursuant to a decision by the 
Governing Body in March 1998, a short survey was submitted to the Working 
Party in 2001.285 In brief, the United States, as a general obstacle to ratification 
and a specific obstacle to Article 4, cited the common law rule that an employee 
without a contract for a definite period can be discharged for good cause, no 
cause or even a morally wrong cause. Consequently, the right to appeal a 
termination of employment as provided in Article 7 was not available either.286
The American government did not mention that opponents of the at-will rule 
prefer that this rule will be given notice. Grodin, in brief, states that the at-will 
rule should be dismissed, because it is out of step with job protection systems 
adopted by other industrialized nations, and with international norms as 
exemplified in the ILO Convention 158.287 However, the chance that the United 
States will ratify ILO Convention 158 is small. In fact, by 2007, the United 
States has ratified 14 Conventions only and is among the countries with the least 
ratification.288 To give an idea, by 2007, the Netherlands ratified 104 
Conventions.289
26  Conclusion 
In this Chapter, I have examined to what extent the American and Dutch just 
cause standards meet the international just cause standard of Article 4 of ILO 
Convention 158. The conclusion is that, besides the just cause standard under 
collective labor law, the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act 
(WDFEA) holds a good cause standard according to Article 4 of ILO 
Convention 158. Under common law, the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract 
approaches most closely the just cause standard of Article 4 of ILO Convention 
282  Protection against unjustified dismissal, ILO 1995. 
283  Governing Body, Paper 1997. 
284  Governing Body, Paper 1998. 
285  Governing Body, Paper 2001, par. 13 and 14; Appendix I (short survey), par. 1. 
286  Governing Body, Paper 1998, par. 52 and 82.  
287  Grodin 1990, p. 2. 
288  Hardin 1997, p. 23.21; Jacobs 2003, p. 22. 
289  See www.ilo.org. See also Leary 1982, p. 13. 
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158. It should be stressed, however, that the foregoing just cause standards 
under American dismissal law apply to a minority of the work force only, and – 
apart from the just cause standard under collective labor law – do not always 
provide just cause protection in practice. The majority of private-sector 
employees, therefore, are still subject to the at-will rule, hence, would welcome 
the ratification of ILO Convention 158. The American government, however, 
has no intention to ratify the Convention. In contrast, the Dutch government 
expressed its wish to ratify the Convention. In the Netherlands, the majority of 
private-sector employees already enjoy just cause protection according to 
Article 4 of ILO Convention 158 under the BBA 1945. The Dutch dual 
dismissal system, however, leaves room for employers, as an alternative, to ask 
for dissolution of the employment agreement. From case law it can be derived 
that Article 7:685 DCC provides just cause protection in theory. However, in 
practice, Cantonal Courts do not consistently apply Article 7:685 DCC 
according to the legislature’s intent. Hence, to this extent, Article 7:685 DCC is 
not in accordance with Article 4 of ILO Convention 158. Before ratifying ILO 
Convention 158, the Dutch government, thus, must reconsider Article 7:685 
DCC when it wishes to make dismissal law more flexible by abolishing the 
BBA 1945 in finding a new balance between flexibility for employers on the 
one hand, and just cause protection for employees on the other. 
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V COMPARISON OF AMERICAN AND DUTCH  
DISMISSAL LAW  
27      Illustrative comparison 
27.1 Aim of the comparison 
The previous Chapters show that the American dismissal system is showing a 
development towards just cause protection, and the Dutch dismissal system 
towards more flexibility for employers. At first sight, the American and Dutch 
dismissal system, therefore, grow towards one other.1 Nevertheless, the 
American and the Dutch dismissal system in respect of just cause protection still 
significantly differ from one another. The basic rule in the United States is the 
at-will rule, and the basic rule in the Netherlands the just cause rule.2
 The just cause rule is generally considered as a better rule than the at-
will rule. This can be explained by the international acceptance of just cause 
protection as a primary social goal in the post-war period, for example, through 
the ILO Recommendation 119 of 1963, the predecessor of ILO Convention 
158.3 From an economic point of view, however, the at-will rule is considered as 
a better rule, because rules on employment termination lead to costs in hiring 
and firing employees. Due its low costs, the at-will rule enables employers to 
make more profits, hence, benefits the economy.4 The answer to the question 
whether the at-will rule or the just cause rule is better, thus, depends on one’s 
economic or social point of view.5 Moreover, one must bear in mind that law 
makers may well recognize the positive aspects of an at-will or a just cause rule, 
but that they do not always have a choice to act upon at notice as a dismissal 
system is the outcome of specific social, historical or geographical conditions of 
the country.6 In fact, the Chapters 2 and 3 on American and Dutch dismissal 
law, respectively, show that only the analysis of other legal systems will 
recognize what is accidental rather than necessary, and what is permanent rather 
than changeable in legal norms.7
In this Chapter, I compare American and Dutch dismissal law in respect of just 
cause protection. Unlike a legal comparison (rechtsvergelijking) that generally 
focuses on the harmonization of legal rules, the underlying comparison will not
1  From OECD 2004 it derives that this applies to Anglo-saxon countries in general. See also 
Nagelkerke 2006, p. 483. 
2  For a same conclusion, see also OECD 2004, Chapter 2. See also TK 2004-2005, 30 109, No. 1, p. 39 
and 40. 
3  For ILO Convention 158, see below under § 21. See also Napier, Javillier and Verge 1982, p. 3. 
4  See above under § 1.1.2. See also Van den Heuvel 2000b, p. 361. 
5  For a discussion of the common law and the civil law system, see below under § 27.2. 
6  Van der Heijden 2000, p. 236. See also the Minister of Social Affairs in Notitie Ontwikkelingen en 
keuzes in het stelsel van werk en inkomen of 28 June 2006, p. 2 and 3. 
7  Sauveplanne 1981, p. 2; Bourgeois 1995, p. 25; De Cruz 1999, p. 3, 9 and 10; Zondag 2001, p. 323. 
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focus on the harmonization of legal rules. The different legal systems of the 
United States and the Netherlands, in fact, make a legal comparison virtually 
impossible. Hence, in furtherance of Heerma van Voss, who compared Japanese 
and Dutch dismissal law, I will speak of an illustrative comparison (illustratieve
vergelijking). In this respect, I will examine whether and what countries can 
learn from each other, regardless of their differences in cultural, geographical 
and legal aspects.8 Also, this comparison must serve a goal, however.  
 The primary goal of the underlying comparison is to describe American 
and Dutch dismissal law as a method of study.9 In 1992, Heerma van Voss 
already stressed the importance for the Netherlands to focus on the United 
States.10 As Heerma van Voss correctly states, the United States is an important 
competitor. Like the Netherlands, it is coping with the process of economic 
globalization, which has resulted in transnational law firms, the ever-growing 
influence of these corporations in foreign countries and the drafting of 
transnational contracts,11 making it necessary to become aware of the legal rules 
of these other countries involved in the process.12 Second, by looking at 
dismissal systems through the perspective of an ‘outsider’, the underlying 
illustrative comparison will help to (i) better understand one’s own dismissal 
system and that of the other; and (ii) realize that, regardless of the cultural, 
geographical and legal differences, the United States and the Netherlands might 
learn from each other in finding a new balance between flexible dismissal law 
for employers and just cause protection for employees.13 This Chapter examines 
whether both countries, despite of their differences, have enough in common to 
allow lessons to be drawn from comparison. Or as Blanplain emphasizes, 
countries may have chosen for different solutions on a same issue ‘such that one 
cannot help, but initiate the analysis and evaluation of one’s own system again, 
but now from another angle, from an enriched point of view, from a new 
insight.’14
27.2 The American common law and the Dutch civil law system  
The different families of legal systems refer to a set of deeply rooted historically 
conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, the role of law in the society and 
8  See Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 18. See also the Minister of Social Affairs in Notitie Ontwikkelingen 
en keuzes in het stelsel van werk en inkomen of 28 June 2006, p. 2 and 3. 
9  Sauveplanne 1981, p. 5; De Cruz 1999, p. 3; Zondag 2001, p. 323. 
10  See Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 20. At present, China is booming due to the process of economic 
globalization, which makes it also interesting to examine Chinese dismissal law, hence, this might 
induce other researchers to ‘illustratevely’ compare Dutch and Chinese dismissal law. See also 
Advocatenblad 2006/9, p. 394 and 395. 
11  De Cruz 1999, p. 21 and 22. 
12  Sauveplanne 1981, p. 2. See also Appendix I. 
13  Sauveplanne 1981, p. 3 and 4;  De Cruz 1999, p. 6. See also Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 18. 
14  Zondag 2001, p. 323, referring to Blanpain 1993, p. 4. See also Blanpain 2001, p. 4; De Cruz 1999,  
p. 9 and 10. 
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the political ideology, and the organization and operation of a legal system.15
Different distinctions between families of legal systems have been made.16 The 
most common distinction is between common law, civil law, and socialist 
countries. Countries, which are usually classified as common law jurisdictions 
are the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, England and Wales, 
Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong. Civil law countries, for example, include 
the Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Latin American countries, and 
Turkey. Socialist law jurisdictions include the former USSR, China and Cuba.17
It is generally agreed that the United States and the Netherlands do not belong to 
the same family of legal systems.18
 In the United States, English settlers implemented English common law,
which was developed by courts. It provided a large body of rules founded on 
unwritten customary law that had evolved and developed throughout the 
centuries with strong monarchs and centralized courts, being its typical 
features.19 In fact, from the beginning of the eleventh century, King William the 
Conqueror (1066-1087) prevented the triumph of Roman law in England. King 
Henry II (1154-1189) subsequently prevented a diversity of customary law. In 
this respect, he appointed so-called ‘justices in eyre’ to speak law on behalf of 
the King in cases, which involved the Crown. These judges had a great influence 
on the development of common law in England. In effect, three kings’ courts 
established English common law, i.e. (i) the Court of Exchequer, which handled 
tax issues; (ii) the Court of King’s Bench, which handled cases on interests that 
involved the Crown; and (iii) the Court of Common Pleas, which handled all 
other – civil – cases.20 Consequently, typical legal institutions in common law 
jurisdictions were – and still are – contract and tort principles.21 Kings’ courts 
initially traveled throughout the country, hence, common law reflected – and 
still reflects – ad hoc decisions, rather than a general principle or rule of law.22
In fact, federal judges in the United States – in accordance with the English 
common law system – still are appointed for life, contrary to judges on state 
level who are chosen for a number of years. The rationale behind chosen judges 
is that the public wishes to have a saying – other than through jury trials – on 
15  De Cruz 1999, p. 31. 
16  For example, a distinction has been made between the French and the German group. Under this 
distinction, the Netherlands belongs to the first, Japan to the second. For an in-depth discussion of the 
influence of German law on Japanese law, see Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 373 and 374. See also 
Sauveplanne 1981, p. 14, 74, 162 and 178. See further, De Cruz 1999, p. 3 and 31. Also, a(nother) 
distinction has been made between Romanistic, Germanic, Anglo-Saxon, Slavic and Islamic on the 
one hand, and Romanistic, Germanic, Nordic, Common Law Family, Socialist, Far Eastern Systems, 
Islamic Systems and Hindu law on the other. See Sauveplanne 1981, p. 18-20; De Cruz 1999, p. 32, 
referring to Esmein (1905) and Zweigert and Kotz (1977). 
17  De Cruz 1999, p. 32 and 33. 
18  De Cruz 1999, p. 3 and 31.  
19  See above under § 10.2. See also De Cruz 1999, p. 34. 
20  Sauveplanne 1981, p. 138-140; Uniken Venema/Zwalve 2000, p. 28-33. 
21  De Cruz 1999, p. 37. See also above under § 10.3. 
22  Sauveplanne 1981, p. 140. 
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those who apply the law, i.e. on those who rule over them. In this respect, a 
court decision, too, may include more opinions, i.e. concurring and dissenting 
opinions.23
In contrast, in the Netherlands, the reception of Roman law took place in the late 
Middle Ages, although its influence was already felt in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth century.24 Subsequently, in 1795, when Napoleon Bonaparte 
conquered the – former – Netherlands, the influence of French law was felt. 
When in 1808 Napoleon’s brother was appointed King of the new Kingdom of 
Holland, he, in effect, abolished Roman Dutch law, introducing Het Wetboek 
Napoleon ingerigt voor het Koningkrijk Holland. The French Civil Code, in 
turn, replaced the latter, in 1811. After the French had left in 1813, a new 
Kingdom of the Netherlands was established in 1815, after which the Dutch 
government – after the separation of Belgium in 1830 – in 1838, enacted its own 
civil codes. The Dutch government saw codification, introduced by the Romans 
and subsequently by the French, as an important means for the unification of 
rules and security on interpretation of these legal rules.25 Hence, the Netherlands 
generally is qualified as a civil law country. The civil law system, unlike the 
common law system, as De Cruz correctly states 
‘(…) reflects both the Roman law origins, strong influence of the French Civil 
Code and the subsequent influence of the German Civil Code. However, more 
significant has been the influence and reception of Roman law with a particular 
system. It was Roman law with its notions of codification, systematization of 
concepts into categories, principles and divisions of law which has left its 
lasting imprint on the French and German Codes. This was in stark contrast to 
common law adoption of substantive law principles, which developed in an ad 
hoc fashion, in response to the need to resolve disputes, whose development 
was largely dependent on disputants bringing their case to the courts. In 
general, there in fact is no common law legislative tradition which sought to 
reform or redress the law by means of the legislature, unlike the civil law 
system.’26
The common law and the civil law system explain why judge-made law has 
considerable weight in the American legal system, and statutory law in the 
Dutch legal system.27 These systems also explain that the at-will rule in the 
United States is judge-made law, and the just cause rule in the Netherlands has 
23  A concurring judge agrees with the majority, but not with its reasoning. In contrast, a dissenting  
judge disagrees with the majority. See Drion en De Savornin Lohman 1973, p. 25; Stolker 1992, p. 
33-44; Klik 1994, p. 17. 
24  For an in-depth discussion of the reception of Roman law in the Netherlands, see De Monte Verloren 
en Spruit 1982, p. 228-248. 
25  Sauveplanne 1981, p. 56; Bourgeois 1995, p. 26; Uniken Venema/Zwalve 2000, p. 27. See also C.J. 
Loonstra, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, Boek 7 Titel 10, Inleiding § 3. 
26  De Cruz 1999, p. 34 and 35. See also Bourgeois 1995, p. 2.  For an in-depth discussion of the 
historical development of the civil law system, see De Cruz 1999, p. 47-100. 
27  De Cruz 1999, p. 35. 
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been adopted by the legislature. Moreover, the common law and the civil law 
system clarify why American courts and the Dutch legislature, respectively, are 
generally considered as the appropriate instances to amend the at-will and the 
just cause rule in the United States and the Netherlands. Last, the common law 
system explains why the judge-made at-will rule in the United States – with 50 
states with their own law and court system – is only slowly developing towards 
a just cause rule. The distinction between common law and civil law countries is 
not black and white, however.  
For example, Roman emperors were in command of England – at the 
time, called Britannia – during five centuries.28 Also, common law and the civil 
law systems, in practice, overlap, in that legal systems continue to resemble each 
other in their use of sources of law.29 For example, in the United States 
discrimination law is given statutory force by federal and state legislatures.30
Nevertheless, the influence of English common law in the United States is still 
felt, although it has declined.31 In fact, three main English common law ideas, in 
fact, still dominate the American legal thought, i.e. (i) the concept of supremacy 
of law, best illustrated by the notion that statutory law is subject to judicial 
review; (ii) the tradition of precedent; and (iii) the notion of a trial as an 
adversarial, contentious proceeding, usually before the jury.32 In the 
Netherlands, the qualification of civil law country is not black and white either. 
In the Netherlands, statutory law has considerable weight, but may well be a 
codification of judge-made law.33 Hence, in understanding the legal rules of the 
United States and the Netherlands one must consider the influence of common 
law and civil law, respectively. However, it is only one aspect of the legal 
system. To understand American and Dutch dismissal law one – as took place in 
the Chapters 2 and 3 – must focus on all relevant aspects of the legal system, 
including its legal history, the institutions that are inherent to these legal 
systems, the legal hierarchy of law, and the political influence on these legal 
systems.34 Also, in understanding American and Dutch rules on employment 
termination, it is noteworthy to mention that the United States is a relatively 
young state compared to the Netherlands. 
28  Uniken Venema/Zwalve 2000, p. 26. 
29  De Cruz 1999, p. 39. 
30  See above under § 8. 
31  De Cruz 1999, p. 109. 
32  De Cruz 1999, p, 120. Sub (ii) also explains why American judges – still – apply the rule of stare 
decisis. De Cruz 1999, p. 119 and 120, referring to Atiyah and Summers (1991). 
33  For example, see Art. 7:667.4 DCC, providing a rule on a valid termination of an employment 
agreement for a definite period preceded by an employment agreement for an indefinite period. This 
rule is a codification of HR 4 april 1986, NJ 1987, 678 (Ragetlie/SLM). For an in-depth discussion of 
this rule, see Ostendorf 2004. See also Buijs en Heerma van Voss 1996, p. 286. 
34  Bourgeois 1995, p 45.  For example, the historical explanation of American jurisdictions is not only 
found in British, but also in French colonism. As a consequence, the state of Louisiana – as the only 
state in the United States – has a legal system that is based on Roman, Spanish, and French Civil Law 
as opposed to English Common Law . In fact, Louisiana retains a civil law legal sytem, based on the 
Louisian Civil Code , which is almost similar to the French Civil Code. See De Cruz 1999, p. 35. 
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27.3   Differences and bottlenecks regarding just cause protection 
The United States of America was established in 1787 by thirteen colonist 
states, with the potential to grow to fifty states.35 In this process of growth, 
Congress, in principle, felt no need to intervene in the relationship between 
employers and employees. Instead, the priority of the American federal 
government at the end of the nineteenth, and the beginning of the twentieth 
century, was to stimulate the relatively young economy. Although the American 
government was aware of the negative effects of the Industrial Revolution on 
workers, the bad working conditions mainly involved immigrants. The latter 
were not the government’s first concern.36 Nevertheless, under pressure of 
unions, the federal government started to enact protective labor laws. The 
Republican pro-business orientated US Supreme Court, in turn, frustrated the 
existence of these laws.37 Subsequently, when the US Supreme Court allowed 
protective labor laws – and Congress could regulate any subject matter, 
including that of employment termination protection – pressure from politically 
powered groups such as employers and attorneys-at-law kept national just cause 
legislation from enactment.38
Consequently, Congress left the issue of employment termination to 
state governments, which left the issue to the courts. These applied the at-will 
rule to employment agreements, which was attributed to H. Wood’s Treatise on 
the Law of Master and Servant of 1877.39 It is assumed that Wood’s 
understanding of the doctrine was well-suited to the needs of employers in the 
developing industrial and commercial society of his period, which might explain 
the popularity of the at-will rule.40 Under this rule, employers and employees are 
considered as equal parties to which general contract principles apply. The rule 
assumes a market transaction, a buyer and a seller of goods or services.41 The at-
will rule, in other words, denies the existence of unequal bargaining power 
between the employer and the employee.42 From this view, the at-will rule 
enables employers to run their businesses as they like, providing an unlimited
power to dismiss employees. Courts, too, approached the employment 
relationship from this economic point of view.43 In fact, courts still consider 
35  See above under § 5.1. 
36  See above under § 1.2.1. 
37  See below under § 28.1.1. 
38  See above under § 6.2. 
39  For Wood’s rule, see above under § 10.2. Subsequently, the US Supreme Court gave the at-will 
doctrine constitutional protection. For a discussion of Adair (1908), see below under § 28.1.1. 
40  Barber 1993, p. 3. Others argue that the doctrine reflected the dominant pattern of short term 
employment of that time. They, however, cannot explain why the at-will rule survived in times of 
long term employment as well. Summers 2000, p. 3. 
41  Finkin 1995, p. 171. See also above under § 10.3. 
42  Finkin 1995, p. 171. 
43  See above under § 10.2. 
345
employers and employees as parties with equal rights, in that an employer can 
dismiss an employee at will on the one hand, and employees can quit at any time 
on the other. These courts, however, ignore that employees generally do not 
wish to quit, but that they prefer job security.44 An important development for 
at-will employees in the United States, therefore, was when in the late 1970s, 
and early 1980s, a number of courts started to recognize just cause protection for 
these employees by applying modern contract principles.45 Already, federal and 
state governments had started to restrict the employer’s freedom of contract by 
making legislative exceptions to the at-will rule.46
In contrast, the Netherlands already had a flourishing economy at the time the 
United States of America was established. With the incorporation of the Dutch 
East India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie or VOC) in 1602 – in 
effect, being the world’s first multinational trading species and other consumer 
products worldwide – the Netherlands was fortunate to experience the Glory of 
the Golden Age, in which  Amsterdam would become the trade and financial 
center of the world. From an economic point of view, the Industrial Revolution 
in the nineteenth century meant a new boost for the economy, but not for 
workers. In fact, the Industrial Revolution reached its lowest point for Dutch 
workers at the end of the nineteenth century, a period better known as the 
‘Social Question’ (Sociale Quaestie).47 By means of the Act of the Employment 
Agreement of 1907, the Dutch government aimed to balance the unequal 
bargaining power between employers and employees.48 A hundred years later, 
the process of economic globalization, however, forced the Dutch government to 
look at dismissal law – again – from an economic point of view.49
 In conclusion, both the United States and the Netherlands cope with 
finding a new balance between flexibility of rules on employment termination 
for employers on the one hand, and just cause protection for employees on the 
other. In the United States, the main bottleneck is that courts still consider the 
employment agreement a contract like any other. In the Netherlands, the main 
bottleneck is that the government still considers the employment relationship as 
a special relationship. As derives from the first Chapter, the aim of this thesis is 
to make suggestions regarding bottlenecks in respect of just cause protection. 
However, before one is able to make suggestions, one needs to understand the 
different views on dismissal law by American courts and Dutch governments, 
and on the rules underlying these bottlenecks in particular. Therefore, in 
paragraph 28, I will first focus on dismissal law from a social-economic angle, 
discussing the economic point of view on dismissal law by American courts on 
44  Napier, Javillier and Verge 1982, p. 7; Finkin 1995, p. 171. See also under § 28.1.2. 
45  See above under § 10.4. 
46  See above under § 6.1. 
47  See above under § 1.2.1. 
48  See above under § 15.3.1. 
49  See above under § 15.3.3. See also below under § 29.2.2. 
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the one hand, and the social point of view on dismissal law by the Dutch 
government on the other. In paragraph 29, I will focus on dismissal law from a 
judicial-technical angle, discussing the legal rules which underlie the 
bottlenecks regarding just cause protection in the United States and the 
Netherlands, respectively.50
28   Differences due to different views on the employment relationship 
28.1 American dismissal law: economic view 
28.1.1    At-will rule: equal bargaining power 
By giving the at-will doctrine constitutional protection in Adair (1908), the US 
Supreme Court, in effect, affirmed that employers and employees have equal 
bargaining power. In question was the Erdman Act, which Act was passed by 
Congress in 1898. It applied to carriers engaged in interstate commerce and their 
employers, making it illegal for employers to dismiss employees on the basis of 
their participation in labor unions. Under the Act, ‘yellow dog’ contracts under 
which employees had to commit themselves not to join a union during the 
duration of the employment agreement, were considered as illegal as well.51 In 
this case, a representative of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, 
William Adair, had violated the Erdman Act by discharging a locomotive 
fireman who had joined a union. The issue on which the US Supreme Court had 
to decide was whether the Erdman Act violated the Fifth Amendment. The latter 
guarantees freedom of contract and property right, and prevents governments 
from depriving an individual of liberty or property without due process of law.52
On a 6-2 decision, the US Supreme Court held that the right to purchase or to 
sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this Amendment. In this respect, Jude 
Harlan, who delivered the opinion of the Court, held that 
‘The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in 
its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the 
conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell 
it. So the right of the employee to quit the service of the employer, for whatever 
reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to 
dispense with the services of such employee. It was the legal right of the 
defendant Adair (…) to discharge Coppage because of his being a member of 
labor organization, as it was the legal right of Coppage, if he saw fit to do so 
(…) to quit the service in which he was engaged because the defendant 
employed some persons who were not members of a labor organization.’53
50  For a same distinction, see also Zondag 2001, p. 324. 
51  For an in-depth discussion of  the  Erdman Act and the (in)validity of yellow dog contracts, see Stege 
2004, p 340, 347-352. 
52  See also above under § 5.2.1.1. 
53 Adair (1908), 208 U.S. 161, 175 and 176. 
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Moreover, the Adair Court held that any legislation that disturbs the equality 
between an employer and employee is an arbitrary interference with the liberty 
of contract, which no government can legally justify in a free land. Therefore, it 
considered the Erdman Act as unconstitutional for violating the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment. Second, it held that whereas Congress has a 
large discretion in the regulation of interstate commerce, it could not make it a 
crime against the United States to discharge the employee because of his being a 
member of a labor organization, which in its opinion had nothing to do with 
interstate commerce. More specifically, it argued that anyone who engages in 
the service of an interstate carrier would faithfully perform his duty whether he 
is a member, or not a member of a labor organization. It is the employee as a 
man, and not as a member of a labor organization who labors in the service of an 
interstate carrier.54
In contrast, the dissenting judges McKenna and Holmes argued that the 
liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is not a liberty, free from all 
restraints and limitations, e.g. it does not include the liberty to discriminate. As 
regards the Erdman Act, which prohibited discrimination or discharge of 
employed persons because of union membership by a carrier engaged in 
interstate commerce in the employment, McKenna added that relations of 
railroads with unions of railroad employees are closely enough connected with 
commerce to justify legislation by Congress and that, consequently, legislation, 
which prevents the exclusion of such unions is sufficiently near.55   
In effect, the decision in Adair (1908) reflected the consistent pro-business slant 
that the US Supreme Court would take until 1937.56 This changed when the 
Democratic President Roosevelt (1933-1945) and Congress, under pressure of 
the stock-market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 1930s, discussed 
the possibility of authorizing the President to appoint additional democratic 
justices to the Court to change the balance of power, i.e. to change the Court’s 
attitude towards the constitutional doctrine. Before Congress and the President 
could act, however, the US Supreme Court abandoned the constitutional 
doctrine.  
In West Coast Hotel (1937), the US Supreme Court overruled the 
holding in Adair (1908), making protective labor legislation possible.57 The US 
Supreme Court – in accordance with the dissenting judges in Adair (1908) – 
held that Congress under the Commerce Clause of the US Constitution has the 
power to regulate interstate commerce, including the power to enact all 
appropriate legislation for the protection of the public interest. Moreover, 
54 Adair (1908), 208 U.S. 161, 179 and 180. 
55 Adair (1908), 208 U.S. 161 (1908). See also Barber 1993, p. 3; Goldman 1996, p. 33. 
56  Between 1900 and 1937, Wilson was the only Democratic president (1913-1921). More specifically, 
the others were McKinley (1897-1901), Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909), Taft (1909-1913), Harding 
(1921-1923), Coolidge (1923-1929) and Hoover (1929-1933). 
57  Peck 1991, p. 3; Burnham 1995, p. 12 and 13; Jacobs 2003, p. 211, and p. 17, footnote 12,  referring 
to Levenbach 1926b, p. 93; Stege 2004, p. 341. 
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because the Fifth Amendment does not speak of freedom of contract,58 but of 
liberty without due process of law, it held that the US Constitution does not 
recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty. Instead, the Fifth Amendment 
refers to a liberty in a social organization, which requires the protection of law 
against the evils, menacing the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people. 
Hence, Congress can intervene in the relationship between employers and 
employees. In this respect, it held that 
‘The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with 
respect to bargaining power and are, thus, relatively defenseless against the 
denial of a living wage is detrimental to their health and well being. 
Subsequently, the community may direct its law-making power to correct the 
abuse which springs from disregard of the public interest.’59
Subsequently, it decided that Congress could establish minimum wages 
designed to counteract the unequal bargaining position of workers under the Act 
in question.60 Consequently, the US Supreme Court upholds protective labor law 
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin (1937). In question was the National Labor 
Relations Act, which was passed by Congress in 1935.61 The NLRA was 
challenged by Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation in its entirety as an attempt to 
regulate all industry, invading the reserved powers of the states over their local 
concerns. In brief, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) under the NLRA 
had ordered the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation to cease and desist from 
discrimination against members of the union with regard to hire, tenure and 
termination of employment, and intimidating its employees in order to interfere 
with their self-organization. When the NLRB ordered reinstatement to ten 
employees, the employer failed to comply. The NLRB petitioned the Circuit 
Court of Appeals to enforce the order, which, however, denied the petition, after 
which the US Supreme Court granted certiorari.  
The US Supreme Court held that the Act did not regulate all industry for 
it did not compel agreements between employers and employees. It stressed that 
the Act did not go further than to safeguard the right of employees to self-
organization and to select representatives of their own choosing for collective 
bargaining or other mutual protection, without restraint or coercion by their 
employer. Hence, a rule to prevent the free exercise of the right of employees to 
self-organization and representation in the opinion of the Court was a proper 
subject for condemnation by Congress, stressing the law-making power of 
Congress to correct the abuse by employers of the unequal position of 
employees. As regards the latter, it held that 
58 West Coast Hotel (1937), 300 U.S. 379, 399 and 400. See also Stege 2004, p. 363 and 364. 
59 West Coast Hotel (1937), 300 U.S. 379, 399 and 400. See also Stege 2004, p. 363 and 364. 
60 West Coast Hotel (1937), 300 U.S. 379, 391. 
61  For the NLRA (1935), see above under § 7.3. 
349
‘Long ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. We said that they were 
organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a single employee was 
helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was dependent ordinarily on his 
daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family; that, if the employer 
refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to 
leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union was 
essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their 
employer.’62
After Adair (1908) was overruled in 1937, the at-will rule, nonetheless, 
remained in place as the basic premise in the United States undergirding the 
employment relationship.63 For an outsider this is remarkable, because the US 
Supreme Court, in 1937, in effect, acknowledged that employees needed 
protection, due to their unequal position in the relationship with employers. The 
at-will rule denies this unequal position. The basic premise of the at-will rule, 
thus, at first sight seems inconsistent with labor law. Not surprisingly, opponents 
of the at-will rule generally refer to protective labor laws, stressing that the 
employment agreement is not a contract like any other, and special rules should 
apply.64 As demonstrated in Chapter 2, bottlenecks in the United States 
regarding just cause protection arise, because of the application of general 
contract principles to the employment agreement. Subsequently, the question 
that arises is ‘when general contract principles do not fit in the employment 
contract, must the employment relationship still be considered as a contractual 
relationship like any other, or rather as a relationship to which special rules must 
apply?’65
28.1.2 Discussion on special character of the employment relationship 
In the landmark case of Foley (1988), the California Supreme Court had to 
decide on whether the employment agreement was a special relationship. More 
specifically, the Foley Court had to decide on whether a breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing in the relationship between employers and 
employees could lead to tort damages, analogous to the relationship between an 
insurer and insured.66 The majority of courts, considering the insurance
relationship as a special relationship, argued that the insured typically has no 
ability to bargain for terms,  and is at the insurer’s mercy in case a claim is 
made. Hence, the insurer is in an automatically superior bargaining position.67
Consequently, the majority of jurisdictions, by finding a special relationship 
62 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin (1937), 300 U.S. 1, 30-32. See also above under § 7.3.1 and Stege 2004, 
p. 359. 
63  Peck 1991, p. 3; Goldman 1996, p. 33; Summers 2000, p. 1 and 3. 
64  See below under § 29.1.1. 
65  See also above under § 10.3. 
66  For an in-depth discussion of Foley (1988), see above under § 10.4.2.2. 
67  Rancourt 1996, p. 4. 
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between the insurer and the insured,68 has recognized a breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing to sound in tort in the insurance relationship.69 As 
this thesis reached its completion, the majority of states have not recognized the 
tort remedy for a breach of this covenant outside the insurance context. In 
contrast, the California Court of Appeal has recognized the tort remedy for 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment
relationship in Cleary (1980) and Koehrer (1986), inspired by Tameny (1980)
and Seaman’s (1984), respectively.  
 In Tameny (1980), the California Supreme Court held that the employee 
could recover tort damages in the employment context when a discharge 
violated public policy. In Seaman’s (1984), the California Supreme Court had 
carried the Tameny ruling one step further, in creating tort liability for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in commercial contracts.70
The impact of Seaman’s (1984) in the employment context was that the 
California Supreme Court in this decision made explicit reference to footnote 12 
of its decision in Tameny (1980). In this footnote, the California Supreme Court 
stated that past California cases held that breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing in the employment context could sound in tort as well as in 
contract, referring to insurance cases. Herewith, it had hinted that the 
employment agreement might be as special as insurance contracts. Inspired by 
footnote 12 in Tameny (1980), the California Court of Appeal decided Cleary 
(1980), permitting tort recovery for a breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing in the employment context.71 Subsequently, inspired by inspired by 
footnote 6 in Seaman’s (1984), it decided Koehrer (1986),72 allowing employees 
to claim tort damages based on breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, when being discharged intentional and done without probable cause 
while having fully performed and complied with all duties under the 
employment agreement.73 In  footnote 6 in Seaman’s (1984), the California 
Supreme Court held that  
‘In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) (…) footnote 12 (…) this court 
intimated that breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the 
employment relationship might give rise to tort remedies. That relationship has 
some of the same characteristics as the relationship between insurer and insured 
(…).’74
68  Davidow 1990, p. 3; Horvitz 1993, p. 4; Mijuskovic 1996, p. 14; Dodge 1999, p. 5 and 6. 
69 Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654 (1958); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 
425 (1967); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 620 P. 2d 141 (1979).
70 Seaman’s Direct Buying Service v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752 (1984).
71  Jung and Harkness 1989, p. 2,referring to footnote 5; Walker 1993, p. 3; McGowan 1998, p. 5. See 
also above under § 10.4.3.2. 
72 Foley (1988), 47 Cal.3d 654, 693.  
73  Macintosh 1994, p. 5 and 6. 
74  Jung and Harkness 1989, p. 6; Macintosh 1994, p. 5 and 6; Rancourt 1996, p. 2;  
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Again, but this time more explicit, the California Supreme Court in this footnote 
recognized that an employment relationship could be as special as the insurance 
relationship. The California Supreme Court in Foley (1988), however, declined 
to accept the suggestion that a special relationship, analogous between insurer 
and insured, should be deemed to exist in the employment relationship. It 
refused to award tort damages in case of a breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing in the employment context, emphasizing the traditional role of 
contract remedies and the need for predictability in commercial relationships.75
In brief, it argued that under a special – insurance – relationship  
x one of the parties to the contract enjoys a superior bargaining 
position, to the extent, that it is able to dictate the terms of the 
contract; 
x the purpose of the weaker party in entering into the contract is not 
primarily to profit, but rather to secure an essential service or 
product, financial security or peace of mind;  
x the relationship of the parties is such that the weaker party places its 
trust and confidence in the larger entity; and  
x there is conduct on the part of the defendant to frustrate the weaker 
party’s enjoyment of the contractual rights.
Subsequently, regarding the employment relationship it held that  
x a breach in the employment context did not place the employee in 
the same economic dilemma that an insured faces, because the 
insured cannot turn to the marketplace, while an employee 
presumably may seek alternative employment; 
x an employer, unlike an insurance company, does not sell economic 
protection; 
x an employee, unlike an insured, allegedly does not seek a different 
kind of financial security than those entering a typical commercial 
contract; and 
x insurance and employment contracts differ fundamentally, because 
the insured’s and insurer’s interests are financially at odds, while 
the employer’s and employee’s interests allegedly are most 
frequently in alignment.76
At first sight, the Foley Court seems to deny that an employee lacks dependency 
on the employer. On the other hand, one may argue that the Foley Court denies 
that an employee lacks the dependency of an insured to subscribe that tort
75  Grodin 1992, p. 2 and 3; Macintosh 1994, p. 7; Rancourt 1996, p. 10; McGowan 1998, p. 5. Dodge 
1999, p. 5. 
76 Foley (1988), 47 Cal. 3d 654, 719. See also Macintosh 1994, p. 7 and 8; Livoti and Manning 1996,  
p. 4. 
352
damages in case of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not 
the appropriate remedy in the employment context.77 What is without 
discussion, is that the Foley Court does not consider the employment agreement 
a special contract in this respect, but as a contract like any other.  
This view was not shared by all justices of the Foley Court, however. 
Broussard, Kaufman, and Mosk dissented from the court’s refusal to allow tort 
damages for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in wrongful 
discharge cases. They stated that the relationship between an employer and an 
employee is as special as the relationship between an insurer and insured, 
stressing that it is naive to believe that the availability of the marketplace, or that 
a supposed alignment of interests renders the employment relationship less 
special or less subject to abuse than the relationship between an insurer and 
insured.78 They stressed 
‘Whatever bargaining strength and marketability the employee may have at the 
moment of hiring diminished rapidly thereafter. Marketplace? What market is 
there for the factory worker laid off after 25 years of labor in the same plant, or 
for the middle-aged executive dismissed after 25 years with the same firm? 
Financial security? Can anyone seriously dispute that employment is generally 
sought, at least in part, for financial security and all that that implies: food on 
the table, medical car etc. Peace of mind? One’s work obviously involves more 
than just earning a living. It defines for many people their identity, their sense 
of self-worth, their sense of belonging.’79
In fact, the dissenting judges stated that they could not think of a relationship in 
which one party places more reliance upon the other, is more dependent upon 
the other, or is more vulnerable to abuse of the other, than the relationship 
between employer and employee. In their opinion, in no other relationship does 
the relative imbalance of economic power between employer and employees 
tend to increase, rather than diminish the longer that relationship continues. 
Also, an employee usually does not enter into an employment relationship solely 
for the money, but because a job is one of status, a way of defining one’s self-
worth and worth in the community as well. Hence, a job is central to one’s 
existence and dignity.80 In literature, too, one emphasizes that a contract of 
employment differs from an ordinary business contract, in that employees are 
unique individuals possessing distinct talents, strengths, and weaknesses, not 
merely inputs to production. Moreover, one refers to the fact that people earn the 
necessities of life, i.e. food, clothing and shelter by working. Therefore, the loss 
of a job is not only an economic catastrophe, but also a psychological and 
emotional disaster for the employee and his or her family.81
77  See Foley (1988),  47 Cal.3d 654, 690. 
78  Jung and Harkness 1989, p. 3. 
79 Foley (1988), 47 Cal. 3d 654, 719. See also McGowan 1998, p. 1. 
80 Foley (1988), 47 Cal. 3d 654, 709. 
81  McGowan 1998, p. 1 and 2. 
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The Foley Court was of another opinion, although it should be noted 
that the winds of political change just began to blow at the time of its decision. 
The California Supreme Court, headed by the liberal Chief Justice Rose Bird, at 
the time persistently overturned nearly all death verdicts. In 1986, angered by 
this apparent refusal to carry out the popular will, the public voted Chief Justice 
Bird and two other justices out of office. Consequently, in 1986, Governor 
George Dukemejian, an avowed conservative, appointed three new justices as 
replacements and elevated fellow conservative Justice Malcom Lucas to the 
position of Chief Justice.82 Not only did the court’s death penalty jurisprudence 
changed virtually overnight after the shift from a liberal to a conservative 
court,83 but the jurisprudence in civil cases as well. Foley (1988) is part of this 
significant imprint that Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas left on California 
jurisprudence.84 Not surprisingly, the Foley Court, too, mentioned that changing 
remedies was best left to the legislature as well. However, as the dissenting 
justices correctly stated, it is fundamentally illogical for the majority to abolish
an established judge-made tort remedy for the implied covenant in employment 
agreements, and then to argue that radical change in existing remedies is best 
left to the legislature.85 In Lazar (1996),86 the California Supreme Court, 
however, repeated that any extension of tort remedies for an implied covenant 
should come from the legislature and not the courts.87 A discussion on the 
appropriate remedy for a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
in the employment context, in fact, still continues.88 In my opinion, Grodin has a 
point that the way out of this dilemma ideally does not lie in the direction of 
choosing tort remedies over contract remedies, but rather by reframing and/or 
expanding the remedies of the employment agreement.89 Hence, the focus 
should not be on the question whether a good faith covenant constitutes a tort or 
breach of contract, but on the question whether the employment agreement 
should be considered a relationship to which special rules and remedies should 
apply, as in the Netherlands. 
28.2 Dutch dismissal law: social view 
28.2.1    From a general to a special contract 
In the Netherlands, Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code and the BBA 1945 
provide rules, which apply to the employment relationship. Besides, employees 
have a cause of action under general contract principles if the employer abuses 
82  Stolker 1992, p. 39; Macintosh 1994, p. 7. 
83  Jung and Harkness 1989, p. 2 and 3; Horvitz 1993, p. 3. 
84  Jung and Harkness 1989, p. 2 footnote 5; Walker 1993, p. 4; Rancourt 1996, p. 2 and 7. 
85  Walker 1993, p. 6. 
86 Lazar v. Superior Court, 909 P.2d 981 (Cal. 1996).
87  McGowan 1998, p. 5 and 6. 
88  See above § 10.4.3.2. 
89  Grodin 1992, p. 3. 
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its economic power to force the employee to close an agreement.90 For an 
outsider this is remarkable. This general contract principle, however, was not yet 
law in 1907. It was then when the legislature enacted the Act of the Employment 
Agreement, the predecessor of Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code, which, 
in turn, replaced a summary regulation on master and servants (huur van 
dienstboden en werklieden), i.e. the Articles 1637 to 1639 of the Dutch Civil 
Code of 1838.91 These Articles, with the exception of Article 1639 which 
derived from Dutch ancient custom law (oud-vaderlands recht) and was 
introduced in 1838, were copies of the French Code Civil and had been 
introduced in the Dutch Civil Code in 1811.92
 The reason to enact the Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907 was 
due to the deficiencies of this summary regulation. Under the latter, employees 
who had a contract for an indefinite period could be dismissed with or without 
cause, or even for a bad cause.93 The Dutch government was aware of this 
deficiency, however, followed a so-called ‘laissez-fair, laissez-aller’ policy and, 
in principle, did not wish to intervene in contractual relationships between 
citizens. Citizens – including employers and employees – were considered as 
equals who were perfectly able to regulate their own affairs in relation to one 
another.94 This attitude towards employers and employees changed when 
complaints on abuse of employees by employers reached the government, after 
the Lower House of Parliament had installed a Parliamentary Committee on 13 
October 1886. After this Committee had registrated abuse of employers on 27 
July 1887, the government installed a State Committee on 19 January 1890 to 
investigate these abuses. In January 1894, the Committee submitted its report to 
the government. Subsequently, based on depositions, which Section committees 
had held with employees and experts throughout the Netherlands, the State 
Committee delivered proof that, in practice, employees were unable to negotiate 
on an equal basis with their employers.95 For example, the results for the North-
Eastern part of the Netherlands showed that  
90  See Art. 44.4 of Book 3 Title 2 of the Dutch Civil Code. See also Hijma 1988,  p. 125 and 126. 
Hartlief 1997, p. 225, referring to the rules on vitiated consent in general (wilsgebreken); Van 
Heusden 2006, p. 80 and 81, referring to HR 5 februari 1999, NJ 1999, 652 (Ameva/Van Venrooij). 
See also Van Eck 2001.
91  Bles I, 1907, p. 221. 
92  Bles I, 1907, p. 1; Cornelissens 1959, p. 34-36; Kuip 1993a, p. 15-21;  C.J. Loonstra, Losbladige 
Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, Boek 7 Titel 10, Inleiding § 3.1; Loonstra en Zondag 2004, 
p. 53. 
93  See also Handelingen NJV 1894, I, p. 181. For the deficiencies, see also above under § 15.3.1. 
94  Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 31. See also C.J. Loonstra, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, 
Deventer, Boek 7 Titel 10, Inleiding § 3.2. 
95  The installment of the State Committee took place by Stb. 19 January 1890, No. 1. See 
Arbeidsenquete 1893, p. 1; Handelingen NJV 1894, I, p. 198; Bles I, 1907, p. 1; Meijers 1912, p. 57; 
C.J. Loonstra, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, Boek 7 Titel 10, Inleiding §  3.1. 
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x an obligation to respect a notice period was generally lacking, and 
when agreed upon these periods were very short;  
x factory regulations (fabrieksreglementen) that included a notice 
period could be amended by employers whenever it suited them; 
and
x employees were often dismissed without cause or even for a bad 
cause.
The State Committee concluded that these social abuses were a result of the 
poor regulation on master and servants in the Dutch Civil Code of 1838. In its 
opinion, the regulation needed to be replaced by an act that would provide 
specific rights and obligations of those working on the basis of an employment 
agreement.96 This proposal to replace the Articles 1637 to 1639 was in 
accordance with the opinion of academics gathered in the Netherlands
Association of Legal Academics and Practitioners (Nederlandse Juristen 
Vereniging or NJV),97 and with the public opinion in general.98 Already, Cohen 
Stuart in his Preliminary Advice (Preadvies), addressing to the NJV, had 
stressed that the Articles 1637 tot 1639, in effect, were dead letters. Article 1637 
aimed to prevent slavery, and Article 1638 assumed that the employer in all 
circumstances could be taken on his word. Furthermore, Article 1639 required 
of a master, who wished to terminate an employment agreement for a definite
period before the expiry date, a just cause for dismissal. However, employees 
generally were hired per hour, per day or per week, hence, this Article was 
without effect as well.99
The government could not deny the abuse of employees by employers, and saw 
it as its task to protect the weak. Therefore, it felt it had no other choice than to 
undertake action. An option was to replace the summary regulation by a cause of 
action under general contract principles, allowing a party to have an agreement 
declared void when the other abused his economic power to force one to close 
an agreement. Another option was to replace the summary regulation by an in-
depth regulation that would entail rights and obligations of employees working 
on the basis of an employment agreement. The government chose for the latter. 
In this respect, it followed the State Committee, which had held that a more 
extensive regulation would be more efficient to prevent abuse.100 To justify that 
96  Arbeidsinspectie 1893, p. 95 and 96; Bles I, 1907, p. 1; Canes 1908, p. 7. 
97  The NJV, the only one of its kind, was an association, which was established in 1870 as a forum for 
legal academics and practitioners to discuss on legal affairs. See Handelingen NJV 1894, I, p. 199; II,  
p. 100. 
98  Bles I, 1907, p. 1; Meijers 1912, p. 3. 
99  Handelingen NJV 1894, I, p. 267. See also Verhulp 2003b, p. 291 referring to H.P.G. Quack, De 
socialisten, deel VI, Amsterdam 1921, p. 446. See further above under § 15.3.1. 
100  Bles I, 1907, p. 221, 225 and 226. See also Verhulp 2003b, p. 291; C.J. Loonstra, Losbladige 
Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, Boek 7 Titel 10, Inleiding § 3.2. 
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the employment relationship required special rules, the government held that the 
employment relationship distinguishes itself from a regular contractual 
relationship, in that  
x labor is not a commodity like any other good that can be traded for 
money as it is part of the person of the employee;101
x it generally is the only means for an employee to earn a living;  
x the latter makes the employee dependent of an employer in 
economic and societal aspects; with the loss of a job he loses his 
income, but this also affects his status; and  
x the employee’s dependent position requires protection against 
abuse of the employer.  
Although in other relationships one party, too, might be dependent on the other, 
in the government’s opinion, it was not as constantly present on the side of one 
party as in the relationship between the employer and the employee.102 In Foley 
(1988), the dissenting judges, in effect, had brought forward the same 
argument.103 Unlike the Foley Court, the Dutch government recognized the 
employee’s economic and societal dependence on the employer,104 and adopted 
special rules to protect an employee against employer’s abuse in virtually all
aspects.
This raises the question which rules apply in the Netherlands, when special rules 
under Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code are lacking. The principal rule 
under Dutch (employment) law is that special rules prevail over general contract 
principles.105 They, however, do not set aside general contract law as a whole, as 
it is virtually impossible for the legislature to regulate the employment 
relationship in all aspects in advance.106 In fact, general contract principles are 
needed besides special rules. A good example is Sijthoff/Ouwerkerk (1996).107 In 
this case, the BBA 1945 applied to the publisher and the freelancer. The 
freelance contract did not meet the requirements of an employment agreement. 
Hence, when the public authority refused a permit, the contract could not be 
dissolved under Article 1639w (Article 7:685 DCC). The Netherlands Supreme 
Court hereupon held that the contract could be dissolved under the general 
101  See also Fokker, Handelingen NJV 1894, I, p. 175 and 176. 
102  Meijers 1924, p. 17; C.J. Loonstra, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, Boek 7 
Titel 10, Inleiding § 3.3. 
103  See above under § 28.1.2. 
104  See below under § 28.2.2. See also Levenbach 1934, p. 19; Verhulp 2003b, p. 291. 
105  Loonstra 2003, p.37. 
106  Van den Berg en Zondag 2003, p. 4 and 404. See also Hartlief 1997, p. 232. 
107  HR 8 november 1996, NJ 1997, 217, JAR 1996/249 (Sijthoff/Ouwerkerk). For a discussion of cases 
in which employees invoke general contract principles in the employment context, see Konijn 2000. 
See also Van der Heijden 1993b. 
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contract principle of Article 6:258 DCC.108 This raises another question. 
Suppose, the application of general contract principles contrast with the special 
character of the employment agreement. A good example is case law on the 
validity of conditions subsequent (ontbindende voorwaarde). In brief, the 
application of the general contract principle of Article 6:21 DCC in the 
employment relationship frustrates the protective rules under the dual dismissal 
system. In reply, the Netherlands Supreme Court adjusted the general contract 
principle to fit into the employment context,109 taking the special character of 
the employment agreement into consideration.110
 This, in turn, raises the question if a Labour Code, setting aside general 
contract principles that conflict with the special character of the employment 
relationship, would not be a better alternative, as Loonstra suggested in the past. 
In this respect, Loonstra referred to the status aparte of the employment 
relationship in which the employee makes his labor and person subservient to 
the employer.111 Like Loonstra, Levenbach, too, in 1926, spoke of a status 
aparte of the employment relationship, referring to its personal character, 
however, not in the same sense as Loonstra. Rather, he thought of the 
recognition of employment law as a separate field of law, not as separate rules 
setting aside general contract principles per se that are contrasting with the 
special character of the employment agreement.112
Initially, Drucker was indifferent about whether the special rules on the 
employment agreement became part of the Civil Code or were enacted as a 
separate act.113 Eventually, Drucker agreed with the government – and the 
majority in Parliament114 – in that the rules on the employment relationship 
would be part of the Civil Code, being a private contract in the first place, to 
which primarily special rules, and subsidiary general contract principles 
applied.115 A few members of the Upper House, on the other hand, considered it 
as illogical to include the rules on the employment agreement in the Civil Code. 
The premise of general contract law was that parties were equal. In contrast, the 
premise of the rules, which would apply to the employment agreement, was that 
parties were unequal.116 Hence, they preferred a separate act containing private 
and public rules, which would apply to the employment agreement. With the 
majority, however, they agreed that general contract principles would apply 
108  For an in-depth discussion of concurrence (samenloop of cumulatie), alternativity (alternativiteit) and 
exclusivity (exclusiviteit) of general and special rules, see Ingelse 1993; Van Slooten 1999, p. 20-24 
and 34; Konijn 1999; Konijn 2000, p. 154.  
109  For an in-depth discussion of case law on conditions subsequent, see  above under § 15.3.1. 
110  See also Konijn 1999, p. 304 and 308, stressing that this is not always the case. 
111  Loonstra 2003, p. 52 and 53. See also Canes 1908, p. 5-7. 
112  Levenbach 1926a, p. 28 and 29. See also Levenbach 1966a, p. 9. 
113  Bles I, 1907, p. 109. 
114  Bles I, 1907, p. 113 and 114. 
115  Bles I, 1907, p. 111. 
116  Bles I, 1907, p. 120. 
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when special rules were lacking.117 In accordance with legislative history, the 
ongoing practice of courts is to apply primarily special rules, and subsidiary
general contract principles.  
With Loonstra, De Laat, a  Cantonal Judge, acknowledges that when 
special rules lack for the employment agreement, it is insecure how courts will 
apply the general contract principle, but in his opinion this does not justify a 
Labour Code as suggested by Loonstra.118 I agree with De Laat. To his 
argument(s), I add that under Loonstra’s proposal a court – generally the 
Cantonal Court – must establish a new rule of law if it finds the general contract 
principle contrasting with the special character of the employment agreement. 
The first problem that arises is that a discussion may evolve on whether the 
general contract principle contrasts with the special character of the employment 
agreement. Moreover, when the case is brought before the Cantonal Court under 
a 7:685 DCC procedure, appeal is excluded. Therefore, in light of legal 
certainty, I advocate that the Dutch legislature only is the appropriate authority 
to establish, and to supervise rules on employment termination.119 Only when 
decisions of courts interpreting a general contract principle continue to lead to 
legal uncertainty, should the legislature in my opinion make a special rule. This 
brings me to the question whether this rule should be mandatory (dwingend) or 
permissive (regelend).
28.2.2 Mandatory law: balancing unequal bargaining power 
The Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907 held full mandatory law (vol-
dwingend recht), semi mandatory law (semi-dwingend recht), and permissive 
law (regelend recht). The majority of provisions on employment termination – in 
total twenty – were full(y) mandatory.120 In effect, these rules replace the will of 
parties. For a justification for the government to intervene to this extent, Loth 
states that this may be justified for three reasons (1) to protect the weak; (2) to 
safeguard the public interest; and/or (3) to protect the interests of third parties.121
With the Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907, the Dutch government 
particularly wished to protect the weak employee.122 In this respect, it invoked 
the principle of balancing unequal bargaining power (beginsel van 
ongelijkheidscompensatie) to justify full mandatory law,123 allowing parties to 
117  Bles I, 1907, p. 124 and 125. See also Van Slooten 1999, p. 14-16. 
118  De Laat 2003b, p. 313 and 314. See also Van Slooten 1999, p. 19 and 20; Heerma van Voss 2004,  
p. 117 and 118. 
119  For an in-depth discussion of the trias politica, and the role of the court within this system, I refer to 
Broers en Van Klink 2001, and Broers en Jacobs 2003. 
120  For an in-depth discussion of the legislative history of the Act of the Employment Agreement of 
1907, see above under § 15.3.1. 
121  Loth 2000, p. 41-47. 
122  Van Peijpe 1999, p. 364; Verhulp 2003b, p. 289 and 290. 
123  For an in-depth discussion of this principle in the employment relationship, see the contributions of 
I.P. Asscher-vonk, LH. van den Heuvel, P.F. van der Heijden and A.T.J.M. Jacobs to the Liber 
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deviate in favor of the employee only (gunstigheidsbeginsel).124 The principle of 
balancing unequal bargaining power aims to guarantee the economically and 
socially weaker employee from being abused by the employer on the one hand, 
and to provide private-sector employees a minimum level of protection on the 
other.125
Besides, the Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907 held semi 
mandatory law and permissive law.126 The legislature did not make this 
distinction, i.e. qualified these rules as such. Instead, the qualification of semi 
mandatory law had been made by Scholten in 1931, placing the rules between 
full mandatory law and permissive law.127 In brief, semi mandatory law allows 
parties to deviate from permissive rules, however, in writing only (eis van 
geschrift). The rationale behind this requirement was to make employees aware 
of a deviation of the permissive rule. By introducing semi mandatory law, the 
government acknowledged that employees needed protection on the one hand, 
but that both parties, in practice, might wish to deviate from the rule in question 
on the other.128 The aim of permissive rules was to provide rules when parties 
had not made arrangements of their own. Hence, parties are allowed to deviate 
from these rules, verbally or in writing.129
In time, unions and Works Councils started to play an important role in 
determining terms of employment. Subsequently, the government started to 
recognize unions – and to a certain extent, Works Councils – as equal bargaining 
parties of employers.130 Consequently, three-quarters mandatory law 
(driekwart-dwingend recht) was introduced with the Act of 1953, which allowed 
collective bargaining parties – only – to deviate by a collective bargaining 
agreement from the rules in question.131 The qualification of three-quarters 
mandatory law was not made by the legislature either, but by Levenbach, in 
1954, placing this type of law between fully mandatory law and semi mandatory 
law.132 In general, the rationale for the government to choose for three-quarters 
mandatory law is to offer employers the possibility to adapt the rules in question 
Amicorum of M.G. Rood, Ongelijkheidscompensatie als roode draad in het recht, L. Betten (red.), 
Kluwer, Deventer, 1997. 
124  TK 1996-1997, 25 426, No. 1, p. 4 and 5; EK 1999-2000, No. 222a, Notitie (zelf) regulering, p. 2.  
See also Franssen en Jacobs 2006, p. 114. 
125  Bles I, 1907, p. 212.  
126  See also Heerma van Voss 2005b, p. 121. 
127  Scholten 1931, p. 30. See also Loth 2000, p. 4 and 5. 
128  TK 1996-1997, 25 426, No. 1, p. 6; Van Arkel en Loonstra 2004, p. 12.14. 
129  TK 1996-1997, 25 426, No. 1, p. 6; EK 1999-2000, No. 222a, Notitie (zelf) regulering, p. 2; Bles I, 
1907, p. 212. See also Heerma van Voss 2005b, p. 121. 
130  TK 1996-1997, 25 426, No. 1, p. 5 and 6; EK 1999-2000, No. 222a, Notitie (zelf) regulering, p. 4.  
For the the pivotal role unions play as counterpary of the employee, see also Jacobs 1986, p. 301; 
Buijs en Heerma van Voss 1996, p. 288; Loonstra 1997, p. 29; Heerma van Voss 2005b, p. 121 and 
126; Grapperhaus 2006, p. 33-36; De Ly 2006, p. 13. 
131  Heerma van Voss 2005b, p. 128. For the Act of 1953, see above under § 15.3.2. 
132  Levenbach 1954, p. 18. See also Heerma van Voss 2005b, p. 121 and 122. 
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to the operation of the enterprise on the one hand, and to avoid that parties set 
aside the protection of employees relatively easily on the other.133
Last, two-thirds or five-eights mandatory law (tweederde of vijfachtste 
dwingend recht) was introduced with the Working Time Act of 1996 
(Arbeidstijdenwet or ATW). Under this Act, standard clauses apply, unless 
parties are allowed under deliberations clauses (overlegbepalingen) to deviate – 
within certain margins – from these standards through so-called collective 
agreements. For purposes of the ATW, collective agreements refer to collective 
bargaining agreements, and enterprise agreements (ondernemingsovereenkomst)
between the employer and the Works Council (Ondernemingsraad).134
Consequently, in the literature, this type of law has been qualified as two-thirds 
or five-eights law.135 In the near future, this dual standard system will only apply 
to just a few provisions of the Act.136
I wish to stress that the introduction of mandatory law in the Act of the 
Employment Agreement of 1907 was not without discussion. In its meetings on 
31 August and 1 September 1894, the NJV had a discussion on the issue of 
mandatory law in the employment relationship, initially concentrating on three 
questions. The first was whether the freedom of contract between employers and 
employees should be unlimited. If not, the second question was which rules 
needed to be mandatory. Third, the question was which remedies needed to 
apply if parties violated these mandatory rules. The members of the NJV 
eventually decided not to vote on the second question. Nevertheless, the 
arguments in favor of, and against mandatory law remain interesting to look at, 
because these are still used to justify the existence of mandatory rules or its 
abolishment.137 It bears mentioning, that Fokker, Heldt and Mouton, all 
members of the NJV, had already advised the Corporation Promoting Machinery 
and Manual Work in the Netherlands (Vereeniging tot bevordering van 
Fabrieks- en Handwerksnijverheid in Nederland) on this matter. Subsequently, 
in the meetings of the NJV of 1894, the findings of the Reporters were included, 
accompanied with a Memorandum of Fokker, in which he stressed that the 
Reporters had approached the assignment by the Corporation from an economic 
point of view.138 From this point of view, they had concluded that the legislature 
should only intervene in the relationship between employers and employees 
when necessary in light of the public interest. In fact, the less intervention, the 
133  TK 1996-1997, 25 426, No. 1, p. 5 and 6; EK 1999-2000, No. 222a, Notitie (zelf) regulering, p. 2. 
134  TK 1996-1997, 25 426, No. 1, p. 6; Van Arkel en Loonstra 2004, p. 12.14; Heerma van Voss 2005b, 
p. 124, 125 and 128. See also EK 2000-2001, 00033, No. 229, p. 5. 
135  See EK 2000-2001, 00033, No. 229, p. 5; Heerma van Voss 2005b, p. 128. 
136  As this thesis reached its completion, a Bill was pending to abolish this dual standard system, with 
the exception of a few provisions. For these exceptions, see TK 2005-20006, 30 532, No. 3, p. 7 and 
No. 6, p. 9, referring to SER-Advies 2003/3. 
137  See also above under § 1.1.2. 
138  Handelingen NJV 1894, I, p. 173. 
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better.139 In this respect, the Reporters had stated that rules frustrated the 
employer’s operation and competition position.140
In his Memorandum, Fokker now approaches the issue from a social
point of view. From this point of view, he concludes that, due to its personal 
character, special rules should apply to the employment relationship.141 Second, 
he advocates that in making these rules, the legislature must make mandatory 
rules when the principle of freedom of contract leads to dangerous situations, 
causing harm to the public.142 Cohen Stuart, in his Preliminary Advice, adds that 
mandatory rules in the employment relationship, in effect, already exist, but 
generally to protect women and children only.143 To the extent protective rules 
lack for adult men, this in his view can be called odd when they work under bad 
circumstances, hence, need protection against employers as well.144 ‘What 
reason, he wonders, is there for protecting women and children against the abuse 
of the employer, and not to use the same argument for adult men?’145 Cohen 
Stuart recognizes that employers have valid arguments in opposing mandatory 
rules, because the total costs generally will increase. On the other hand, the 
government can and must limit the freedom of contract when this is necessary to 
safeguard the welfare of the public, he states.146 In enacting mandatory rules, the 
government’s task is to find a balance between the interests of the employer on 
the one hand, and the interests of the employees on the other.147 Consequently, 
his advice is to primarily enact permissive rules, allowing parties to deviate from 
the rule in question,148 and to enact mandatory law only when permissive rules 
turn out to be ineffective.149
The members within the NJV react differently to the Memorandum, and the 
Preliminary Advice. Advocates of mandatory law, in principle, are Levy, Eyssell 
and Tripels. They stress that employees, who for their existence have nothing 
more than their labor to rely on, and, in practice, are at the will of the employer 
must be protected against abuse of employers.150 Eyssell, however, warns that 
the legislature must prevent employees from abusing their economically weaker 
position.151 Coninck Liefsting does not oppose mandatory law per se either, but 
prefers permissive rules, in that too many mandatory rules may weaken the 
139  Handelingen NJV 1894, I, p. 203 and 256. 
140  Handelingen NJV 1894, I, p. 255. 
141  Handelingen NJV 1894, I, p. 176. 
142  Handelingen NJV 1894, I, p. 178. 
143  Handelingen NJV 1894, I, p. 268-273. 
144  Handelingen NJV 1894, I, p. 273. 
145  See also Bles I, 1907, p. 125. 
146  Handelingen NJV 1894, I, p. 275-277 and 285. 
147  Handelingen NJV 1894, I, p. 279. 
148  Bles I, 1907, p. 212. 
149  Handelingen NJV 1894, I, p. 287-289. 
150  Handelingen NJV 1894, II, p. 19 and 55. 
151  Handelingen NJV 1894, II, p. 33 and 34. 
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competitive position of the employer.152 Stern, too, stresses that mandatory rules 
may frustrate the employer in his operation.153 Tripels and De Pinto agree with 
Drucker.154 The latter, who would eventually become the ‘founding father’ of 
the Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907, and was already preparing 
drafts for the Minister of Justice at the time,155 states that the question should not 
be whether the legislature needs to enact mandatory rules. In fact, the first step 
must be whether the legislature must enact rules for the employment agreement. 
In this respect, he states that the legislature had done so for other relationships, 
e.g. purchase agreements, hence, there is no reason to withhold action as regards 
employment agreements. Second, the legislature must ask itself with every rule 
whether permissive or mandatory law suffices. If the legislature wishes to 
prevent that the rule will become a dead letter, it must apply mandatory law.156
Hereupon, the members of the NJV unanimously voted in favor of 
special rules for the employment agreement. They did not vote on the question 
which rules should be mandatory. They admitted that the answer was virtually 
impossible to give, as Drucker had stressed.157 What was important for the 
government, was that there was general agreement on government’s intervention 
in the employment relationship, and also through mandatory law, when 
necessary for the employee’s welfare.158
A debate within Parliament on mandatory law in the employment relationship 
took place in discussions on the Bill, underlying the Act of the Employment 
Agreement of 1907. Particularly, members of the Upper House opposed 
mandatory law, objecting to the general assumption that an employee is the 
economically weak party per se, hence, all need to be protected against the 
economic strong(er) employer. They held that an employee’s economic 
dependence on the employer, in general, is determined by the supply and 
demand of employees.159 The government, however, replied that employees, in 
practice, generally have no other choice than to agree upon the employer’s 
terms, because they are dependent on the employer for their income. Employees 
who reject the terms will not be hired. For the employer, on the other hand, it 
will be relatively easy to find another employee, regardless of the supply and 
demand of employees.160
 In the Upper House, Van Houten opposed the fact that the legislature 
wished to enact mandatory law in the employment relationship in almost every
aspect. He argued that the legislature with mandatory law, in effect, aimed to 
152  Handelingen NJV 1894, II, p. 41. 
153  Handelingen NJV 1894, II, p. 50 and 51. 
154  Handelingen NJV 1894, II, p. 55-58. 
155  See above under § 15.3.1. 
156  Handelingen NJV 1894, II, p. 42-47. 
157  Handelingen NJV 1894, II, p. 100-103. 
158  See Drucker, Handelingen NJV 1894, II, p. 99. 
159  Bles I, 1907, p. 219 and 220. 
160  Bles I, 1907, p. 228 and 299. 
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punish the employer for making profits to the detriment of employees. He 
noticed that it is inherent to any relationship which involves a financial trade-
off, that one party aims to make profits to the detriment of the other.161 Van der 
Feltz, on the other hand, stressed that the discussion should not see to more or 
less mandatory rules, but to its justification, which in his opinion laid in the 
protection of the economic weaker employee.162 The Minister of Justice, Van 
Raalte, agreed with Feltz, and held that the employee, in general, is the 
economically weaker party, hence, it in fact is superfluous to have a discussion 
on this.163 Van Houten, however, objected, stating that not all employees are in 
an economic weak position, i.e. need protection of the government through 
mandatory law, referring to an employee who has a choice between working for 
an employer or for himself.164 In reply, Van Raalte held that those who work in 
service of the employer are economically dependent and need protection through 
mandatory rules against abuse of the employer.165 In fact, referring to De 
Courcy, the government was of the opinion that mandatory rules only could 
prevent an employer from abusing the employee, as permissive rules, in 
practice, could be contracted away.166
The legislature partly met Van Houten’s objection to apply mandatory law to all
employees. Already in his drafts, Drucker had made a distinction between 
employees, based on the height of their salary. For example, Article 1638l of the 
Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907 held a rule on the moment of 
payment of salary. When the employee earned less than four Dutch florins per 
day, an employer had to pay out salary ultimately after two weeks. When an 
employee earned more, parties themselves could decide on this moment.167 In 
this respect, the legislature had recognized that in certain aspects employees 
with a high salary were less economically dependent on employers than those 
with an average salary. This distinction as regards the moment of payment no 
longer exists.168
On the other hand, the successor of Article 1637u, Article 7:650 DCC – 
providing a rule on penalty clauses in employment agreements – still makes a 
distinction between employees based on the height of salary. The only 
difference compared to 1907, is regarding the height of salary. In 1909, the 
height of salary was set on four Dutch florins per day in Article 1637u. As this 
thesis reached its completion, the height in Article 7:650 DCC has been set on 
the minimum wage. In brief, for those who earn more than the minimum wage, 
161  Bles I, 1907, p. 219 and 220. 
162  Bles I, 1907, p. 229. 
163  Bles I, 1907, p. 230 and 231. 
164  Bles I, 1907, p. 234 and 235. 
165  Bles I, 1907, p. 235 and 236. 
166  Bles I, 1907, p. 212. See also Verhulp 2003b, p. 292. 
167  For an in-depth discussion of Art. 1638l, see Meijers 1912, p. 125-127. See also Canes 1908, p. 216 
and 217. 
168  See its successors, i.e. Art. 7:623 and 624 DCC. 
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permissive rules apply.169 This raises the question whether mandatory rules, in 
general, should not be converted into permissive – or less mandatory170 – rules 
for all employees earning more than a certain wage. 
28.2.3 Discussion on the existence of unequal bargaining power 
The government eventually chose to apply the rules of the Act of the 
Employment Agreement of 1907 to all employees in service of the employer.171
Thus, mandatory rules applied, regardless of whether the employee in question
was economically and socially dependent, or whether the employer in question
was economically stronger and socially independent.172 The reason to choose for 
a general act was based on the thought that employees in service of employers, 
in general, were dependent of these employers. One will not deny that, in 1907, 
employees were working under extreme bad working conditions, and not in the 
position to determine their own terms.173 The employee of 2007, however, 
differs from the employee of 1907. In a period of a hundred years the employee 
partly determines his own terms. This has raised the question whether 
employees are still parties with unequal bargaining power, i.e. whether 
mandatory rules in the employment relationship are still necessary.174
Apparently, the government thinks they are. The number of mandatory rules in 
Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code has increased rather than decreased in a 
period of hundred years.175
 In 1972, Van der Ven already stressed to reconsider the rules on 
employment termination in light of the employee’s (in)dependency on 
employers.176 In this respect, Jacobs, in 1994, stressed that the premise of 
unequal bargaining power no longer existed for the majority of employees, 
pointing out that in 1907 only a small minority of employees were subject to 
collective bargaining agreements. In 1994, he stressed, the majority were subject 
to collective bargaining agreements, hence, unions were able to bargain on 
behalf of employees with the employer.177 Also, he suggested that employees 
who earned more than 150.000 Dutch Florins, about 70.000 Euro, or with a 
university degree should be excluded from Book 7 Title 10 DCC – he does not 
speak of the BBA 1945 – and, instead, should become subject to general 
169  See Art. 7:650.6 DCC. For an in-depth discussion of Art. 1637u, see Meijers 1912, p 124-128. 
170  See Heerma van Voss 2005b, p. 126, suggesting to reconsider a conversion of fully mandatory rules 
into three-quarters mandatory rules. 
171  Bles I, 1907, p. 132. See also Koopmans 1962, p. 78-86; Verhulp 2003b, p. 292-294. 
172  Bles I, 1907, p. 139-141; Koopmans 1962, p. 78. See also Hondius 1999, p. 389; Lindenbergh 1999, 
p. 411. 
173  See above under § 1.2.1. See also Verhulp 2003b, p. 289. 
174  See also Verhulp 2003b, p. 297. 
175  See Heerma van Voss 2005b, p. 125. See also below under § 28.2.3.  
176  Van der Ven (1) 1977. See also Van den Heuvel 2002, p. 238. 
177  Jacobs 1994, p. 1039 and 1040. In 1997, on the other hand, he recognizes the often dominant position 
of the employer. Jacobs 1997, p. 76. 
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contract principles, and collective bargaining agreements. In his opinion, these
employees are not economically dependent, and are able to determine their own 
terms of employment.178 Already, the SER suggested in 1970 to include a rule in 
the Act of the Employment Agreement, i.e. Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil 
Code, which makes it possible to exclude – or include – certain employees.179
Jacobs’s suggestions met with heavy criticism in literature, however. Only Duk 
seemed to agree with Jacobs.180 The main objection against Jacobs’s proposal 
has been that the Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907 had proven to be 
efficient to the extent that it applied to all employees in service of an employer. 
Jacobs’ suggestion to make a distinction between employees would lead to too 
much diversity, hence, would be inefficient.181 Van Peijpe and Van der Heijden, 
in effect, opposed Jacobs’s proposal to distinguish between employees based on 
salary only. They rather prefer to distinguish between dependency in the sense 
of Article 7:610 DCC, and independency in the sense of Article 7:400 DCC. 
Hence, Van der Heijden calls for protection of economic independent 
employees who, in effect, are economic dependent.182 Conversely, Van Peijpe 
calls for excluding those who are economic independent, from protective rules 
on employment termination.183   
At first sight, this criticism is remarkable. In general, one recognizes 
that employees with higher salaries are less dependent on their employers. Also, 
the legislature, in effect – although to a certain extent only – recognized that 
employees with high salaries are less dependent on employers than those with 
average salaries. I admit, during the discussion of the Bill, underlying the Act of 
the Employment Agreement of 1907, Drucker already stressed that salary based 
upon which one would be excluded from a rule’s protection was arbitrary. On 
the other hand, the advantage of this criterium was that the height of one’s salary 
was easy to determine.184 In this respect, the Lower House and the government 
agreed with Drucker that in certain aspects a distinction could be made between 
more and less economically weak employees based on this criterium.185 In 
contrast, the Upper House opposed the height of salary as a criterium for 
protection. In reply, the government stated that one cannot deny that, in general,
an employee with a high salary will be less dependent on the employer than an 
employee with an average salary, hence, economic dependency lies in the height 
of the salary.186
178  Jacobs 1994, p. 1041 and 1042. See also Jacobs 1997, p. 74 and 77. 
179  SER-Advies 1970/9, p. 22. 
180 Duk 1996, p. 25. 
181 Pera 1994, p. 1425; Van der Heijden 1995, p. 13; Asscher-Vonk 1995, p. 17. See also Konijn 1999,  
p. 32. 
182  Van der Heijden 1999a, p. 6-8. See also Verheul 1999. 
183  Van Peijpe 1999, p. 375-377.  
184  Bles I, 1907, p. 243. 
185  Bles I, 1907, p. 246 and 247. 
186  Bles I, 1907, p. 247-251. 
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Jacobs correctly points at the, meanwhile, mature and independent employee 
who is able to determine his own terms. Also, he referred to the importance of 
unions in this respect.187 In contrast, in 1993, Van der Heijden asked attention 
for the development of individualization (individualisering), referring to 
employees who wished to deliberate on specific terms with the employer, 
dependent on their personal circumstances, rather than that unions speak up for 
them. However, Van der Heijden, too, stressed the need to convert industrial law 
into post-industrial employment law,188 in that the society in a period of hundred 
years had converted from an industrialized society, in which employees needed 
protection against the employer’s abuse, into an industrial and service society, in 
which employees have become emancipated, well-educated, and capable of 
speaking up for themselves or through others. In this respect, Van der Heijden 
pointed at the development of privatization (privétisering), referring to 
employment laws, which take the personal circumstances of employees into 
consideration, furthering the rights of employees to agree upon their own 
personal terms.189
Van der Heijden, too, emphasized that employees were still protected 
through mandatory rules, which had been created for employees a hundred years 
ago. On the other hand, employers who needed to operate flexibly to strengthen 
their competitive position in the international context, due to the process of 
economic globalization, avoided these rules by hiring contingent workers, who, 
in turn, were in need of, but lacked dismissal protection. To the extent courts 
were unable to solve the problem, Van der Heijden concluded that it was time 
for the government to adapt the rules on the employment relationship in 
furtherance of the foregoing development.190 In this respect, Jacobs, in 1997, 
stressed that the principle of order (ordeningsfunctie) – enabling an employer to 
run his business properly – is as important as the principle of balancing unequal 
bargaining power.191
Van den Heuvel correctly states that advocates of protective rules will continue 
to stress that employees need protection, due to their unequal bargaining power, 
and opponents of protective rules will continue to stress that protection is not 
necessary, stressing that parties, in effect, are equal.192 I agree with Van den 
187  Jacobs 1994, p. 1040 and 1041. 
188  Van der Heijden 1993a, p. 297. 
189  Van der Heijden 1999c; Zondag 2003c. 
190  Van der Heijden 1993a, p. 298 and 300. See also Van der Heijden 1997a, p. 56-59. 
191  Jacobs 1997, p. 71-73. In 1994, he spoke of ‘the principle of freedom of contract, unless necessarily 
limited by law or collective bargaining agreements’ as a leading principle. See Jacobs 1994, p. 1040 
and 1041. 
192  Van den Heuvel 1989a, p. 15. 
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Heuvel that employees in service of employers will never be independent in 
respect of employment termination.193
However, I agree  with Van der Heijden, Noordam, and Jacobs that the 
principle of balancing unequal bargaining power is and should no longer be the 
leading principle in all aspects, i.e. to the extent that it was when the legislature 
introduced the Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907. Put differently, 
employees are still in need of dismissal protection on the one hand, and 
protective rules in general on the other, but not to the extent as a hundred years 
ago.194 Subsequently, I suggest that, in the spirit of Drucker, the legislature – 
due to the new developments – reconsiders whether protective rules are 
necessary, secondly whether these should be full mandatory, three-quarters 
mandatory, semi-mandatory, or permissively,195 and thirdly, to which workers 
these rules should apply.196 In this respect, it is important to stress that 
employers generally do not oppose just cause protection. For example, when, in 
1995, the VNO-NCW, being the largest employers’ association in the 
Netherlands, suggested to reduce the large number of mandatory rules on 
employment termination – stressing the need for employers to survive in the 
race of international competition in light of the process of economic 
globalization – to a few basic norms, it explicitly rejected the so-called ‘hire and 
fire’ system of the United States. It suggested abolishing Article 6 of the BBA 
1945 on the one hand, however, it stressed that it wished to maintain the just 
cause rule as a basic rule in a new dismissal system on the other.197 The SER, 
too, advised the government that one of the basic rules of dismissal law should 
remain that employers should not be allowed to dismiss employees on unjust 
grounds.198
Consequently, the government in Bill 25 263 on Flexiblity and Security held 
that just cause protection remains necessary, due to the economically weak 
position of the employee in his relationship with the employer. On the other 
hand, it recognized that the rules on employment termination needed to be made 
more flexible in light of developments as individualism, privatization and the 
process of economic globalization. This needs clarification. As mentioned 
above, the term individualization refers to mature and independent employees 
who are able to partly determine their own terms.199 To the extent the 
government wishes to maintain just cause protection for employees due to their 
193 Van den Heuvel 2002, p. 238. See also EK 1999-2000, No. 222a, Notitie (zelf) regulering, p. 4, in 
which the Upper House acknowledges that collective bargaining parties must be free to regulate 
working conditions other than those related to employment termination; Zondag 2004c, p. 9. 
194  Van der Heijden 1997a, p. 63; Konijn 1999, p. 33. 
195  See also Verhulp 2003b, p. 302-304. 
196  See above under § 28.2.2. 
197  VNO-NCW 1995, p. 12.  
198  For the VNO-NCW, see above under § 28.2.3. For the SER, see SER-Advies 1970/9, p. 13 and 22. 
See also De Vries, below under § 29.2.2. 
199  See TK 1996-1997, 25 263, No 6, p. 4. 
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economically weak position on the one hand, but recognizes that employees are 
independent on the other, this means that (i) the government interprets the term 
economically weak as meaning something different than mature and 
independent;200 or (ii) to the extent economically weak must be interpreted as 
immature and dependent, the government recognizes that not all employees are 
mature and independent, but that it prefers a uniform act for employees in 
service of the employer; or (iii) the government wishes to reconsider the rules on 
employment termination on the one hand, but wishes to maintain the just cause 
rule on the other. The latter is most likely. What was striking, therefore, was the 
recent – meanwhile, withdrawn – proposal of the Minister of Social Affairs in 
Bill 30 370, in which he suggested to allow collective bargaining parties to agree 
upon their own criteria for dismissal in collective dismissals, excluding them 
from the scope of the BBA 1945, thus, without the CWI examining whether 
there is just cause to dismiss these employees.201
Bill 25 263 eventually led to the Flexicurity Act of 1998.202 The 
Flexicurity Act of 1998 provided – as Van der Heijden had suggested in 1993 – 
flexible rules on employment termination for employers on the one hand, and 
(job) security for contingent workers on the other.203 In the underlying Bill, the 
government indeed acknowledged that, in 1997, with the technical revision of 
the Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907,204 it had missed a chance to 
adapt the Act earlier to the process of economic globalization.205 The discussion 
on the need of more flexible rules on employment termination, nonetheless, 
continued after the Flexicurity Act of 1998.206 In this debate, Van der Heijden 
and Noordam asked attention for developments as globalization, flexibilisation 
and deregulation, in effect, urging the government to again reconsider the rules 
on the employment relationship in light of these developments.207 In brief, they 
suggest distinguishing between basic principles (basiswaarden), social variables 
(sociaalrechtelijke variabelen) and social methods (sociaalrechtelijke
methoden). For example, they consider protection as a basic principle, and the 
circle of protected workers as a variable principle.208 In effect, the principle of 
balancing unequal bargaining power still underlies what they call the basic 
principle of protection.209 In contrast, in the United States the principle of order 
(ordeningsfunctie) seems to prevail. Also this country, however, is in search of a 
200  See also Riphagen 1997, p. 136. 
201  For this proposal in Bill 30 370, see also below under § 29.2.2. 
202  See also above under § 15.3.3. 
203  See EK 1999-2000, No. 222a, Notitie (zelf) regulering, p. 4. See also below under § 29.2.1. 
204  For the technical changes, among which the renumeration of  the provisions into 610 to 686, see 
‘Vaststellingswet titel 7.10 Burgerlijk Wetboek (Stb. 1996, 562)’.
205  Van der Heijden 1995. 
206  For an in-depth discussion of the ongoing discussions on dismissal law, see below under § 28.2.2. 
207  Van der Heijden en Noordam 2001, p. 7-29. 
208  Van der Heijden en Noordam 2001, p. 96-98. 
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new balance between flexibility for employers on the one hand, and just cause 
protection for employees on the other. 
29 Bottlenecks due to the need to strike a new balance between  
flexibility for employers and security for employees 
29.1 American dismissal law: from flexibility to security  
29.1.1 At-will system under fire: wrongful discharge law  
In the late 1970s, and the early 1980s, the American at-will system came under 
fire. Courts became responsive to the cry to protect employees against abuse of 
employers of their unilateral right to dismiss employees, implementing a variety 
of exceptions to the at-will doctrine.210 As Ballam put it, by the mid-twentieth 
century, employment law began to reflect the interdependence of individuals, 
and particularly the dependence of employees on employers, and the 
concomitant power of employers to abuse that power.211 In this respect, 
reference is made to statutes, which evidenced a legislative judgment that 
employee interests in employment deserve protection from the unhindered 
power of employers to discharge. Additionally, Peck points at job protection for 
public employees, making it difficult for the government to justify the arbitrary 
and capricious action of private-sector employers tolerated by the employment-
at-will doctrine.212 Also, the California Court of Appeal in Pugh (1981)
considered it as striking that legislatures in the United States  have refrained 
from adopting statutes, providing generalized protection to private-sector 
employees against unjust dismissal, while public employees may enjoy job 
security through civil service rules and due process principles.213 In Pugh 
(1981), the California Court of Appeal in this respect held that 
‘The law of the employment relationship has been, and perhaps still is, in the 
process of continuing evolution. The old law of master and servant, which held 
sway through the 18th century and to some extent beyond (…) drew its contours 
from the model of the household – in which, typically, the servant worked, the 
master had general authority to discipline the servant, and it was the servant’s 
duty to obey. (…). With the industrial revolution in the 19th century the law of 
master and servant underwent a gradual remodeling (…). The emphasis shifted 
from obligation to freedom of choice. (…) In light of the generally superior 
bargaining power of the employer, the employment contract became (…) in 
large part a device for guaranteeing to management unilateral power to make 
rules and exercise discretion (…). The recognized inequality of bargaining 
power between employer and individual employee undergirded the rise of the 
labor unions (…) [which] have placed limitations on the employer’s unilateral 
210  Barber 1993, p. 4; Summers 2000, p. 4. 
211  Ballam 2000, p. 3. 
212  Peck 1991, p. 5. 
213  Pugh (1981),  116 Cal.App.3d 311, 321. 
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right of termination. Under most union contracts, employees can only be 
dismissed for just cause (…). In recent years, there have been established by 
statute a variety of limitations upon the employer’s power of dismissal (…). 
[Hence] the employer’s right to terminate employees is not absolute.’214
To illustrate the new attitude of courts, Peck further refers to Monge (1974), in 
which an employee was discharged for refusing to date her foreman.215 The New 
Hampshire Supreme Court condemned this exploitative use of the employment 
relationship by the employer as breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing.216 In effect, it condemned the unlimited power of the employer to 
dismiss employees under the at-will rule. The Monge Court in this respect held 
that 
‘When asked to reexamine the long-standing common law rule of property 
based on an ancient feudal system which fostered in a tenancy at will a 
relationship heavily weighted in favor of the landlord, this court did not hesitate 
to modify that rule to conform to modern circumstances. (…) The law 
governing the relations between employer and employee has similarly evolved 
over the years to reflect changing legal, social and economic conditions. (…) 
Although many of these changes have resulted from the activity and influence 
of labor unions, the courts cannot ignore the new climate prevailing generally 
in the relationship of employer and employee. (…) In all employment contracts, 
whether at will or for a definite term, the employer’s interest in running his 
business as he sees fit must be balanced against the interest of the employee in 
maintaining his employment, and the public’s interest in maintaining a proper 
balance between the two.’217
Peck further refers to Pierce (1980).218 In this case, the highest court of the state 
of New Jersey recognized a cause of action for violation of public policy. In 
justifying an ‘abandonment’ of the at-will rule, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
held that 
‘In the last century, the common law developed in a laissez faire-climate that 
encouraged industrial growth and approved the right of an employer to control 
his own business, including the right to fire without cause an employee at will. 
(…) The twentieth century has witnessed significant changes in socio-economic 
values that have led to reassessment of the common law rule. Businesses have 
evolved from small and medium size firms to gigantic corporations, in which 
ownership is separate from management. Formerly there was a clear delineation 
between employers, who frequently were owners of their businesses, and 
employees. The employer in the old sense has been replaced by a superior in 
the corporate hierarchy who is himself an employee. We are a nation of 
214 Pugh (1981),  116 Cal.App.3d 311, 319-321. 
215  Peck 1991, p. 7. 
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employees. Growth in the number of employees has been accompanied by 
increasing recognition of the need for stability in labor relations. Commentators 
have questioned the compatibility of the traditional at-will doctrine with the 
realities of modern economics and employment practices. (…) The common 
law rule has been modified by the enactment of labor relations legislation. (…) 
The National Labor Relations Act and other labor legislation illustrate the 
governmental policy of preventing employers from using the right of discharge 
as a means of oppression. (…) Consistent with this policy, many states have 
recognized the need to protect employees who are not parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement or other contract from abusive practices by the 
employer.’ 219
Subsequently, in the early 1990s, most states had recognized one or more of the 
three following exceptions to the at-will rule under the law of wrongful 
discharge (1) violation of public policy; (2) breach of an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing; and/or (3) breach of contract to discharge for good 
cause only, either under (i) the handbook exception, or (ii) the implied-in-fact
(good cause) contract theory.220 What is striking, is that when courts created 
these causes of action in the employment context, American labor unions 
suffered the greatest decline in membership. It appears that a social change took 
place in favor of job security for employees, as an alternative for just cause 
protection under collective bargaining agreements.221
29.1.2 Bottleneck:  application of general contract law to employment contract 
                          
Private-sector employees in the United States may obtain just cause protection
under the common law (i) handbook exception; and/or (ii) the implied-in-fact 
(good cause) contract exception. Under the handbook exception, the main 
bottleneck is that an at-will disclaimer can negate just cause protection. In 
contrast, the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception considers an at-will 
disclaimer merely as one of the factors in the totality of circumstances test, thus, 
offers a more solid ground. Nevertheless, bottlenecks remain. First, with regard 
to both contract exceptions the employee must prove all elements of the claim, 
i.e. the good cause contract and the lack of good cause when wrongfully 
discharged. Second, the majority of states protect a good-faith employer, 
although the reason given by the employer in the majority of states may be 
subject to scrutiny. Third, both exceptions can lead to contract damages only. 
Attorneys-in-law, in general, only accept cases, in which punitive damages can 
be asked for. This leaves blue-collar workers, who in general cannot afford legal 
counsel on an hourly basis, empty-handed in this respect. Last, the handbook 
exception is accepted in virtually all states. The implied-in-fact (good cause) 
contract exception is good law in the state of California and in a minority of 
219 Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,417 A.2d 505, 509 (N.J. 1980). See also Peck 1991, p. 7. 
220  Autor 2001, p. 3 and 4. 
221  Berks 2000, p. 8 and 11. 
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other states, and as this thesis reached its completion, has not (yet) been 
recognized by the Drafters on the Restatement of Employment Law as a cause 
of action.222
 In conclusion, the bottlenecks employees in the United States face 
regarding just cause protection derive from the economic view of American 
courts on dismissal law in the past. From this point of view, employers and 
employees have equal bargaining power, and labor is considered as a 
commodity, which can be traded by parties. In this respect, the employment 
agreement is considered as a contract like any other, to which general contract 
principles apply. Hence, bottlenecks under American dismissal law remain (i) 
the burden of proof; (ii) at-will disclaimers; and (iii) the protection of good-faith 
employers.223 In contrast, bottlenecks in respect of just cause protection in the 
Netherlands derive from the social view of the Dutch legislature on dismissal 
law, as the following paragraphs will show. 
29.2      Dutch dismissal law: from security to flexibility 
29.2.1   Dual dismissal system under fire: Flexicurity Act of 1998 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, employees pled for the introduction of 
a just cause for dismissal, which eventually led to a dual just cause dismissal 
system in the Netherlands. At the end of the twentieth century, employers, in 
turn, plead for the abolition of this system. In brief, employers stress that in the 
process of economic globalization they need to respond flexibly to changes on 
the market to strengthen their competitive position in the international context, 
and that the dual just cause dismissal system restricts them in this respect. 
Employers plead for the abolition of the BBA 1945,224 as the true bottleneck for 
the rigid system.225
In reply, the Minister of Social Affairs, Melkert, presented his 
Memorandum on Flexibility and Security in 1995.226 He acknowledged the need 
for a more flexible dismissal law on the one hand, but stressed the need for (job) 
security for contingent workers on the other.227 Being aware of the conflicting 
interests between employers and employees, the Minister asked the Labour 
Foundation for advice on his proposals on 4 December 1995.228 On 3 April 
1996, the Labour Foundation presented its report to the Minister of Social 
Affairs. In brief, the Labour Foundation agreed with the government to (i) 
liberalize the rules on termination of employment, but not to overreact by means 
222  See above under § 6.4. 
223  See above under § 11.4 and 12.4. 
224  VNO-NCW 1995, p. 12.  
225  Van der Heijden 2000, p. 227. 
226  Nota Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid 1995. 
227  Nota Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid 1995, p. 1, 28 and 29. 
228  See the Letter of the Minister of Social Affairs Melkert to the Labour Foundation of 4 December 
1995, AV/RV/952497e (enclosure to STAR-Advies 1996/2). 
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of the American ‘hire and fire’ system;229 (ii) to maintain the BBA 1945; and 
(iii) to amend the Act on the Employment Agreement of 1907 in this respect. 
More specifically, the Labour Foundation suggested regarding 
x the probationary period: in case of a contract for a definite period of 
shorter than two years, to restrict the notice period to a maximum of 
one month instead of two months;  
x employment agreements for a definite period: to allow more 
employment agreements after one another which would all end 
automatically after the expiry date; however, to protect employees 
in the long term, thus, to convert a contract for a definite period into 
an employment agreement for an indefinite period in case of three 
continuing contracts, and if the contracts exceeded a period of 36 
months;  
x temporary workers: to qualify their relationship with the agency as 
an employment agreement to which a special regime would apply; 
and
x contingent workers: to assume an employment agreement when a 
worker has worked at least one day per week or twenty hours per 
month for at least three months, after which the burden of proof 
rests with the employer that the agreement does not meet the 
requirements of Article 610 DCC.230
In large, the Labour Foundation followed the proposals made in the Minister’s 
Memorandum. It presented three new proposals. First, the Labour Foundation 
suggested that after the employer has received a permit under the BBA 1945, the 
employer would be allowed to shorten the notice period by one month, on the 
condition that one month would be left. Second, the Labour Foundation 
suggested that the prohibition on dismissal regarding illness would not apply 
when the employee had become ill after the CWI had received a request of the 
employer for a permit to terminate the employment agreement. Third, the 
Labour Foundation suggested that appeal be allowed against the award of a 
severance payment in an Article 685-procedure.231  On 7 March 1997, the 
Minister of Social Affairs sent the Bill on Flexibility and Security to the Lower 
House. His proposals were based on the Report of the Labour Foundation.232 In 
fact, the Minister of Social Affairs followed the suggestions of the Labour 
Foundation, with one exception. It did not allow appeal in an Article 685-
procedure regarding the severance payment.233
229  STAR-Advies 1996/2, p. 5 and 6. 
230  For these and all other amendments, see STAR-Advies 1996/2. 
231  STAR-Advies 1996/2, p. 31-33. 
232  TK 1997-1998, 25 263, No. 1-2. 
233  Kuip en Scholtens 1999, p. 13 and 27. 
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This Bill on Flexibility and Security, in effect, was the successor of Bill 21 479. 
The latter was based on a Report of the Social-Economic Council (Sociaal-
Economische Raad or SER) of 1988. In this Report, the SER had stressed the 
need for deregulation,234 and had suggested that the government would maintain 
the BBA 1945, and amend the Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907, to 
establish this deregulation. The SER based it advice on the Report of the DIA-
Committee (Deregulering, Inkomensvorming en Arbeidsmarkt or Deregulation,
Income policy and Labour Market),235 which had emphasized the need for 
deregulation and flexibilisation for the Dutch economy to enable employers to 
strengthen their competitive position in the international context.236 In 
furtherance of SER’s Advice of 1988, the Minister of Social Affairs sent Bill 21 
479 to the Lower House, focusing on deregulation. However, it avoided a 
discussion on the abolition of the BBA 1945.237 This led to severe criticism of 
the Upper House that wished to await an investigation on the effect of the BBA 
1945, before deciding on new dismissal law. Hence, the government, in 1996, 
decided to withdraw Bill 21 479.238
A year later, the Minister of Social Affairs sent the Bill (25 263) on 
Flexibility and Security to the Lower House. This time the emphasis was on 
flexibilisation of dismissal law. The Bill more explicitly met the wish of 
employers to make rules on employment termination flexible, enabling them to 
respond flexibly to changes in the market to strengthen their competitive 
position in the international context.239 The Bill on Flexibility and Security was 
adopted by the Upper House on 12 May 1998, and approved by the Queen on 14 
May 1998.240  The Act on Flexibility and Security – also known as the 
Flexicurity Act of 1998 – went into force on 1 January 1999.241
The Flexicurity Act only partly met the need of employers. As before with Bill 
21 479, the government again had avoided a discussion on the abolition of the 
BBA 1945. In 1996, the government had been forced to withdraw Bill 21 479. 
In 1999, the Upper House stated it would withdraw its approval to the Bill on 
Flexibility and Security, unless the Minister of Social Affairs promised to install 
a Committee that would reconsider the – abolition of the – dual dismissal 
234  SER-Advies 1988/12. 
235  For DIA-Rapport, see TK 17 931, 1983-1984, No. 24. 
236  TK 1989-1990, 21 479, No. 1-2. For a discussion of this Bill, see Van der Heijden 1992; Scholtens 
1992a, p. 271-285; C.J. Loonstra, Losbladige Arbeidsovereenkomst, Kluwer, Deventer, Boek 7 Titel 
10, Inleiding § 3.5. 
237  Scholtens 1990, p. 424. See also Scholtens 1992b, p. 476. 
238  STAR-Advies 1996/2, p. 18 footnote 11. See Van der Heijden 1997b. 
239  Kuip en Scholtens 1999, p. 31. 
240  Stb. 1998, 300. See also Kuip en Scholtens 1999, p. 25. 
241  Stb. 1998, 332. See also Kuip and Scholtens 1999, p. 26. 
375
system.242 Hereupon. the government installed the ADO-Committee, known as 
the Committee Rood, named after its Chairman, on 25 February 1999, which 
consisted of representatives of judges, professors of law and lawyers, hence, 
lacking representatives of employers’ organizations and unions.243
In brief, the government asked the ADO-Committee to examine the 
effectiveness of the dual dismissal system for the future, in both the national and 
international context. Also, it was invited to make suggestions to improve the 
system if it considered the system ineffective. If it would decide to abolish the 
BBA 1945, it was invited to propose a new dismissal system with compensating 
measures, taking the employees with a weak market labour position into 
consideration.244 Overall, the Committee’s recommendations led to a discussion 
on the abolition of the BBA 1945, which continues as today.245
29.2.2   Bottleneck: abolition of the BBA 1945 
The ADO-Committee presented its Report on 15 November 2000 under the 
promising title Farewell to the dual dismissal system (Afscheid van het duale 
ontslagrecht). The Committee suggested abolishing the CWI’s preventive 
review on just cause protection, thus, to abolish Article 6 BBA 1945, and, 
instead, to introduce a civil dismissal system with a repressive judicial review 
on just cause protection, on the condition of an internal hearing procedure. As 
regards just cause protection, it suggested to include an explicit rule in the new 
dismissal law system according to Article 4 of ILO Convention 158, 
determining that an employer needs a valid reason for dismissal, i.e. a just cause 
for dismissal connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on 
the operational requirements of the undertaking.246 Hence, under the new 
dismissal system, employees have a cause of action if (i) a just cause for 
dismissal is lacking; and/or (ii) the employer has not respected the formal rules 
on the hearing procedure. Under the system of repressive judicial review, 
employees can address the Court only after being dismissed to ask for 
annulment of the termination of the employment agreement. The employee 
needs to invoke the annulment within two months after termination of 
employment. If the court is of the opinion that reinstatement is not possible, it 
can, at the request of the employee, grant severance payment instead.  
In furtherance of the foregoing, the ADO-Committee suggested that the 
7:681 DCC procedure be abolished, because the new just cause rule of Article 4 
of ILO Convention 158, in effect, made Article 7:681 DCC superfluous. 
Additionally, the ADO-Committee suggested to restrict the application of 
Article 7:685 DCC on the one hand, however, to introduce the possibility to 
242  EK 1997-1998, 25 263, No. 132g. See also Kuip 1998, p. 154. 
243  Stcrt. 1999, 43. See also ADO-Rapport 2000, p. 1 and 5; Van der Heijden 2000, p. 227. 
244  ADO-Rapport 2000, p. 5; See also Kuip en Verhulp 2001, p. 415 and 416. 
245  For an in-depth discussion of the legislative history of the Flexicurity Act of 1998, and the ADO-
Rapport 2000, see below under § 28.2.2. 
246  See also above under § 22.1. 
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appeal from the decisions of the Cantonal Court on the other. In this respect, it 
suggested that Article 7:685 DCC would apply to the following situations only, 
i.e. (i) an employer is unable to terminate the employment agreement, e.g. when 
a prohibition on dismissal applies; and (ii) an employer wishes to terminate an 
employment agreement for a definite period, with a period of at least one year 
left, prior to the expiry date.247
After the Ministers of Social Affairs, and of Legal Affairs, had received the 
Report they decided to ask advice from (i) the Labour Foundation (Stichting van 
de Arbeid or STAR); (ii) the Netherlands Association for the Judiciary (de
Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtspraak or the NVvR); (iii) the Netherlands 
Bar Association (de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten or NOvA); and (iv) the 
Lisv ((Landelijk Instituut voor Sociale Verzekeringen or National Institute for 
Social Security).248
 Only the NOvA agreed with the new dismissal system as proposed by 
the ADO-Committee. The Labour Foundation rejected the new dismissal 
system, considering the dual dismissal system as more efficient in providing just 
cause protection.249 It particularly stressed the importance of the BBA 1945-
procedure for small-sized companies, which considered this procedure as cheap 
and relatively quick.250 It further questioned whether ILO Convention 158 
should be the basis for Dutch dismissal law, due to the low number of 
ratifications among states of the European Union.251 Moreover, it held that the 
Dutch dismissal system was in accordance with Article 4 of the ILO Convention 
158. In this respect, it referred to Article 3:1 of the Dismissal Decree and Article 
7:685 DCC.252 The NVvR agreed with the abolition of Article 6 BBA 1945, 
however, took into doubt whether a repressive judicial review would provide 
sufficient just cause protection. In this respect, it had missed the Committee’s 
examination on a preventive judicial review on just cause protection. The Lisv
stated that it expected an inflow of unemployed under the new dismissal 
system.253
In literature, the ADO-Committee’s proposal on a new dismissal system led to 
mainly negative sounds. One of the few positive sounds came from Scholtens.254
A subcommittee on dismissal law of the Dutch Association on Employment 
247  ADO-Rapport 2000, p. 137-151.See also Van Slooten 2001c, p. 932 and 933. 
248  The Lisv has been replaced by the Institute for Employee Benefits Schemes (Uitvoeringsinstituut 
Werknemers Verzekeringen or UWV) as from 1 January 2002 based on the Act on the Implementation 
Structure for Work and Income (Wet Structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen or SUWI).
249  STAR-Advies 2003/7. See also TK 2004-2005, 30 109, No. 1, p. 42; Knegt 2003, p. 174; Duk 2003, 
p. 295. 
250  STAR-Advies 2003/7, p. 4. See also Knegt 2003, p. 176. 
251  STAR-Advies 2003/7, p. 7. See also above under § 1.3.3.  
252  STAR-Advies 2003/7, p. 7, 11 and 12. See also above under § 24.3.1. 
253  TK 2004-2005, 30 109, No. 1, p. 42. 
254  Scholtens 2001c. See also R. Hansma, Financieel Dagblad  of 16 June 2006. 
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Law (Working Committee on Dismissal Law or Werkgroep ontslagrecht van de 
Vereniging voor Arbeidsrecht) agreed, but presented a new proposal to make the 
new dismissal system more workable.255 The majority of academics rejected the 
new dismissal system, however. Particularly, there was skepticism on the 
Committee’s motives to replace the preventive review on just cause protection 
by a repressive judicial review. Hereafter, I will focus on this aspect only, being 
directly related to just cause protection. For other aspects, I refer to the large 
number of publications that saw the light after the ADO-Committee presented 
its Report in November 2000.256
 In justifying a repressive judicial review, the ADO-Committee argued 
that just cause protection under Article 6 BBA 1945 had proven to be 
ineffective. It referred to the fact that (i) despite rejections of requests to 
establish termination of employment, the employment relationship eventually 
comes to an end; and (ii) the dual dismissal system does not prevent employees 
with weak labour market situations – e.g. elderly – from being dismissed.257 The 
Committee, however, did not mention the dismissals that the BBA 1945 did
prevent. Van der Heijden, for example, refers to the 1983 study on the 
effectiveness by Knegt and Wilthagen, who concluded that six out of ten 
employees for whom the public instance had refused a permit were still in 
service the year after.258 Earlier, in 1970, also, the SER had pointed at positive 
effects of the BBA 1945 to the extent that (i) employers do not tend to address 
the GAB, if they realize they do not have a case; (ii) employers during the BBA 
1945-procedure may invoke their request, preferring termination of employment 
with mutual consent, rather than terminating the employment agreement through 
the BBA 1945-procedure.259 Hence, the argument of ineffectiveness alone
cannot carry the decision of the ADO-Committee to abolish Article 6 BBA.260
Its effectiveness, in fact, justifies preventive review.261 In this respect, Hampsink 
has serious doubts whether the employee will enjoy just cause protection under 
the new dismissal system, when preventive review of a third independent party 
on a just cause for dismissal is lacking.262 Moreover, Van Slooten adds that the 
assumption of the ADO-Committee that a hearing procedure will induce parties 
to deliberate on alternatives, is in vain, particularly when an employee is 
255  Werkgroep Ontslagrecht VvA 2001, p. 35. 
256  For example, for reactions from different angles on the ADO-Rapport 2000, see SMA 2001/2. 
257  ADO-Rapport 2000, p. 58 and 59. For additional arguments, see Grapperhaus 2006. 
258  Van der Heijden 2000, p. 288 and 229. See Knegt en Wilthagen 1988, p. 328. In contrast, Van 
Zevenbergen and Oelen conclude that with regard to 2,344 requests out of 39,064, which had been 
rejected, 93% of the employees in question eventually left the company. Research voor Beleid 2000, 
p. 49. 
259  SER-Advies 1970/9, p. 8 and 14. See also Research voor Beleid 2000, p. 49. 
260  Knegt 2003, p. 177. See also Knegt 2001, p. 93-96; Havinga 2001, p. 104-106.  
261  Hampsink 2001. See also Van Slooten 2001c, p. 936. 
262  Hampsink 2001, p. 73; Meijer 2001, p. 45. See also Fase 2000, p. 194 and 195; Loonstra 2000,  
p. 356; Havinga 2001, p. 105 and 106; Kuip en Verhulp 2001, p. 423. 
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dismissed based on his ability and/or capacities.263 In conclusion, Kuip and 
Verhulp are of the opinion that the ADO-Committee, to the extent it 
recommended to abolish the BBA 1945, has not fulfilled its assignment to offer 
measures to compensate the lack of the guarantees on just cause protection.264
Five years after the ADO-Committee submitted its Report, the government
finally took a position on future dismissal law in Bill 30 109 on the 
Unemployment Benefits Insurance Act and Dismissal Law (Werkloosheidswet 
en Ontslagrecht).265 In this Bill, it stressed that to establish a more dynamic 
labour market situation, future dismissal law must lead to an efficient allocation 
of demand and supply on the labour market on the one hand, and just cause 
protection for employees on the other.266 For the justification of just cause 
protection it used the same argument as a hundred years ago, in that the 
employee is economically and socially dependent on his employer. On the other 
hand, it recognized that mandatory rules on employment protection led to a rigid 
dismissal system, protecting insiders, rather than offering job opportunies for 
outsiders. As regards the latter, it referred to the problem of the increasing 
number of elderly persons (vergrijzing). In this respect, it stressed that 
employers are not eager to (re)hire elderly employees, referring to their low 
productivity, relatively high salaries, and the compensation of the(ir) age in the 
Cantonal Formula which makes it expensive to dismiss these employees. 
Subsequently, to meet the interests of all, the government in Bill 30 109 
suggested the following measures 
x to replace the principle of seniority by the principle of reflection in 
collective dismissals, regardless of the number of employees 
involved, to establish just cause protection of insiders on the one 
hand, and to offer opportunities for newcomers and outsiders on the 
other.267
Meanwhile, as from 1 March 2006, Article 4:2.1 of the Dismissal 
Decree determines that the employer must apply the reflection rule 
in collective dismissals, regardless of the number of employees 
involved;268
x to allow collective bargaining parties to determine their own criteria 
in collective bargaining agreements regarding collective dismissals 
under the WMCO. In this respect, the government proposed to 
263  Van Slooten 2001c, p. 934. For a more positive view on the hearing procedure, see Van der Heijden 
2001, p. 89 and 90. 
264  Kuip en Verhulp 2001, p. 416 and 417.  See also Van den Heuvel 2002, p. 240. 
265  TK 2004-2005, 30 109, No. 1 and 2. 
266  TK 2004-2005, 30 109, No. 1, p. 11 and 43. 
267  TK 2004-2005, 30 109, No. 1, p, 44. 
268  Stcrt. 2005, 242, p. 24. See also above under § 16.4.2. 
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amend the BBA 1945, in that parties do not need permission of the 
CWI (i) when these criteria are agreed upon in the collective 
bargaining agreement; (ii) the collective bargaining agreement 
provides the possibility for employees to bring forward their 
objections to the contemplated dismissal in a hearing in front of a 
complaints committee; and (iii) the collective bargaining agreement 
determines that the complaints committee only is able to handle 
objections of these employees after parties have reported the 
collective dismissal with the CWI according to Article 3 of the 
WMCO.269
The Minister of Social Affairs, meanwhile, has withdrawn this 
proposal;270
x to diminish pro forma procedures by amending the Unemployment 
Benefits Insurance Act (Werkloosheidswet or WW).271
The Minister of Social Affairs, meanwhile, has amended the 
Unemployment Insurance Benefits Act. The amendment went into 
force on 1 October 2006.272 Under the amendment, an employee is 
voluntary unemployed (verwijtbaar werkloos), i.e. only loses his 
right to unemployment benefits, when he has been dismissed based 
on an urgent reason for which the employee is to blame, or the 
employment agreement has been terminated at his own request.273
In furtherance of this amendment, the expedited procedure under 
the Dismissal Decree, too, has been abolished as from 1 January 
2007.274
x if collective bargaining parties have reached consensus on the 
necessity of the dismissal due to economic circumstances, and on 
the number of positions which have become redundant due to these 
circumstances, to restrict the CWI’s review to the questions only 
whether parties correctly applied the principle of reflection, and 
seriously examined whether the employees in question can be 
replaced in the same, an adjusted or another position.275
269  TK 2004-2005, 30 109, No. 1, p. 45 and 46. See also TK 2005-2006, 30 370, No. 2, p. 21; No. 3,  
p. 3, 67 and 68. 
270  TK 2005-2006, 30 370, No. 8, p. 3 and 4. 
271  TK 2004-2005, 30 109, No. 1, p. 46 and 48. 
272  Stb. 2006, 303 and 304. 
273  Art. 24.2 under a and b, respectively, of the WW. See also TK 2005-2006, 30 370, No. 12. 
274 Stcrt. 2006, 243, p. 11. For the rationale behind the introduction and, in turn, the abolition of the 
expedited procedure under Article 2:6 (old) of the Dismissal Decree, see above under § 16.8.  See 
also Stb. 2006, 303, p. 6.; Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 13. 
275  TK 2004-2005, 30 109, No. 1, p. 48. 
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Meanwhile, as from 1 March 2006, Article 4:1 of the Dismissal 
Decree no longer applies to a collective dismissal under the 
WMCO when (i) the employer has reported the collective dismissal 
to the CWI according to Article 3 of the WMCO; and (ii) this report 
is accompanied by a union’s statement in which it acknowledges 
the existence of economic circumstances, and agrees on the number 
of positions that have become redundant due to these 
circumstances;276
x to stimulate job training and/or occupational retraining and 
employability to prevent dismissals, particularly of elderly 
employees. This to compensate that elderly employees will be 
dismissed in particular, due to the new criteria for dismissal under 
the Minister’s proposal in Bill 30 370.277
The Minister of Social Affairs, meanwhile, has withdrawn this 
proposal.
In brief, the Minister of Social Affairs focuses on four categories of persons, in 
establishing a new dismissal law for the future (1) employers; (2) insiders, 
including elderly employees; (3) outsiders, including elderly persons; and (4) 
newcomers.278 In my opinion, Bill 30 370 is an important step towards a new 
balance between more flexible rules on employment termination for employers 
and just cause protection for insiders on the one hand, while providing job 
opportunities for outsiders and newcomers on the other. However, the Minister 
of Social Affairs, meanwhile, has withdrawn his proposal to exclude collective 
bargaining parties from the scope of the BBA 1945. Indeed, it is likely that this 
proposal did not meet the interests of insiders, including elderly employees. 
Nevertheless, the Minister dared to start a discussion regarding the BBA 1945. 
After a negative advice of the CPB of 13 January 2006, however, the Minister 
got cold feet, leaving the issue with the SER. In brief, the CPB concluded that 
the proposal would result in negative effects on particularly elderly employees. 
Subsequently, on the same date, the Minister announced to withdraw his 
proposal.279
What was striking, was that the Minister, in 2003, had already asked the 
CPB to advise the government on positive and/or negative incentives (positieve
en negatieve prikkels) to stimulate the demand of elderly employees on the 
labour market, i.e. to advise the government on (i) a negative incentive, which 
included a penalty after an employer had dismissed an elderly employee; and (ii) 
276  See also above under § 16.4.1. 
277  TK 2004-2005, 30 109, No. 1, p. 49-51. 
278  See also TK 2004-2005, 30 109, No. 1, p. 11. 
279  See the Minister’s Letter to the Chairman of the Lower House of 13 January 2006, 
SV/F&W/2006/4519. See also TK 2005-2006, 30 370, No. 8, p. 3 and 4. 
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a positive incentive, which included employer’s immunity from disability and 
unemployment benefits for hiring elderly persons. Already, the CPB in its 
advice of 17 November 2003 had answered that the negative incentive would 
lead to extra costs for employers, therefore, this incentive would have a counter 
effect, because due to this negative incentive, employers would prefer to hire 
young(er) employees rather than older ones. In contrast, a positive incentive 
would reduce costs, hence, would have a positive effect on (re)hiring elderly 
employees. In its Advice of 13 January 2006 the CPB, in effect, affirmed these 
standpoints. It did not imply that the proposal in Bill 30 370 should be 
withdrawn. In fact, it did not take any standpoint on whether the government 
should introduce a positive incentive, or a combination of positive and negative 
incentives to prevent an outflow of elderly employees from the labour process. 
As regards the latter, the Minister in his letter of 4 January 2006 to the CPB – in 
which he asked for advice on this matter – in fact, had suggested that ‘it is also 
conceivable to introduce only the positive incentive in accordance with the 
CPB’s advice of 17 November 2003’.280 Therefore, the most logical reaction 
would have been if the Minister had included the CPB’s Advice of 17 
November 2003 and 13 January 2006 in the discussions on Bill 30 370, opening 
a debate in the Lower House on alternatives for compensating measures in light 
of these advices. The Minister, however, simply decided to withdraw his 
proposal after the statement that the proposal would result in negative effects for 
particularly elderly employees. Not surprisingly, the withdrawal by the Minister 
led to criticism in the literature.281
Bill 30 370, nonetheless, remains an important step towards a new balance 
between more flexible rules on employment termination for employers and just 
cause protection for insiders on the one hand, while providing job opportunities 
for outsiders and newcomers on the other. A negative side of Bill 30 370 is that 
the government again has not taken position on the abolition of the dual 
dismissal system, i.e. the abolition of the BBA 1945. In this respect, it 
announced that it wished to await the MLT-Advice of the SER (Advice on the 
Dutch Social-Economic Policy on the Mid-Long Term or Advies over het 
Nederlandse Sociaal-Economische Beleid op de Middellange Termijn). More 
specifically, on 15 February 2005, the Ministers of Social Affairs, and Economic 
Affairs, asked the SER to advise the government on the Dutch Social-Economic 
Policy for the future five years to see whether and how the government can meet 
the demands of time. Initially, the SER had planned to send the advice to the 
government in June 2006. However, on 28 April 2006, it announced that it 
postponed its advice to the Fall of 2006, stating that it wished to await financial 
data of the CPB, which it wanted to include in the MLT-Advice. In July 2006, it 
280  See the Letter of  the Directeur Financieel-Eocnomische Zaken, R.H.J.M. Gradius, on behalf of the 
government to the Chairman of the Lower House of 4 January 2006, FEZ/ASV/2006/1282.  
281  For example, see Boot 2006c; Stege 2006. For criticism on the Minister’s proposal, see Duk 2006,
p. 19 and 20. 
382
announced to split up the MLT-Advice in two parts. Part I was due for the Fall, 
Part II on Dismissal Law was due for December 2006.282
Meanwhile, Part I on Welfare for and by All (Welvaartsgroei door en 
voor iedereen) has been sent to the government on 20 October 2006. In brief, the 
SER unanimously advises the government on the mid-long term to convert the 
welfare state (verzorgingsstaat) into a state in which all will participate 
(activerende participatiemaatschappij), e.g. through the creation of work, job 
training and/or occupational retraining, favorable taxes, social security on the 
one hand, while reducing costs of aging on the other.283 The SER announced 
that the ways of participation will be furthered in Part II, which will focus on 
dismissal law, (re)training, and social security in light of this new strategy. 
Consequently, dismissal law by the government is not considered as a goal in 
itself, but rather as a means which must serve the new strategy of the 
government as described in Part I.284 Meanwhile, on 11 December 2006, the 
SER announced to have postponed Part II, partly because it wants to await the 
formation of the new government in furtherance of the elections of 22 
November 2006.285
Most probably, the SER has difficulties in reaching a consensus on the abolition 
of Article 6 BBA 1945. To the extent unions may agree upon the abolition of the 
BBA 1945, they undoubtedly will demand compensation for absence of just 
cause protection under the BBA 1945. The skepticism on the outcome of the 
abolition of the BBA 1945 can be explained by discussions in the past on its 
abolition,286 which started in the 1950s. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the general 
idea then was that after the introduction of Article 1639s on a manifestly 
unreasonable dismissal, Article 6 BBA 1945 would be abolished. Subsequently, 
during the parliamentary discussions of the Bill, underlying the Act of 1953, a 
significant number of members in the Lower House voted in favor of the 
abolition of Article 6 BBA 1945. They considered the BBA 1945 as emergency 
legislation on the one hand, and considered Article 1639s to have introduced a 
just cause for dismissal on the other. In fact, if Rijckevorsel had not forgotten to 
register for the voting, and Van Dis had not erroneously voted in favor of the 
BBA 1945 – upon which the only other member in the Lower House of this 
same political party (SGP), Ds. Zandt, withdrew from the voting to avoid 
conflicting interests – there would have been a majority in favor of the abolition 
of Article 6 BBA 1495, which would have meant the end of the BBA 1945. 
Instead, Article 6 BBA 1945 ‘survived’.287 Moreover, the government made 
282 Volkskrant  of  8 July 2006, p. 7. See also the website of the SER (www.ser.nl). 
283  SER-Advies 2006/8. 
284  SER-Advies 2006/8, p. 120. 
285  See website of the SER (www.ser.nl). 
286  See Duk 2006, p. 17 and 20. 
287  Van den Heuvel 1983, p. 56-58; Van den Heuvel 1989a, p. 12 and 13; Van den Heuvel 2000b,  
p. 362; Scholtens 1992b, p. 477 and 478; Heerma van Voss 2000, p. 240. See also TK 1975-1976,  
13 656, No. 3, p. 7. 
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clear that it wished to maintain the BBA 1945, arguing that the BBA 1945 could 
– and should function – besides the Articles in the Act of the Employment 
Agreement of 1907.288
 However, in 1968 – when the government decided to abolish the 
Articles in the BBA 1945 on national wage formation289 – the Minister of Social 
Affairs decided to ask the SER for advice on whether Article 6 BBA 1945 
should be maintained. It acknowledged that the BBA 1945, in principle, was still 
emergency legislation. On 17 July 1970, the SER advised that Article 6 BBA 
1945 be abolished. However, the SER was divided on an alternative rule in the 
Civil Code. As regards the termination of employment there were (i) members – 
a large minority – who were of the opinion that employers and employees were 
equal, therefore, the same rule for preventive or repressive review on just cause 
protection should apply to parties; and (ii) members – a small majority – who 
were of the opinion that employers and employees were unequal. Hence, a 
different rule should apply for the employer and the employee, in that 
termination of employment on the part of the employer would be subject to a 
preventive review. Termination on the part of the employee would be subject to 
a preventive review, in exceptional cases only.290 The SER finally chose for (ii), 
referring to the employee’s weak position in the relationship with the employer 
in case of termination of employment.291 The government followed the small 
majority within the SER.  
In furtherance of the SER’s Advice of 1970, the government sent Bill 13 656 to 
the Lower House on 13 October 1975. In brief, it proposed to abolish Article 6 
BBA 1945, and to incorporate this rule in the Civil Code.292 Subsequently, 
members in Parliament raised the question whether a public authority was still 
the appropriate instance to decide on a conflict, involving the interests of 
employers and employees or, instead, a civil court. Moreover, the question was 
raised whether review on just cause protection should be preventive or 
repressive.293 In general, employers opposed a preventive review, in that it 
frustrated them in responding flexibly to changes in the market. Earlier, in 1982, 
one of the largest employers’ organizations, the Netherlands Christian 
Federation of Employers (Nederlands Christelijk Werkgeversverbond or 
288  The Minister first wished to await case law on Art. 1639s. See also Dienske 1965, p. 34, referring to 
Bijl. Hand. II 881, Hand. II 1952-1953, p. 2320-2363, 2365-2379, Bijl. Hand. I 881, Hand. I  
1953-1954, p. 2051-2071. 
289  These Articles would eventually be replaced by the Act on Wage Formation of 1970 (Wet op de 
Loonvorming van 1970). 
290  SER-Advies 1970/9, p. 6-18. See also Van den Heuvel 1989a, p. 12 and 13. 
291  SER-Advies 1970/9, p. 13 and 14, 18-24. 
292  TK 1975-1976, 13 656, No. 3, p. 8. See also TK 1992-1993, 22 977, No. 1, p. 9 and 10; Verburg 
1984, p. 110 and 111. 
293  For an in-depth discussion of the parliamentary discussion on this subject, see ADO-Rapport 2000,  
p. 27 and 28. 
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NCW),294 and, subsequently, in 1983, the Committee Van der Grinten opposed 
preventive review on just cause protection for this reason.295
The Committee Van der Grinten was set up by the Minister of 
Economic Affairs in 1983 to give advice on how to cope with the economic 
recession. This Committee had focused on rules, which frustrated the restoration 
of the Dutch economy. In its Report, which was sent to the Lower House  on 27 
June 1983, the Committee van der Grinten held that the preventive review by the 
GAB frustrated the restoration of the economy significantly, and that it did not 
offer positive effects which outweighed this negative effect. However, it 
expected strong resistance to the abolition of Article 6 BBA 1945. Therefore, it 
suggested that the government would reconsider (i) replacing the preventive 
review by a repressive judicial review; or (ii) abolishing Article 6 BBA 1945, 
and, instead, to install dismissal committees in the GAB-districts that would 
decide in advance on the dismissal, but by means of a non-binding advice only; 
or (iii) maintaining Article 6 BBA 1945, on the condition that its procedure 
would be amended. In this respect, it suggested that if the GAB had not refused 
a permit within a month after it had received the request, the employer was free 
to dismiss the employee. The Committee preferred (i) or (ii), hence, preferred to 
have Article 6 BBA 1945 abolished,296 subscribing to the DIA-Committee’s 
point of view on the need of deregulation and flexibilisation.297
In conclusion, already as from the 1980s, the Committee Van der Grinten, has 
induced the Dutch government to look at dismissal law from another angle – i.e. 
an economic point of view – in light of the process of economic globalization.298
The Report of the Committee Van der Grinten, in fact, led the government to ask 
the SER for advice on its proposals on dismissal law in Bill 13 656. After the 
SER disapproved most proposals in its Advice of 1988,299 the government 
decided to withdraw Bill 13 656. Instead, the government sent Bill 21 479 to the 
Lower House on 15 March 1990, the latter, in turn, being the predecessor of Bill 
(25 263) on Flexibility and Security. It is noteworthy to mention, that under Bill 
21 479, the government wished to maintain Article 6 of the BBA 1945,300 but 
that there was no consensus in the Lower House on whether Article 6 BBA 1945 
should be maintained. Consequently, members of the Lower House invited the 
Minister of Social Affairs to take a standpoint on this. Subsequently, in 1992, in 
294  See Verburg 1984, p. 112; Van Peijpe 1990, p. 49. 
295  Most recently, Grapperhaus opposed the requirement of prior authorization of the CWI to dismiss an 
employee in his inaugural lecture. See Grapperhaus 2006. 
296  TK 1982-1983, 17 931, No. 5. See also TK 1992-1993, 22 977, No. 1, p. 10; Verburg 1984,  
p. 107-111; Van der Meer 1989, p. 50 and 51; Van Peijpe 1990, p. 49 and 50; Heerma van Voss 
2000, p. 241; ADO-Rapport 2000, p. 28. 
297  TK 1983-1984, 17 931, No. 24. For the DIA-Committee, see above under § 29.2.1.  
298  See also Van Peijpe 1999, p. 364. 
299  SER-Advies 1988/12, p. 16 and 18-43. For an in-depth discussion of SER-Advies 1988/12, see  
Werkgroep Ontslagrecht VvA 1989; Van Peijpe 1990, p. 50. 
300  TK 1992-1993, 22 977, No. 1, p. 10 and 11. For criticism on this Bill, see Heerma van Voss 1992,  
p. 116, footnote 459. 
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times of economic recession, the Minister of Social Affairs, De Vries, suggested 
to abolish Article 6 BBA 1945 to improve the functioning of the labour market 
and to combat unemployment. In this respect, he suggested to replace the 
preventive review of the RDA by a repressive judicial review on the one 
hand,301 and to maintain the basic rule under Dutch dismissal law that an 
employee should not be dismissed arbitrarily on the other.302 In his opinion, a 
repressive judicial review, too,  
x would protect an employee against arbitrary dismissal, i.e. loss of 
income; 
x would respect the employer’s interest, i.e. continuation of the 
undertaking;  
x would not frustrate the mobility of the employee and/or well-
functioning of the labour market; and  
x would protect employees with a weak labour market situation.303
The majority of the SER rejected De Vries’s proposal, because it was not 
convinced that the abolition of the BBA 1945 would lead to less 
unemployment.304 In 1994, the Ministers of Social Affairs, De Vries, and of 
Judicial Affairs, Kosto, nonetheless, sent their proposal to the Council of State 
(Raad van State), which advises the Dutch government and parliament on 
legislation and governance.305
 Before the Council of State was able to advise on the matter, the 
successor of De Vries, Melkert, withdrew the proposal.306 In brief, Melkert 
considered the BBA 1945 as an important tool to regulate the outflow of 
employed and inflow of unemployed, and to protect employees with a weak 
labour market position. To justify the withdrawal, the Minister stressed that the 
SER in 1970 was not unanimous on the abolition of preventive review either. 
Important objections of the SER against a repressive judicial review were that (i) 
301  TK 1992-1993, 22 977, No. 1; ADO-Rapport 2000, p. 29. For an in-depth discussion of this proposal, 
see ADO-Rapport 2000, p. 121 and 122. 
302  See also the VNO-NCW above under § 27.2.3, and the SER in SER-Advies 1970/9, p. 13 and 22. 
303  TK 1992-1993, 22 977, No. 1, Toetsing van Ontslag, p. 7-9. See also Boot 2005c, p. 246 and 247. 
304  SER-Advies 1994/05.  See Trap en Vogel 1994, p. 135; Heerma van Voss 2000, p. 241. For criticism 
on the proposal of De Vries, see Scholtens 1993b; Barendrecht 1993; Buijs1993; Knegt en 
Wilthagen. 
305  Voorstel van wet, gepubliceerd in P.F. van der Heijden, J.J.M. de Laat, C.G. Scholtens, Ontslagrecht 
zonder ontslagvergunning, Mededelingen van het Hugo Sinzheimer Instituut, Nr. 10, Amsterdam 
1995. See also Buijs en Heerma van Voss 1996, p. 87; Van der Heijden 2000, p. 229-232; ADO-
Rapport 2000, p. 121. 
306  See Letter of the Minister of Social Affairs Melkert of 23 November 1994, TK 1994-1995, 22 977, 
No. 3. Subsequently, the Minister of Judicial Affairs informed the Queen that a discussion on the 
proposal of De Vries would not be continued, and consequently requested the Council of State not to 
handle the advice on the proposal. See ADO-Rapport 2000, p. 121. In reply, the Section Employment 
and Labor Law of the University of Tilburg, the Netherlands, presented its own proposal on future 
dismissal law. See FRW KUB Tilburg 1994. For an in-depth discussion of this proposal, see ADO-
Rapport 2000, p. 123 and 124. 
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employees with a weak labour market position would lack just cause protection 
under this system; (ii) the BBA 1945-procedure was an efficient means for 
small-sized employers to establish termination of employment agreements; and 
(iii) employees would lack just cause protection they enjoyed under Article 6 
BBA 1945.307 Instead, Melkert suggested simplifying the procedure of the BBA 
1945. Subsequently, he asked the Labour Foundation for advice on 2 December 
1994, to which the Labour Foundation responded on 29 May 1995.308 Melkert 
took these suggestions into consideration in Bill 21 479. As mentioned above, 
this Bill focused on deregulation, however, avoided a discussion on the abolition 
of the dual dismissal system. After resistance of the Upper House in this 
respect,309 the government decided to withdraw Bill 21 479 in 1996. Its 
successor, Bill 25 263, became the Flexicurity Act of 1998, which went into 
force on 1 January 1999. However, this Bill, too, avoided a discussion on the 
abolition of the BBA 1945.310 Hence, as today, a discussion on the abolition of 
the BBA 1954 still continues. 
30   Conclusion 
                                        
A comparison between American and Dutch dismissal law shows that the at-will 
dismissal system and the dual just cause dismissal system are slowly growing 
towards one another. Initially, courts in the United States approached 
employment termination from an economic point of view. The Dutch 
government approached employment termination from a social point of view. 
As from the 1980s, the process of economic globalization, in effect, forced the 
United States and the Netherlands to reconsider their rules on employment 
termination, i.e. to approach dismissal law from a social rather than from an 
economic point of view, and vice versa. Still, the American and the Dutch 
dismissal system significantly differ from each other. In the United States, the 
at-will rule is still the basic rule. In the Netherlands, the just cause rule is the 
basic rule. Moreover, a difference remains that, in their attempts to strike a new 
balance between flexible dismissal law for employers on the one hand, and just 
cause protection for employees on the other, courts in the United States play an 
important role, which means that a just cause rule, in effect, can only develop 
under case law. In contrast, in the Netherlands, the government plays an 
important role. The comparison (further) demonstrates that contrasting views 
between employers and employees lead to impasses in both countries. At first 
307  TK 1994-1995, 22 977, No. 3, p. 8 and 9. See also Trap en Vogel 1995, p. 3 and 4; Van der Heijden 
2000, p. 231 and 232; Heerma van Voss 2000, p. 241 and 242. 
308  STAR-Advies 1995/3. For  Letter of the Minister of 2 December 1994, see enclosure 1 with the 
Advice.
309  For an in-depth discussion of the withdrawal of Bill 21 479, see above under § 29.2.1. 
310  For an in-depth discussion on the withdrawal of Bill 21 479 and its successor Bill 25 263, see above 
under § 29.2.1. For proposals on alternatives for the dual just cause dismissal system, published after 
the Flexicurity Act of 1998 went into force, see HSI 1999/03; Nyfer 2000; Van den Heuvel 2000b,  
p. 359-370; Werkgroep Ontslagrecht VvA 2000. For an in-depth discussion of these proposals, see 
ADO-Rapport 2000, p. 124-128. 
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sight, in the United States, the emphasis in the ongoing debate on dismissal law 
is on just cause protection for employees, however, without a departure of the at-
will dismissal system. In the Netherlands, the emphasis is on flexibility for 
employers, however, without a departure of the dual just cause dismissal system. 
Hence, American courts still apply general contract principles, in effect, 
frustrating the possibility for private-sector employees to enjoy just cause 
protection. In the Netherlands, private-sector employees are still subject to a 
dual just cause dismissal system, in effect, frustrating employers to respond 
flexibly to changes on the market. In my opinion, in resolving these bottlenecks, 
the United States and the Netherlands can learn from each other, regardless of 
their differences in cultural, geographical and legal aspects, for this Chapter 
shows that in the United States, the employee is as much dependent on the 
employer as in the Netherlands. Rather, the extent of just cause protection is 
determined by whether economic or social views prevail among their 
lawmakers, which now brings me to making suggestions on how to solve 
bottlenecks under American and Dutch dismissal law. 
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VI CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
31 Just cause protection under American and Dutch dismissal law 
In this thesis, I have focused on a just cause for dismissal in the United States 
and the Netherlands. In Chapter 1, I have stressed the importance of just cause 
protection. In the Chapters 2 and 3, respectively, I have described where the law 
in the United States and the Netherlands stands in this respect. In Chapter 4, I 
have examined to what extent the American and the Dutch just cause standards 
meet the international just cause standard of Article 4 of ILO Convention 158. In 
Chapter 5, I have compared American and Dutch dismissal law regarding just 
cause protection. More specifically, I have examined whether and to what extent 
both countries can learn from each other in this respect. This thesis shows that in 
the United States, there is a trend towards just cause protection according to 
Article 4 of ILO Convention 158. I point at the just cause standard in collective 
bargaining agreements, the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment 
Act (WDFEA), and the implied-in-fact contract (good cause) exception under 
common law. All foregoing standards under American dismissal law, however, 
apply to a minority of the work force only, and – apart from the just cause 
standard under collective labor law – do not always offer just cause protection in 
practice. Hence, the majority of private-sector employees are still subject to the 
at-will rule. Therefore, private-sector employees in the United States would 
welcome a ratification of ILO Convention 158. The American government has 
no intention to ratify the Convention, however. In contrast, the Dutch 
government expressed its wish to ratify the Convention. In the Netherlands, 
private-sector employees, in theory, enjoy just cause protection under the BBA 
1945 and Article 7:685 DCC. This dual just cause dismissal system is unique 
among dismissal systems in the world. The rationale behind the government’s 
intent to ratify ILO Convention 158, in fact, is to harmonize its dismissal system 
with those of other member states, and in accordance with one of the goals of 
the ILO, to establish fair international competition. Although this goal in itself is 
justified, one can doubt whether a ratification of ILO Convention 158 is the best 
alternative for striking a new balance between flexible dismissal law for 
employers on the one hand, and just cause protection for employees on the 
other, or instead, a better alternative would be to modify the dual just cause 
dismissal system without (yet) ratifying the Convention. As this Chapter will 
show, I advocate the latter. 
 I conclude that although there are obvious differences between the 
United States and the Netherlands, both countries in the ongoing process of 
economic globalization are in search of a new balance between flexible 
dismissal law for employers on the one hand, and just cause protection for 
employees on the other. My presumption has been that in striking a new 
balance, both countries might learn from each other in solving bottlenecks 
regarding just cause protection. This Chapter justifies this presumption. 
390
32 Bottlenecks regarding just cause protection  
In the United States, bottlenecks regarding just cause protection relate to the fact 
that the majority of courts still consider the employment agreement a contract 
like any other. Only the relationship between an insurer and insured has been 
recognized as a special relationship by courts. Until 1907, Dutch courts took a 
same approach as regards the employment relationship. In the Netherlands, a 
debate on the special character of the employment relationship took place at the 
end of the nineteenth, and the beginning of the twentieth century, which resulted 
in the Act of the Employment Agreement of 1907. 
In contrast, in the United States, national just cause legislation is 
lacking. This does not mean that lawmakers in the United States, or academics, 
deny the unequal bargaining power between employers and employees. Mainly 
due to the political power of employers and attorneys-at-law who oppose such 
legislation, however, national and state just cause legislation is frustrated. An 
exception is Montana that adopted the Wrongful Discharge from Employment 
Act (WDFEA), setting aside the at-will rule. Blue-collar workers in Montana, 
however, in practice, in general, lack just cause protection under this Act. 
Outside Montana, at-will employees in the United States, however, may enjoy 
just cause protection under common law exceptions to the at-will rule, i.e. the 
handbook exception and the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception. 
They, too, often lack this protection, due to the contingency fee system of 
attorneys-at-law. In fact, it seems that only at-will employees who are subject to 
collective bargaining agreements, in practice, enjoy just cause protection. 
Hence, a minority of private-sector employees in the United States only enjoy 
just cause protection. This is mainly due to the economic point of view on the 
employment relationship by state courts, which still apply general contract 
principles to the employment agreement. The United States can learn from 
Dutch dismissal law in this respect. The recognition of the employment 
agreement as a special relationship – with its own rules and remedies – in the 
Netherlands has been determinative for Dutch private-sector employees in 
obtaining just cause protection. The focus, in other words, should be on the 
special character of the employment relationship. Instead, the focus in the 
United States is on whether violation of an exception to the at-will rule results in 
contract or punitive damages. However, when the central issue in the ongoing 
debate on just cause protection continues to be that ‘when the employment 
agreement is considered as a special relationship, punitive damages must be 
awarded’, employers will continue to protest in recognizing the employment 
agreement as a special relationship due to the high unpredictable costs, hence, 
continue to frustrate the adoption of bills on just cause legislation.  
In the Netherlands, the main bottleneck derives from the social point of view by 
the Dutch legislature to the employment relationship, i.e. the recognition of the 
employment agreement as a special agreement. In brief, employers stress that 
the just cause dual dismissal system leaves them no room to respond flexibly to 
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changes on the market. They particularly advocate the abolition of the BBA 
1945, due to the rigid application of these rules by the CWI.1
As I made clear in Chapter 3, the CWI consistently applies the just 
cause standard, hence, provides just cause protection to private-sector 
employees. This explains that the government and private-sector employees, in 
principle, oppose the abolition of the BBA 1945. Meanwhile, the Dutch 
government recognized the need for more flexible rules on employment 
termination in light of the process of economic globalization, and adopted the 
Flexicurity Act of 1998 to establish this flexibility.2 Moreover, in 2005, the 
government again recognized the need for (more) flexible rules on employment 
termination, when calling on the SER for advice on a social-economic policy on 
the mid-long term.3 Besides the government, Cantonal Courts, too, recognize the 
need for more flexible rules on employment termination. In collective
dismissals, they started to apply other – flexible – criteria for dismissal than the 
CWI. Additionally, in individual dismissals, they started to allow employers to 
trade off just cause protection with severance payments. This explains the 
popularity of Article 7:685 DCC, which in time has become the alternative route 
for the BBA 1945. The question is whether (more) flexible rules on employment 
termination should be established by the legislature or courts. As I emphasized 
in the previous Chapter, in light of legal certainty, in my opinion, the Dutch 
legislature only is the appropriate authority to establish, and to supervise rules 
on employment termination.4 In fact, intervention is necessary since the practice 
of Cantonal Courts leads to legal inequality en uncertainty for private-sector 
employees, due to the fact that the CWI and Cantonal Courts apply different 
criteria in deciding on the same grounds of dismissal. 
33 Suggestions 
33.1 American dismissal law 
The majority of private-sector employees in the United States are subject to the 
at-will rule. The at-will rule evolved under common law, which implies that the 
just cause rule may evolve under common law as well. Courts, which play an 
important role with regard to the development of just cause protection in the 
United States already started this process in the late 1970s, and the early 1980s. 
This, in fact, will remain unchanged so long as Congress does not regulate this 
matter. For the near future, there is no reason to assume that Congress will enact 
national just cause legislation. On the other hand, nothing stands in the way of 
1  See also TK 30 109, 2004-2005, No. 1, Brief van de Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid  
p. 40 and 41. 
2  TK 25 263, 1996-1997, No. 3, p. 1. 
3  Adviesaanvraag over het sociaal-economisch beleid op middellange termijn d.d. 15 februari 2005 van 
Ministers Brinkhorst (Economische Zaken) en De Geus (Sociale Zaken) aan de Voorzitter van de 
SER (Wijffels), kenmerk EP/AEP5005891, p. 2. 
4  See above under § 28.2.1. 
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courts to recognize the inequality of bargaining power between employers and 
employees, and to apply special rules and remedies to the employment 
agreement. Courts in this respect could determine that  
x just cause protection cannot be contracted away through at-will 
disclaimers;5
x the employer in dismissals based on economic circumstances has 
discretionary power with regard to the choice of operational 
requirements on the one hand, but must show the need and the 
existence of these operational requirements on the other;  
x the employer must show actual (mis)conduct or (in)capacity; and 
x the burden to prove good cause rests on the employer.  
The true bottleneck is that courts must first recognize a (common law) right on 
just cause protection. In the past, California Courts of Appeal established such a 
right under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. State supreme courts, 
too, could recognize this right under the covenant, referring to the unequal 
bargaining power between parties in respect of termination of employment, and 
the need of protective rules in light of this inequality. Already, Congress and a 
number of state courts – like the Dutch government – acknowledged that (i) 
labor is not just a commodity, which can be traded; (ii) instead, has a personal 
character, thus, to the extent employees earn wages, this is more than just a 
trade-off of labor; (iii) employees are in service of the employer, i.e. are part of 
an organization, therefore, in practice, dependent on the employer’s will and 
subject to the goals of the organization; (iv) hence, employees are economically 
and socially dependent of the employer; (v) because employees can only rely on 
labour for income, they are lacking bargaining power when they are not able to 
– sufficiently – offer this labour; (vi) taking into consideration that the 
employee’s performance can only be defined during the employment agreement; 
(vii) this makes employees particularly dependent in case of a dismissal.6
The reality is that most courts continue to apply general contract principles to 
the employment agreement. Moreover, the system of contingency fees causes 
attorneys-at-law to accept tort claims and contract claims of white-collar 
workers only. However, the exceptions to the at-will rule, providing just cause 
protection, result in contract damages only. Hence, in practice, blue-collar 
workers generally lack just cause protection. 
In my opinion, there are several options to solve the foregoing 
bottlenecks. First, federal and/or state legislatures could abolish the contingency 
fee system, which is unlikely to succeed, considering the economic power of 
5  Under Dutch dismissal law, one speaks of full mandatory law, making it impossible for parties to 
deviate from the rule by contract. Levenbach 1954, p. 71. See also above under § 28.2.2. 
6  For the United States, see above under § 28.1.1. and § 28.1.2. For the Netherlands, see Van Slooten 
1999, p. 31-34. 
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attorneys-at-law in the United States. A more realistic option is that courts 
award a special remedy in case of violation of the just cause standard, including
punitive damages. The latter, in turn, may lead to state just cause legislation, e.g. 
the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (WDFEA). The 
weakness of this Act, however, is that private sector-employees under the 
arbitration provisions eventually rely on the system of contingency fees again. 
Whereas the Act primarily prescribes – but does not compel – arbitration, in 
practice, employers refuse to arbitrate. Hence, employees can address the 
judiciary only. Third, government(s) could consider a public subsidized legal aid 
system similar to the system in the Netherlands,7 allowing blue-collar workers 
with contract damage claims to effectuate their claims at the expense of the 
government(s), at least for the major part.8 On the other hand, one must be 
realistic about how far the measures above will go in the – near – future. Hence, 
for the near future, I suggest to address the Drafters of the Restatement of 
Employment Law, convincing them through publications, to recognize all
common law exceptions to the at-will rule, including the implied-in-fact (good 
cause) exception. The function of the Drafters – i.e. the American Law Institute 
– should not only be to codify majority rules, but also to anticipate and 
encourage the development of laws. Moreover, to the extent these Drafters 
recognize the handbook exception, to convince them that it is as important to 
recognize that once there is a good cause contract under the handbook 
exception, and the employer wishes to modify this contract through an at-will 
disclaimer, this modification according to general contract principles – as 
subscribed to by a number of state supreme courts and academics – requires 
consideration and assent. 
33.2 Dutch dismissal law 
In the Netherlands, the legislature fulfills an important role regarding the 
development of just cause protection for private-sector employees. Courts fulfill 
an important role in applying and anticipating on the rules on employment 
termination. Courts, in principle, must consistently apply legal rules. To the 
extent they do not, they may undermine just cause protection for private-sector 
employees. On the other hand, this deviation may be a signal towards the 
legislature that these rules need to be changed. In the 1990s, the Dutch 
government with the Flexicurity Act of 1998, in fact, partly responded to case 
law.9 In 2005, the government recognized the need for more flexible rules on 
7  See Wet op de Rechtsbijstand (WRB), Stb. 1993, 775, gewijzigd per 13 juli 2002, en laatstelijk per 1 
april 2006. Advocatenblad 2006/5, p. 228 For the replacement of Bureau voor Rechtshulp by 
Juridisch Loket, see Amsterdams Balie Bulletin, maart 2006, p. 19 and 20. For the main rules of the 
WRB, see Advocatenmemo 2006, Kluwer, Deventer, p. 304-325 (No. 15 Gefinancierde rechtshulp). 
See also Themanummer Rechtshulp 1994/1, p. 2-5;  Muller en Woudenberg 1995. 
8  In theory, the Legal Service Corporation Act of 1974 offers equal justice for all. However, with the 
exception of legal aid in penal matters, in practice, this in civil matters generally means nothing more 
than being  pshysically present in the courtroom. See Kleiboer, Huls en De Kluiver 1997, p. 13-31. 
9  See TK 25 263, 1996-1997, No. 3, p. 4, 9. 
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employment termination.10 In this respect, the government – and employers – 
more than once suggested to abolish the BBA 1945.11 Recently, in Bill 30 370, 
the Minister of Social Affairs proposed to exclude collective bargaining parties 
from the scope of the BBA 1945. Meanwhile, the Minister has withdrawn this 
proposal after the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (Centraal 
Planbureau or CPB) held that the measures as suggested by the government 
could not prevent negative effects for elderly employees, to be expected of the 
proposal. In literature, several authors have argued that the Minister should 
reconsider his decision.12
Others, however, continue to advocate the abolition of the BBA 1945.13
In brief, they argue that (i) the BBA 1945 is emergency legislation, in that it 
needed to regulate the labour market after the war, however, this public interest 
is no longer present; (ii) to the extent the BBA 1945 still protects the public 
interest, this is to protect the weak, which finds its basis in Book 7 Title 10 of 
the Dutch Civil Code as well;14 (iii) a review on just cause protection in 
individual dismissals involve the interests of employers and employees only, 
therefore, should be left to a civil court. In this respect, they add that the BBA 
1945-procedure is in violation of Article 112 of the Dutch Constitution and/or 
Article 6 ECRM, requiring an independent instance to decide on civil disputes;15
(iv) the dissolution procedure under Article 7:685 DCC has become the 
alternative route of Article 6 BBA 1945, hence, Article 6 BBA 1945 has become 
superfluous in individual dismissals.16
Zijl, in her 2006 dissertation, doubts whether employers are in need of more 
flexible rules on employment termination, as often stated. She emphasizes that 
employers generally have invested in employees, hence, prefer to maintain 
them.17 De Gier, in turn, doubts whether the government will achieve its goal to 
involve unemployed – in particular elderly, youngsters and women – through 
more flexible rules on employment termination.18 It is noteworthy to mention, 
that both refer to the OECD Employment Outlook of 2004, stressing that the 
10  See above under § 32. 
11  See above under § 29.2.2. 
12  Boot 2006a, Loonstra 2006a. 
13  Heerma van Voss 2005a, p. ix.  
14  Scholtens 2002. See also above under § 15.2.2. 
15  Verburg 1984, p. 113; Van der Heijden 1984, p. 60-64;Van der Heijden 2000, p. 228, 232 and 233. 
16  See ADO-Rapport 2000, p. 19-23. See also Scholtens 1992b; Scholtens 2003. 
17  Zijl 2006, p. 127-129, 145 and 146. See also Financieel Dagblad of 20 June 2006. 
18  H.G. de Gier is appointed as Professor ‘Comparatief Arbeidsmarktbeleid’ with the Faculty of Science 
of Management at the Radboud University of Nijmegen. For his reaction, see Staatscourant 24 
August 2006 ‘De Geus legt teveel nadruk op versoepeling van het ontslagrecht’, in which he refers to 
the Memorandum of the Minister of Social Affairs ‘Notitie ontwikkelingen en keuzes in het stelsel 
van werk en inkomen’ of 28 June 2006. 
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Netherlands belongs to the average of countries in providing employment 
protection.19 The following remarks need to be made, however.  
First, I will not deny that employers in general wish to protect their 
investments.20 However, in Chapter 3, I have sufficiently shown that Article 
7:685 DCC has become the alternative route of Article 6 BBA 1945 regarding 
employment agreements for an indefinite period. From the OECD Employment 
Outlook of 2004 derives that employment protection in respect of these 
contracts is extremely high in the Netherlands.21 This explains the popularity of 
Cantonal Courts, which apply more flexible criteria for dismissal than the CWI. 
Hence, regarding employment agreements for an indefinite period, employers 
appear to be in need of more flexible rules on employment termination. Second,
a recent research in assignment of the Ministry of Social Affairs shows that 
employers are in need for more flexible rules on employment termination, 
particularly with regard to collective dismissals.22 Third, a recent research of the 
CPB stressed the need for flexible rules on employment termination to establish 
participation of outsiders and newcomers.23 Fourth, the OECD-indicator 
includes employment protection for employees (i) with regular jobs; (ii) with 
temporary jobs; and (iii) those involved in collective dismissals.24 The Dutch 
government particularly focuses on employment agreements for an indefinite 
period.25 Hence, the main question for the Dutch government regarding these 
contracts has become not whether employers need more flexible rules on 
employment termination, rather how it must respond to the need of employers 
for more flexible rules on employment termination.  
This brings me to the BBA 1945. Regarding its abolition to make dismissal law 
more flexible, I wish to make the following remarks. First, in the discussion on 
the abolition of Article 6 BBA 1945, one must not lose sight of the fact that its 
abolition would mean that those working on the basis of a contract according to 
the BBA 1945, but not on the basis of an employment agreement according to 
Article 7:610 DCC, would lack just cause protection.26 Second, in the urge for a 
more flexible dismissal law, one too easily forgets that the Dismissal Decree and 
the CWI Handbook on Dismissal – unlike Article 7:685 DCC and/or the 
Cantonal Formula – hold clear rules on just cause protection. The fact that these 
rules are consistently applied by the CWI should not be a negative, but rather a 
positive aspect in light of legal certainty. On the other hand, the negative 
19  For a discussion of the results of the OECD Employment Outlook of 2004, see CEP 2006, p. 143. 
See also Nagelkerke 2006, 483. 
20  See also Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 10 and 11; Nyfer 2000, p. 80 referring to OECD Jobs study, Part 
II, p. 74. 
21  CEP 2006, p. 144; Nagelkerke 2006, p. 483. 
22  Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 100. 
23  CPB Document 135 (2006). 
24  See also CEP 2006, p. 144. 
25  TK 1996-1997, 25 263, No. 6, p. 4. 
26  See also Dienske 1965, p. 34; Koopmans 1962, p. 281. 
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appreciation by employers is a signal that these rules may be too rigid. This 
means – as also recognized by the Dutch government – that it needs to act. It 
does not mean that the Dutch government must abolish the BBA 1945. In fact, if 
one continues to focus on the abolition of the BBA 1945, this will rather 
polarize employers and employees than that parties will be able to reach a 
compromise, which is needed to strike a new balance between the interests of 
employers and employees in light of the process of economic globalization. In 
this respect, there is a similarity with the debate on dismissal law in the United 
States.
Therefore, in striking a new balance, the focus in the Netherlands 
should not be on the abolition of the BBA 1945, but primarily on the question 
how to avoid legal inequality and legal insecurity for private-sector employees, 
which is a result of the alternative routes for the same grounds of dismissal 
under the Dutch dual just cause dismissal system.27 Subsequently, the focus 
should be on the question whether the CWI and Cantonal Courts can and must 
play a role in this new dismissal system. Thirdly, the focus should be on the 
question how to strike a balance between – more – flexibility for employers on 
the one hand, while safeguarding just cause protection for employees on the 
other.  
The results of my research induce me to suggest to maintain the dual dismissal 
system,28 and to divide the tasks between the CWI and Cantonal Courts. More 
specifically, requests with the CWI should be restricted to requests based on 
economic circumstances as described in the CWI Handbook on Dismissal.29
Thus, requests with the CWI cannot include a breach of trust, although these 
eventually constitute a severe frustration of the operation of the company, i.e. 
‘economic circumstances’. The rationale behind this division of tasks is that the 
CWI and Cantonal Courts apply different criteria for requests based on the same 
grounds of dismissal. This can and – in light of legal certainty and legal 
insecurity – must be avoided by authorizing the CWI to handle all requests 
based on economic circumstances, and authorizing Cantonal Courts to handle 
individual dismissals based on grounds other than economic circumstances. This 
distinction of tasks is in accordance with ongoing practice.30 Cantonal Courts, 
too, acknowledge that the CWI is the appropriate authority to handle requests 
based on economic circumstances.31 In this respect, I add that individual
dismissals based on economic circumstances, which involve one employee only, 
too, should be handled by the CWI. Subsequently, I propose to modify the 
WMCO, the BBA 1945, the Dismissal Decree, the CWI Handbook on 
27  See Research voor Beleid 2000, p. 59. 
28  Employers, in principle, do not oppose the dual dismissal system. See Research voor Beleid 2000,  
p. 63. Those who oppose refer to the fact that they advocate one instance to decide on dismissals, 
instead, of two instances. See Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 98. 
29  See above under § 16.4.1 
30  For the years of 2005 – in comparison with earlier years – see Loonstra en Kruit 2006, p. 20 and 21. 
31  Petri 1981, p. 164. 
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Dismissal, Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code and the Cantonal Formula, 
as described below. 
CWI: (individual and collective) dismissals based on economic circumstances 
1.
To establish that the CWI will have the exclusive authority to decide on 
collective dismissals based on economic circumstances, my first proposal is to 
make the WMCO exclusive for the CWI.  
2.
My second proposal is to amend Article 3:1 of the Dismissal Decree and Article 
7:685 DCC, in that the CWI, will be authorized to decide on requests based on 
economic circumstances, and Cantonal Courts to decide on requests based on 
serious cause, economic circumstances exempted.
The rationale behind my proposals is that the BBA 1945 aims to prevent mass 
unemployment. Meanwhile, the WMCO, too, aims to prevent mass employment 
and authorizes the CWI to decide on collective dismissals under this Act. It, 
however, too, leaves room for Cantonal Courts to decide on these dismissals. 
Cantonal Courts, however, lack the specific tools of the CWI, and apply other – 
less stringent criteria for dismissal – than the CWI.32 This leads to legal 
inequality and legal uncertainty for private-sector employees. By making the 
CWI the exclusive safekeeper on collective dismissals according to this Act, and 
all other dismissals based on economic circumstances, the government in my 
opinion will be able to better serve the goal of preventing mass unemployment, 
needed in the ongoing development of economic globalization. At first sight, 
these proposals sound groundbreaking. However, case law shows that Cantonal 
Courts, in general, already point at the CWI as the appropriate authority to 
decide on requests based on economic circumstances. The CWI handles these 
request generally also quicker than Cantonal Courts.33 More important, by 
authorizing one instance only – the CWI – to decide on requests based on 
economic circumstances, the government will prevent private-sector employees 
from being treated differently. In my proposal, the only difference among 
requests based on economic circumstances handled by the CWI will be whether 
additional rules of the WMCO apply.  
32  See also TK 30 109, 2004-2005, No. 1, Brief van de Minister van Sociale Zaken en 
Werkgelegenheid, p. 40. 
33  Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 22. 
398
3.
A consequence of authorizing the CWI to decide on dismissals based on 
economic circumstances, is that selection of employees based on quality will no 
longer be allowed. Quality is an important asset for the employer, in that it is an 
important asset to compete.34 In itself, (in)capacity is a valid reason for 
dismissal. Employees, on the other hand, argue that to the extent quality is 
applied by Cantonal Courts as a criterium for dismissal in collective dismissals, 
the latter implies that the employee is less qualified than other employees, not
that the employee is incapable of performing his duties. Therefore, quality as a 
criterium of dismissal in collective dismissals is difficult to measure. In my 
opinion, both have a point. Consequently, to meet the interests of employers and 
employees, my third proposal is that the Minister considers an amendment of 
the Dismissal Decree, which will include the ‘new’ principle of quality – as 
already applied in dissolution procedures – as a criterium for dismissal in 
collective dismissals under the WMCO. In the past, the government did not 
oppose this principle.35 However, by means of a trade-off, I suggest that a duty 
of job training and/or occupational retraining is laid down in the Dismissal 
Decree, on the part of employers, for employees who must meet this new 
requirement of quality.  
 With employees, I agree that quality as a criterium of dismissal in 
collective dismissals is difficult to measure. Hence, I advocate that the Minister 
of Social Affairs lists the – exhaustive – criteria for dismissal in the Dismissal 
Decree. Moreover, the CWI Handbook on Dismissal must determine that these 
criteria must be in accordance with reasonability, objectivity and verifiability, to 
prevent these criteria of being abused by employers. To stick with the ‘new’ 
criterium of quality. With regard to reasonability, the CWI, in my opinion, must 
apply a marginal test. The CWI must pose the question whether under the 
circumstances of the case it is reasonable, for example, to require a university 
degree of the employee. In brief, the requirement of quality as a criterium for 
dismissal is unreasonable when – like with a manifestly unreasonable dismissal 
– it is clear to every reasonable human being that the requirement is 
unreasonable. Reasonability, however, should be required, because it at least 
constitutes some scrutiny of the employer’s freedom to dismiss an employee 
based on this criterium. Furthermore, in furtherance of case law under Article 
7:685 DCC, the principle of quality as a criterium for dismissal in collective 
dismissals must meet the requirements of objectivity and verifiability to prevent 
the employer from being the sole ‘judge’ of the employee’s capabilities. Based 
on objective criteria, which includes job training and/or occupational retraining, 
the employee himself must be able to check to what extent he has (not) met the 
requirement of quality.36 The foregoing explains why I find the proposal of the 
Minister of Social Affairs in Bill 30 370, to allow collective bargaining parties 
34  Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 6, 7 and 52-60. 
35  See TK 2005-2006, 30 370, No. 3, p. 23. 
36  See also EK 2005-2006, 29 738 and 30 370 C, p. 17 and 18, referring to the KPN ‘Mobiliteit-CAO’.
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to decide on their own criteria of dismissal, too far-reaching in two aspects. 
First, the Minister leaves the criteria for dismissal open-ended, assuming up 
front that the criteria agreed upon by collective bargaining parties will meet the 
requirements of reasonability, objectivity and verifiability. Second, the Minister 
leaves the supervision with the parties who draw up these criteria. In my 
opinion, the government only is the appropriate authority to establish, and – by 
means of the CWI or Cantonal Court – to supervise the application of criteria for 
dismissal.37 To rule otherwise will endanger the requirements of reasonability, 
objectivity and verifiability, hence, will lead to legal inequality and legal 
uncertainty. To this extent, I am pleased that the Minister of Social Affairs has 
partly withdrawn Bill 30 370.  
4.
My fourth proposal is to amend the Dismissal Decree, in that employers will be 
left a choice to apply the principles of reflection or seniority, either or not in 
combination with quality as a criterium for dismissal to collective dismissals 
under the WMCO, as subscribed to by Cantonal Courts already,38 and 
representatives of employers in the Labour Foundation.39 It is awkward that the 
Minister in Bill 30 370 initially allowed collective bargaining parties to draw up 
their own criteria for dismissal in these dismissals, leaving parties free to 
alternatively apply these principles, and, subsequently, to determine that these 
same parties as from 1 March 2006 must apply the principle of reflection.40 This 
brings me to the reason for the Minister to withdraw his initial proposal. He held 
that the proposal might negatively affect elderly employees, however, practice
has shown that the principle of reflection, too, negatively affects elderly 
employees.41 Indeed, one cannot deny that employers do not tend to hire elderly 
employees easily,42 and that elderly employees form a significant part of 
employees being dismissed,43 however, the focus should not be on elderly 
employees only, as subscribed to by the government’ members in the SER.44
37  The need of preventive review becomes clear as regards Redundancy Plans (Sociaal Plan), in which 
both the CGB and the Cantonal Court conclude that the Plan is in violation of the Act on Equal 
Treatment Based on Age (WGBL). For example, see CGB 13 maart 2006, JAR 2006/85 ‘affirmed’ 
by the Cantonal Court of Deventer 9 juni 2006, JAR 2006/161. For an in-depth discussion on age 
discrimination in Redundancy Plans, see Bruynincks en Kehrer-Bot 2006. 
38  For example, see ABN Redundancy Plan. See also above under § 16.4.2 
39  STAR-Advies 2004/13. See also above under § 16.4.2. 
40  See also a divided Labour Foundation in this respect. STAR-Advies 2004/3. See also above under
§ 6.4.2. 
41  According to announcement of Jan Meijer, Head Dismissal Law, at CWI Congress ‘Ontslagrecht 
bespiegeld’ , 17 November 2006. See also EK 2005-2006, 29 738 en 30 370, C, p. 2-5. 
42  TK 2002-2003, 28 862, No. 6,  p. 9, referring to the Report of the Netherlands Interdisciplinary 
Demografic Institute (NIDI), Organisaties, veroudering en management: een onderzoek onder 
werkgevers, Den Haag 2001, p. 16. See also Plessen 2006, p. 289; Van der Lans 2006, p. 21, 24 and 
25, referring to ‘Werkdocument Arbeidsbemiddeling en – reintegratie van werklozen, Centraal 
Planbureau, Den Haag, februari 2000, p. 62 en Kamerstukken II 1998/00, 26202, nrs. 1-2, p. 54-55’.
43  TK 2002-2003, 28 862, No. 3, p. 2;  No. 6, p. 8. 
44  SER-Advies 2006/8. 
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First, one too easily assumes that employers tend to dismiss elderly employees 
as a rule. The general assumption that elderly people are less productive per se
has been proven to be unjustified, in that this, in general, depends on other 
characteristics and circumstances than age alone.45 Second, to the extent the new 
criterium of quality negatively affects elderly employees, my third proposal to 
introduce a duty of job training and/or occupational retraining, may partly 
prevent elderly employees of being dismissed.46 Third, there is no such thing for 
– elderly – employees as job security, i.e. a right to the job.47 To the extent 
elderly employees are considered to be in need of protection, already they obtain 
protection as a special category. For example, elderly employees are protected 
under the Act on Equal Treatment Based on Age (Wet gelijke behandeling op 
grond van leeftijd),48 through measures on the part of employers,49 and through 
specific measures of the government, stimulating employers to hire elderly 
persons and to invest in them.50
5.
My fifth proposal, like my third proposal, as a matter of fact, too, may be in the 
interest of elderly employees. In brief, I suggest that employers compensate the 
years of service when an employee is dismissed based on economic 
circumstances only. This applies to all dismissals in my proposal, which are 
subject to the CWI’s review. I, thus, do not agree with Hansma that employees, 
in principle, are not entitled to severance payment, when being dismissed with 
just cause.51 Rather, I agree with Zondag and Grapperhaus that although the 
principle of seniority should no longer be considered as the primary criterium 
for dismissal in requests based on economic circumstances, this does not mean 
that the years of service are without meaning.52 As I stated in Chapter 1, 
employers and employees depend on each other to reach their goals. Employers, 
in other words, can only survive with the help of employees, and employees, in 
principle, can only survive with the help of employers. If the employee has to 
45  Nyfer 2000, p. 99. See also Van der Lans 2006, p. 26. 
46  See also EK 2005-2006, 29 738 and 30 370, C, p. 2. 
47  See below under § 15.1.2 and § 21.2.In this respect, see also Plessen 2006, p. 290, referring to HvJ 
EG 22 november 2005, C-144/04 (Mangold). 
48  See CGB 13 maart 2006, JAR 2006/85 and in furtherance hereof Ktg. Deventer 9 juni 2006, JAR 
2006/161. See also Ktg. Deventer 21 maart 2006, JAR 2006/89. See further Heemskerk 2006a; 
Heemskerk 2006b; Heerma van Voss  en Van Slooten 2006, p. 503-505; Van Kranenburg-Hanspians  
2005; Plessen 2006. 
49 See Financieel Dagblad of 12 July 2006, Ziekenhuis-CAO opzij vanwege vergrijzing. On the other 
hand, the age of 65 is still a justification to terminate employment. See De Jong (2) 2006. See further  
Plessen 2006, p. 290; and Themanummer Arbeid Integraal 2006/1, De oudere werknemer.
50  For example, see Wet van 19 december 2003, houdende premievrijstelling bij in dienst nemen en in 
dienst houden van oudere werknemers, Stb. 2003, 557. For an overview of – other – measures taken 
in this respect, see TK 2003-2004, 27 046, Bevordering arbeidsdeelname oudere werknemers, No. 5, 
p. 11-18, 28 and 29. See also Plessen 2006, p. 289 and 290.
51   See Scholtens 2005b, p. 52, referring to Hansma 2000, p. 363. 
52   Zondag 2005b; Grapperhaus 2006, p. 37 and 38. See also Duk 2006, p. 18, referring to HR 28 maart  
       1997, NJ 1997, 561, JAR 1997/90 (Cemsto/El Azzouti). 
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leave the company for economic reasons only, the employer is asking the 
employee to make a sacrifice in order for the employer to survive, which he 
could not have done without the help – i.e. years of service – of the employee in 
the first place. For this sacrifice on the part of the employee, the employer, 
regardless of whether he applies quality as a criterium of dismissal, in my 
opinion should award the years of service. In fact, at present, an award for the 
years of service implicitly is incorporated in the Cantonal Formula. Employees 
in neutral dissolutions, e.g. dissolutions based on economic circumstances only, 
in principle, have a ‘right’ on a severance payment. In my proposal, the 
Cantonal Court is no longer authorized to decide on dismissals based on 
economic circumstances. Hence, employees, in effect, waive this right, because 
the CWI cannot grant severance payments.  
 Subsequently, the CWI Handbook on Dismissal, therefore, should be 
amended, determining that the employer must take the years of service into 
consideration. Primarily, the employer must offer a severance payment 
according to the Cantonal Formula.53 Alternatively, when financial means are 
insufficient, employers may offer outplacement. According to ongoing practice, 
employers, too, can offer a combination.54 The chance that a compensation 
based on the years of service is in violation of the Act on Equal Treatment 
Based on Age should not meet too much resistance.55 All the more so, when the 
Redundancy Plan meets the requirements of appropriateness and 
proportionality.56 The offer of severance payment and/or outplacement (costs) 
can take place through so-called premises. If an employer invokes the so-called 
‘habe-nichts’-exception, alleging that he is unable to offer a severance payment 
due his financial situation, the CWI, however, cannot reject the request when 
there is a just cause for dismissal. In this respect, the CWI is allowed to express 
his doubts in the permit, offering the employee a handout to start a procedure 
under Article 7:681 DCC.57 Unlike the Committee Rood, therefore, I argue in 
favor of Article 7:681 DCC remaining in existence, as a continuation of the 
BBA 1945-procedure, with the aim it may urge employers to consider the years 
53  TK 2001-2002, 28 170, No. 3, p. 33 and 34. See also Van der Hulst 1999, p. 248; Loonstra 2001b;  
Knegt 2006; Grapperhaus 2006, p. 38. For a calculation of the years of service, see Martens 1997; 
Van Ladesteijn 2006. 
54  Van der Hulst 1999, p. 247-249. 
55  See CGB 13 maart 2006, JAR 2006/85, ‘affirmed’ by the Cantonal Court of Enschede, 9 juni 2006, 
JAR 2006/161, determining that a Redundancy Plan violated this Act, due to a distinction based on 
age. See also Veldman 2005, p. 47 en 48, referring to Advies over de notitie van de Minister van 
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid inzake heroverweging van het last-in/firs-out (lifo) beginsel bij 
bedrijfseconomisch ontslag, CGB-Advies/2004/05, Utrecht (juli) 2004. In contrast, see CGB 12 
oktober 2006, JAR 2006/268, allowing parties to make a distinction – in paying severance payments 
– based on age in a Redundancy Plan.  
56  See CGB 24 september 2004, Oordeel 2004-118. For a discussion of this case, see Vegter 2004,  
p. 379 and 380; Joosten 2005. In this respect, see also HvJ EG 17 oktober 1989, zaak 109/88, Jur. 
1989, p. 3199 (Danfoss) and HvJ EG 3 oktober 2006, zaaknr. C-17/05, JAR 2006/267 (Cadman). For 
a discussion of these cases, see Veldman 2006. 
57  This possibility is explicitly referred to in the CWI Handbook on Dismissal under breach of trust. See 
above under § 16.6. 
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of service more seriously in making efforts to examine whether another position 
is available or in calculating a severance payment. As may have become clear, I 
do not advocate a legal right on the award of the years of service through a 
severance payment in the BBA 1945. This would mainly hurt small-sized 
companies which, due to the low costs, tend to address the CWI when asking for 
a termination of employment based on economic circumstances.58 In my 
proposal, they have a possibility to offer outplacement, or to invoke the ‘habe-
nichts’-exception.  
Cantonal Courts: individual dismissals based on other grounds 
6.
In my proposal, Cantonal Courts under Article 7:685 DCC will be authorized to 
decide on individual dismissals based on serious cause, economic circumstances 
exempted. Already, these cases form the majority of the substantive cases with 
the Cantonal Court.59 The Cantonal Formula, however, unlike the CWI 
Handbook on Dismissal, does not provide clear rules on these dismissals, which 
explains that the decision-making of Cantonal Courts is so often referred to as a 
‘tombola’. Hence, my sixth suggestion is that the Circle of Cantonal Courts 
adopts a Cantonal Formula with respect to the Application of the Just Cause 
Standard, and uses the CWI Handbook on Dismissal as a model. In effect, 
nothing stands in the way for Cantonal Courts to apply the same rules as the 
CWI. There is a difference between the CWI and the Cantonal Court, however. 
The CWI as part of the government must serve the public interest. Cantonal 
Courts, in principle, ‘only’ need to balance the interests of employers and 
employees. Therefore, the Circle of Cantonal Courts, in principle, must be free 
to adjust the rules of the CWI Handbook on Dismissal in this respect. Overall, 
the rules in the CWI Handbook on Dismissal are to the satisfaction of 
employers. It appears that employers are particularly satisfied on the application 
of rules as regards ill employees.60 Also, for dismissals based on unsatisfactory 
performance, the CWI provide clear rules, taking case law of civil courts into 
consideration. The rules in the CWI Handbook on Dismissal as regards a breach 
of trust, too, are in accordance with the legislature’s intent behind just cause 
protection. In contrast, Cantonal Courts often allow employers in these cases – 
of which most are handled by Cantonal Courts – to trade off just cause 
protection.61
7.
My seventh proposal sees to (these) requests based on breach of trust. As I 
pointed out in Chapter 3, in practice, Cantonal Courts tend to dissolve the 
58  See Loonstra en Zondag 2000, p. 1268-1272. See also Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 48. 
59  See Loonstra en Kruit 2006, p. 20 and 21. 
60  See also Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 21, 37 and 38. 
61  See also Research voor Beleid 2000, p. 30; Boot 2005c, p. 268-272. 
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employment agreement based on breach of trust, although the alleged reason 
underlying the breach of trust is non-existent. This explains an announcement in 
the Newspaper for the People (Volkskrant) of 28 March 2006 that the question 
in dissolution procedures under Article 7:685 DCC, in practice, focuses on the 
question of severance payment only.62 The law, however, requires serious cause, 
without the possibility of employers to trade off just cause protection. According 
to legislative history, this means that Cantonal Courts may dissolve these 
requests only when the employment relationship is severely and irreparably 
disrupted, hence, a replacement in the same, an adjusted or another position is 
impossible.  
The system, on the other hand, is not workable if Cantonal Courts reject 
a request because serious cause is lacking, and parties appear in court shortly 
after, due to the fact that replacement does not severely frustrate the operation of 
the firm, but eventually is enough to render the working situation not workable 
for the employee. To make the new dismissal system workable for both parties, 
I, therefore, suggest that the legislature amends Article 7:685 DCC, in that when 
serious cause is lacking, an employee is given a choice to agree upon 
continuation of the employment agreement or a trade-off sum, instead, as 
suggested by the court.63  In this respect, the new Cantonal Formula with 
respect to the Application of the Just Cause Standard must give clarity on its 
size. In my opinion, my proposal is in accordance with Article 4 of ILO 
Convention 158. The latter does not allow employers to trade off just cause 
protection. Also, the employer remains entitled to withdraw the request. The 
employer, thus, has the last say. The employee, on the other hand, has the last 
say on whether the employment agreement will come to an end, when just cause 
protection is lacking. An advantage of this trade-off system is that the law 
provides employees just cause protection according to the legislature’s intent on 
the one hand, but that the system of dismissal law becomes more flexible and 
workable for employers and employees on the other. In this respect, I agree with 
Zijl that trade unions need not be overly concerned about the level of 
employment protection. In her opinion, employees may prefer other job aspects 
than job security alone.64 Also, employees, in principle, remain entitled to 
unemployment benefits to the extent that the employment agreement is 
dissolved based on breach of trust for which the employee is not to blame. The 
UWV, on the other hand, may argue that the employee, in effect, agreed with the 
termination of employment. Future case law will decide whether the employee, 
indeed, remains entitled to unemployment benefits.  
8.
My eight proposal, in effect, is in furtherance of the foregoing and sees to factor 
N(umber of years of service)/A (aantal dienstjaren) of the Cantonal Formula. It 
62 Volkskrant of 28 March 2006, p. 7. See also Van den Heuvel 2000b, p. 364. 
63   This proposal ressembles the opt-out provision in the META. See above under § 6.3. 
64  Zijl 2006, p. 93; Financieel Dagblad of 20 June 2006. See also Bureau Bartels/SZW 2006, p. 104. 
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sees to the size of the severance payment. More specifically, it sees to the aspect 
of age. Under the Cantonal Formula, N is related to age, in that N = 1.5 for 
employees each year of service when the employee is between ages 40 through 
49; N = 2 for employees each year of service when the employee is 50 or older. 
Probably, the Circle of Cantonal Courts was of the opinion that the older the 
employees are, the more difficult it is for them to find a new job.65 A side-effect 
has been that severance payments, in general, are considered as relatively high 
compared to other countries.66 What is more important, is that the Cantonal 
Formula in this respect undermines measures of the government, stimulating 
employers to hire elderly employees and to invest in them, because factor N 
makes it unattractive to hire elderly employees, imposing relatively high costs 
on the employer when he wishes to dismiss this employee.   
Moreover, factor N discriminates against employees below the age of 
40. Under European case law, this is allowed only, when according to Article 
7.1.c of the Act, this distinction is objectively justified. Hence, the distinction 
must meet the requirements of legitimacy (legitimiteit), appropriateness 
(doelmatigheid) and proportionality (proportionaliteit) to be valid.67 In my 
opinion, one can doubt whether factor N (A) in the Cantonal Formula meets 
these criteria. First, one can doubt whether it is legitimate to protect elderly 
employees. As derives from case law of the European Court of Justice, the 
legitimacy is determined by state law and/or the social policy of the 
government.68 The social policy of the Dutch government is to involve elderly 
employees in the labour process. This goal is legitimate under Article 7.1.a of 
the Act. The Cantonal Formula negates the effect of measures to stimulate 
employers to hire elderly persons and to invest in them, however. Moreover, 
case law of the European Court of Justice does not allow deviating from the Act 
based on general assumptions.69 One can doubt whether it is legitimate to 
protect elderly employees based on the general assumption that elderly 
employees have more difficulties to find a new position on the labour market 
when being dismissed. In this respect, one can doubt whether it is appropriate to 
offer elderly employees a severance payment to cope with the problem of 
eventual unemployment. Also, one can doubt whether it is appropriate that an 
employee of 36 years with 15 years of service in a neutral dissolution obtains a 
severance payment of 15 x salary x 1, and an employee of 59 years with 10 
years of service in a neutral dissolution obtains a severance payment of (9x2) + 
65  The Circle of Cantonal Courts (Kring van Kantonrechters) has not made clear the exact reason to 
include age in factor N (A). See also Van der Lans 2006, p. 14. 
66   See TK 2004-2005, 30 109, No. 1, p. 40. For a discussion on this issue, see Barendrecht 2004,  
Fikkers 2004, Jongerius 2004, and Van den Braak 2004. See also Scholtens 2005b. 
67  These requirements derive from case law of the European Court of Justice. See HvJ EG 31 maart 
1981, zaak 96/80, Jur. 1981, p. 911 (Jenkins), HvJ EG 13 mei 1986, zaak 170/84, Jur. 1986, p. 1607 
(Bilka) and HvJ EG 13 juli 1989, zaak 171/88, p. 2743 (Rinner-Kuhn). 
68  HvJ EG 9 februari 1999, C-167/97, Jur. 1999, p. I-623 (Seymour-Smith). 
69  HvJ EG 13 juli 1989, No. 171/88, Jur. 1989, p. 2743 (Rinner-Kuhn). 
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(1x1.5) = 19.5 x salary x 1.70 Last, one can doubt whether the factor N (A) in the 
Cantonal Formula is necessary to meet the difficulty of elderly employees in 
finding a job. Factor C, too, allows Cantonal Courts to include the bad labour 
market position of the elderly employee. Moreover, it is less disproportional
than application of factor N (A). In this respect, I agree with the Judiciary 
Council (Raad voor de Rechtspraak) not to introduce a legal norm on severance 
payments under Article 7:685 DCC, but to leave Cantonal Courts the possibility 
to decide on the size of the severance payment based on the specific 
circumstances of the case, which may include the bad labour market position of 
the elderly employee.71 In conclusion, I subscribe to the claim that the forum 
named Alternative for Union (Alternatief voor Vakbond or AVV) – focusing on 
rights for newcomers on the labour market – recently filed with the CGB, 
alleging that the factor N is in violation of the Act on Equal Treatment Based on 
Age.72  To a certain extent, my proposal shows similarity with the so-called 
Groen Version (Groen-variant), named after the Cantonal Judge who refused to 
apply factor N (A) = 2, because the employee was hired above the age of 50. In 
his opinion, factor N (A) = 1 should be applied to employees who were hired 
above the age of 40, and between ages 40 through 49 at the time of the 
dissolution. Factor N (A) = 1.5 should be applied to employees who were hired 
above the age of 40, and between ages 50 and older at the time of the 
dissolution. To employees who were hired above the age of 50, he advocated 
that factor N (A) should be 1, regardless of their age.73 The Groen Version has 
been followed by a number of courts.74 In fact, most recently, it has been 
followed by the Cantonal Court of Deventer. In brief, the Cantonal Court held 
that to include age as a separate factor, this may impose unreasonable costs on 
the employer on the one hand, and may form a bottleneck to hire elderly – 
experienced – employees on the other. Moreover, this Court, too, had doubts 
whether the Cantonal Formula is in accordance with the Act on Equal Treatment 
Based on Age in this respect.75
9.
My ninth proposal sees to conditional requests based on urgent reasons for 
dismissal. To the extent that Cantonal Courts do not consistently apply case law 
on summary dismissals to conditional requests, these employment agreements, 
in effect, are being dissolved based on non-existing urgent reasons. My proposal 
70  See also Van der Lans 2006, p. 18. 
71   For the government, see TK 2004-2005, 30 109, No. 1, p. 42. For the Raad voor de Rechtspraak, see       
       its Advice (Letter) of 8 July 2004 (www.rechtspraak.nl). See SER-Advies 2005/5, p. 126 and 127. 
72  The AVV filed its complaint with the CGB in August 2006 based on a doctoral thesis of Van der 
Lans 2006. See www.alternatiefvoorvakbond.nl. 
73  Ktr. Hilversum 22 oktober 1999, JAR 1999/241. 
74  For case law, see Scholtens statistiek ontslagvergoedingen 2002 (II), p. 6;  2004 (II), p.7; Scholtens 
2005c, p. 6; Van Kranenburg-Hanspians 2005, p. 7;  Heemskerk 2006a, p. 21; Van der Lans 2006,  
p. 16, footnote 24. 
75  Ktg. Deventer 21 maart 2006, JAR 2006/89. For another opinion, see Ktg. Heerlen 23 augustus 2006, 
JAR 2006/230. 
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is that the new Cantonal Formula with respect to the Application of the Just 
Cause Standard, too, determines that Cantonal Courts consistently apply case 
law on summary dismissals to these requests on the one hand, and that the 
legislature abolishes the possibility of a summary dismissal under Article 7:677 
DCC on the other. The rationale behind the foregoing proposal(s) is twofold. 
First, the abolition of an summary dismissal will prevent that employers, in 
effect, abuse the practice of conditional requests under Article 7:677 DCC in 
conjunction with Article 7:685 DCC to get rid of an employee without cause. 
Second, under Article 7:677 DCC an employer decides on an urgent reason for 
dismissal. In general, dismissals under the Dutch dismissal system are subject to 
a preventive review of the CWI or the (Cantonal) Court. The rationale behind a 
preventive review is to prevent rash dismissals, and to safeguard that employers 
will use a dismissal as an ultimum remedium only.76 Therefore, it seems 
illogical to have an employer to decide on a summary dismissal, considering the 
consequences it has for employees. Moreover, for employers and employees it is 
more efficient if an employer suspends the employee after the occurrence of the 
urgent reason for dismissal, in principle with continuation of payment of salary, 
and instantly initiates an Article 7:685-procedure, in which the Cantonal Court is 
asked to grant a dissolution based on urgent cause. This procedure will lead to 
lower costs for the employer on the one hand, and will protect an employee 
against instant loss of income on the other. I am aware that if the legislature will 
abolish summary dismissals under Article 7:677 DCC, case law on an urgent 
reason for dismissal as from then will be established by Cantonal Courts. Case 
law of courts under Article 7:677 DCC, on the other hand, will remain to serve 
as its starting point. Consequently, Cantonal Courts must reject a request when 
an urgent reason for dismissal – under this case law – is lacking. Instead, based 
on my seventh proposal, Cantonal Courts may leave the employee a choice to 
agree upon either continuation of the employment agreement, or a trade-off sum 
instead.
10.
My tenth proposal, finally, sees to workers employed on the basis of a contract 
according to the BBA 1945, but not on the basis of an employment agreement 
according to Article 7:610 DCC. These employees fall within the scope of the 
BBA 1945 only. Hence, in my proposal, they will lack just cause protection 
when being dismissed based on grounds other than economic circumstances. For 
these workers, I propose to include a rule in Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil 
Code, enabling the Minister of Social Affairs to apply a special regime to these 
workers, in that they have the same rights as employees under Article 7:610 
DCC regarding these other grounds of dismissal. In 1970, the SER already 
suggested such a rule, allowing the Minister to exclude – or include – 
employees. Earlier, Van der Heijden already suggested a special regime for 
76  Kuip en Verhulp 2001, p. 416. See also Van den Heuvel 2000b, p. 368 and 369; Loonstra 2005a,  
p. 293. 
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economically dependent employees in general. The latter is still point of debate, 
however.77 In this respect, Koopmans correctly states that by applying the Act of 
the Employment Agreement of 1907, the legislature did not aim to make an Act 
for all types of agreements and workers, rather to outban social abuses.78 There 
is no discussion, however, on whether workers who already enjoy just cause 
protection under the BBA 1945 should obtain just cause protection. Hence, to 
the extent these workers no longer enjoy just cause protection under the BBA 
1945, this should be provided by Book 7 Title 10 of the Dutch Civil Code. 
Overall, my proposals on individual and collective dismissals primarily intend to 
provide employers and employees legal equality and legal security regarding 
employment termination on the one hand, and to make the dual just cause 
dismissal system more flexible for employers and employees – while 
safeguarding just cause protection for employees – on the other. As regards the 
latter, my suggestion is to give employees a possibility to trade off just cause 
protection. If the International Labour Office opposes this practice, the Dutch 
government in my opinion should reconsider why it, in fact, wishes to ratify ILO 
Convention 158. The desire for harmonization of dismissal systems alone does 
not enable employers to strengthen their competitive position in the international 
context. Only if all countries adhere to the just cause rule, this may be the case. 
In this respect, the statement of the Labour Foundation is understandable, in that 
‘due to the low number of ratifications among states of the European Union it 
was not (yet) convinced whether ILO Convention 158 should be the basis for 
Dutch dismissal law’.79 Hence, my suggestion is to modify the dual just cause 
dismissal system according to the above, without (yet) ratifying the Convention 
In my opinion, the Dutch government – as a matter of speaking – kills two flies 
with one stone. First, private-sector employees will enjoy just cause protection 
according to Article 4 of ILO Convention. Second, in this respect, the Dutch 
dismissal system will be harmonized with dismissal systems of other member 
states, which ratified the Convention. 
In conclusion, as regards the United States, I primarily address the Drafters of a 
Restatement of Employment Law. I suggest that (i) they reflect the law as it 
stands, hence, recognize the implied-in-fact (good cause) contract, which is 
good law in California and a number of other states; and (ii) they recognize that 
once there is a good cause contract under the handbook exception, and the 
employer wishes to modify the just cause standard, the employer needs 
consideration and assent to such modification according to general contract 
principles. I further invite courts to focus on the question whether and which 
special rules and remedies should apply to the employment relationship.  
77  EK 2005-2006, 29 738 and 30 370 C, p. 17. 
78  Koopmans 1962, p. 80. 
79  See above under § 1.3.3. and § 24.3.1. 
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As regards the Netherlands, I address the legislature, Cantonal Courts 
and the CWI to consider my proposals. In my opinion, by making rules on 
employment termination more flexible for employers and employees, while 
maintaining just cause protection, this will result in (job) security for insiders, 
and job opportunities for newcomers and outsiders.80 In this respect, my 
suggestions meet the requirements with which Dutch dismissal law, according to 
the government, must comply. In brief, it (1) must prevent rash dismissals to 
protect an employee against the loss of work and income; (2) this protection 
must find its limit in a reasonable interest of the employer on continuation and 
the well-being of the organization; (3) must not frustrate the mobility of the 
labour market, nor that of employees; and (4) must offer newcomers and 
outsiders job opportunities.81 In this respect, my suggestions, too, comply with 
the mid-long policy that all must participate in the labour process, as subscribed 
to by the SER.82
80  See also Zijl 2006, p. 143; CPB Document 135 (2006). 
81  HSI 1999/03, p. 13, referring to TK 1992-1993, 22 977, No. 2. See also Boot 2005c, p. 246 and 247 
referring to TK 1992-1993, 22 977, No. 2 as well. In my opinion the(se) aims of dismissal law as 
formulated by De Vries are rather to be found in TK 1992-1993, 22 977, No. 1.  See also more 
recently, Notitie Ontwikkelingen en keuzes in het stelsel van werk en inkomen of the Mininster of 
Social Affairs, sent to the Lower House on 28 June 2006, in furtherance of TK 2004-2005, 29 804, 
No. 6. 
82  SER-Advies 2006/8. 
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SAMENVATTING 
INLEIDING EN PROBLEEMSTELLING (hoofdstuk 1) 
De Industriële Revolutie in de 19e eeuw leidde tot sociale misstanden voor 
werknemers. De Nederlandse regering reageerde met de Wet op de 
arbeidsovereenkomst van 1907. Deze wet beoogde werknemers te beschermen 
tegen misbruik door werkgevers, maar bevatte vooralsnog geen zogeheten iusta 
causa dimissionis. Deze eis van een redelijke grond voor ontslag, die beoogt een 
willekeurig ontslag in het algemeen tegen te gaan, kreeg voor het eerst haar 
beslag in na-oorlogse – van origine Duitse – wetgeving, beter bekend als het 
Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen van 1945 (BBA 1945). Naast de 
introductie van dit algemene opzegverbod, introduceerde de wetgever 
bijzondere opzegverboden in Boek 7 Titel 10 Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW), de 
opvolger van de Wet op de arbeidsovereenkomst van 1907, die beogen 
werknemers te beschermen tegen een willekeurig ontslag op grond van 
specifieke redenen. Amerika kent eveneens opzegverboden. De nadruk in 
Amerika werd echter aanvankelijk gelegd op de ontwikkeling van de relatief 
jonge economie. Regels die beogen werknemers te beschermen tegen een 
willekeurig ontslag in het algemeen bleven uit. Amerikaanse rechters kozen 
voor de zogeheten at-will rule, die nog steeds het uitgangspunt is voor 
werknemers in het Amerikaanse ontslagrecht. Op grond van deze regel kan een 
werkgever een werknemer zonder reden ontslaan.  
 Het proces van economische globalisering aan het eind van de 20e eeuw 
leidde wederom tot misbruik van werknemers. Dit proces werd ingeleid door de 
openstelling van markten voor goederen en diensten door landen wereldwijd, 
waardoor de internationale concurrentie toenam. Met name in 
ontwikkelingslanden, maar ook in Amerika en Nederland leidde het proces van 
economische globalisering – behalve tot positieve effecten voor de economie 
ook – tot negatieve effecten voor werknemers. Het proces noodzaakte de 
laatsten feitelijk op zoek te gaan naar een nieuwe balans tussen een flexibel 
ontslagrecht voor werkgevers enerzijds, en ontslagbescherming voor 
werknemers anderzijds. De vraag die in dit proefschrift centraal staat, is in 
welke mate werknemers met een arbeidsovereenkomst voor onbepaalde tijd in 
Amerika en Nederland bescherming genieten tegen een willekeurig ontslag in 
het algemeen. Het antwoord is van belang voor Amerika en Nederland bij hun 
zoektocht naar deze nieuwe balans. Met betrekking tot de mate waarin 
werknemers bescherming tegen een willekeurig ontslag in het algemeen 
genieten, is aansluiting gezocht bij artikel 4 van Conventie 158 van de 
Internationale Arbeidsorganisatie (IAO). Dit artikel bepaalt dat de 
arbeidsovereenkomst van een werknemer niet mag worden beëindigd zonder dat 
daarvoor een geldige reden aanwezig is, die verband houdt met de geschiktheid 
of het gedrag van de werknemer of gebaseerd is op de vereisten voor het 
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functioneren van de onderneming.1 Voor beide landen is nagegaan welke 
knelpunten rijzen in hun zoektocht naar een nieuwe balans tussen flexibiliteit 
voor werkgevers enerzijds, en ontslagbescherming voor werknemers anderzijds. 
Ik vraag mij daarbij steeds af of, en in hoeverre beide landen van elkaar kunnen 
leren. Het onderzoek beoogt oplossingen voor de geconstateerde knelpunten aan 
te dragen, en op deze manier een bijdrage te leveren aan de discussie over het 
ontslagrecht in beide landen. 
AMERIKAANS ONTSLAGRECHT (hoofdstuk 2) 
In hoofdstuk 2 beschrijf ik het Amerikaanse ontslagrecht. Ik ga na in hoeverre 
Amerikaanse werknemers met een arbeidsovereenkomst voor onbepaalde tijd 
bescherming tegen een willekeurig ontslag in het algemeen genieten uit hoofde 
van de door de federale wetgever, statelijke wetgevers, en rechters gemaakte 
uitzonderingen op de at-will rule. In dit kader besteed ik achtereenvolgens 
aandacht aan het (federale) collectieve arbeidsrecht, (federale) anti-
discriminatiewetgeving, statelijke wetgeving, en de rechtspraak. De conclusie is 
dat de vooronderstelling als zou het Amerikaanse recht in het geheel geen 
ontslagbescherming aan werknemers bieden onjuist is. Dit staat overigens los 
van de vraag of werknemers deze bescherming in de praktijk genieten. 
Werknemers op wie een collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst (CAO) van toepassing 
is, de zogeheten collective bargaining-unit employees, genieten bescherming 
tegen een willekeurig ontslag in het algemeen uit hoofde van CAO-bepalingen 
en arbitrage. Civiele rechters lijken geenszins bereid om in navolging van 
arbiters deze bescherming ook aan non-bargaining-unit employees c.q. at-will
employees te bieden. De laatsten genieten op grond van de National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) van 1935 ‘slechts’ bescherming tegen een willekeurig 
ontslag op grond van een specifieke discriminatoire reden, en in het geval van 
georganiseerde activiteiten (concerted activities), maar niet tegen een 
willekeurig ontslag in het algemeen. At-will employees zijn voor het laatste 
aangewezen op (federale) anti-discriminatiewetgeving, statelijke wetgeving 
en/of rechtspraak (common law).
 Uit hoofde van (federale) anti-discriminatiewetgeving genieten at-will 
employees geen bescherming tegen een willekeurig ontslag in het algemeen, 
maar ‘slechts’ bescherming tegen een ontslag op grond van specifieke 
discriminatoire gronden. Wel vloeit uit de rechtspraak omtrent (federale) anti-
discriminatiewetgeving voort dat de werkgever een non-discriminatoire reden 
dient te aan te tonen nadat de werknemer het vermoeden van discriminatie heeft 
aangetoond. De rechtspraak bepaalt evenwel dat deze non-discriminatoire reden 
geen redelijke grond voor ontslag hoeft te behelzen, maar slechts een reden die 
geen discriminatoire in de zin van de wet in kwestie is. Ergo, resteert statelijke 
wetgeving en/of rechtspraak waarop at-will employees zich eventueel kunnen 
verlaten voor bescherming tegen een willekeurig ontslag in het algemeen. 
1   Zie ook Kuip 1993a, p. 280. 
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Een exercitie onder statelijk recht leert dat alleen werknemers in de staat 
Montana bescherming kunnen genieten tegen een willekeurig ontslag in het 
algemeen. De Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (WDFEA) van 1987 
behelst een just cause standard, die overeenkomt met de standaard in CAO’s. 
De WDFEA is tot stand gekomen op initiatief van werkgevers als reactie op 
exorbitant hoge schadevergoedingen die Amerikaanse rechters aan werknemers 
toekenden in geval van een zogeheten wrongful discharge. Het probleem van de 
WDFEA is dat in de praktijk lager opgeleiden bescherming ontberen, omdat 
overtreding van de just cause standard ‘slechts’ leidt tot een contractuele 
schadevergoeding. Het probleem is dat advocaten in de regel plegen te 
procederen op grond van een contingency fee basis. Dit betekent dat zij 
procederen op grond van no cure, no pay enerzijds, evenwel een (hoog) 
percentage van de opbrengst van een gewonnen zaak bedingen anderzijds. In de 
praktijk leidt dit ertoe dat advocaten in de regel alleen zaken aannemen die 
leiden tot een hoge opbrengst. Het gaat dan om tort claims die resulteren in 
zogeheten punitive damages of contract claims van hoger opgeleiden. Met 
punitive damages wordt beoogd de overtreder te straffen, in tegenstelling tot een 
contractuele schadevergoeding die beoogt de daadwerkelijk geleden schade te 
compenseren. Hoewel de WDFEA tracht het probleem van afwijzing van 
contract claims door advocaten tegen te gaan door in beginsel arbitrage voor te 
schrijven, weigeren werkgevers in de praktijk arbitrage, waardoor werknemers 
alsnog zijn aangewezen op het zogeheten contigency fee system. Lager 
opgeleiden ontberen veelal de financiële middelen om zich te laten bijstaan door 
een  advocaat op uurbasis. 
 De overige staten hanteren nog steeds als uitgangspunt de at-will rule in 
het ontslagrecht. De uitzonderingen die de rechters vanaf eind zeventiger jaren 
en begin tachtiger jaren maakten op deze regel behelzen kort samengevat de (1) 
public policy exception, een uitzondering gebaseerd op strijd met de openbare 
orde; (2) good faith and fair dealing exception, een uitzondering gebaseerd op 
strijd met de redelijkheid en billijkheid; en (3) contract exception, bestaande uit 
de (i) handbook exception, een uitzondering gebaseerd op arbeidsvoorwaarden; 
en (ii) implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception, een uitzondering 
gebaseerd op de omstandigheden van het geval. Ten aanzien van voornoemde 
uitzonderingen die door rechters gemaakt werden nam Californië het voortouw. 
Californië nam echter tevens het voortouw om de reikwijdte van de 
uitzonderingen op de at-will rule in te perken. Inperking geschiedde eerst ten 
aanzien van de norm, later ook ten aanzien van de sanctie. Zo duidde de good 
faith and fair dealing exception aanvankelijk op het vereiste van een redelijke 
grond voor ontslag voor werknemers, maar het bereik werd al snel beperkt tot 
uitzonderlijke gevallen van slecht werkgeverschap. Ook werd de 
schadevergoeding van punitive damages uitgesloten ten aanzien van de good 
faith and fair dealing exception. Voorts resulteren de uitzonderingen die een 
redelijke grond voor ontslag vereisen, te weten de handbook exception en de 
implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception, slechts in contractuele 
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schadevergoedingen. Lager opgeleiden ontberen daarom in de regel 
bescherming onder deze uitzonderingen. Ook kunnen werkgevers just cause 
protection contractueel uitsluiten ten aanzien van de handbook exception door 
zogeheten at-will disclaimers. Hoewel werkgevers at-will disclaimers eveneens 
opnemen om de implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception te ondergraven, 
is dit niet in al de gevallen met succes. Een at-will disclaimer onder deze 
uitzondering wordt door rechters beschouwd als slechts een van de 
omstandigheden om te bepalen of een redelijke grond voor ontslag is vereist. 
Deze uitzondering heeft dus een steviger basis dan de handbook exception. De 
implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception wordt anderzijds – in 
tegenstelling tot de handbook exception – slechts door een minderheid van 
staten aanvaard. 
NEDERLANDS ONTSLAGRECHT (hoofdstuk 3) 
In hoofdstuk 3 beschrijf ik het Nederlandse ontslagrecht. Gelijk als in het vorige 
hoofdstuk ga ik na in hoeverre werknemers met een arbeidsovereenkomst voor 
onbepaalde tijd bescherming genieten tegen een willekeurig ontslag in het 
algemeen, overeenkomstig de bedoeling van de wetgever. Deze luidt dat een 
werkgever een werknemer tegen zijn wil kan ontslaan met inachtneming van een 
redelijke grond voor ontslag, zonder dat de werkgever de  mogelijkheid heeft 
om deze ontslagbescherming af te kopen. In het bijzonder ga ik na of de 
vooronderstelling juist is dat werknemers deze bescherming genieten op grond 
van het BBA 1945, artikel 7:681 BW en artikel 7:685 BW. Als eerste beschrijf 
ik het duale ontslagstelsel. Dit behelst kort samengevat dat werkgevers die tot 
een beëindiging van de arbeidsovereenkomst willen komen tegen de wil van de 
werknemer in verplicht zijn om (1) een vergunning te vragen bij het Centrum 
voor Werk en Inkomen (CWI) om de arbeidsovereenkomst op te kunnen 
zeggen; of (2) de Rechtbank, Sectie Kanton (hierna Kantonrechter) te verzoeken 
de arbeidsovereenkomst te ontbinden. Het CWI toetst of sprake is van een 
redelijke grond voor het ontslag. De Kantonrechter toetst of sprake is van een 
gewichtige reden. Het onderzoek toont aan dat in de praktijk deze gronden voor 
ontslag op hetzelfde neerkomen, echter de Kantonrechter minder stringente 
normen dan het CWI hanteert om te bepalen of sprake is van een redelijke grond 
voor ontslag. Na een beschrijving van het BBA 1945, artikel 7:681 BW en 
artikel 7:685 BW trek ik de volgende conclusies ten aanzien van de mate waarin 
werknemers met een arbeidsovereenkomst voor onbepaalde tijd in Nederland 
bescherming genieten.  
 Ik concludeer dat op grond van het BBA 1945, nader uitgewerkt in het 
Ontslagbesluit en de Beleidsregels Ontslagtaak CWI, en studies die zijn verricht 
naar de praktijk van het CWI en haar voorgangers, werknemers bescherming 
genieten tegen een willekeurig ontslag in het algemeen, overeenkomstig de 
bedoeling van de wetgever. Het feit dat dit niet steeds als zodanig wordt ervaren, 
is omdat het merendeel van de verzoeken om een vergunning door het CWI 
wordt toegewezen. Dit laat onverlet dat het CWI de regelen van het BBA 1945, 
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het Ontslagbesluit en de Beleidsregels Ontslagtaak CWI consistent toepast. Voor 
werknemers is het CWI niet altijd de aangewezen weg. Het CWI kan namelijk 
geen vergoeding toekennen. Echter, een werknemer heeft de mogelijkheid om 
na een (on)geldig gegeven ontslag een vergoeding te verzoeken op grond van 
artikel 7:681 BW. 
Artikel 7:681 BW schrijft voor dat wanneer een ontslag kennelijk onredelijk is, 
de rechter een vergoeding toe moet kennen. Het vereiste van een kennelijk 
onredelijk ontslag is niet synoniem aan het vereiste van een redelijke grond voor 
ontslag in het algemeen. Hoewel veelal wordt aangenomen dat artikel 1639s – 
de  rechtsvoorganger van artikel 7:681 BW – de introductie van een iusta causa 
dimissionis behelsde in het Nederlandse ontslagrecht, is dit niet juist. In de 
eerste plaats heeft de wetgever dit uitdrukkelijk niet gewild, evenwel de rechter 
slechts een discretionaire bevoegdheid willen geven om op grond van de 
omstandigheden van het geval te oordelen of een ontslag kennelijk onredelijk is. 
Voorzover de wet een ontslag zonder redelijke grond als een kennelijk 
onredelijk ontslag kwalificeert, behelst dit slechts een voorbeeld en geldt het als 
een van de omstandigheden die kan leiden tot een kennelijk onredelijk ontslag. 
In de tweede plaats ligt bij artikel 7:681 BW het accent vanaf het arrest 
Lampe/De Vries (1961) veeleer op de (financiële) gevolgen van het ontslag voor 
de werknemer. Ten slotte kan men zich afvragen in hoeverre sprake is van 
bescherming tegen een willekeurig ontslag in het algemeen, wanneer de 
werkgever deze ex artikel 7:681 BW kan afkopen als de werknemer om herstel 
van de arbeidsovereenkomst verzoekt. 
Artikel 7:685 BW vereist wel uitdrukkelijk een redelijke grond voor 
ontslag. Uit de wetsgeschiedenis volgt dat artikel 1639w – de rechtsvoorganger 
van artikel 7:685 BW – een gewichtige reden voor ontslag vereist die bestaat uit 
(1) een dringende reden; of (2) een verandering van omstandigheden. Artikel 
1639w werd aanvankelijk restrictief uitgelegd. De reden hiervoor was tweeërlei. 
In de eerste plaats vloeide uit de rechtspraak omtrent een ontslag op staande voet 
voort, dat van een dringende reden slechts sprake kon zijn als de werkgever de 
werknemer na kennisneming van de dringende reden terstond ontsloeg. Bij een 
verzoek uit hoofde van een dringende reden ex artikel 1639w bleef de 
werknemer echter in dienst tot de datum van de ontbinding. Deze rechtspraak 
stond hiermee de facto een ontbinding op grond van een dringende reden in de 
weg. In de tweede plaats werd artikel 1639w restrictief uitgelegd, omdat de 
wetgever bij een verandering van omstandigheden slechts dacht aan 
uitzonderlijke gevallen, waardoor ontbindingen op deze grond eveneens zelden 
plaats vonden. In 1953 besloot de wetgever artikel 1639w op te rekken, ter 
compensatie van de langere opzegtermijnen die werden geïntroduceerd om 
werknemers een betere ontslagbescherming te bieden. In de eerste plaats werd 
bepaald dat de rechtspraak omtrent het ontslag op staande voet ontbindingen op 
grond van een dringende reden niet langer in de weg stonden. In de tweede 
plaats werd bepaald dat de verandering van omstandigheden – behalve 
bedrijfseconomische omstandigheden en disfunctioneren – een verstoorde 
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arbeidsverhouding kon behelzen. Ook maakte de wetgever het voor de 
Kantonrechter mogelijk om bij een ontbinding op grond van een verandering 
van omstandigheden een vergoeding toe te kennen. Ondanks deze flexibilisering 
werd artikel 1639w nog steeds beperkt toegepast. Dit veranderde na de tweede 
oliecrisis in de tachtiger jaren toen de voorganger van het CWI de toestroom van 
verzoeken om ontslagvergunningen niet langer aankon. Bij wijze van alternatief 
wendden werkgevers zich tot de Kantonrechter om ontbindingen  van de 
arbeidsovereenkomst op grond van artikel 1639w te verzoeken. De populariteit 
van de Kantonrechter werd alleen maar groter nadat werkgevers bleek dat 
Kantonrechters soepeler omgingen met zogeheten pro forma procedures. Het 
gaat bij deze procedures om een formeel protest van de werknemer – partijen 
zijn het in beginsel eens over beëindiging van de arbeidsovereenkomst – tot 
behoud van een werkloosheidsuitkering. Voor werkgevers is de 
ontbindingsprocedure inmiddels een volwaardig alternatief voor de 
vergunningenprocedure geworden. De laatste wordt met name aangewend voor 
verzoeken op grond van economische redenen, die door het CWI worden 
getoetst aan de hand van het BBA 1945, het Ontslagbesluit en de Beleidsregels 
Ontslagtaak CWI. De ontbindingsprocedure wordt met name aangewend voor 
een verandering van omstandigheden, bestaande in een verstoorde arbeidsrelatie. 
Deze dienen te worden afgewezen wanneer een redelijke grond voor ontslag 
ontbreekt. Uit rechtspraak volgt evenwel dat Kantonrechters ertoe neigen om bij 
afwezigheid van een gewichtige reden een vergoeding toe te kennen in plaats 
van een verzoek af te wijzen. Dit zien we met name bij verzoeken op grond van 
een verstoorde arbeidsverhouding die niet aan de werknemer te wijten is. 
Eveneens zien we dit bij zogeheten voorwaardelijke verzoeken op grond van een 
dringende reden, die in de regel door werkgevers worden ingediend na een 
ontslag op staande voet. Wij zien het ook, in mindere mate, bij verzoeken die 
worden ingediend op grond van een economische reden – door een zeer ruime 
toepassing van de marginale toetsing door Kantonrechters – en bij verzoeken die 
worden ingediend op grond van ziekte die langer duurt dan twee jaren.  
AMERIKAANS EN NEDERLANDS ONTSLAGRECHT  
IN HET LICHT VAN IAO CONVENTIE 158 (hoofdstuk 4) 
Amerika en Nederland zijn beide lidstaten van de Internationale 
Arbeidsorganisatie (IAO), die sinds 1946 deel uitmaakt van de Verenigde Naties 
(VN). De IAO houdt zich binnen de VN bezig met sociale vraagstukken. In 
hoofdstuk 4 heb ik onderzocht in hoeverre de mate van bescherming die 
werknemers in Amerika en Nederland genieten tegen een willekeurig ontslag, 
voldoet aan de eis die hieraan gesteld wordt door artikel 4 van IAO Conventie 
158. Het valt op dat beide landen zich ontwikkelen in de richting van deze 
international just cause standard. Nederland is ook voornemens tot ratificatie 
van IAO Conventie 158 over te gaan, in tegenstelling tot Amerika. De reden om 
IAO Conventie 158 desalniettemin tot uitgangspunt te nemen, is dat op niet-
ratificerende landen de voortdurende plicht rust om na te gaan in hoeverre 
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ratificatie mogelijk is, en kennisname van de huidige stand van zaken van het 
Amerikaanse en het Nederlandse ontslagrecht met het oog hierop van belang 
blijft.  
 Het onderzoek toont aan dat in Amerika werknemers op wie een CAO 
van toepassing is, bescherming genieten tegen een willekeurig ontslag 
overeenkomstig artikel 4 van IAO Conventie 158. Ook de Montana Wrongful 
Discharge From Employment Act of 1987 behelst een just cause standard
overeenkomstig artikel 4, echter ontberen lager opgeleiden veelal bescherming. 
Het laatste geldt ook voor de implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exception,
welke in de rechtspraak het meest artikel 4 van ILO Conventie 158 nadert. De 
meerderheid van Amerikaanse werknemers is derhalve feitelijk nog steeds 
onderworpen aan de at-will rule. Deze meerderheid zou een ratificatie van IAO 
Conventie 158 verwelkomen. Zoals hiervoor opgemerkt is de Amerikaanse 
regering niet voornemens de Conventie te ratificeren. De situatie in Nederland is 
een geheel andere. In Nederland genieten werknemers bescherming tegen een 
willekeurig ontslag in het algemeen, overeenkomstig artikel 4 van IAO 
Conventie 158, op grond van het BBA 1945, nader uitgewerkt in het 
Ontslagbesluit en de Beleidsregels Ontslagtaak CWI. Het Nederlandse 
ontslagrecht laat werkgevers evenwel de ruimte om in plaats van een vergunning 
te vragen aan het CWI, zich ex artikel 7:685 BW te wenden tot de Kantonrechter 
om ontbinding van de arbeidsovereenkomst te verzoeken op grond van een 
gewichtige reden. Deze procedure heeft aan populariteit gewonnen, niet in de 
laatste plaats vanwege het gegeven dat Kantonrechters bij het ontbreken van een 
gewichtige reden, in plaats van verzoeken af te wijzen, arbeidsovereenkomsten 
ontbinden onder toekenning van een vergoeding. Geconcludeerd kan worden dat 
Kantonrechters artikel 7:685 BW niet conform de bedoeling van de wetgever 
toepassen. Ergo, door de minder stringente toepassing van de wet, prefereren 
vele werkgevers de ontbindingsprocedure. Werkgevers die met het oog op de 
toenemende internationale concurrentie werknemers gemakkelijker willen 
kunnen ontslaan, dringen er bij de overheid in dit kader tevens op aan om het 
BBA 1945 – die bedoeld was als tijdelijke na-oorlogse wetgeving – af te 
schaffen. De overheid, op zoek naar een balans tussen flexibiliteit voor 
werkgevers enerzijds en ontslagbescherming voor werknemers anderzijds, heeft 
afschaffing ook overwogen. De conclusie ten aanzien van Nederland onder het 
huidige duale ontslagstelsel luidt dat wanneer de Nederlandse regering het BBA 
1945 afschaft om het ontslagrecht flexibeler voor werkgevers te maken, het – de 
toepassing van – artikel 7:685 BW heroverweegt alvorens tot  ratificatie van 
ILO Conventie 158 over te gaan.  
VERGELIJKING VAN AMERIKAANS EN NEDERLANDS ONTSLAGRECHT 
(hoofdstuk 5) 
In hoofdstuk 5 heb ik het Amerikaanse en Nederlandse ontslagrecht vergeleken 
met betrekking tot de mate van bescherming die werknemers met een 
arbeidsovereenkomst voor een onbepaalde tijd genieten tegen een willekeurig 
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ontslag in het algemeen. De conclusie is dat het Amerikaanse ontslagrecht zich  
ontwikkelt in de richting van ontslagbescherming voor werknemers. Het 
Nederlandse ontslagrecht ontwikkelt zich in de richting van een flexibel 
ontslagrecht voor werkgevers. Op het eerste gezicht groeien de beide 
ontslagstelsels dus naar elkaar toe. Beide ontslagstelsels verschillen echter nog 
steeds significant van elkaar. In Amerika is de hoofdregel nog altijd dat een 
werkgever een werknemer at will kan ontslaan, dus zonder – redelijke – grond 
voor ontslag. In Nederland is de zogeheten iusta causa dimissionis nog steeds de 
hoofdregel. In het algemeen kan overigens niet gesteld worden dat de ene regel 
beter is dan de andere. Desalniettemin wordt de laatste als de betere regel 
ervaren. Dit is gedeeltelijk te verklaren door de consensus die hierover is bereikt 
op internationaal niveau in 1963 in IAO Aanbeveling 119 (ILO
Recommendation 119), de voorganger van IAO Conventie 158. Vanuit 
economisch oogpunt wordt de at-will rule evenwel als de betere regel 
beschouwd c.q. de just cause rule als belemmerend ervaren om flexibel te 
kunnen reageren op ontwikkelingen in de markt, hetgeen noodzakelijk is 
geworden door de toenemende internationale concurrentie als gevolg van het 
proces van economische globalisering.  
Het onderzoek laat ook overeenkomsten zien. Ten eerste, dat een 
werknemer in Amerika net zo afhankelijk is van zijn werkgever als een 
werknemer van zijn werkgever in Nederland. Het onderzoek toont aan dat de 
mate van ontslagbescherming met name wordt bepaald door de economische of 
sociale invalshoek van degenen die ‘recht maken’. Ten tweede, waar het proces 
van economische globalisering Amerikaanse rechters vanaf de tachtiger jaren 
noodzaakt om de arbeidsverhouding te benaderen vanuit een sociaal oogpunt, 
noodzaakt het de Nederlandse regering om de arbeidsverhouding te benaderen 
vanuit een economisch oogpunt. In Amerika heeft dit geleid tot meer zekerheid 
voor werknemers tegen een willekeurig ontslag in het algemeen, om zodoende 
tegenwicht te bieden tegen misbruik van werknemers door machtige werkgevers 
waaronder multinationals. In Nederland heeft dit geleid tot meer flexibiliteit 
voor werkgevers c.q. een versoepeling van het ontslagrecht teneinde werkgevers 
in staat te stellen beter in te kunnen spelen op ontwikkelingen in de markt om 
hun internationale concurrentiepositie te verstevigen. Het proces van 
economische globalisering heeft Amerika en Nederland met andere woorden 
gedwongen tot het zoeken naar een nieuwe balans tussen flexibel ontslagrecht 
voor werkgevers enerzijds, en ontslagbescherming voor werknemers anderzijds. 
De strijd tussen de tegenovergestelde belangen van werkgevers en werknemers 
leveren echter knelpunten op, waardoor het debat in Amerika zich toespitst op 
ontslagbescherming voor werknemers enerzijds, en behoud van de at-will rule
voor werkgevers anderzijds. In Nederland spitst het debat zich toe op een 
flexibeler ontslagrecht voor werkgevers enerzijds, en het behoud van het duale 
ontslagstelsel voor werknemers anderzijds. De vergelijking laat zien dat 
Amerika en Nederland van elkaar kunnen leren ten aanzien van het oplossen van 
voornoemde knelpunten. 
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CONCLUSIES EN AANBEVELINGEN (hoofdstuk 6) 
Amerika
Ten aanzien van Amerika ben ik tot de conclusie gekomen dat een minderheid 
van werknemers bescherming tegen een willekeurig ontslag in het algemeen 
geniet, en dat op de meerderheid van werknemers feitelijk nog steeds de at-will 
rule van toepassing is. Deze regel heeft zich ontwikkeld in de rechtspraak. Dit 
behelst dat een just cause rule zich tevens kan ontwikkelen in de rechtspraak. 
Rechters hebben in feite reeds vanaf eind jaren zeventig, en begin jaren tachtig, 
uitzonderingen gemaakt op de at-will rule. Zoals het ernaar uitziet zal het 
initiatief ook van rechters uit blijven gaan, hetgeen voor een belangrijk deel te 
verklaren is door het zogeheten common law system van Amerika. Dit laat 
onverlet dat de nationale wetgever in beginsel eveneens kan handelen. Nationale 
wetgeving die de at-will rule opzij zet is echter niet te verwachten, vanwege de 
politieke macht van werkgevers en advocaten die in staat zijn deze wetgeving 
tegen te houden. De ontwikkeling van just cause protection ligt dan ook 
vooralsnog in handen van Amerikaanse rechters. Uit rechtspraak volgt dat de 
meeste Amerikaanse rechters de arbeidsovereenkomst als een overeenkomst als 
elke andere beschouwen, en dientengevolge algemene regels van het 
contractenrecht op de arbeidsovereenkomst toepassen. Dit leidt tot knelpunten. 
Zo blijkt het mogelijk op grond van deze algemene regels van het 
contractenrecht een redelijke grond voor ontslag contractueel uit te sluiten, komt 
aan de werkgever een ruime discretionaire bevoegdheid toe om werknemers te 
ontslaan in bedrijfseconomische ontslagen, en rust de bewijslast voor het 
ontbreken van een redelijke grond voor ontslag op de werknemer. Een ander 
knelpunt is dat lager opgeleiden in de praktijk veelal ontslagbescherming 
ontberen vanwege het zogeheten contingency fee system van advocaten. Op 
grond van dit systeem – waarbij advocaten een percentage van de vergoeding 
bedingen – is het voor advocaten slechts aantrekkelijk zaken aan te nemen die 
kunnen resulteren in zeer hoge vergoedingen. De handbook exception en de 
implied-in-fact (good cause) contract exceptions leiden ‘slechts’ tot contract 
damages.   
 Mijn suggesties om voornoemde knelpunten op te lossen zijn de 
volgende. In de eerste plaats zou Amerika gesubsidieerde rechtshulp gelijk als in 
Nederland kunnen invoeren. Deze komt erop neer dat werknemers slechts een 
deel van de advocatenkosten betalen en de advocaat de overige kosten kan 
verhalen op de staat. Dit stelt werknemers met zogeheten contract claims in 
staat zich te laten bijstaan door een advocaat op uurbasis. Een zogeheten Wet op 
de Rechtsbijstand zal het echter naar alle waarschijnlijkheid niet halen in 
Amerika vanwege de politieke macht van advocaten om een dergelijk 
wetsvoorstel tegen te houden. Zoals hiervoor opgemerkt, zijn zij tezamen met 
werkgevers ook in staat om national just cause legislation tegen te houden. Het 
is met andere woorden aan Amerikaanse rechters om een just cause rule te 
ontwikkelen. Een aanvang door rechters kan worden gemaakt door, gelijk als in 
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Nederland is geschied, het bijzondere karakter van de arbeidsovereenkomst ter 
discussie te stellen. Een realistischer optie op korte termijn is de Drafters van de 
Restatement of Employment Law te adresseren. Kort samengevat zijn zij vanaf 
2005 doende om uitzonderingen op de at-will rule vast te leggen als leidraad 
voor rechters in de toekomst. Tot op heden hebben zij de public policy exception
en de handbook exception erkend als uitzonderingen op de at-will rule. Mijn 
suggestie is hen onder meer door publicaties te bewegen tevens de implied-in-
fact (good cause) contract exception te erkennen die nog steeds goed recht is in 
Californië en in een aantal andere staten, en te erkennen dat de handbook 
exception niet langer contractueel door een at-will disclaimer kan worden 
uitgesloten. De Restatement of Employment Law zou in dit opzicht dienen te 
behelzen dat voor een wijziging van de eis van een redelijke grond voor ontslag 
uit hoofde van de handbook exception de werkgever instemming behoeft van de 
werknemer overeenkomstig de algemene regels van het contractenrecht, zoals 
ook wordt betoogd door een aantal staten en wetenschappers in Amerika.  
Nederland 
Ten aanzien van Nederland ben ik tot de conclusie gekomen dat de wetgever een 
belangrijke rol speelt om werknemers bescherming te bieden tegen een 
willekeurig ontslag in het algemeen. Dit is voor een deel te verklaren door het 
zogeheten civil law system van Nederland. Dit systeem verwacht in beginsel van 
rechters dat zij de wet consistent toepast. Voorzover rechters dit niet doen, 
ondermijnen zij in beginsel de mate van de bescherming die de wetgever beoogt 
werknemers te bieden. Anderzijds kan het ook een signaal naar de wetgever toe 
zijn dat deze regels wijziging behoeven. Ook met de Wet Flexibiliteit en 
zekerheid van 1998 reageerde de overheid, gedeeltelijk op rechtspraak, 
gedeeltelijk op het proces van economische globalisering dat de noodzaak van 
een flexibel ontslagrecht onderstreepte. Het proces van economische 
globalisering heeft de overheid in 2005 wederom de noodzaak van een 
soepel(er) ontslagrecht doen onderkennen. De centrale vraag voor de overheid is 
dan ook niet of een soepeler ontslagrecht noodzakelijk is, maar hoe zij dit moet 
bewerkstelligen. In dit kader is meerdere malen vanuit overheidswege, en in de 
literatuur, de suggestie gedaan het vergunningenstelsel van het BBA 1945 af te 
schaffen.
Ik heb bij de afschaffing van het BBA 1945 erop gewezen dat men niet 
uit het oog moet verliezen dat werknemers die onder de werkingssfeer van het 
BBA 1945 vallen, maar niet onder het bereik van Boek 7 Titel 10 BW, bij 
afschaffing van het BBA 1945 bescherming tegen een willekeurig ontslag zullen 
ontberen. Voorts heb ik erop gewezen dat bij het uiten van de wens voor een 
flexibeler ontslagrecht, men te snel voorbij gaat aan het feit dat het BBA 1945, 
het Ontslagbesluit en de Beleidsregels Ontslagtaak CWI duidelijke regels 
bevatten teneinde bescherming tegen een willekeurig ontslag in het algemeen te 
waarborgen. Dit in tegenstelling tot artikel 7:685 BW en/of de 
Kantonrechtersformule. Het feit dat het CWI deze regels stringent hanteert zou 
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geen negatieve beoordeling behoren te krijgen, maar een positieve met het oog 
op rechtszekerheid en rechtsgelijkheid. Aan de andere kant, de negatieve 
beoordeling door werkgevers en rechters is een teken voor de overheid dat deze 
regels wellicht te rigide zijn. Dit betekent – zoals ook inmiddels door de 
overheid erkend – dat de overheid moet handelen. Dit betekent niet dat de 
overheid het BBA 1945 moet afschaffen. In feite, wanneer men zich te veel richt 
op de afschaffing van het BBA 1945, werkt dit eerder polarisering tussen 
werkgevers en werknemers in de hand dan dat partijen in staat zullen zijn een 
compromis te bereiken, hetgeen door de overheid noodzakelijk wordt geacht om 
in te kunnen spelen op het proces van economische globalisering.  
Ik concludeer na een beschrijving van het Nederlandse ontslagrecht in hoofdstuk 
3, dat onder het huidige duale ontslagstelsel het CWI en de Kantonrechter over 
dezelfde gronden voor ontslag beslissen. Uit rechtspraak volgt dat 
Kantonrechters ertoe neigen bij het ontbreken van een gewichtige reden, om een 
vergoeding toe te kennen, in plaats van het verzoek af te wijzen. Het CWI wijst 
in beginsel het verzoek bij het ontbreken van een redelijke grond voor ontslag 
af. Deze verschillende behandeling leidt tot rechtsonzekerheid en 
rechtsongelijkheid voor werknemers.  
In een bezinning over het huidige ontslagstelsel richt ik mij dan ook in 
de eerste plaats op de vraag hoe deze rechtsonzekerheid en rechtsongelijkheid 
kan worden opgeheven, waarbij ik mij steeds afvraag in welk opzicht het CWI 
en de Kantonrechter hieraan kunnen bijdragen. In de laatste, maar niet in de 
minste plaats richt ik mij op de vraag op welke wijze een nieuwe balans kan 
worden bereikt tussen een flexibel(er) ontslagrecht voor werkgevers enerzijds, 
en ontslagbescherming voor werknemers anderzijds. Kort samengevat pleit ik 
ervoor om het duale ontslagstelsel te behouden, en de taken tussen het CWI en 
Kantonrechters te verdelen. Het CWI wordt uitsluitend bevoegd om over 
bedrijfseconomische ontslagen te oordelen, Kantonrechters worden uitsluitend 
bevoegd om over alle andere ontslagen te oordelen. In tien aanbevelingen werk 
ik vervolgens uit hoe dit nieuwe ontslagstelsel flexibeler moet worden voor 
werkgevers en werknemers enerzijds, met behoud van het vereiste van een 
redelijke grond voor ontslag anderzijds. 
CWI: bedrijfseconomische ontslagen 
1.
Mijn suggestie is het CWI te laten oordelen over individuele en collectieve 
ontslagen op grond van economische gronden, nader gespecificeerd in de 
Beleidsregels Ontslagtaak CWI.  Reeds uit de rechtspraak vloeit voort dat 
werkgevers in de regel het CWI adiëren met betrekking tot bedrijfseconomische 
ontslagen, en Kantonrechters het CWI de geëigende instantie achten om te 
oordelen over bedrijfseconomische ontslagen. Mijn eerste aanbeveling luidt dan 
ook om in de Wet Melding Collectief Ontslag (WMCO) het CWI exclusieve 
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bevoegdheid toe te kennen met betrekking tot collectieve ontslagen in de zin van 
deze wet.  
2.
Mijn tweede aanbeveling is een logisch gevolg van de tweede, en luidt om 
artikel 3:1 van het Ontslagbesluit en artikel 7:685 BW te wijzigen in dier voege 
dat het CWI en Kantonrechters slechts bevoegd zijn te oordelen over 
bedrijfseconomische ontslagen, respectievelijk een gewichtige reden, 
bedrijfseconomische gronden uitgesloten.  
De ratio van deze aanbevelingen is de volgende. Vooralsnog laat het WMCO 
een werkgever de keuze om ten aanzien van collectieve ontslagen van 20 of 
meer werknemers in een en hetzelfde CWI-district, te kiezen of hij zich richt tot 
het WMCO of de Kantonrechter. In de praktijk wordt steeds vaker gebruik 
gemaakt van de Kantonrechter omdat deze andere – flexibeler – criteria voor 
ontslag toelaat dan voorgeschreven door het Ontslagbesluit, waaronder een 
selectie van werknemers in bedrijfseconomische ontslagen op grond van 
kwaliteit.  
Het onderzoek laat zien dat Kantonrechters niet eensgezind zijn over 
hun bevoegdheid ten aanzien van collectieve ontslagen. Dit leidt tot grote 
rechtsonzekerheid en rechtsongelijkheid voor werknemers en werkgevers. De 
hiervoor genoemde aanbevelingen voorkomen dat  verschillende instanties over 
dezelfde ontslaggrond oordelen, en heffen tevens genoemde rechtsonzekerheid 
en rechtsongelijkheid op. 
3.
Een gevolg van voornoemde verdeling van taken tussen het CWI en 
Kantonrechters is dat werkgevers bij collectieve ontslagen niet langer kunnen 
selecteren op grond van kwaliteit. Het Ontslagbesluit kent slechts een selectie in 
bedrijfseconomische ontslagen op grond van het afspiegelingsbeginsel. 
Anderzijds, de Minister van Sociale Zaken heeft in het recente verleden 
voorgesteld partijen in WMCO-ontslagen de ruimte te laten om eigen 
ontslagcriteria te ontwikkelen. Deze behoefte bestaat ook in de praktijk, met 
name de behoefte om te kunnen selecteren op grond van kwaliteit, hetgeen door 
de Kantonrechter reeds toegestaan wordt. Vorenstaande ontwikkelingen lijken 
een duidelijk signaal naar de wetgever toe dat de regels omtrent de selectie van 
werknemers in bedrijfseconomische ontslagen nadere wijziging behoeven.  
Mijn derde aanbeveling luidt daarom om het kwaliteitscriterium voor 
WMCO-ontslagen op te nemen in het Ontslagbesluit. Om misbruik van dit 
criterium tegen te gaan betoog ik dat het – gelijk het afspiegelingsbeginsel en 
voorheen het anciënniteitsbeginsel – moet voldoen aan de eisen van 
redelijkheid, objectiviteit en controleerbaarheid, overeenkomstig de rechtspraak 
van Kantonrechters. Met betrekking tot de redelijkheid stel ik een marginale 
toets voor. Met betrekking tot de objectiviteit en controleerbaarheid stel ik een 
verplichte scholingsplicht voor – eveneens neer te leggen in het Ontslagbesluit – 
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voor werkgevers  ten aanzien van werknemers die in beginsel als gevolg van het 
kwaliteitscriterium moeten afvloeien.  
4.
Gekoppeld aan de derde aanbeveling, luidt mijn vierde aanbeveling om 
werkgevers vervolgens een keuze te laten tussen het afspiegelingsbeginsel en het 
anciënniteitsbeginsel al dan niet in combinatie met het ‘nieuwe’ 
kwaliteitscriterium in WMCO-ontslagen. De ratio van dit voorstel is dat het 
werkgevers in WMCO-ontslagen meer flexibiliteit biedt enerzijds, en ten gunste 
is van zogeheten outsiders en newcomers anderzijds. Tevens gaat dit voorstel  
minder ver dan het voorstel van de Minister van Sociale Zaken in het recente 
verleden om partijen in WMCO-ontslagen ruimte te laten om eigen 
ontslagcriteria te ontwikkelen, en aan hen de supervisie te laten.  
Een bezwaar is dat de door mij voorgestane flexibiliteit mogelijk ten 
koste gaat van oudere werknemers. Vooropgesteld, ook het 
afspiegelingsbeginsel – dat sinds 1 maart 2006 het uitgangspunt is in 
bedrijfseconomische ontslagen – leidt in de praktijk tot meer ontslagen van 
oudere werknemers. Echter, een verplichte scholingsplicht voor werkgevers ten 
aanzien van werknemers die in beginsel als gevolg van het kwaliteitscriterium 
afvloeien, conform mijn derde aanbeveling, kan het ontslag van (oudere) 
werknemers gedeeltelijk voorkomen. Voorts wijs ik erop dat het uitgangspunt 
op de middellange termijn conform het SER MLT-Advies deel 1 is om 
participatie in het arbeidsproces van allen in de samenleving te bewerkstelligen. 
5.
Mijn vijfde aanbeveling is feitelijk een aanvulling op de scholingsplicht, in de 
zin dat ook deze aanbeveling in de praktijk naar alle waarschijnlijkheid ten 
goede zal komen aan oudere werknemers. Deze luidt dat werkgevers verplicht 
worden de dienstjaren van werknemers bij bedrijfseconomische ontslagen te 
compenseren, primair tot uiting komend in een vergoeding, en subsidiair in 
outplacement. De ratio hierachter is dat van werknemers bij het merendeel van  
bedrijfseconomische ontslagen feitelijk verlangd wordt baan te maken voor 
anderen opdat de werkgever in staat zal zijn de internationale concurrentie het 
hoofd te bieden. Zonder deze werknemers had de werkgever echter niet kunnen 
overleven. Compensatie van dienstjaren bij bedrijfseconomische ontslagen is 
ook gerechtvaardigd om de volgende reden. Kantonrechters kennen bij neutrale 
ontbindingen aan werknemers in beginsel een vergoeding toe waarbij rekening 
wordt gehouden met het aantal dienstjaren. Bij de door mij voorgestane 
herverdeling van taken tussen het CWI (bedrijfseconomische ontslagen) en 
Kantonrechters (overige ontslagen) valt dit ‘recht’ voor werknemers feitelijk 
weg.  
De verplichting van compensatie van dienstjaren zou wat mij betreft tot 
uiting kunnen komen in de Beleidsregels Ontslagtaak CWI. Het niet nakomen 
van deze plicht kan niet tot afwijzing van een verzoek door het CWI leiden 
wanneer sprake is van een redelijke grond voor ontslag. Het CWI kan 
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daarentegen zijn twijfel over een geldig ‘habe-nichts’-verweer in de vergunning 
kenbaar maken en de werknemer hiermee een handvat aan kunnen reiken om 
een vergoeding ex artikel 7:681 BW, waarbij alsnog rekening wordt gehouden 
met de dienstjaren, te vorderen. 
Kantonrechter: overige ontslagen  
6.
Vorenstaande aanbevelingen brengen met zich dat Kantonrechters exclusief 
bevoegd zullen zijn om te oordelen over ontslagen, met uitsluiting van 
bedrijfseconomische. De Kantonrechtersformule bevat ten aanzien van (deze) 
ontslagen echter geen duidelijke regels. De Beleidsregels Ontslagtoets CWI 
bevatten deze wel.  
Mijn zesde aanbeveling luidt met het oog op rechtszekerheid en 
rechtsgelijkheid dat derhalve de Kring van Kantonrechters een 
Kantonrechtersformule voor de Toepassing van de Gewichtige Reden
ontwikkelt, waarbij de Beleidsregels Ontslagtaak CWI als leidraad kunnen 
dienen. Voor het aanhaken bij de Beleidsregels Ontslagtaak CWI bestaat geen 
juridisch obstakel. Met name ten aanzien van ontbindingen op grond van de 
verstoorde arbeidsrelatie zijn duidelijke regels nodig. Overeenkomstig de 
bedoeling van de wetgever zou een ontbinding bij een verstoorde arbeidsrelatie 
alleen mogelijk moeten zijn wanneer de verstoorde arbeidsrelatie het opereren 
van de onderneming ernstig frustreert c.q. herplaatsing onmogelijk is. Nog 
steeds komt het echter voor dat  Kantonrechters de arbeidsovereenkomst 
ontbinden met toekenning van een vergoeding. Veelal is de reden dat in de 
praktijk na een afwijzing van het verzoek partijen alsnog voor het gerecht 
verschijnen vanwege de vertroebelde verstandshouding. Kantonrechters maken 
tevens geen onderscheid tussen een verstoorde arbeidsrelatie die wel, en die niet 
aan de werknemer te wijten is. Aan een niet aan de werknemer te wijten 
verstoorde arbeidsrelatie kan echter een non-existente reden ten grondslag 
liggen. Dit laatste is van belang, omdat de wet niet toestaat dat bij de 
afwezigheid van een – gewichtige – reden voor ontslag, de Kantonrechter de 
arbeidsovereenkomst ontbindt.  
7.
Voornoemde praktijk van Kantonrechters is een signaal dat meer flexibiliteit ten 
aanzien van de regels omtrent ontslag is gewenst. Mijn zevende aanbeveling 
luidt daarom om artikel 7:685 BW in die zin te wijzigen dat het de 
Kantonrechter mogelijk wordt gemaakt om bij het ontbreken van een gewichtige 
reden de werknemer een keuze te laten tussen de voortduring van de 
arbeidsovereenkomst of afkoop van ontslagbescherming tegen een vergoeding, 
waarbij factor C de hoogte gaat bepalen. De werkgever heeft daarop de keuze 
het verzoek in te trekken als het kostenplaatje voor hem te hoog uitvalt. Deze 
flexibiliteit komt de werknemer ten goede. De laatste kan baat hebben bij een 
verandering van zijn baan. Ook komt deze flexibiliteit ten goede aan outsiders 
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en newcomers, die bij ‘afkoop’ de mogelijkheid hebben in te stromen in het 
arbeidsproces. Deze flexibiliteit kom werkgevers ten goede, omdat zij – tegen 
betaling – ontslagbescherming kunnen afkopen. Het nadeel is dat de 
ontbindingsvergoedingen reeds vrij hoog liggen in Nederland. 
8.
Ten aanzien van het laatste luidt mijn achtste aanbeveling daarom om duidelijke 
regels te stellen voor de – hoogte van de – afkoopsom neer te leggen in de 
Kantonrechtersformule voor de Toepassing van de Gewichtige Reden, en de 
factor leeftijd  uit de Kantonrechtersformule te lichten. Kort samengevat, de 
factor A (aantal dienstjaren) in de formule AxBxC betreffen ‘gewogen’ jaren. 
Dienstjaren voor het 40e levensjaar tellen voor 1, van het 40e tot 50e jaar voor 
1,5 en elk dienstjaar vanaf het 50e levensjaar telt voor 2. De redenen om de 
‘gewogen’ dienstjaren om te zetten in dienstjaren ‘sec’ zijn tweeërlei.  
In de eerste plaats hebben de ‘gewogen’ dienstjaren tot gevolg dat het 
voor werkgevers onaantrekkelijk is om oudere werknemers in dienst te houden 
of te nemen. Hiermee doet de Kantonrechtersformule de facto teniet wat de 
overheid met maatregelen tot behoud, investering en aanname van oudere 
werknemers beoogt te bewerkstelligen. In de tweede plaats is de 
Kantonrechtersformule mijns inziens in strijd met de Wet gelijke behandeling op 
grond van leeftijd. De aanname is dat oudere werknemers moeilijk aan het werk 
komen, en dus  (meer) inkomenszekerheid behoeven. Voor een objectieve 
rechtvaardiging voor discriminatie gelden evenwel de eisen van legitimiteit, 
doelmatigheid en proportionaliteit. Dit houdt in dat (1) de ter bereiking van het 
doel gekozen middelen dienen te beantwoorden aan een werkelijke behoefte 
(legitimiteit); (2) geschikt moeten zijn om dat doel te bereiken (doelmatigheid); 
en (3) en hiervoor noodzakelijk moeten zijn (proportionaliteit). Men kan zich 
echter afvragen of (ad 1) de aanname dat ouderen moeilijker aan het werk 
komen geldt voor alle werknemers; (ad 2) het doel wordt bereikt wanneer een 
36-jarige (oude) werknemer met 15 dienstjaren factor 15 krijgt toegekend, en 
een 59-jarige (oude) werknemer met 10 dienstjaren (9x2) + (1x1.5) = 19.5 krijgt 
toegekend; en (3) de noodzaak bestaat wanneer factor C het mogelijk maakt 
rekening te houden met de omstandigheden van het geval, waaronder de  positie 
van de (oudere) werknemer op de arbeidsmarkt. 
9.
Mijn negende aanbeveling ziet eveneens op een ontbinding van de 
arbeidsovereenkomst zonder dat sprake is van een gewichtige reden. Ik doel op 
de door de werkgever ingediende voorwaardelijke verzoeken op grond van een 
dringende reden. Deze worden veelal toegekend onder toekenning van een 
vergoeding, terwijl feitelijk een (dringende) reden ontbreekt. De nieuwe 
Kantonrechtersformule voor de Toepassing van de Gewichtige Reden zou 
moeten voorschrijven dat op deze verzoeken consistent de rechtspraak omtrent 
een ontslag op staande voet moet worden toegepast, en bij afwezigheid van een 
dringende reden deze verzoeken moeten worden afgewezen, tenzij de 
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werknemer en werkgever akkoord gaan met afkoop van ontslagbescherming 
overeenkomstig mijn zevende aanbeveling. 
10.
Mijn tiende aanbeveling, ten slotte, ziet op hen die onder het bereik van de BBA 
1945 vallen maar geen arbeidsovereenkomst hebben. Bij de door mij 
voorgestane verdeling van taken tussen het CWI en de Kantonrechter ontberen 
zij bescherming tegen een willekeurig ontslag op grond van een andere reden 
dan een bedrijfseconomische. Waar zij voorheen deze bescherming voorheen 
genoten, luidt mijn aanbeveling dat zij, uit hoofde van een nieuwe bepaling in 
Boek 7 Titel 10 BW, bescherming tegen een willekeurig ontslag ex artikel 7:685 
BW genieten. 
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APPENDIX I
BRIEF REVIEW ON DISMISSAL LAWS IN THE WORLD 
Introduction
The aim of this survey is to give a brief overview of dismissal laws in the world as regards 
just cause protection of countries involved in the process of economic globalization. That is, 
that time does not allow me to concentrate on all states on the one hand, and the interest of 
this thesis is on the process of economic globalization on the other. Hence, I have used the 
World Investment Report (WIR) of 2003 of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD)1 as a starting point. In the WIR, the UNCTAD carries an analysis 
of the trends in foreign direct investment (FDI) in both developed and developing countries, 
ranking the largest transnational corporations (TNCs) in the world by its foreign assets. 
Subsequently, I will make a distinction between the regional groups of: (a) Africa; (b) 
America; (c) the Arab States; (d) Asia, and; (e) Europe. 
Africa
Countries in the continent of Africa have shown little progress in their effort to penetrate the 
world market. Especially the so-called sub-Saharan African countries, including Cameroon, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe have shown little progress, 
mainly in view of their low rate of export of manufactured goods that is believed to support 
sustained overall growth.2 One of the explanations given for their low rate is that these 
countries have extensive natural resources on the one hand, but a poorly educated labour force 
on the other hand.3 As a result these – and other – sub-Saharan countries are not involved in 
the process of globalization. An exception is South Africa that differs from these countries in 
a way that its economy operates at a higher level of industrialization, it holds a democratically 
elected government – which makes it a more stable country for foreign direct investments -, 
and last but not least, views at education and job training and/or occupational retraining as a 
key determinant of long-term economic performance, as a result of which it plays a – more - 
pronounced role in the global economy as compared to the rest of the continent.4 With regard 
to offering protection to individual private sector employees, South Africa applies ILO 
Convention 158, without (yet) having ratified the Convention. The just cause protection for 
individual employees can be found in the Labour Relations Act of 1995. It, in sum, 
determines that the employer needs a fair reason for a discharge. When an employer dismisses 
an employee on a discriminatory ground this is automatically unfair even if there were other 
good reasons for the dismissal.5
America 
The United States (of America) and its neighbor Canada are important countries in the 
process of globalization. They both belong to world’s top 30 foreign direct investment (FDI) 
recipients. The United States further hosts the largest transnational corporations in the world 
1  The UNCTAD was established in 1964 and is aimed at promoting the development-friendly 
integration of developing countries into the world economy. See www.unctad.org 
2  Mazumdar and Mazaheri 2003, p. 3. See also ILO World Employment Report 1995-1996. 
3  Mazumdar and Mazaheri 2003, p. 349 and 356. 
4  Mannah 2001, p. 37. The main export product of South Africa is gold. Hayter, Reinecke and Torres 
2001, p. 39. 
5  International Labor and Employment Laws, Keller (ed.),Vol. I, 1997, Chapter 33, South Africa, 
Christopher Alberteyn, p. 9 and 10 and 16; International encyclopaedia for labour law and industrial 
relations, Blanpain (ed.), Volume 12, South Africa, J. Piron and P.A.K. le Roux. See also Hayter, 
Reinecke and Torres 2001, p. 79. 
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such as General Electric, Exxon Mobil Corporation, Ford Motor Company and General 
Motors.6 In fact, the majority of multinationals - ranked in the top ten in 2001 - are American, 
and for this reason, the United States is referred to as the wealthiest nation in the world.7
Historically, it further played an important role in international trade when in 1947 it invited 
nineteen countries to negotiate bilateral trade agreements that became the multilateral General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), operative in 1948, meanwhile, known as the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).8 As regards employment termination the United States adheres to 
the at-will rule, which in general means that employer can dismiss an employee without 
cause. Under common law this rule has been interpreted in a way, however, that an employer 
can dismiss an employee for a good reason, no reason or a bad reason.9 Although statutory 
and common law has eroded the pure concept, the ILO International Labour Office correctly 
states that, notwithstanding, the at-will rule in the United States ‘(…) is still predominant, 
particularly when one compares it to employment security law in other Western and 
developed countries.’10 In contrast, in Canada, termination of employment must be justified 
by a valid reason. That is, that the employer may dismiss an employee for cause without 
notice. Under case law just cause, for example, includes unauthorized absences, theft, 
fighting, disobeying orders, drug use in the workplace and incompetence or negligence in the 
performance of work.11
In Latin America, the Southern part of the continent, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and 
Venezuela play an important role in the process of globalization, although there was a fall of 
foreign direct investments (FDI) at the beginning of the 21st century, due to economic and 
political uncertainties.12 As regards employment termination, the majority of countries in 
Latin America require a just cause for dismissal.13  Mexico was the first to recognize in its 
Constitution of 1917 that workers should not be dismissed without justification. Other 
countries in Latin America from the 1920s on started to incorporate this principle in their laws 
as well.14 Influenced by the Termination of Employment Recommendation 119 that was 
adopted by the ILO International Labour Conference in 1963, countries further adapted their 
labour legislation as regards employment termination. Most of these Latin American countries 
were also founding members of the ILO.15 Under Mexican law, if an employee is dismissed 
without a valid reason, the termination is void, hence, the employee can ask for 
6  It concerns multinationals that in 2001 all belonged in the top ten of foreign assets. WIR 2003, p. 4 
and 5. 
7  WIR 2003, p. 5; Gould 2001, p. 3. 
8  The WTO succeeded the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades) in 1995. As of April 
2004, the WTO has 147 members, covering about 90 per cent of world trade. Among the still absent 
countries are China, Taiwan and the Russian Federation. See also Van Roozendaal 2001, p. 32; 
Validire 2001, p. 51and 52; Munck 2002, p. 128 and 129; Mandle 2003, p. 12. 
9  See below under § 15.2. 
10  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 355 and 356. See also International Labor and 
Employment Laws, Keller (ed.), Vol. I, 1997, Chapter 23, USA, Patrick Hardin; Zondag 2001, p. 
422-426; International encyclopaedia for labour law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 14, 
USA, Alvin L. Goldman and Rebecca H. White. 
11  International Labor and Employment Laws, Keller (ed.), Vol. I, 1997, Chapter 21, Roy L. Heenan 
and Thomas E.F. Brady, p. 7; Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 96; International 
encyclopaedia for labour law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 4, Canada, D.D. Carter, G. 
England, B. Etherington and G. Trudeau. 
12  WIR 2003, p. 3 and 9. 
13  Bronstein 1990, p. 599. 
14  Bronstein 1990, p. 593 and 594; Bronstein 1995, p. 164. 
15  Bronstein 1990, p. 596. 
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reinstatement.16 Under Argentina law that requires a just cause for dismissal as well, the 
employer must pay compensation if he acts contrary.17 Venezuela is the only country in Latin 
America that adopted ILO Convention 158. Other countries in Latin America – such as 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic - still adhere to the 
at-will rule (known as desahucio), on the sole condition that notice is given.18 Chile that 
adhered to the at-will rule, until 1990, abolished the concept of desahucio by the requirement 
of just cause.19 Brazil, finally, takes a unique position in a way that it has an Act establishing 
the Length-of-Service Guarantee Fund (LSGF) that requires neither notice nor justification for 
the dismissal. Under this mechanism, introduced in 1966, an employer is required to deposit 
each month in an escrow account opened for each employee a sum equal to 8 per cent of the 
remuneration paid to him or her during the preceding month. When the employment 
relationship is terminated, for whatever cause, the worker can draw the money deposited in 
the account.20 Moreover, by virtue of a constitutional provision, an Act promulgated in 1989, 
implicitly recognized the right of employees not to be dismissed without justification.21
Arab States
In the Middle East, the states of Israel and Saudi Arabia play a role in the process of 
globalization.22 Whereas Israel adheres to the at-will rule, it eroded somewhat by 
jurisprudence.23 The law of Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, determines that a discharge may 
be effectuated for a valid reason only. Good cause, for example, includes well-documented 
unsatisfactory performance or inadequate completion of an employer’s assignment.24
16  The same principle applies to Cuba, Panama and Peru. Bronstein 1990, p. 599. For Mexico, see 
Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 226 and 228; International Labor and Employment 
Laws, Keller (ed.), Vol. I, 1997, Chapter 22, Mexico, Nestor de Buen Lozano, Carlos de Buen Unna 
and Jorge F. Perez-Lopez; International encyclopaedia for labour law and industrial relations, 
Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 9, Mexico, Nestor de Buen. 
17  Bronstein 1990, Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 37; International Labor and 
Employment Laws, Keller (ed.), 2001, Vol. II, Chapter 27, Argentina, Jordan W. Cowman, Carlos A. 
Dodds and Jorge Daniel Orlansky; International encyclopaedia for labour law and industrial relations, 
Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 3, Argentina, Mario Ackerman and Adrian O. Goldin. The same principle 
applies to Columbia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Urugay. See Bronstein 1990, p. 599. 
18  Bronstein 1990, p. 599. 
19  For its remedy, see Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 103 and 104; International 
Labor and Employment Laws, Keller (ed.), 2001, Vol. II, Chapter 28, Chile, Jeffrey A. Van Detta, 
Diane L. Prucino, Charles M. Rice, Luis Perez-Eguiarte and Oscar Aitken; International 
encyclopaedia for labour law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 4, Chile, Emilio Morgado 
Valenzuela and Francisco Walker Errazuriz. 
20  Bronstein 1990, p. 599 footnote 14. 
21  Bronstein 1990, p. 599 and 600; Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 67, 69 and 70; 
International Labor and Employment Laws, Keller (ed.), 1997, Vol. I, Chapter 30, Brazil, W. Gary 
Vause; International encyclopaedia for labour law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 4, 
Brazil, A.F. Cesarino Junior and Marly A. Cardone. 
22  For Israel, see Shalev 1996, p. 143, 149 and 157. 
23  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 186; International Labor and Employment Laws, 
Keller (ed.), Vol. II, 2001, Chapter 38, Israel, Frances Raday; International labour law and industrial 
relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 8, Israel, R. Ben-Israel and H. Bar-Mor. 
24  International Labor and Employment Laws, Keller (ed.), Vol. II, 2001, Chapter 39, Saudi Arabia, 
Nabhan, p. 33. 
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Asia
In Asia, the process of globalization, led by Japan, delivered ‘winners’ such as Singapore, 
Hong Kong (part of China)25 and Korea, countries that have become known as the Asian 
Tigers, achieving phenomenally high growth rate by emphasizing exports during the 1970s.26
Also China, Indonesia and India became involved in the process of globalization. Important in 
this respect is that India changed from a socialist-orientated, centrally planned economy into a 
liberated economy in the late 1980s.27 In the beginning of the 21st century there was a fall of 
foreign direct investments (FDI). Notwithstanding, Asia still plays an important role in the 
process of globalization.28 As regards employment termination there is a number of countries 
that adhere to the at-will rule. The law in India, for example, starts from the premise that an 
employer has a right to terminate the services of an employee without a reason. For dismissals 
for misconduct, however, this right has been affected by legislative intervention. The reasons 
that justify a dismissal in this respect include (i) wilful insubordination or disobedience; (ii) 
theft or dishonesty; (iii) wilful damage or loss of employer’s property; (iv) bribery; (v) 
habitual lateness or absence; and (vi) striking unlawfully.29 Also Singapore adheres to the at-
will rule. The Employment Act of 1968, as amended, presumes employment is at will, 
although notice periods for termination are in effect. An employer may end an employment 
agreement without notice, however, if there is a wilful breach of a contract condition or the 
employer is willing to pay the employee a sum of money. Evidence of an express or implied 
contract can rebut the presumption of at will.30 In Japan, the Civil Code is based on the 
principle of freedom of termination as well. Under case law dismissals without justifiable 
cause, however, are held invalid as an abuse of the employer’s right of dismissal. If the cause 
referred to is not considered serious enough the dismissal will be held abusive.31 The at-will 
rule, thus, under case law is replaced by a just cause rule. The same applies to Malaysia where 
the relevant statutes do not set out a prohibition against unfair dismissal either, but like Japan, 
courts have developed a principle against dismissals based on just cause.32 In China, the new 
Labor Code that has become effective as per 1 January 1995, applying to both domestic 
enterprises and so-called FIES (Foreign Invested Enterprises). Under this Act an employee 
can be dismissed – with respect of a notice period - for limited reasons only.33 Thailand lists 
specific circumstances under which employment may be terminated as well. An employer 
may dismiss an employee who willfully disobeys or habitually neglects the lawful commands 
of his or her employer; absents himself or herself from service; is guilty of gross misconduct; 
25  See International encyclopaedia for labour law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 4, China, 
Chen, Ke and Vol. 7, Hong Kong, L. Nagy. 
26  Mandle 2003, p. 13. 
27  Scrase, Holden and Baum 2003, p. 5. 
28  WIR 2003, p. 9. 
29  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 172 and 173; International encyclopaedia for labour 
law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 7, India, Chandra Kumar Johri. 
30  International Labor and Employment Laws, Keller (ed.), Vol. II, 2001, Chapter 35, Singapore, Ellen 
L Lyons, p. 6, 7 and 9. See also Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 297. 
31  International encyclopaedia for labour law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 8, Japan, A. 
Hanami and Fumito Komiya; Heerma van Voss 1992, p. 441-448; International Labor and 
Employment Laws, Keller (ed.), Vol. I, 1997, Chapter 32, Japan, Tomio Fukui, p. 4 and 9-10; 
Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 199; Zondag 2001, p. 443 and 444. 
32  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 216; International encyclopaedia for labour law and 
industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 9, Malaysia, Ponniah Arudsothy. 
33  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 108; International Labor and Employment Laws, 
Keller (ed.), Vol. I, 1997, Chapter 33, China, Joe Ramirez, John H. Curley and Anne Stevenson-
Yang, p. 5 and 10; International encyclopaedia for labour law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), 
Vol. 4, China, Chen, Ke. 
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or, otherwise acts in a manner incompatible with the due and faithful discharge of his or her 
duties.34 A country that explicitly requires a just cause for a dismissal is South Korea. 
Generally, just cause is considered to include a lack of attitude, continuing unsatisfactory 
work, debilated disease, breach of the employment contract, egregiously unacceptable 
misconduct or misbehavior on the job, misrepresentation or previous school or work 
experience, an improper relationship with another employee or serious criminal violation.35
Indonesia takes a unique position in Asia. Indonesian law requires prior authorization of the 
government for termination of employment. An employer will obtain a permit only if it is 
clear that a discussion about the intention to terminate the employment agreement has taken 
place and that they failed to reach an agreement. Further, as regards a dismissal based on 
misconduct or poor performance, the requirement of three warnings applies.36 Australia and 
New Zealand, finally, play a role in the process of globalization. Australia adopted ILO 
Convention 158. New Zealand, too, requires that there must be a good reason for an employee 
to be dismissed at the employer’s initiative.37
Europe
Western European countries, long before 1990, played an important role in the process of 
globalization with the creation of – the predecessor of – the  European Union (EU).38 With the 
extension to other countries – among which southern, central and eastern European countries 
– all countries started to play a role in the process of globalization either adhering to the at-
will rule or the just cause rule.39 In Western Europe, the law in Austria, Belgium, Denmark 
and Switzerland, however, starts from the premise that an employer has a right to terminate 
the services of an employee at will. In Austria and Denmark this freedom is curtailed in case 
of summary dismissals for which a valid reason is required by specific occupational 
legislation.40 Belgium developed the doctrine of abusive dismissal. Under this doctrine, a 
distinction is made between blue and white-collar workers. A blue-collar worker who is 
dismissed for reasons unrelated to his conduct or ability or for economic reasons is qualified 
under case law as abusive, pursuant to which the employee is entitled to a six-month salary 
payment. A white-collar worker who proves that he is dismissed without cause can ask for 
34  International Labor and Employment Laws, Keller (ed.), Vol. II, 2001, Chapter 37, Taiwan, Lee and 
Lee, p. 12 and 14-15. See also Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 336 and 337. 
35  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 207 and 208; International Labor and Employment 
Laws, Keller (ed.), Vol. II, 2001, Chapter 36, South Korea, C.W. Hyun and Paul Cho, p. 15 and 18; 
International encyclopaedia for labour law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 12, South 
Korea, Chi Sun Kim. 
36  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 175-178. 
37  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 247 and 248; International encyclopaedia for labour 
law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 10, New Zealand, John M. Howells. 
38  The European Economic Community was established on March 25, 1957 in Rome. The change in 
name from European Economic Community into European Community took place with the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and the change in name from European Community to European Union 
took place with the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. See Kooijmans 2000, p. 209; Blanpain 2003, p. 41-
43.
39  Fouarge 2002, p. 3 and 4. 
40  For Austria, see Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 48; International encyclopaedia for 
labour law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 2, Austria, Rudolf Strasser. For Denmark, see 
International encyclopaedia for labour law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 5, Denmark, 
Per Jacobsen and Ole Hasselbalch. 
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even higher damages.41 Belgian courts, however, apply a marginal test in determining abuse, 
in that the latter is not assumed easily.42
In Switzerland, the employer who dismisses an employee without notice in the absence of a 
valid reason will have to compensate the employee with what he would have earned if the 
employment relationship had been terminated by observing the notice period.43 Countries that 
explicitly require a just cause for dismissal – besides the countries of Finland, Sweden, 
Luxembourg, France, Portugal and Spain that all adopted ILO Convention 15844 – are Italy 
and the United Kingdom. Italy deems any dismissal automatically unfair, unless it is for just 
cause or a justified reason. Just cause, according to case law, requires very grave conduct 
which, when evaluated both subjectively and objectively, constitutes a serious and 
irremediable breach of the contract of employment. Justified reason is defined as the obvious 
failure of the employee to fulfill contractual obligations; or, reasons inherent in the production 
process, the organization of work or the smooth running of the undertaking.45 Under the law 
of the United Kingdom employees are not to be dismissed unfairly. According to the 
Employment Rights Act an employer has to show that the reason for a dismissal was one of 
the five statutory fair reasons (i) capability of or lack of qualification of the employee for 
performance of work; (ii) employee’s conduct; (iii) employee’s job was redundant; (iv) 
continued employment would have meant that the employer or employee would have been 
breaking the law; or (v) there was some other substantial reason that justified a dismissal. The 
foregoing only applies to those employees with at least twelve months’ service. The latter 
does not apply to automatically unfair dismissals connected with a discriminatory reason.46
Germany also explicitly lists the reasons, which render dismissals lawful. These are reasons 
that relate to (i) the employee’s incapability; (ii) the employee’s misconduct; or (iii) 
redundancy, due to urgent operational reasons. On the other hand, if the cause of dismissal is 
for one of the reasons listed above, the dismissal is considered to be unlawful if the employee 
can be transferred to a comparable job immediately or after reasonable job training and/or 
occupational retraining.47 The Netherlands, finally, take a unique position in Europe – and in 
41  Blanpain en Vanachter 1993, p. 176 and 177; Industrial Labor and Employment Laws, Keller (ed.), 
Vol. I, 1997, Chapter 2, Belgium, Bevernage, p. 16, 17 and 20; Termination of employment digest, 
ILO 2000, p. 7 and 58; Hugo Sinzheimer Instituut Research 99/03, p. 31 and 32; Zondag 2001,  
p. 346-350; International encyclopaedia for labour law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 3, 
Belgium, R. Blanpain. 
42  Loonstra en Zondag 2000, p. 1274. 
43  Termination of employment digest, ILO, 2000, p. 322 and 324; International encyclopaedia for 
labour laws and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 13, Switzerland, Alexandre Berenstein and 
Pascal Mahon. 
44  For a discussion of French law, see Loonstra en Zondag 2000, p. 1275 and 1276. 
45  International Labor and Employment Laws, Vol. I, 1997, Chapter 5, Capua, p. 13 and 15; 
Termination of employment digest, ILO, 2000, p. 191; International encyclopaedia for labour law 
and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 8, Italy, T. Treu; Loonstra en Zondag 2000, p. 1276. 
46  Despite its division into England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, for the purposes of 
employment law it can be treated as one national jurisdiction. See International Labor and 
Employment Laws, Keller (ed), Vol. I, 1997, Chapter 7, United Kingdom, Henderson; HSI 1999/03, 
p. 66-71; Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 348; Zondag 2001, p. 399-403; 
International encyclopaedia for labour and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 6, Great Britain, 
Bob Hepple, Sandra Fredman, Glynis Truter; Loonstra en Zondag 2000, p. 1276 and 1277.  
47  Kuip 1993a, p. 291-346; International Labor and Employment Laws, Keller (ed.), Vol. I, 1997, 
Chapter 4, Germany, Leuchten, Solmssen and Dichter, p. 13-14;Termination of employment digest, 
ILO, 2000, p. 157; Loonstra en Zondag 2000, p. 1275; Zondag 2001, p. 379-382; International 
encyclopaedia for labour law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Germany, Manfred Weiss and 
Marlene Schmidt.  
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the world – to the extent it has a so-called dual just cause dismissal system, requiring that the 
employer who wishes to unilaterally terminate an employment agreement either needs consent 
of the government, or needs to address the District Court, Cantonal Section, to ask for 
dissolution of the employment agreement. In effect, both the government and the court will 
only grant a permit when there is a just cause for a dismissal.48 In Central and Eastern Europe 
– besides the countries that adopted ILO Convention 158, such as Latvia, Slovenia and 
Turkey – most countries that play an important role in the process require a just cause for 
dismissal.49 Termination of employment at the initiative of the employer may only be 
effective for a valid reason in Bulgaria,50 in Poland,51 and in the Russian Federation.52 Under 
the Bulgarian Labor Code valid reasons include (i) lateness; (ii) absenteeism; (iii) failure to 
fulfill the requirements of the job; (iv) non-compliance with safety standards; (v) damaging 
the employer’s property; and (vi) production of low-quality products.53 Under the Polish
Labor Code, these include (i) the breach of the employee’s duties; (ii) lack of required 
qualifications and skills; (iii) failure to perform a superior’s orders; (iv) negligence and/or 
carelessness in the performance of the employee’s duties; (v) absence from work without 
leave; (vi) loss of confidence in the employee; or (vii) violation of non-competititon 
obligations.54 The Russian Labor Code, on the other hand, includes a general principle against 
unfair dismissals.55 Moreover, like Czech Republican law, it qualifies a valid reason as a 
reason connected with the capacity or conduct of the employee, or based on the operational 
requirements of the undertaking.56 Hungarian law, in effect, requires the same, in that the 
reason for notice must be connected with conduct, ability or operations of the company.57
Overall, the majority of countries in the world, involved in the process of economic 
globalization, require a just cause for dismissal. Among developed industrialized countries, 
the United States take a unique position for the at-will rule, in effect, is still the basic rules 
undergirding the employment relationship. The Netherlands take a unique position, in that it 
48  Termination of employment digest, ILO, 2000, p. 243 and 244. International Labor and Employment 
Laws, Keller (ed), Vol. II, 2001, Chapter 9, The Netherlands, Van Arkel en Loonstra, p. 21, 22 and 
26; International encyclopaedia for labour law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 10, 
A.T.J.M. Jacobs. 
49  Turkey gained most from the development of globalization when between 1923 and 1980 it evolved 
from a predominantly agrarian economy into one of the most industrialized economies in Eastern 
Europe. Berik and Bilginsoy 1996, p. 37. 
50  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 76; International Labor and Employment Laws, 
Keller (ed.), Vol. II, 2001, Chapter 14, Bulgaria, W. Gary Vause and Kalina Sarmova. International 
encyclopaedia for labour law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 4, Bulgaria, Vassil 
Mrachkov. 
51  International Labor and Employment Laws, Keller (ed.), Vol. II, 2001, Chapter 17, Poland, Czopski 
2001, p. 18; International encyclopaedia for labour law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 
11, Poland, Maria Matey. 
52  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 287. 
53  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 76. 
54  Czopski 2001, p. 17.18. 
55  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 287. 
56  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 128; International Labor and Employment Laws, 
Keller (ed), Vol. II, 2001, Chapter 15, Czech Republic, Catherine Adams and Lubos Tichy; 
International encyclopaedia for labour law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 5, Czech 
Republic, M. Kalenska and Belina. 
57  Termination of employment digest, ILO 2000, p. 168; International Labor and Employment Laws, 
Keller (ed.), Vol. II, 2001, Chapter 16, Hungary, Catherina Adams, Agnes Diviny, Peter Demeny, 
Gergely Pakh, Katalin Hollo and Emese Koranyi, p. 23 and 24; International encyclopaedia for 
labour law and industrial relations, Blanpain (ed.), Vol. 7, Hungary, L. Nagy. 
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adheres to a so-called dual just cause dismissal system, in which a preventive review by the 
government or court on just cause takes place. 
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APPENDIX II
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE 
Convention 158
CONVENTION CONCERNING TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE 
INITIATIVE OF THE EMPLOYER 
The General Conference of the International Labour Organisation,  
Having been convened at Geneva by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, 
and having met in its Sixty-eighth Session on 2 June 1982, and  
Noting the existing international standards contained in the Termination of Employment 
Recommendation, 1963, and  
Noting that since the adoption of the Termination of Employment Recommendation, 1963, 
significant developments have occurred in the law and practice of many member States on the 
questions covered by that Recommendation, and  
Considering that these developments have made it appropriate to adopt new international 
standards on the subject, particularly having regard to the serious problems in this field 
resulting from the economic difficulties and technological changes experienced in recent 
years in many countries,  
Having decided upon the adoption of certain proposals with regard to termination of 
employment at the initiative of the employer, which is the fifth item on the agenda of the 
session, and  
Having determined that these proposals shall take the form of an international Convention;  
adopts this twenty-second day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and eighty-two 
the following Convention, which may be cited as the Termination of Employment 
Convention, 1982:
PART I. METHODS OF IMPLEMENTATION, SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS 
Article 1 
The provisions of this Convention shall, in so far as they are not otherwise made effective by 
means of collective agreements, arbitration awards or court decisions or in such other manner 
as may be consistent with national practice, be given effect by laws or regulations.  
Article 2 
1. This Convention applies to all branches of economic activity and to all employed persons.  
2. A Member may exclude the following categories of employed persons from all or some of 
the provisions of this Convention:  
(a) workers engaged under a contract of employment for a specified period of time or a 
specified task;  
(b) workers serving a period of probation or a qualifying period of employment, determined in 
advance and of reasonable duration;  
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(c) workers engaged on a casual basis for a short period.  
3. Adequate safeguards shall be provided against recourse to contracts of employment for a 
specified period of time the aim of which is to avoid the protection resulting from this 
Convention.
4. In so far as necessary, measures may be taken by the competent authority or through the 
appropriate machinery in a country, after consultation with the organizations of employers 
and workers concerned, where such exist, to exclude from the application of this Convention 
or certain provisions thereof categories of employed persons whose terms and conditions of 
employment are governed by special arrangements which as a whole provide protection that is 
at least equivalent to the protection afforded under the Convention.  
5. In so far as necessary, measures may be taken by the competent authority or through the 
appropriate machinery in a country, after consultation with the organizations of employers 
and workers concerned, where such exist, to exclude from the application of this Convention 
or certain provisions thereof other limited categories of employed persons in respect of which 
special problems of a substantial nature arise in the light of the particular conditions of 
employment of the workers concerned or the size or nature of the undertaking that employs 
them.
6. Each Member which ratifies this Convention shall list in the first report on the application 
of the Convention submitted under Article 22 of the Constitution of the International Labour 
Organisation any categories which may have been excluded in pursuance of paragraphs 4 and 
5 of this Article, giving the reasons for such exclusion, and shall state in subsequent reports 
the position of its law and practice regarding the categories excluded, and the extent to which 
effect has been given or is proposed to be given to the Convention in respect of such 
categories.  
Article 3 
For the purpose of this Convention the terms termination and termination of employment
mean termination of employment at the initiative of the employer.  
PART II. STANDARDS OF GENERAL APPLICATION 
DIVISION A. JUSTIFICATION FOR TERMINATION 
Article 4 
The employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for such 
termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational 
requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service.  
Article 5 
The following, inter alia, shall not constitute valid reasons for termination:  
(a) union membership or participation in union activities outside working hours or, with the 
consent of the employer, within working hours;  
(b) seeking office as, or acting or having acted in the capacity of, a workers' representative;  
(c) the filing of a complaint or the participation in proceedings against an employer involving 
alleged violation of laws or regulations or recourse to competent administrative authorities;  
(d) race, colour, sex, marital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political 
opinion, national extraction or social origin;  
(e) absence from work during maternity leave.  
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Article 6 
1. Temporary absence from work because of illness or injury shall not constitute a valid 
reason for termination.  
2. The definition of what constitutes temporary absence from work, the extent to which 
medical certification shall be required and possible limitations to the application of paragraph 
1 of this Article shall be determined in accordance with the methods of implementation 
referred to in Article 1 of this Convention.  
DIVISION B. PROCEDURE PRIOR TO OR AT THE TIME OF TERMINATION 
Article 7 
The employment of a worker shall not be terminated for reasons related to the worker's 
conduct or performance before he is provided an opportunity to defend himself against the 
allegations made, unless the employer cannot reasonably be expected to provide this 
opportunity.
DIVISION C. PROCEDURE OF APPEAL AGAINST TERMINATION 
Article 8 
1. A worker who considers that his employment has been unjustifiably terminated shall be 
entitled to appeal against that termination to an impartial body, such as a court, labour 
tribunal, arbitration committee or arbitrator.  
2. Where termination has been authorised by a competent authority the application of 
paragraph 1 of this Article may be varied according to national law and practice.  
3. A worker may be deemed to have waived his right to appeal against the termination of his 
employment if he has not exercised that right within a reasonable period of time after 
termination.  
Article 9 
1. The bodies referred to in Article 8 of this Convention shall be empowered to examine the 
reasons given for the termination and the other circumstances relating to the case and to 
render a decision on whether the termination was justified.  
2. In order for the worker not to have to bear alone the burden of proving that the termination 
was not justified, the methods of implementation referred to in Article 1 of this Convention 
shall provide for one or the other or both of the following possibilities:  
(a) the burden of proving the existence of a valid reason for the termination as defined in 
Article 4 of this Convention shall rest on the employer;  
(b) the bodies referred to in Article 8 of this Convention shall be empowered to reach a 
conclusion on the reason for the termination having regard to the evidence provided by the 
parties and according to procedures provided for by national law and practice.  
3. In cases of termination stated to be for reasons based on the operational requirements of the 
undertaking, establishment or service, the bodies referred to in Article 8 of this Convention 
shall be empowered to determine whether the termination was indeed for these reasons, but 
the extent to which they shall also be empowered to decide whether these reasons are 
sufficient to justify that termination shall be determined by the methods of implementation 
referred to in Article 1 of this Convention.  
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Article 10 
If the bodies referred to in Article 8 of this Convention find that termination is unjustified and 
if they are not empowered or do not find it practicable, in accordance with national law and 
practice, to declare the termination invalid and/or order or propose reinstatement of the 
worker, they shall be empowered to order payment of adequate compensation or such other 
relief as may be deemed appropriate.  
DIVISION D. PERIOD OF NOTICE 
Article 11 
A worker whose employment is to be terminated shall be entitled to a reasonable period of 
notice or compensation in lieu thereof, unless he is guilty of serious misconduct, that is, 
misconduct of such a nature that it would be unreasonable to require the employer to continue 
his employment during the notice period.  
DIVISION E. SEVERANCE ALLOWANCE AND OTHER INCOME PROTECTION 
Article 12 
1. A worker whose employment has been terminated shall be entitled, in accordance with 
national law and practice, to-  
(a) a severance allowance or other separation benefits, the amount of which shall be based 
inter alia on length of service and the level of wages, and paid directly by the employer or by 
a fund constituted by employers' contributions; or  
(b) benefits from unemployment insurance or assistance or other forms of social security, 
such as old-age or invalidity benefits, under the normal conditions to which such benefits are 
subject; or  
(c) a combination of such allowance and benefits.  
2. A worker who does not fulfil the qualifying conditions for unemployment insurance or 
assistance under a scheme of general scope need not be paid any allowance or benefit referred 
to in paragraph 1, subparagraph (a), of this Article solely because he is not receiving an 
unemployment benefit under paragraph 1, subparagraph (b).  
3. Provision may be made by the methods of implementation referred to in Article 1 of this 
Convention for loss of entitlement to the allowance or benefits referred to in paragraph 1, 
subparagraph (a), of this Article in the event of termination for serious misconduct.  
PART III. SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS CONCERNING TERMINATIONS OF 
EMPLOYMENT FOR ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL, STRUCTURAL OR 
SIMILAR REASONS 
DIVISION A. CONSULTATION OF WORKERS' REPRESENTATIVES 
Article 13 
1. When the employer contemplates terminations for reasons of an economic, technological, 
structural or similar nature, the employer shall:  
(a) provide the workers' representatives concerned in good time with relevant information, 
including the reasons for the terminations contemplated, the number and categories of 
workers likely to be affected and the period over which the terminations are intended to be 
carried out;  
437
(b) give, in accordance with national law and practice, the workers' representatives concerned, 
as early as possible, an opportunity for consultation on measures to be taken to avert or to 
minimise the terminations and measures to mitigate the adverse effects of any terminations on 
the workers concerned such as finding alternative employment.  
2. The applicability of paragraph 1 of this Article may be limited by the methods of 
implementation referred to in Article 1 of this Convention to cases in which the number of 
workers whose termination of employment is contemplated is at least a specified number or 
percentage of the workforce.  
3. For the purposes of this Article the term the workers' representatives concerned means the 
workers' representatives recognised as such by national law or practice, in conformity with the 
Workers' Representatives Convention, 1971.  
DIVISION B. NOTIFICATION TO THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY 
Article 14 
1. When the employer contemplates terminations for reasons of an economic, technological, 
structural or similar nature, he shall notify, in accordance with national law and practice, the 
competent authority thereof as early as possible, giving relevant information, including a 
written statement of the reasons for the terminations, the number and categories of workers 
likely to be affected and the period over which the terminations are intended to be carried out.  
2. National laws or regulations may limit the applicability of paragraph 1 of this Article to 
cases in which the number of workers whose termination of employment is contemplated is at 
least a specified number or percentage of the workforce.  
3. The employer shall notify the competent authority of the terminations referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article a minimum period of time before carrying out the terminations, 
such period to be specified by national laws or regulations.  
PART IV. FINAL PROVISIONS 
Article 15 
The formal ratifications of this Convention shall be communicated to the Director-General of 
the International Labour Office for registration.  
Article 16 
1. This Convention shall be binding only upon those Members of the International Labour 
Organisation whose ratifications have been registered with the Director-General.  
2. It shall come into force twelve months after the date on which the ratifications of two 
Members have been registered with the Director-General.  
3. Thereafter, this Convention shall come into force for any Member twelve months after the 
date on which its ratification has been registered.  
Article 17 
1. A Member which has ratified this Convention may denounce it after the expiration of ten 
years from the date on which the Convention first comes into force, by an act communicated 
to the Director-General of the International Labour Office for registration. Such denunciation 
shall not take effect until one year after the date on which it is registered.  
2. Each Member which has ratified this Convention and which does not, within the year 
following the expiration of the period of ten years mentioned in the preceding paragraph, 
exercise the right of denunciation provided for in this Article, will be bound for another 
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period of ten years and, thereafter, may denounce this Convention at the expiration of each 
period of ten years under the terms provided for in this Article.  
Article 18 
1. The Director-General of the International Labour Office shall notify all Members of the 
International Labour Organisation of the registration of all ratifications and denunciations 
communicated to him by the Members of the Organisation.  
2. When notifying the Members of the Organisation of the registration of the second 
ratification communicated to him, the Director-General shall draw the attention of the 
Members of the Organisation to the date upon which the Convention will come into force.  
Article 19 
The Director-General of the International Labour Office shall communicate to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of 
the United Nations full particulars of all ratifications and acts of denunciation registered by 
him in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Articles.  
Article 20 
At such times as it may consider necessary the Governing Body of the International Labour 
Office shall present to the General Conference a report on the working of this Convention and 
shall examine the desirability of placing on the agenda of the Conference the question of its 
revision in whole or in part.  
Article 21 
1. Should the Conference adopt a new Convention revising this Convention in whole or in 
part, then, unless the new Convention otherwise provides-  
(a) the ratification by a Member of the new revising Convention shall ipso jure involve the 
immediate denunciation of this Convention, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 17 
above, if and when the new revising Convention shall have come into force;  
(b) as from the date when the new revising Convention comes into force this Convention shall 
cease to be open to ratification by the Members.  
2. This Convention shall in any case remain in force in its actual form and content for those 
Members which have ratified it but have not ratified the revising Convention.  
Article 22 
The English and French versions of the text of this Convention are equally authoritative. 
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